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Ownership and management of defense industry enterprises affords the military power, 
autonomy, and a claim to economic rents. Why do some countries successfully transfer some 
or all of these enterprises from military to civilian ownership and management while others 
fail? This study stresses the joint role of the balances of coalitional and institutional strength 
between civilians and the armed forces. Civilian and military must surmount obstacles in 
order to translate their preferences into policy. They must find party and executive allies who 
can compete on their behalf to craft or defeat legislation that affects their interests, and they 
must create or develop bureaucratic agencies that can design policy efficiently and 
effectively. Coalition formation and institution creation become crucial, especially in 
fragmented polities. When civilians can forge a stronger legislative coalition and can create 
a defense industry bureaucracy that is stronger than the existing military bureaucracy, 
enterprises will be transferred; when the military can forge a stronger coalition and maintain 
a relatively stronger bureaucracy, reform will stall. Firms will be partially transferred when 
the civilian bureaucracy is stronger but the military coalition is stronger. How civilian and 
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military coalitions and institutions behave and interact and how they form, ossify, or fail to 
develop is assessed through a comparative analysis of Argentina (1983–1989), Argentina 
(1989–1997), Chile (1990–2018), Turkey (1983–2018), and Portugal (1976–2018). 
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  1 
Introduction 
 
  This is a study about civilians, soldiers, power relations, and defense industries in 
post-authoritarian Chile and Argentina. It accounts for why it is that democratic leaders 
who crafted policies transferring some or all of the military’s defense-industrial firms to 
civilian ownership and management either succeeded or failed at what they set out to do. 
Unlike other recent, similar studies that emphasize neoliberal ideology or duties to 
external actors or states, this study shifts the focus to key domestic relations of power 
that, depending upon their configuration, create a mix of constraints on and abilities 
available to a reform-minded civilian leader and an anti-reform military elite. 
In the fields of political economy and civil-military relations, power relations 
have faded from view as the political and economic transitions with which their study has 
often been associated become distant memories.1 If they are considered at all, power 
relations are often taken for granted2 or treated as brittle legacies of a bygone era.3 In this 
study, by contrast, relations of power take center stage, and the balance of power is 
                                                        
1 Joel S. Hellman, “Winners Take All: The Politics of Partial Reform in Postcommunist Transitions,” 
World Politics, 50, 2 (1998), 203–34; Stephan Haggard and Steven B. Webb, eds., Voting for Reform: 
Democracy, Political Liberalization, and Economic Adjustment (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1994); Felipe Agüero, Soldiers, Civilians, and Democracy: Post-Franco Spain in Comparative Perspective 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995). For a critique of the discipline of political science’s 
retreat from the study of power, see Terry M. Moe, “Power and Political Institutions,” Perspectives on 
Politics, 3, 2 (2005), 215–33; for a discussion, see Paul Pierson, “Power and Path Dependence,” in James 
Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen, eds., Advances in Comparative-Historical Analysis (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2015), 123–46. 
 
2 Aurel S. Croissant, David Kuehn, Paul W. Chambers, and Philip Lorenz, eds., Democratization and 
Civilian Control in Asia (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). 
 
3 Agüero; Hunter, Wendy, “Negotiating Civil-Military Relations in Post-Authoritarian Argentina and 
Chile,” International Studies Quarterly, 42, 2 (1998), 295–317. 
  2 
treated as a fluid rather than static concept. Civilian and military face off in a competition 
to build or benefit from relatively stronger political arrangements for promoting their 
interests and imposing costs on their foes. Civilians may propose and militaries may 
oppose any defense industry reforms they desire. Their promotion or opposition is only as 
effective as the arrangements they actively build or absorb permit them to be. Those 
arrangements liberate or constrain actors by altering key relations of power between 
them, making it more or less likely that they will prevail in open conflict. 
Any Chilean alive in 1973 or Argentine in 1976 could be excused for rejecting out 
of hand the notion that the military would face civilians on an equal footing and accept 
the trappings of democratic politics. Power was once expressed as a pitched battle, with 
little more than spectator to behold the shock of body on body between unbridled social 
forces. Military inevitably conquered civilian in those anarchic struggles, the clash of 
interests reaching fever pitch in disturbing forms of intervention that only crescendo in 
the almighty coup d’état.4 In a democratic era, however, military praetorianism begins to 
look more and more like a relic of headier days. Disregarding democratic norms by 
trampling on duly-anointed politicians is a prohibitively costly gambit for the military. It 
puts the institution’s respect and resources on the line at a time when politicians, driven 
to maximize electoral and political dividends, are already on the prowl for the resources 
necessary to please their constituents.5 
                                                        
4 Guillermo A. O’Donnell, Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in South American 
Politics (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, Berkeley, 1973). 
 
5 Wendy Hunter, Eroding Military Influence in Brazil: Politicians against Soldiers (Chapel Hill: University 
of North Carolina Press, 1997). 
  3 
In the contemporary era, civil-military power struggles increasingly occur within 
democratic settings. Like civilians, the military must find non-coercive ways of 
expanding the radius of its support and building its decision-making capacity. It cannot 
put its faith in initial political and institutional endowments stemming from its control of 
the democratic transition because those advantages are liable to diminish as competitive 
rule solidifies and politicians, parties, parliaments, and bureaucracies all gain a stronger 
footing, more influence, and more resources.6 Nor can it rely on pressure, institutional 
clout, or tactics of coercive intimidation. Its power will dissipate without the aid and 
capacity of other powerful actors, namely executive branch allies, political parties within 
congress, bureaucrats, and state managers and governmental agencies. Therefore, like 
civilian, the military must elicit the cooperation of actors critical to the crafting or defeat 
of policies that affect its interests.7 Actors benefit from the convergence of their positions 
and those of these actors as well as from the concentration of formal decision-making 
authority in their hands. That means understanding interests, capacities, conflicts, 
passions, duty, and obedience. It means being, in a word, political. 
There are, of course, multiple arenas in which power struggles occur and relations 
of power develop in any democratic polity. Not all power relations resemble one another, 
nor do all of them necessarily combine in a way that enhances the qualities of one 
another. They each revolve around different political currencies, are mobilized and 
                                                        
6 Agüero; Hunter, 1998. 
 
7 Collin Grimes and David Pion-Berlin, “Power Relations, Coalitions, and Rent Control: Reforming The 
Military's Natural Resource Levies,” Comparative Politics, 51, 4 (2019), 625–43. 
 
  4 
exercised in different ways, and have their own logic of acceptance and resistance.8 They 
vary, in other words, in the nature and relation between two actors and the environment, 
with each interrelationship enabling one and constraining the other by affecting their 
ability to craft policy in a given domain of organized conflict. In a clash of interests, who 
will prevail in the fight for the defense industry? Will civilian seize some or all control of 
defense industry firms or will military remain ascendant in those economic institutions? It 
depends upon the web of power relationships that the civilian must traverse in trying to 
push their policies through the key authoritative institutions of the democratic polity. In 
order to know how easy or hard it may be for a politician to craft defense industry 
policies the military opposes, we must identify the balance of power within the political 
institutions that craft such policy. From this flows the study’s central hypothesis: as 
power relations change, so too does control of defense industries. 
This marks an important shift in the nature of civil-military power relations. We 
find ourselves in a world where democratic norms and institutions not only command the 
obedience of civilian and military but facilitate the representation of the interests of the 
military as but one actor among many issuing forth competing demands in the democratic 
setting.9 Like civilian, the military’s success depends crucially on the relative strength of 
the arrangements it deliberately assembles for the express purpose of doing political 
battle. And should the civilian emerge from the power-building struggle with the upper 
                                                        
8 Michel Foucault, “The Subject and Power,” Critical Inquiry, 8, 4 (1982), 777–95. 
 
9 Philippe C. Schmitter, “Dangers and Dilemmas of Democracy,” Journal of Democracy , 5, 2 (1994), 57–
74, 71. 
  5 
hand and prove capable of crafting objectionable defense industry reforms, it may 
enhance their authority and public and democratic legitimacy while expanding the 
universe of possibilities with regard to economic development, poverty reduction, 
investments in health and education, and the government’s fiscal policy goals. Civilian 
victors in the power-building struggle can force unwanted change upon their military 
subjects precisely because those subjects are confined to the same democratic rules of the 
game as their rivals. Even if the military comes out on top and can marshal the strength to 
beat back the civilian’s advances, civilian failure in the policy battle occurs because 
democracy has become, for civilian as well as military, the only game in town.10 
Two particular relations of power warrant especially close attention. The first type 
to be addressed in greater detail in the following chapter is the balance of coalitional 
strength between civilians and the armed forces. This relation concerns the distribution 
between civilian and military of the ability to shape legislative outcomes. The distribution 
may favor the civilian, vesting the leader and her partisan and political allies with 
sufficient strength to advance difficult reforms while simultaneously suppressing 
uprisings waged against the new direction of public policy by the military’s own partisan 
allies. In this case, the dominant coalition and overall balance of coalitional strength is 
civilian. But by the same token, the balance of coalitional strength may favor the military, 
vesting the military’s allies with the requisite ability to veto or prevent the introduction of 
                                                        
10 Grimes and Pion-Berlin. 
 
  6 
legislative changes, suppressing uprisings against the continuation of the status quo in the 
process. Here, the dominant coalition and balance of coalitional strength is military. 
The second type of power relation is the balance of institutional strength between 
civilians and the armed forces. Power relations are not just partisan and legislative; they 
are also bureaucratic and administrative. In fact, although political scientists tend to focus 
on the legislature and executive (of which we are already guilty), “the great bulk of 
government is composed of bureaucratic agencies… designed and adopted by public 
officials who make decisions under prevailing rules of the game.”11 In our case, the 
balance of institutional strength deals with the distribution between civilian and military 
of the ability to shape administrative outcomes. It may favor the civilian, equipping the 
democratic leader with the capacity to craft the reform policies for individual defense 
industry firms while at the same time barring the military and its allies from entering key 
governmental agencies to exert their influence. The dominant institutions and overall 
balance of institutional strength are civilian in this instance. Or the balance of 
institutional strength may favor the military, affording military actors the capacity to 
prevent, frustrate, or capture the crafting of the civilian’s policy goals, in which case the 
dominant institutions and overall balance of institutional strength are military. 
The formation of dominant civilian coalitions and institutions, it will be shown, 
accounts for the crafting of certain defense industry reform policies in Argentina, Chile, 
Portugal, and Turkey. But by the same token, the emergence of dominant military 
coalitions and institutions accounts for the defeat of certain reform policies. The joint 
                                                        
11 Moe, 218. 
  7 
emergence of dominant civilian institutions and dominant military coalitions accounts for 
the partial crafting of reform policies. And yet, in all of these cases, the military’s 
behavior is par for the course in democratic political economies: actors compete to elicit 
the cooperation of political parties and legislative actors and/or develop particular kinds 
of bureaucratic arrangements for shaping policy creation. In other words, some defense 
industry policy reform efforts will fail not in spite of the consolidation of competitive rule 
and institutional strengthening, but because of it. 
In stressing not only capacities but interests, this study is sure to be met with 
skepticism from some. They may question whether civilian actors really have an interest 
in what happens in the defense sector. Politicians in emerging democracies are widely 
seen as lacking sufficient electoral and political incentives to subject defense policy to the 
same scrutiny and debate as health, education, and public safety.12 Civilian leaders are 
sometimes said to be so disinterested in defense, the impetus for difficult reform must 
come from an imposing force originating from outside of the system. One important 
example are obligations to an external organization or state regarding establishing 
democratic oversight of the military.13 Such external obligations are said to give 
politicians the requisite incentives to challenge the military’s interests, since doing so 
                                                        
12 David Pion-Berlin and Harold Trinkunas, “Attention Deficits: Why Politicians Neglect Defense Policy in 
Latin America,” Latin America Research Review, 42, 3 (2007), 76–100; Thomas C. Bruneau, “Civilians 
and the Military in Latin America: The Absence of Incentives,” Latin American Politics and Society, 55, 4 
(2013), 143–60. 
 
13 Andrew Cottey, Timothy Edmunds, and Anthony Forster, “The Second Generation Problematic: 
Rethinking Democracy and Civil-Military Relations,” Armed Forces & Society, 29, 1 (2002), 31–56; James 
Burk, “Theories of Democratic Civil-Military Relations,” Armed Forces & Society, 29, 1 (2002), 7–29. 
 
  8 
stands to credibly signal the civilians’ commitment to meeting organization or agreement 
guidelines as well as help those leaders bypass external scrutiny and enforcement, thus 
ensuring that norm violations are kept in check and accountability is dealt with at home. 
But external obligations exerted no discernible influence on the prospects for 
defense industry reform in Chile or Argentina. The cases are marked by dissimilar 
relationships and obligations to outsiders. In Chile, accession to the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in May 2010 required a commitment 
to aligning the corporate governments of state firms with OECD and international 
standards.14 In Argentina during both of two periods under study, 1983–1989 and 1989–
1997, no external duties specifically tailored to defense industry corporate governance 
reform like those which materialized in Chile appeared. Thus, one might expect external 
pressures stemming from accession to the OECD to have motivated leaders in Chile to 
reform the defense sector, while the absence of similar duties and resulting pressures in 
Argentina may have deterred leaders in that country from pursuing the same course. Yet 
as we shall see, the outcomes defy these expectations: reform was partial in Argentina 
(1983–1989), radical in Argentina (1989–1999), and nonexistent in Chile.  
Even if external obligations were immaterial, readers may still wonder whether 
the dominant coalition formed in the heat of battle is in fact born and bred from mutual 
interest, or if historical and ideological factors are not more important. Perhaps it is the 
                                                        
14 For those standards as of 2005, when democratic leaders began attempting to reform the defense industry 
in Chile and by which point the limits to transparent corporate governance in the defense sector had come 
under external scrutiny, see OECD, OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-Owned 
Enterprises (Paris: OECD, April 2005); World Bank, Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes 
(ROSC), Corporate Governance Country Assessment: Chile (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, June 2005). 
 
  9 
relative strength of the pre-democratic allies of the military and the civilian opposition 
that solves the coalitional puzzle, in which case initial conditions would remain critical.15 
Yet this overestimates the durability of pre-democratic alliances. Consider the Chilean 
case. In September 1973, the military pronounced its faith in the neoliberal ideas of a 
clique of civilian technocrats from the economics department at the University of 
Chicago after waging a coup in defense of “private property” and ousting the 
democratically-elected Socialist Administration of Salvador Allende before handing 
power to themselves. These “Chicago Boys,” backed by the three largest business 
conglomerates, took control of the Chilean economy in 1975 and began privatizing the 
350 companies nationalized by Allende. Meanwhile, a group of rightwing politicians 
associated with them called the Gremialists provided Chile’s ruling president, 
Commander in Chief of the Army, General Augusto Pinochet, with the political basis for 
his program.16  
Though at the onset of military rule this civilian-military coalition was political 
rather than partisan, it shifted its focus as the need to resort to the popular vote through 
open elections loomed larger. It concentrated on revamping the rightwing parties in 
Chile, of which the formation of Unión Demócrata Independiente (Independent 
Democratic Union—UDI), Renovación Nacional (National Renewal—RN), and Unión 
                                                        
15 Gabriel L. Negretto, “Authoritarian Constitution Making,” in Tom Ginsburg and Alberto Simpser, 
 eds., Constitutions in Authoritarian Regimes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 83–110. 
 
16 Pinochet also formed a tripartite alliance for arms purchases between the armed forces, private enterprise, 
and government authorities, with a central role for himself. The Independent, “Pinochet made millions after 
coup,” February 14, 1999. 
 
  10 
de Centro Centro (Union of the Centrist Center—UCC) were a result: “The goal was to 
form a power group that would become sufficiently influential to constitute the principal 
political force when the military called elections,” observed Carlos Huneeus.17 And when 
democracy dawned, the rightist parties proved themselves to be stalwart defenders of the 
military defense industry. They elected to provide their support without vacillation, for 
they knew that the military and General Augusto Pinochet “regarded half-heartedness or 
dilatoriness as unacceptable,” even when it meant stifling criticism of coercive 
irrationality.18 Case in point, Alianza—the legislative coalition they formed—defended 
the military defense sector even while demanding deeper privatization in other, civilian 
sectors. Consider the contrast between its positions in 1995 on water and defense 
privatization. The former garnered their support; the latter, their contempt.19 Thus, when 
Deputy Alberto Espina (RN) suggested selling defense firms as part of a bid to sell all 
remaining state enterprises, his counterparts objected, quashing the idea.20 
But despite all of this, Alianza began to rethink its loyalties after the turn of the 
millennium. By December 2004, it was abandoning the military and collaborating with 
Concertación (the center-left, pro-government coalition) to make changes that solidified 
civilian control, and it quickly turned its ire on the military’s defense industry thereafter. 
                                                        
17 Carlos Huneeus, “Technocrats and Politicians in an Authoritarian Regime. The ‘ODEPLAN Boys’ and 
the ‘Gremialists’ in Pinochet's Chile,” Journal of Latin American Studies, 32, 2 (2000), 461–501, 466. 
 
18 Huneeus, 482. 
 
19 See Foreign Broadcast Information Service-Latin America (FBIS-LAT), “Water Privatization Views 
Outlined,” June 9, 1995. 
 
20 FBIS-LAT, “War Under Secretary Views Williamsburg, Military Role,” August 18, 1995. 
 
  11 
By November 2005, Alianza was supporting leftist President Ricardo Lagos’s (2000–
2006) corporate governance initiative, including its changes to military firms. In 2012, 
rightist President Sebastián Piñera (RN) (2010–2014) sought to partially privatize 
military firms at the same time that he began vetting options for reforming their corporate 
governments. Before long, the defense ministry began preparing a defense industry 
corporate governance reform initiative, which was then taken up by the second leftist 
Michelle Bachelet Administration (2014–2018). In August 2014, Deputy Jorge Ulloa 
(UDI) and a band of cohorts introduced a legislative bill to modify the ASMAR organic 
law by replacing three of the seven military representatives on the ASMAR Superior 
Council with civilians.21 Rightist parties, once stalwart defenders of the military’s 
defense industry, had morphed into devout exponents of its market-driven reform. 
And Alianza was not the only one to switch positions. Civilians in government 
historically found their voice in leftist parties grouped in Concertación de los Partidos 
por la Democracia (Coordination of Parties for Democracy). Originally formed to 
organize the ‘No’ campaign during the 1988 plebiscite held to determine whether 
Pinochet should extend his rule for another eight years, Concertación included the center-
left Demócrata Cristiano (Christian Democrat—DC) party and the left bloc consisting of 
the Socialista (Socialist—PS) party, the Partido por la Democracia (Party for 
Democracy—PPD), and the Partido Radical (Radical Party). The leftist party-coalition 
                                                        
21 República de Chile, Cámara de Diputados, “Proyectos de Ley. Modifica la ley No. 18.296, orgánica de 
los Astilleros y Maestranzas de la Armada, en lo que respecta al domicilio de Asmar y a la composición de 
su Consejo Superior,” August 20, 2014. 
  12 
quickly established itself as the vanguard of the civilian opposition to the military.22 In 
March 2000, when President Lagos (PS) and Senate President Andres Zaldívar (DC) 
brokered an agreement with Alianza whereby Concertación and Alianza each would 
submit a bill to reform the 1980 Constitution, Concertación proposed to eliminate almost 
all military legal-institutional privileges, while the party Right entered a bill which 
preserved most military enclaves and, instead, made changes reducing the power of the 
executive.23 There could be no mistaking who the heart of the military reform was. Or 
could there? Surprising many, the party Left supported the military and its defense 
industry. Time and again, leftist parties came out against defense industry reforms, 
parting company with presidents of their kin and backing the same military that sought to 
eliminate those in its ranks during military rule. 
These facts indicate that historical antecedents and ideological affinities do not 
provide satisfactory clues to the mystery of coalition formation. If the weight of historical 
and ideological alignments so shaped the military’s coalition-making potential, then its 
traditional, fellow rightist, pre-democratic allies would have remained by the military’s 
side and defended its defense industry until the end. Yet they did not. Why would the 
military’s longtime ally abandon it and try to deprive it of its investments and valued 
                                                        
22 Alan Angell, Democracy after Pinochet: Politics, Parties and Elections in Chile (London: Institute of 
Latin American Studies, 2007), 33. 
 
23 The bill submitted by Alianza, by contrast, largely preserved the military enclaves of political and 
economic power and, instead, sought amendments limited the power of the executive. These included 
increasing the required supermajorities in subjects concerning public spending and reducing the president’s 
ability to transfer resources from one agency to another without legislative approval. Claudio A. Fuentes, 
“A Matter of the Few: Dynamics of Constitutional Change in Chile, 1990-2010,” Texas Law Review, 89, 7 
(2010), 1741–75, 1763–4. 
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influence and prerogatives? By the same token, if prior relationships and ideology were 
really central, then traditional leftist allies would have remained by the side of civilians in 
government and promoted their policies to reform the defense industry just as they 
promoted so many other military reforms. Yet they did not. Why would the civilian 
government’s longtime ally suddenly abandon it and seek to prevent it from advancing 
changes intended to weaken the armed forces, develop the civilian economy, and enhance 
the prospects for civilian control? 
Some rightly caution against too easily reading coalitions into data where they do 
not exist, and that this type of study necessarily requires the scholar to be nuanced and 
careful in defining what kind of support executive coalitions have in legislatures. And 
there are substantial differences that exist between building coalitions in multi-party 
parliamentary or semi-presidential systems and building them in multi-party presidential 
systems such as Chile and Argentina.24 Yet the approach employed here is neither 
imprudent, nor aspirational, nor a mere academic exercise. Rather, it is based on a shrewd 
examination of copious evidence. And the evidence will suggest not only that coalitions 
and institutions are increasingly the operative vehicles for translating interests into policy, 
but that their relative strength helped to define the prospects for policy success and 
failure. Later on, we will turn to power relations in two more countries—a parliamentary 
democracy and a semi-presidential democracy—and demonstrate that the similarities in 
coalition-building loom larger than the differences. 
                                                        
24 David Altman, “The Politics of Coalition Formation and Survival in Multiparty Presidential 
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In fact, the power-centered approach used here helps to answer some important 
questions that would otherwise remain unanswered. To begin to see how, let us consider 
a series of strange and stubborn facts, beginning with a spate in Chile. The military 
regime’s (1973–1990) civilian economic team, the Chicago Boys, privatized all but a 
handful of state firms in a series of Goliathan sell-offs, and successive democratic 
governments from both left and right upheld the new order in the decades after the 
restoration of civilian rule in 1990. Not only that, but in 2005, leftist parties and the 
military’s traditional rightist party allies teamed up to throw off the military shackles by 
approving constitutional changes eliminating the military’s arbiter role and the designated 
senators and lifetime senators, civilianizing and curtailing the powers of the members of 
the National Security Council, and empowering the president to remove military 
commanders. The stage seemed set for leaders to throw the military from great heights 
and turn Chile’s three defense firms over to civilians as well.  
Yet the curtain never opened. President Lagos’s corporate governance initiative 
went down in defeat in open voting in the Senate in 2005. President Bachelet’s version of 
the same initiative met a similar fate in the narrower confines of the Chamber Finance 
Commission in 2008. President Piñera’s decision to use defense ministry authority to 
incorporate private capital and private management into military firms, bypassing 
Congress, was overturned by the Comptroller in 2012. And President Bachelet beheld the 
death of a long-awaited defense industry corporate governance initiative, which was dealt 
its final blow in the distant vestibules of the Ministry of the Presidency, in 2016. More 
than a decade and a half and four reform efforts later, the defense industry remained 
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under absolute military control. All efforts to change the situation had failed, signaling a 
striking departure from prevailing economic and civil-military affairs in this South 
American country and leading market and military reformer.25 
In Argentina (1983–1989), the events of which followed a canonical case of 
authoritarian collapse and democratic renewal, civilians emerged from the transition with 
the upper hand. During the Proceso dictatorship (1976–1983), the military split over 
disputes about leadership, governance, and political strategy. The political parties had 
been lobbying the military regime for a political opening since 1981; public 
condemnation was simmering over a cascade of human rights abuses and an economic 
crisis wrought by an overvalued currency, the collapse of import-competing industries, 
bank failures, and slashed import tariffs that triggered capital flight. Then, when military 
defeat in its own needless war became a boiling point, the resultant galvanizing of the 
civilian front left the military isolated and threw it into even acuter turmoil. The 
military’s schisms and isolationism created a power vacuum which diverted its focus long 
enough for the democratic forces to regroup. Seizing the initiative, the civilians filled the 
void and abruptly sent the military scurrying back to the barracks in a powerless and 
listless state.26 All eyes were henceforth trained upon the defense industry, then the 
military’s powerbase, as civilians set their sights on dismantling it root and branch. 
                                                        
25 For more on the anomaly, see David Pion-Berlin and Rafael Martínez, Soldiers, Politicians, and 
Civilians: Reforming Civil-Military Relations in Democratic Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2017), 102. 
 
26 James McGuire, “Political Parties and Democracy in Argentina,” in Scott Mainwaring and Timothy 
Scully, eds., Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America (Stanford: Stanford 
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And some civilian victories at the military’s expense were had, to be sure. Thus, 
the defense ministry’s enterprise management modernization program largely succeeded, 
with the presidencies and most of the directorates of many large industrial firms shifted to 
civilian managers. But by mid-1989, when Argentina’s first post-authoritarian leader, 
President Raúl Alfonsín of the Unión Cívica Radical (Radical Civic Union—UCR), 
handed power to President-elect Carlos Menem of the Partido Justicialista (Justicialist 
Party, a.k.a. the Peronist Justicialist Party or Peronist Party—PJ), it was clear that the 
civilian reformers had not finished all that they started. A sustained effort to transfer 
ownership to new civilian actors of the very same firms utterly failed. The plan to create 
a civilian holding company to absorb the military’s shares, the so-called General Savio 
State Corporation, ground to a halt within the executive in 1985. The Austral Plan 
targeting the military’s steel and petrochemical interests for privatization foundered in 
Congress in 1986. Using decree power to privatize military firms fared no better, with the 
campaign dying in the streets, private boardrooms, and, eventually, legislative offices. 
Civilians could not convert their initial advantage into a clear victory, while a military 
that seemingly lost all power to shape policy nevertheless retained part of its interests. 
In Argentina (1989–1997), the first sector-specific privatization initiative 
introduced by President Carlos Menem was a defense industry bill. The legislation had 
considerable momentum, but before being approved, it slumbered in congressional 
offices for 17 months while political and legislative actors fought overlapping battles 
over control of the proceeds to be obtained from privatizing the giant defense industry. 
Yet the slow pace of the process of crafting the legislative reform bill stood in stark 
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contrast to the speed with which the reform policies for individual military firms were 
created once the legislation was finally approved. Indeed, the rest of the story is well 
known precisely because of the rate of the reform process that the state administration 
proceeded to design and carry out. Between March 1992 and August 1997, the defense 
ministry designed and executed the purge or transfer to private civilian actors of 38 of the 
military’s roughly 45 firms, including all the biggest ones, in a transfer of wealth that 
became a shot heard round the world for its size, scope, pace, and social complexity. 
These facts are revealing for the following reasons. First, they show that historical 
antecedents do not provide satisfactory clues to the defense industry policy puzzle either. 
Earlier, we saw that democratic coalitions do not necessarily stem from pre-democratic 
alliances. Now, zooming out and looking at the system, we see initial conditions exerting 
little impact in the policy battle.27 Thus, if the relative strength of the military and 
civilians at the end of the democratic transition determine the prospects for policy reform 
or continuity once a democratic regime is in place, then the transition via collapse that 
weakened the military and emboldened civilians in Argentina (1983–1989) would have 
precipitated sweeping defense industry policy losses for the military and radical gains for 
civilian leaders. But they did not. Moreover, the military’s ability to bounce back did not 
advance its overall agenda. Like civilians, the military compiled a record that was 
strikingly inconsistent, as gains in one area did not generate gains in other areas. Neither 
                                                        
27 Literature in both civil-military relations and political economy assigns an important role to initial 
conditions. We have already discussed the salience of these ideas in civil-military relations literature. For a 
discussion of their importance in political economy, see Gerard Roland, “The Political Economy of 
Transition,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 16, 1 (2002), 29–50. 
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civilian nor military could fully dominate the other, and, in the end, both occupied the 
defense sector. Even in Chile, the military’s enormous initial political and institutional 
advantages dissipated as its traditional rightist allies moved to the center and collaborated 
with its leftist rival to weaken the armed forces. 
Similarly, if reinforcing the prevailing direction of public policy creates 
increasing returns, making it harder to change course in reformed sectors and easier to 
annex unreformed sectors,28 then the clear market-oriented direction of public policy in 
Chile would have facilitated a civilian victory and military loss in the late-stage fight for 
the defense industry, which contained three of little more than two dozen firms still in 
state hands after decades of privatization. But they did not. The civilian government’s 
ability to appeal to powerful beneficiaries of established policy scored them no military 
industry policy victories and did not advance their overall agenda. The legacy of market-
oriented reforms and the predominant role of private enterprise had no multiplier effect, 
with rightist governments even failing to take advantage of Chile’s legacy of liberal 
reform. Why then, when civilians controlled the state and the political winds had 
changed, could civilians not finish the neoliberal project? In Argentina and in Chile, why 
did the impact of initial political, institutional, and policy conditions diminish? 
And second, the facts suggest that legislative politics does not provide adequate 
clues to the mystery of administrative politics. If the timing, pace, and nature of 
legislative debate about a given sector determined those same aspects of the 
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administrative crafting of reform policies for that sector’s firms, then the lethargic and 
conflict-riven process of approving the defense industry privatization program 
legislatively in Argentina (1989–1997) would have given way to an equally drawn-out 
and halting design and implementation process. Yet they did not. In general, the civilians 
in government compiled a record that varied with regard to the precise timing and pace of 
key decision-making processes involved in the overall defense industry transition. 
Slowdowns in one arena did not necessarily spill over into and cause slowdowns in other 
arenas. Why were some domains less vulnerable to political stalemate and distributive 
conflict than others, even if all arenas ultimately produced judgments advancing reform? 
We shall see that if there is a line of best fit tying these disparate points together, 
it is the configuration of coalitional and institutional relations of power between civilians 
and the armed forces. Civilians in government took up a policy issue that mattered 
greatly to the military when they proposed to use either the bureaucracy by itself or the 
legislature and the bureaucracy to reform the military’s defense industry, transferring its 
ownership and management to civilians. Civilian and military struggled against one 
another in a competition to build relatively stronger coalitions and institutions for shaping 
the outcome of the reform effort. No two policy proposals received the same treatment or 
experienced the same fate because no two arenas of distributional struggle exposed those 
policies to the same power relations. Accordingly, when the arena of struggle changed, so 
too did the political and power-building struggle, which in turn produced different results. 
The military could not always wield influence uniformly from battleground to 
battleground because it could not necessarily build relatively stronger political 
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arrangements in the different democratic arenas with equal proficiency; some arenas were 
more difficult to build and outcompete civilian rivals in than were others. Democratic 
leaders, meanwhile, could not always dominate from arena to arena at all or as rapidly 
because they too could not necessarily outperform the military in the quests to craft 
dominant coalitions and institutions with equal skill. 
The rest of the study is organized as follows. Chapter 1 provides the theoretical 
framework for the empirical analyses that ensue. Departing somewhat from conventional 
wisdom in political economy and civil-military relations, the focal point for the 
discussion is both state and society rather than state or society. The study departs still 
more sharply from engrained notions, however, by casting the military’s political 
behavior and sources of power not as fundamentally authoritarian, but as increasingly 
democratic. By reformulating military politics as but one form of free and fair politics, 
we are able to observe the impact of coalitional and institutional power relations on the 
defense industry policy fortunes of soldiers and civilians. More specifically, we can 
predict how each side fares in the fight for the defense industry by examining 
configurations of key relations of power that shape how defense industry-related policies 
emerge. 
The next four chapters examine democratic power relations and failed, partial, 
and radical defense industry reform across five cases. Chapter 2 studies the failure of 
reform in Chile (1990–2018). Between 2005 and 2018, civilians pushed for a range of 
bold changes but ran aground for coalitional and institutional reasons. Presidents sought 
to use legislative or executive power to advance their agenda. The military responded by 
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cultivating an alliance with the defense-sector labor unions, which not only opposed 
reform because reform was expected to diminish wages, jobs, and the sources of their 
labor power, but also had an ally in Concertación, which had the power to prevent the 
rise of the supermajorities required to change key constitutional defense industry laws. 
The military also developed dominant institutions, preserving military bureaucracies 
while successfully lobbying to limit the powers of the civilian defense industry agency 
created in 2010. When military coalitions and institutions acted collectively, threatening 
the fate of proposed reforms, civilians were forced to watch Congress and the 
bureaucracy repeatedly defend the military and its defense industry. 
In Chapter 3, we investigate partial reform in Argentina (1983–1989). Civilian 
and soldier each sought to advance their agenda on legislative and executive fronts, and 
both scored a victory, but neither actor could advance their overall agenda. The reasons 
for their success and their failure are coalitional and institutional. President Raul Alfonsín 
turned to administrative and legislative powers in waging his challenge to the status quo. 
He was in a relatively stronger position than the military to shape the crafting of policies 
administratively because he had empowered the defense ministry and demoted the 
military commanders, created a new civilian secretariat in charge of the defense industry 
and vested it with appointment power, and subordinated the firms to that agency. Yet the 
military had the upper hand in Congress because it aligned itself with the anti-reform 
defense-sector labor unions, which had sway with the Peronist Party in control of the 
Senate as well as sympathy from the Radicals in the Chamber of Deputies. And so, just as 
the military could only watch as dominant civilian institutions replaced military 
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presidents and boards with civilian heirs, Alfonsín could only watch as the military’s de 
facto legislative allies repeatedly blocked initiatives to divest the military of enterprises. 
We find the military losing all ground and civilian gaining it in the Argentine 
(1989–1997) case of radical defense industry reform examined in Chapter 4. President 
Carlos Menem was greeted by military, labor, and party opposition when he introduced 
bills authorizing the privatization of all defense industry firms, and yet Menem ultimately 
triumphed over his detractors as a result of the decisive coalitional and institutional 
advantages he created for himself. Menem encouraged a division within labor while 
reaching agreements with the Peronist Party and small rightist and provincial parties 
based on bargains, tradeoffs, and transfers. He also fortified the dominant civilian 
institution’s expertise and consolidated its functions by transferring the Ministry of 
Economy structure and team to the Ministry of Defense and charging it with reforming 
the defense sector. Thus, when Menem sought to advance his privatization bills 
legislatively, the military lacked allies with which to stop his coalition, and the sweeping 
reform bills were approved. Then, when Menem delegated the design and execution of 
the reform policies for individual firms to the civilian defense industry bureaucracy, the 
military lacked the power to intercede, policies were crafted, and defense firms were 
passed to civilians. 
The final portion of the study is devoted to comparisons, tests, and conclusions. 
To test a rival hypothesis and see whether power relations have an impact beyond Latin 
American borders, we turn to two faraway countries with higher levels of external 
obligations, Turkey and Portugal, in Chapter 5. In Turkey, where reform failed, the 
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military advanced its overall defense industry agenda despite potential accession to the 
European Union (EU) by outperforming civilians in both coalition and institution-
building struggle. The military could leverage the requisite strength to defend its defense 
industry root and branch against efforts to privatize it even as it lost ground to those 
civilians in similar policy areas, including procurement and budgetary transparency. In 
Portugal, where reform was partial, leaders found ways of developing and using the 
capacity of the bureaucracy to advance the first part of their reform program, involving 
reforming some firms. But despite growing external pressure for reform after Portugal’s 
accession to the EU in 1986, the military was able to align itself with key political parties, 
who proceeded to prevent democratic leaders from advancing the more sweeping 
legislative changes needed to complete the defense industry overhaul. The conclusion 
reviews the major findings of the study and discusses their implications for democratic 
politics and political economy. 
Before concluding this introductory chapter, let us pause to consider the empirical 
and theoretical significance of one of the key findings of the study—namely, that the 
military may enter into a coalition to defeat reform with the defense-sector organized 
labor movement. As this chapter has revealed, Chile was not the only case in which the 
military entered into an alliance with the defense-sector trade unions. Early on in 
Portugal, the interests of workers, leftist parties, and the military converged, resulting in 
the formation of a coalition between these actors to defeat any reform efforts. And in 
Argentina (1983–1989), the military threw in its lot with the unions, ultimately 
benefitting from labor’s close working relationship with the Peronists, the ruling party in 
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the Senate. Only in Turkey did the military refrain from courting defense-sector labor 
groups, but even in Turkey, the unions still opposed even mild military industry reforms 
despite not being courted by the military. This suggests that the formation of coalitions 
between the military and labor is not only possible, but probable. 
It is difficult to overstate the importance of this finding. Consider the gravity of it 
in the context of the Chilean case. Here is a country that is widely celebrated as a leading 
military and economic reformer whose underlying market and democratic fundamentals 
are second to none in Latin America. We have already seen, for example, that beginning 
in 2005, parties of the left and right worked together to amend the military-written 1980 
Constitution in ways that would solidify civilian control over the armed forces. They 
threw off one military shackle after another, from the “bionic” Senators, to the military’s 
dominance of the National Security Council, to the military’s arbiter role, to the defense 
ministry. Yet the defense industry remained impervious to the expansion of civilian 
authority. Not only that, but for the life of them, leading scholars of civil-military reform 
have been unable to explain why.29 As we shall see, the formation of the military-labor 
alliance explains the puzzling failure of defense industry reform in Chile. 
Exaggerating the unexpectedness of the finding is equally challenging. As 
important as military-labor alliances were in Chile (and Portugal and Argentina), the 
literature bears no trace of their existence. Instead, the military and labor are often seen as 
mortal enemies. Many of the militaries that rose to power in the late 20th century actively 
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repressed organized labor and even sought its outright elimination. In Chile and 
Argentina, the military imprisoned, tortured, and disappeared thousands of unionists 
apparently in the name of stamping out communism. It is, then, hard to imagine labor and 
union leaders even being able to stomach the idea of collaborating with the military, 
much less actually doing it.  
Nevertheless, politics can be stranger than fiction when great concentrations of 
power and wealth are at stake, and the odd bedfellows made by the military and labor are 
surely one of history’s more striking examples. Once democracy was restored and 
civilian leaders began promoting policies to reform the military industry, the military and 
labor’s mutual interests overpowered their ancient hatreds. The military feared that 
reform would destroy its institutional power in the economy as well as its claim to 
economic rents, while labor feared reform’s potentially negative consequences for wages, 
employment, and the sources of their labor power. Both actors recognized that they stood 
a better chance of blocking reform if they worked together, since each actor had 
particular comparative advantages in the democratic polity—ties to parties with veto 
power in labor’s case, privileged proximity to the executive in the military’s case. The 
military and labor did not necessarily stop resenting each other; they simply cared more 
about protecting their mutual power and privilege than they did about shunning one 
another out of principle. And so, in a fascinating turn of events that only nature could 
take, the armed and the employed linked arms and went on the warpath. 
The rest of this introductory chapter is devoted to discussing the analytical and 
political importance of military industries and reform. Some may question whether these 
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seemingly obscure institutions are really that consequential. They may ask if the defense 
industry reform issue was not settled already, decades ago, in the wake of the transition, 
by civilians riding a wave of support for neoliberal reforms. Phillipe Schmitter, writing in 
1994, for instance, seemed to take such reform for granted: 
 
“Civilian governments in new democracies that lack border conflicts or internal 
insurrections find themselves assailed with competing demands from myriad 
newly enfranchised groups. To the extent that these governments are 
simultaneously following neoliberal strictures to cut budget imbalances, 
implement austerity measures, and privatize public (and often military-run) 
enterprises, the military must seem like the most likely place for cuts.”30 
 
Schmitter’s world is one where civilians are relatively free to confiscate military firms, 
whenever and wherever, defying vested interests and political and economic conditions. 
Fueled by neoliberal ideology, democratic leaders ride roughshod over the military and 
its interests, leaving the uniformed to hold the bag and handing its industries over to 
civilian kin at will and with ease. 
If Schmitter’s world were the one we find ourselves in today, a quarter-century 
later, it would render military industries and reform irrelevant as issues in the 
contemporary period because we would have missed the action as well as misunderstood 
the nature, context, and significance of this specific type of sectoral transition. But it was 
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Schmitter who misread. Today as much as ever, military industries and reform are 
pressing global issues. This issue set is ubiquitous in emerging democracies and markets, 
spanning four continents and dozens of nations, while military involvement in the 
economy is often more extensive in non-democratic (and potential future democratic) 
regimes. Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela are only some of the 
more prominent Latin American cases.31 Turkey and Pakistan stand out in the Middle 
East,32 a region where the military otherwise dominates the economy of many a 
dictatorship (i.e. Egypt, Iran). On the European continent, Portugal and Spain created or 
have created military industries, as have Poland, Slovakia, and some former Soviet bloc 
countries. South Africa stands out as a key African case.33 
In the political economy of these and similar states, the conflict over transferring 
defense industries from military to civilian control is an important distributional struggle, 
the outcome of which is anything but foretold. Military and military-related industries 
often perform an outsized economic and developmental role, and militaries derive 
substantial economic and political influence and large volumes of off-budget revenue and 
other benefits from them. In Chile, three force-oriented defense firms employing 10,000 
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in 1990 enjoyed protection from competition through immunity from reporting 
requirements, near certain contracts to service arms purchased with guaranteed windfall 
off-budget copper revenues, and other dubious privileges.34 Today, the military remains 
alone in the sector, which retains its size and advantages. In Argentina, the military 
owned and ran in whole or in part 44 industrial and service-sector firms in 1983. Those 
firms employed 40,000 people directly; enjoyed a monopoly or near-monopoly in the 
mining, weapons, steel, petrochemical, and naval sectors; and accounted for a third of 
gross national product (GNP).35 
As will be demonstrated in the cases under study, military control of industry 
carries a number of potentially adverse consequences for democratization and 
development. First, it may undermine civilian control of the military. Military industries 
generate off-budget revenue. That enhances military autonomy while simultaneously 
weakening the civilian government’s power of the purse because it blunts the impact of 
withholding or augmenting budgetary allotments. The inflow into military coffers of 
revenue from a source outside of the general budget diminishes or even nullifies 
policymakers’ ability to use the official budget as a form of leverage over the military, 
resulting in a direct loss of civilian control. Neighbors, rivals, and the international 
community may also be frightened by the uncertainty surrounding the accumulation and 
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allocation of such revenue.36 And the larger the defense industry, the more substantial is 
the volume of off-budget revenue generated in a given quarter or year. 
Second, military industries may delay the development of the civilian economy. 
The military and those with whom it shares its rents may exploit the military’s power and 
privileged proximity to the state to divert resources from more dynamic and innovative 
civilian sectors to less dynamic and innovative but more rent-generating military ones. In 
control of budgets and jobs and perhaps subsidized, tax-free, and even backed by a 
treasury willing to cover its losses, the military may favor some civilian concerns by 
investing in them and squeeze out others by competing with them, as the Argentine 
military did between the 1960s and 1980s.37 Similarly, in governmental corridors, the 
influence of defense firms themselves may provide the military with preponderant 
influence during the budgetary and procurement processes and veto power that prevails 
over the projects of more dynamic and innovative civilian sectors. In Argentina, large 
military firms enjoyed immense political power through direct action, indirect promotion, 
and veto guidance.38 While the military economy and its institutions thrive in this 
extractive institutional environment, the civilian economy and its institutions stagnate, 
fail to emerge, and grow more slowly than they would in a freer and fairer climate. Even 
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if military defense enterprises do not enjoy tax, tariff, market, and other advantages, their 
very presence reduces the space for potentially more productive civilian entities to enter 
and multiply.39 
And third, military industries can foster corruption by military personnel. Military 
leaders may abuse the defense firms’ prerogative to secrecy, autonomy, and economic 
power. This risk is further magnified where the military retains, in addition to control of 
industry, a legal claim to a share of natural resource rents institutionally (Chile, 
Myanmar, Peru, Venezuela, Ecuador until 2008) or through the defense industry itself 
(Turkey).40 In these cases, off-budget mineral export revenues flowing into military 
coffers are transferred to military firms, creating golden opportunities for large-scale 
fraud and theft. Thus, Chile, which is otherwise considered squeaky clean by Latin 
American standards, was marred by a giant corruption scandal (“Milicogate”) involving 
military officers, copper revenues, and contracts for services provided by military firms 
which never took place.41 In short, the implications of inquiries into military industries 
for economic development, democratic civilian control and governance, peace, and 
corruption should animate scholarship across political economy, civil-military relations, 
and peace and security studies. 
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Take political economy, for example. Analyses of military industries and reform 
efforts shed light on the political economy of economic transitions. Like the petroleum or 
mining industry, the military’s defense industry forms one sector of the economy, and the 
political economy of reforming any sector is viewed in part as an issue of how to 
overcome powerful vested interests, relaxing political constraints that can block decision 
making or prevent reforms from being accepted. Uncertainty about the impact of reform 
plays a crucial role in this process by shifting majorities for or against reform. Because 
legislative actors are driven to maximize electoral and political dividends and want some 
sense of the impact of reform before throwing their precious weight behind it, uncertainty 
may shift the majorities against reform.42 The resolution of uncertainty, on the other 
hand, can shift the majorities in favor of reform, ensuring political acceptability. 
Consequently, the design of a sequence of reforms for a sector that minimizes uncertainty 
becomes crucially important to crafting a politically feasible transition.43 
Yet civilians who would reform the military defense sector, like those who would 
reform its natural resource levy, face distinct obstacles to reducing uncertainty that stem 
from limits to information and transparency. In the first place, there is the characteristic 
opacity of the wider defense establishment. “Bureaucratic reluctance to divulge 
information is magnified due to security concerns, and there are few civilian experts or 
groups to turn to for counsel because the military has a near monopoly on expertise and 
                                                        
42 Raquel Fernandez and Dani Rodrik, “Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in the Presence of 
Individual-Specific Uncertainty,” The American Economic Review, 81, 5 (1991), 1146–1155. 
 
43 Roland. 
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information within the defense ministry (and may use secrecy laws to withhold it).”44 But 
the military defense industry itself is even more impenetrable. Defense firms may enjoy 
immunity from reporting requirements. They may not submit to the common system of 
administration by the state, but rather retain the freedom to prepare their accounting and 
financial statements according to their own criteria (which few civilians may be capable 
of understanding), as in Chile. Their losses may be deemed a military and state secret, 
shielding the military from public and legislative scrutiny and providing civilians with 
little or no information about the condition or viability of military firms as they venture 
down the path to reform, as in Argentina. The public funds made available to military 
firms may not be known because their accounts are not audited, as in Turkey. Needless to 
say, this institutionalized obscurity makes it far harder to reduce uncertainty. 
Once again, it is vital to stress that this is not a mere academic exercise. The 
consequences of this lack of transparency are very real indeed. Take it from Chilean 
leaders and bureaucrats associated with parties linked to Concertación. In 2018, duplicate 
invoices for US$200 million in alleged sales of weapons linked to the army’s firm, 
FAMAE, surfaced in connection with the continued investigation into Milicogate, the 
giant corruption scandal mentioned earlier involving military officers, off-budget copper 
revenues, and payments for services never delivered.45 Asked about the consequences of 
the opaqueness of the defense industry for corruption and good governance, the 
                                                        
44 Grimes and Pion-Berlin, 628. 
 
45 El Desconcierto, “Milicogate: Investigan facturas duplicadas por 200 millones de dólares por presunta 
venta de armas,” July 9, 2018. 
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interviewees stressed that such incidents were not the exception, but the rule: 
“Unfortunately it is not the first time that [this] occurs within the institution of the army,” 
and other military institutions have been susceptible to it as well, said Deputy and 
President of the Chamber Defense Commission, Manuel Antonio Matta (DC), in 2018. 
“The absence of civil control of the firms and of a public tender process for their 
purposes allows for a certain opacity and secrecy regarding the… [military] companies,” 
he continued.46 The sentiment was shared by several executive defense officials 
interviewed by the author, including Felipe Illanes Poullangan, a lawyer and advisor in 
the Planning and Policy Division of the Undersecretariat of Defense of the Ministry of 
National Defense, who described the defense sector’s corporate governments as places 
where no light, “only dark[ness],” penetrates.47 
Fortunately, all of this is not lost on scholars of civil-military relations, who have 
been quietly building bridges between their field and that of political economy. In recent 
decades, handsome interest has accumulated in what some have called the political 
economy of civil-military relations.48 Ever since Alfred Stepan claimed some thirty years 
ago that debate over military industry reform “becomes an issue that requires separate 
analytic and political attention,”49 scholars have answered Kristina Mani’s subsequent 
                                                        
46 El Mostrador, “Comisión de Defensa citará a ministro Espina por investigación secreta de facturas 
duplicadas por US$200 millones,” July 10, 2018. 
 
47 Interview with the author, May 17, 2018, Santiago, Chile. 
 
48 Grimes and Pion-Berlin. 
 
49 Alfred Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1988), 82.  
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call to “rethink the relationship between military and economy.”50 Indeed, inquiring 
minds increasingly recognize that the conflicts and cleavages in military economics alter 
power relations and that military interests affect democracy, the market, regional security, 
and military professionalism.51 Thus far, they have sought to explain the creation of 
military industries and the abolition of military natural resource levies. Yet there has been 
little systematic empirical analysis of military industry reform. In this study, I take up 
Stepan’s question and begin to answer the call. 
                                                        
50 Kristina Mani, “Defense Budgets: Bringing the Political Economy of Security into Analysis,” in Red de 
Seguridad y Defensa de América Latina (RESDAL), A Comparative Atlas of Defence in Latin America and 
the Caribbean (Buenos Aires: RESDAL, 2010), 37–8. 
 
51 Muthiah Alagappa, “Investigating and Explaining Change: An Analytical Framework,” in Muthiah 
Alagappa, ed., Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2001), 1–25; Terence Lee, “The Military’s Corporate Interests: The Main 
Reason for Intervention in Indonesia and the Philippines?,” Armed Forces & Society, 34, 3 (2008), 491–
502. 
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1 
 
Coalitions, Institutions, and the Path to Military Industry Reform 
 
“The union of individuals within the state thus becomes a contract, which is accordingly 
based on their arbitrary will and opinions, and on their express consent given at their own 
discretion… [T]he further consequences which follow from this… destroy the divine 
[element]… and its absolute authority and majesty… [C]onsequently, when these 
abstractions were invested with power, they afforded the tremendous spectacle, for the first 
time we know of in human history, of the overthrow of all existing and given conditions 
within an actual major state and the revision of its constitution from the principles and 
purely in terms of thought.”  
Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right1 
 
Introduction 
Carlos Menem’s sweeping transfer of Argentine defense industry firms from 
military to civilian ownership continues to astound observers and to fascinate scholars. 
The reform of the massive industrial complex was notable for “the dizzying pace at 
which it was implemented,” an assessment affirmed by the dozens of military-owned 
firms privatized in a matter of years during Menem’s rule.2 Menem—initially “a 
nationalist, populist candidate for office… who believe[d] the state should continue to 
                                               
1 Georg Wilhelm Fredrich Hegel, Hegel: Elements of the Philosophy of Right (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1991), 277. 
 
2 Daniel Treisman, “Cardoso, Menem, and Machiavelli: Political Tactics and Privatization in Latin 
America,” Studies in Comparative International Development, 38, 3 (2003), 93–109, 96. 
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play a major role in the economy and oppose[d] privatization” and who as a Peronist 
Senator had sought to make it nearly impossible for his predecessor, Raul Alfonsín, to 
advance the latter’s own military industry reform agenda—gradually defeated actual and 
potential opponents within his party, society, and the military leadership and eventually 
subordinated key industrial firms of the Argentine economy to his authority.3 By the mid-
1990s, Menem had overcome rival factions headed by the Radical Party, the Peronist 
Grupo de los Ocho and dissident Afirmación Peronista, large private-sector 
conglomerates, public-sector workers and unions, and the Argentine high command. By 
the end of the 1990s, he had vanquished any independent, collective power of the 
Radicals and recalcitrant Peronists, the Argentine military, private capitalists, and public 
workers and unions. 
Just as perplexing, then, is the equally stunning downfall of Menem’s political 
opponents. In 1989, Argentina’s anti-military industry reform stakeholders were riding 
high, having emasculated three separate military industry reform policies during the 
outgoing Alfonsín Administration (1983–1989), when only one military firm was fully 
reformed and “most of Alfonsín's privatization deals died in Congress, at the negotiating 
table, or in the streets.”4 By the time Menem was set to leave office in December 1999, 
these same anti-reform stakeholders had seen many of their proteges vilified, fired, or 
prosecuted if they rebelled or went on strike and had been almost entirely dismissed from 
                                               
3 U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, Office of African and Latin American 
Analysis, South American-Caribbean Division, “Argentina’s Economic Reforms: A Scorecard,” July 28, 
1988, 9. 
 
4 Javier Corrales, “Coalitions and Corporate Choices in Argentina, 1976–1994: The Recent Private Sector 
Support of Privatization,” Studies in Comparative International Development, 32, 4 (1998), 24–51, 36. 
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Menem’s cabinet and the government leadership. Meanwhile, the legislature became a 
stomping ground for reformists loyal to Menem and the Peronists he had turned against 
the status quo. Menem managed to turn Argentine society, originally a bastion of pro-
military stewards, into an instrument of dramatic military-industrial reform.  
How and why did Menem manage to so radically restructure the relationship 
between the military and society among a sea of “massive social forces” entrenched in 
their opposition to serious change?5 This chapter clarifies the logic behind the sectoral 
transition from military to civilian ownership and management, as epitomized by 
Menem’s profound reform of the Argentine military industry. Such transitions represent 
the apex of a process of coalition formation and institution creation that I call democratic 
power building: The creation and concentration of coalitional and institutional strength 
on the basis of the forging of close links with vital political and legislative allies and the 
simultaneous creation and concentration of essential administrative structures. Menem 
and his opponents’ parallel yet opposite political trajectories highlight the stakes at the 
heart of democratic power building. 
The key accelerant to democratic power building is any political actor’s drive and 
opportunity to acquire more influence at his adversaries’ expense. In a democracy, an 
effective bulwark against such empowerment must be backed by the credible threat of the 
political actor’s electoral or political defeat or loss of vital legislative support. In this 
study, I present these defensive efforts as adversaries’ uprisings. Democratic rebellions 
                                               
5 Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 
84. 
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may fail, and adversaries tend to have only limited information about the actor’s potential 
behavior. Consequently, adversaries will hesitate to revolt under most conditions, but 
rather elect to try to induce key political and legislative actors to adopt positions that 
converge with their own. But that only emboldens the stronger actor to attempt to amass 
more power. And if the political actor succeeds in consolidating sufficient power to 
control the course of events over time without being stopped, they can crowd out their 
adversaries, who will no longer be able to wage an uprising that could depose the 
political agent.6 Eventually the weaker side will concede political standing altogether, 
thus legitimizing the stronger actor and creating an opening that can be seized and used 
by the latter to promote policies that enhance or protect their wealth and power. It is 
precisely this dynamic that facilitates, not just the transition from a military to a civilian 
defense industry, but the failure of such a transition at the hands of an empowered status 
quo defender. 
This chapter therefore answers one question that Menem’s triumph often begs: 
Why didn’t anyone stop Menem the way they stopped Alfonsín? The short answer is that 
Menem’s adversaries tried but failed. By 1992, many of the same opponents of military 
industry reform who had acted to destroy Alfonsín’s plans had been forced to call off 
their efforts to organize effective opposition against Menem’s; Peronist Party dissidents 
and Radical Party opponents had been increasingly divided and isolated, and striking 
workers in petrochemical and other industries had been pressured into submission with 
                                               
6 For an example of these kinds of power struggles in authoritarian regimes, see Milan W. Svolik, The 
Politics of Authoritarian Rule (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
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the threat of invigorated competition from rivals.7 After conquering these and other 
dissenters, Menem achieved immense power over Argentina’s erstwhile anti-military 
industry reform stakeholders. 
Yet this answer—Menem’s opponents tried but failed—is too naïve, and this 
chapter explains why: It fails to appreciate that the reasons for the transition from military 
to civilian ownership and management have as much to do with structure as they do with 
agency. As this chapter emphasizes, all democratic actors—be they would-be change 
agents or status quo defenders—operate under distinctly challenging political 
circumstances. They cannot work alone to translate their preferences into policy, they are 
in direct competition for votes, seats, and influence with their potential allies, and they 
cannot use violence or coercion to compel the behavior of others or to enforce mutual 
agreements. These complex social conditions ensure that no democratic political actor’s 
desire to become the next Menem is met with the ready chance to do so. To the contrary, 
this chapter will show that the process of democratic power building is long, arduous, and 
fraught with perils. At the same time, however, even if a political actor’s adversaries do 
their best to deter her from seizing power at their expense, their own ability to reign her 
in will be limited and closely linked with the distinctive conditions under which 
democratic elites operate. The emergence of civilian ownership and management is 
therefore not an accident of history, but a systematic phenomenon. 
                                               
7 Corrales, 26; Luigi Manzetti, Privatization South American Style (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1999), 97. 
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This chapter’s analysis of the transition from military to civilian ownership and 
management clarifies that democratic power building takes two distinctive forms. In the 
first form, which I associate with the drive to amass coalitional strength, politics is a 
matter of forging relatively stronger alliances of political and legislative actors whose 
consent is necessary to prevail than does one’s adversary. The distribution of coalitional 
strength is the outcome of a power building struggle between civilian and military allies 
that plays out within the institutional domains of the legislature, executive branch, and 
defense portfolio. By contrast, the development of institutional strength is a politics of 
creating bureaucratic institutions that hold the monopoly on the design and 
implementation of policy for the individual firms comprising the military industry. The 
distribution of institutional strength is the outcome of a power building struggle between 
civilian and military allies within the corridors of the administrative state. 
Thus, even if the distribution of power between a civilian or military actor and her 
adversaries spans a continuum—as in the indexed economic and organizational theory of 
relative civilian and military political power developed by Felipe Agüero—there are, in 
fact, only two qualitatively distinct power building quantities: coalitional strength 
distributes the ability to shape legislative outcomes; institutional strength distributes the 
ability to shape bureaucratic outcomes.8 This simple theoretical difference between 
coalitional strength and institutional strength corresponds to the empirical difference 
between the legislative and bureaucratic phases of democratic decision-making. 
                                               
8 Felipe Agüero, Soldiers, Civilians, and Democracy: Post-Franco Spain in Comparative Perspective 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995). 
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The quantity of coalitional strength was introduced by myself and David Pion-
Berlin in an article analyzing the differing fates of military natural resource levy efforts in 
Ecuador and Chile.9 We distinguished that measure from notions of the accumulated 
organizational strength of the military, which fail to account for the relative power of 
civilians or for the role of politicians and congresses in relation to the military;10 notions 
of the relative power of civilians and the military as a byproduct of latent influences 
dating back to the period of the democratic transition, which assume that the democratic 
period initiates no solidification of competitive rule;11 and notions of the power of 
civilians conferred by the ability to access democratic institutions, which fail to account 
for the power of the military as well as assume perfect coalescence among civilian 
groups.12 Unfortunately though, we did not incorporate the role in power contests of 
representation of societal interest groups like unions and the private sector. Additionally, 
neither these authors nor others have introduced a measure of an actor’s bureaucratic 
                                               
9 Collin Grimes and Pion-Berlin, David, “Power Relations, Coalitions, and Rent Control: Reforming The 
Military's Natural Resource Levies,” Comparative Politics, 51, 4 (2019), 625–43. 
 
10 Huntington; Guillermo A. O’Donnell, Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in 
South American Politics (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, Berkeley, 
1973). 
 
11 Scott Mainwaring, Guillermo A. O’Donnell, and J. Samuel Valenzuela, eds., Issues in Democratic 
Consolidation: The New South American Democracies in Comparative Perspective (Notre Dame: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1992); Jorge Zaverucha, “The Degree of Military Political Autonomy 
during the Spanish, Argentine and Brazilian transitions,” Journal of Latin American Studies, 25, 2 (1993), 
283–99; Agüero; Carlos H. Acuña and William C. Smith, “The Politics of “Military Economics” in the 
Southern Cone: Comparative Perspectives on Democracy and Arms Production in Argentina, Brazil, and 
Chile,” Political Power and Social Theory, 9 (1995), 121–57; Wendy Hunter, “Negotiating Civil-Military 
Relations in Post-Authoritarian Argentina and Chile,” International Studies Quarterly, 42, 2 (1998), 295–
317. 
 
12 Agüero; Aurel S. Croissant, David Kuehn, Paul W. Chambers, and Philip Lorenz, Democratization and 
Civilian Control in Asia (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). 
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strength, even though the bureaucracy is closely linked to the design and implementation 
of policy programs the goals of which were determined legislatively.  
Nevertheless, I do observe the consolidation of political power that drives the 
crafting or defeat of reforms across military industries that we observed in the crafting or 
defeat of reforms across military natural resource levies. Well known examples of full or 
partial military industry reform include Argentina, South Africa, Portugal, and Ecuador; 
key examples of the failure of reform and continued development of the military industry 
include Chile, Brazil, and Turkey. Likewise, given the limitations vis-à-vis the 
bureaucracy of existing theories of civil-military power, this work develops the separate 
quantity of institutional strength, which is analytically and politically necessary if the 
winners and losers legislatively are to become the winners and losers bureaucratically as 
well. 
In general, the theory presented here—called brokers and bureaucrats—
significantly expands the sources of power and theoretical micro-foundations that explain 
why such sectoral transitions occur across various types of democratic political 
economies. The successful, partially successful, or failed transition from a military to a 
civilian defense industry analytically mirror the rise to legislative and bureaucratic power 
of civilians who would reform the military industry and military actors who would 
preserve it. On any of these trajectories, a political actor succeeds over time in 
accumulating the requisite strength to shape legislative and bureaucratic decision-making 
in their favor. The logic outlined in this introduction explains why such trajectories are 
possible. 
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These empirical insights are developed in Section 1.6, which examines the 
analytical implications of the theoretical arguments developed in the preceding sections. 
When data on military industry reform is discussed, it is shown that the balances of 
coalitional and institutional strength closely mirror the actual degree of reform. 
Preferences are the subject of Section 1.1, where we learn why and how civilian and 
military leaders develop opposing desires with regard to the outcome of military industry 
reform efforts. Sections 1.2 and 1.3 describe the uniquely challenging circumstances 
actors confront in a democratic era which have so far been a focus of this introduction, 
then develop solutions to these perils: coalition formation and institution creation. Section 
1.4, in turn, derives the empirical implications of these arguments, which are then 
evaluated in Section 1.6 by examining qualitative data across five cases in South America 
and Southern Europe. The chapter ends by discussing the rationale behind different 
variations of practices of coalition formation and institution creation. 
 
1.1. Civilian, Military, Periods, and Preferences 
Civilian and military leaders know in advance whether they will benefit or lose 
from the shift of the defense industry from military to civilian ownership and 
management. Thus, the two actors find themselves at odds over the question of that 
reform. Political scientists and economists tend to agree that for most policy reforms, the 
interests of different groups are relatively easy to identify.13 Thus “the non-tradable 
                                               
13 For political scientists, see Robert Bates, Markets and States in Tropical Africa: The Political Bases of 
Agricultural Policies (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981); Ronald Rogowski, Commerce and 
Coalitions: How Trade Affects Domestic Political Alignments (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1990); Jeffry A. Frieden, “Invested Interests: The Politics of National Economic Policies in a World of 
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goods sector opposes devaluation, firms producing import substitutes balk at trade 
liberalization, farmers object to cutting agricultural subsidies,” and so on.14 And because 
vested interests weigh heavily in analyses of reform efforts, path dependence, and policy 
outcomes in general, there is broad agreement that interest-group analysis is an 
indispensable feature of political economic analysis.15 Interest-group analysis is equally 
important when studying efforts to reform the military industry. 
A democratically-elected civilian leader has a variety of incentives to complete 
the transfer of ownership and management. First, doing so promises to advance the 
civilian’s core survival interests. The civilian wants (and needs) to stay in power, not just 
to promote their desired programs and policies, but to maintain their influence and build 
loyal and viable political organizations.16 Yet military ownership and management may 
place the civilian’s rule and the democratic regime at risk. Since military control enlarges 
the military’s institutional prerogatives and closely links these concerns with national 
security, it can create a pretext for military intervention, justifiable on the basis of the 
national interest, if government selects policies perceived by the military to be 
                                               
Global Finance,” International Organization, 45, 4 (1991), 425–51. For economists, see Anne O. Krueger, 
“The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society,” The American Economic Review, 64, 3 (1974), 291–
303; Jagdish N. Bhagwati, “Directly Unproductive, Profit-Seeking Activities,” Journal of Political 
economy, 90, 5 (1982), 988–1002. 
 
14 Stephan Haggard and Steven B. Webb, “What Do We Know About the Political Economy of Economic 
Policy Reform?” The World Bank Research Observer, 8, 2 (1993), 143–68, 144. 
 
15 See Paul Pierson, “Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics,” American Political 
Science Review, 94, 2 (2000), 251–67. 
 
16 Wendy Hunter, “Reason, Culture, or Structure?: Assessing Civil-Military Dynamics in Brazil,” in David 
Pion-Berlin, ed., Civil-Military Relations in Latin America: New Analytical Perspectives (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 36–48, 43. 
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antagonistic to the military’s interests.17 Reform helps to guard against that possibility 
and protect the civilian and democracy’s fate by severing the link between military 
interests and national security. 
Second, the transition to civilian control expands the civilian’s effective power to 
govern. The civilian wishes to extend their power to its utmost reaches.18 That generates 
democratic legitimacy for the civilian and permits them to identify economic assets or 
resources to be distributed as pork or for programmatic ends, which then improves their 
reelection chances and ability to realize their policy objectives as well as strengthens the 
long-term viability of their party, movement, and persona.19 The military’s control of 
industry short-circuits the civilian’s power and control of their destiny because it negates 
the impact that the civilian can have on the use of large volumes of public resources by 
industrial firms and on the defense industry’s size, scope, strategy, and economic effects. 
Off-budget revenue flowing from defense firms to military coffers undermines civilian 
control by blunting the impact of withholding defense budgetary allotments.20 Shifting 
control to civilians gets at the root of these various governance and control problems. 
In the first place, such reform augments the government’s ability to shape the 
activities of large, important firms. Without a monopoly on force and without favorable 
                                               
17 Anita Isaacs, Military Rule and Transition in Ecuador, 1972–92 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh 
Press, 1993), 141. 
 
18 Peter D. Feaver, Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2003), 61. 
 
19 Croissant et al., 45; Hunter, 2001, 44. 
 
20 Jörn Brömmelhörster and Wolf-Christian Paes, “Soldiers in Business: An Introduction,” in Jörn 
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influences deriving from a partnership in a prior authoritarian regime, new civilian 
owners and directors of defense firms must operate within tighter constraints. 
Cooperating with government becomes vital to securing benefits that the military could 
more easily take for granted. Reform also stops the flow of off-budget revenue to military 
coffers from enterprises, thereby enhancing the civilian’s power-of-the-purse and ability 
to evaluate how revenues generated by public-sector firms are being spent. That improves 
the civilian’s capacity to allocate resources effectively and to prepare the state for armed 
conflict, all of which strengthens the civilian’s political position and reelection prospects. 
For similar reasons, the risk of defense firms exporting arms to fragile or unstable 
areas—and of drawing costly rebukes and sanctions—dissipates as well. 
Third, reform improves the civilian’s prospects for achieving their policy goals. 
The civilian’s survival, viability, and governance interests drive them to use policy to 
pursue economic goals, including increasing growth rates and fiscal flexibility and 
rationalization, reducing unemployment and managing inflation, expanding economic 
opportunity, and enhancing productivity.21 Their ability to realize such ends can be 
seriously impaired by military ownership and management. The military’s economic 
presence can crowd out more capable and dynamic civilian sectors. This is especially the 
case when military firms enjoy privileges that civilian firms do not such as not paying 
taxes; acquiring cost-free vehicles, or being free from reporting requirements, or when 
military firms disproportionately obtain lucrative government contracts due to their close 
                                               
21 Barry Ames, Political Survival: Politicians and Public Policy in Latin America (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1990), 11–2. 
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and privileged proximity to the state.22 These patterns undercut civilian human capital 
formation and the development of tacit knowledge clusters that could bolster the 
civilian’s position by driving sustained economic growth and bringing resultant electoral 
dividends. 
Due to these same protections and privileges, the military may also face 
inadequate incentives to maximize value, which may undermine the economic 
performance and imperil the political survival of the civilian government. Adam Smith’s 
warning about the potential excesses of directors of joint-stock companies applies equally 
in the case of military directors who rely on the Roman grain dole: 
 
“The directors of such [joint-stock] companies, however, being the managers 
rather of other people's money than of their own, it cannot well be expected, that 
they should watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with which the partners 
in a private copartnery frequently watch over their own. Like the stewards of a rich 
man, they are apt to consider attention to small matters as not for their master's 
honour, and very easily give themselves a dispensation from having it.”23  
 
Military firm leaders who enjoy bailouts from the treasury, like joint-stock directors who 
enjoy “other people’s money,” may use their political and state privileges to expropriate 
funds, exert insufficient effort, invest wastefully, or extract excessive salaries and perks, 
                                               
22 Louis W. Goodman, “Military Roles Past and Present,” in Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, eds., 
Civil-Military Relations and Democracy (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1996), 30–43, 37–8. 
 
23 Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations (New York: Modern Library, 1937), 700. 
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while individual managers might self-deal, run slack operations, or pursue sub-goals at 
odds with the civilian leadership’s goals.24 Besides eroding military professionalism and 
jeopardizing military effectiveness, such opportunism reduces the viability of important 
industrial firms and undermines growth, and the problem is compounded when there is 
logrolling or collusion among military managers.25 The transition to civilian ownership 
and management helps to mitigate these various problems. 
As a result of the transition, the civilian leader can, for one, more readily make 
and enforce decisions based on developmental criteria. Civilian owners and managers, 
lacking the military’s power and proximity to the state, are less able than their 
predecessors to extract rents and secure privileges that harm competition by deterring 
entry or creating monopoly-like conditions. (If assets have been sold to private actors and 
military firms did not pay taxes, reform also increases the government’s tax revenue 
base.) As a result, the civilians in control face stronger incentives to maximize value than 
did their predecessors, while entering the economy and increasing economic activity 
become more feasible for other business actors. Likewise, more freedom to pursue their 
agenda is conferred upon the elected civilian leader. Reducing military expenditures in 
order to help stem inflation and balance the budget becomes possible, as does shifting 
                                               
24 Oliver E. Williamson, The Economics of Discretionary Behavior: Managerial Objectives in a Theory of 
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budgetary resources to emerging civilian sectors that could generate more employment or 
to social and economic programs that could increase human capital. As a result of all this, 
the civilian has a powerful incentive to shift the ownership and management of defense 
industry firms from the military to civilians. 
The military has its own powerful incentives as regards the reform effort, only not 
to begin but to stop it. First, any expansion of civilian ownership and management 
reduces the military’s financial stakes and assets correspondingly. The military has a 
vested interest in the status quo and a lot to lose economically, including directly via 
investments in the industry and long-term contracts with other organizations and 
indirectly via investments through the polity in complementary activities.26 Remaining 
the owner and manager preserves their investments, wealth, dividends, and claim to 
economic rents.27 The shift to civilian owners and managers, by contrast, necessarily 
comes at the military’s expense, for the flow of returns from these investments and access 
and control rights vis-à-vis the sector all shift from the military to civilians 
correspondingly. 
Second, the industry is the military’s powerbase. After exerting vast influence or 
even veto power over many areas of national life during authoritarian rule, the military 
agent prefers to shape policy and society as they see fit and tolerate the kinds of business 
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actors they want to tolerate.28 Ownership and management of industry avails them of 
mechanisms for doing so. For one, due to the sector’s size, importance, and secrecy, the 
military enjoy a seat at the policymaking table,29 including the potential to decisively 
shape decisions about national resource allocation, budget appropriations, and arms 
procurement.30 Just as important, the military can use its firms to favor the civilian firms 
it wants to promote while competing with the civilian firms it wants to crowd out.31 The 
more privileges the military enjoys and the bigger its firms, the easier it is for the military 
to use them to accomplish these political objectives.   
Third, there is the matter of the military’s continued autonomy. Self-sufficiency is 
a key interest and value in the armed forces. Military agents want more decision-making 
power and control over their institution rather than less, as they yearn to be free from 
dependence on the government budget and the decisions about arms development of 
others (and particularly the civilians from whom they take orders).32 This is especially 
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true after authoritarian rule, for during authoritarian rule the military and its firms became 
accustomed to not cooperating with civilians and to a political regime that lacked 
institutions that could exert influence over military organizations.33 In this context, 
continued ownership and management of industry allows the military to function like a 
state within a state, minimizing civilian oversight and scrutiny and maximizing military 
freedom in the areas where the military most prioritizes it. 
Thus, off-budget revenue flowing to military coffers from firms enables the 
military to fund itself independently of the government budget, freeing the military from 
the need to acquiesce to civilian demands to satisfy its needs. Making its own weapons 
frees the military from dependence on foreign arms and from civilian influence over the 
domestic production of defense material. The resources of the defense industry sustain 
the military’s ability to pursue its own economic, political, or social objectives because 
its relative seclusion from society and government and the industry’s physical capital 
resources—including the physical technology used in the firms and the firms’ plant and 
equipment, geographic location, and access to raw materials—provide the military with 
the means for undertaking its own projects.34 These extensions of institutional autonomy 
allow the military to resist accepting subordination to civilian control. 
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And finally, the military wants to maintain its standing relative to other 
institutions, both domestically and internationally. The soldier bears a general preference 
for honor and a desire for respect.35 This want is also magnified by the democratic 
transition because after enjoying an exalted status and virtually no challengers during the 
authoritarian period, the military fears losing out to emergent civilian actors that issue 
new, competing claims on scarce resources. Holding down the arms industry represents a 
potential hedge against such loss of status. The military-as-entrepreneur can win 
adoration both at home and abroad. The military are held up as ‘men of arms’ nobly 
cultivating the nation’s power to defend itself and earning prestige abroad for their 
handiwork, and that standing can be parlayed into new claims to economic rents as well 
as the preservation of the military’s existing position and rewards.36 
 
1.2. Coalition Building and the Problem of Generating Political Support 
The antagonisms between civilian and military over the fate of defense industry 
reform efforts find expression in a competitive struggle for power in which both sides try 
to forge a relatively broader coalition of legislative and political actors. Political scientists 
and economists in normative political economy agree that the social benefits of reform 
outweigh the costs. Yet literature on positive political economy in both fields shows that 
the political issue is whether the winners or losers can marshal support for or against 
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reform and can do so within a time frame that is relevant to key political actors.37 That 
insight has driven scholars to conclude that a starting point is the observation that reform 
must be seen as an exercise in coalition building, since “reform in a democracy could not 
occur otherwise.”38 Coalition building is just as vital for civilian and military. 
In a democratic era, neither civilian nor military can act alone to translate their 
interests into policy. In the civilian’s case, the polity is structured in a way that impedes 
civilian power. For starters, reform imposes costs on groups who are important to the 
civilian’s party and to lawmakers, defense ministers, legislative committees, and others 
who keep vital relationships with the party.39 First, reform threatens the ability of the 
civilian’s party to use the industry to patronage constituents and allies. Legislators, facing 
interest-group pressures to increase transfers to their districts, use industrial firms to 
distribute patronage to those districts.40 Doing so ensures the support of voters, as it does 
the cooperation of local and provincial authorities and the directors and employees of the 
firms themselves. Reform stands to disrupt these relationships because it would in all 
likelihood facilitate a reduction in budgets and the flow of pork to these constituencies, 
thereby reducing employment and diminishing other important economic indicators. 
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Second, military industry reform similarly threatens the party’s ability to 
patronage large societal interest groups. Legislative actors face pressures to minimize 
changes from powerful groups who have investments or benefits that depend upon the 
status quo. Thus, political parties are urged by labor unions to minimize changes that 
would create unemployment and reduce union bargaining power by altering spending and 
employment patterns in the industry. So, too, are parties pushed by the private sector to 
limit adjustments that might affect the latter’s access to comfortable competition, cheap 
inputs and lucrative state contracts, joint partnerships with well-connected military firms, 
and the state market for rents. The transition from military to civilian ownership and 
management undermines the ability of parties to preserve these conditions. Some firms or 
factories may be shuttered, downsized, or reorganized, spurring cutbacks, lay-offs, and 
other disruptions that increase unemployment and diminish union bargaining power.41 
The same changes may confront them with stronger competition as well as deny the 
private sector access to cheap inputs, entry into the rent market, lucrative state contracts, 
and other benefits. 
These distributional effects—the interruption of patron-client relationships and 
the erosion of private sector privileges and union power—may carry serious political 
consequences. They may induce anti-reform stakeholders to deny the party their 
resources and support. Politicians and parties, minding their own political and electoral 
fortunes, know this and the possible consequences in advance, and they allocate or 
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withhold their backing for policy reform accordingly. That, in turn, makes it much harder 
for the civilian to win the support of key political and legislative actors. 
Even if the civilian can secure their party or faction’s support, that party is likely 
to face even larger obstacles if the political system is fragmented. The dispersion of the 
vote across many parties ensures that none commands a majority, prompting the civilian 
to go looking for support from outsiders. Yet those other parties are in competition for 
seats, votes, and advancement within the legislature’s committees. Likewise, discipline, 
ideology, and other traits that affect party behavior vary from party to party. All of this 
increases the transaction costs that must be absorbed in order to gather support and 
sustain a collective effort. And it is not just that minor players can thwart policies they 
find disagreeable to their constituency or narrow interest; other actors may agree that 
reform is necessary and desirable but disagree on strategy, or see no benefit to helping 
others. Alternatively, some parties may be unable to properly discipline their members.42 
Each scenario would undermine the widening of the civilian’s support. 
As challenging as these conditions are, the civilian is not alone in facing 
difficulties. The military faces their own impediments to defeating legislation that affects 
their vital interests. In the first place, the military is not in a position to simply veto 
reform bills. They are not a formal part of the legislative or political process in a 
democracy like they were before when the military enjoyed a partnership within or 
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outright controlled the authoritarian regime. To the contrary, legislative debate and 
decision-making and the negotiation and agenda-setting procedures that set up these 
aspects of the democratic political process privilege the civilian far more than the military 
and industry representatives. Consequently, military lobbies will oppose the inclusion of 
reform on the legislative agenda, debate about the matter, the eventual vote, and related 
components of the process, but they will nevertheless find it difficult to stop these 
activities because the decisions lie outside of their jurisdiction and because the military 
enjoy no formal association with political appointees and legislative parties. 
Second, coercion is no longer viable political currency. During the period of 
authoritarian rule, the military employed extralegal means (up to and including coups) as 
well as the threat of them to thwart decisions with which they disagreed.43 Yet defiance 
and naked force lose their cache in a democratic era, when the legislature emerges as the 
arena central to the crafting or defeat of policies that affect military interests. In this 
arena, the costs of employing coercive bargaining are far higher and likely to erode the 
military’s institutional strength.44 It is also harder to threaten the legislature effectively; 
its actors have different proximities to the military than do executive actors, and 
legislative power is more diffuse than executive power, making it harder to attribute 
responsibility. Finally, legislators have their own interests and constituencies. Driven to 
ensure their political survival, they are more likely to mind the electoral and political 
realities that bear directly upon their reelection than to cave to military pressure.  
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Third, even if the military are able to find pre-existing allies more easily because 
of the existence of civilian beneficiaries of the status quo, those opponents of reform face 
their own collective action challenges. There are always inherent disincentives to 
collective action because such coordination is costly.45 Just as important, at some points 
in the political process, collective action costs are greater for the military-led opposition 
to reform than for the civilian-led movement for reform. Specifically, that opposition 
faces higher mobilization costs early in the distributional conflict, for decisions that shape 
the structure of the emerging debate and legislative process occur amidst uncertainty 
about the timing and shape of any future decision.46 That, in turn, creates vulnerabilities 
for the military side that can be exploited by a skilled politician. So, in a democracy, both 
civilian and military face distinct challenges to translating their clear and well-defined 
military industry reform preferences into policy.  
Yet neither side must acquiesce to these obstacles. Rather, they can surmount 
them by creating a dominant coalition of actors able to compete legislatively on their 
behalf, including the executive office, legislative party leaders, and the defense 
portfolio.47 While the civilian works alone and through their party and political allies, 
“the military has to be discreet, and will pin its fortunes on the prospect that political 
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parties and other political actors will adopt positions which converge with its own.”48 In 
any case, both sides use or rely on the resources at their disposal in an effort to forge 
partnerships with, co-opt, or otherwise absorb the same finite set of political actors.  
In the executive branch, civilian and military compete to enlist the defense 
portfolio and executive office. Their ability to do so is affected by the degree of 
ideological affinity and group likeness (including social group and party likeness) 
between the actor-broker and the relevant actor. Group and ideological likeness reduce 
the costs of securing the actor’s support and services, as the association will be more 
politically and electorally palatable for voters and other political actors. Where sufficient 
likeness exists, an executive alliance can be drawn upon to articulate an actor’s agenda, 
mobilize legislative supporters, and perform vital reporting functions. While the civilian 
benefits from an intermediary who can insulate the former from military pressure and 
push reforms through the executive and into the legislature, the military benefits from an 
advocate in the government who enjoys the authority and agenda-setting power to 
insulate the military institution from those same changes. In some cases, defense 
ministers may also enjoy access to discretionary expenditures that can be used to 
purchase the loyalties of legislators and facilitate the approval or denial of quorum, 
committee resolutions, legislative changes, and other relevant decisions.49 
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In the legislature, civilian and military allies each vie to form a broad, multiparty 
alliance. The civilian seeks to obtain their party’s commitment to provide stable support, 
and where they cannot, they must find other legislative allies to act in their party’s stead. 
Meanwhile, while the military tries to bring parties to adopt positions that align with its 
own, the military’s civilian allies try to cultivate relations with parties linked with the 
military. Those links may stem from civilian-military ties forged during the authoritarian 
period if the military co-opted, sponsored, or formed a party at that time.50 Other parties 
may have an ideological or political likeness for the military, the prior regime, or the 
status quo and see a benefit (or, at least, no added cost) to opposing reform. But though 
ideological affinity between military or civilian and the party broker (the actor’s main 
party ally) may facilitate cooperation, it is not as important as mutual interest; potential 
party brokers must see a clear political or electoral benefit to expending their political 
capital by pushing for or against military industry reform. In any event, the civilian and 
their allies and the military’s allies both horse-trade and jockey for position in a bid to 
create a long-term collective goods agenda where every potential player receives 
sufficient value to accept and promote the reform package or opposition deal.  
At the heart of the collective agreements in both coalitions are mid to long-term 
legislative trades and policy compromises that involve extensive searching, integrative 
bargaining, and renegotiating. The military coalition is built on opposition deals where all 
actors agree to suppress a particular bill. One or more groups may be allowed to benefit 
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from the opposition in exchange for allowing one or more groups or factions to benefit 
from the group’s opposition to or support for a future initiative. In the civilian coalition, 
moreover, one group or faction may be allowed to make a policy change in exchange for 
allowing another group or faction to make a change in the future, and parties can also 
post long-term bonds.51 The deals needed to facilitate agreement among potential pro-
reform parties partly depend upon the incorporation into the deal of the societal interests 
they represent. Here, there is a need to relax the political constraints formed by organized 
labor and private sector actors. 
There are four possible strategies for easing political constraints so that a broad 
civilian coalition can be created: a) building reform packages that provide guarantees to 
affected groups; b) building reform packages that give compensatory transfers to losers 
from reforms; c) creating institutions that make credible commitments to compensating 
transfers; and c) employing divide-and-rule tactics to make the status quo appear less 
attractive. We will discuss each in turn. 
Examples of building reform packages that provide guarantees to affected societal 
groups to purchase their acceptance include jobs guarantees for affected workers and 
providing affected firms with sureties like import protection, tax exemptions, and 
preferred prices on goods and services bought from state firms. These are obvious ways 
to help in obtaining the blessing of parties whose constituency includes organized labor 
or private sector actors.52 Guarantees can be difficult to enact, however. One key 
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difficulty is that they can restrict the ability of new owners or managers to improve 
performance. Take the example of jobs guarantees. These restrictions can deter investor 
interest and delay privatization in overstaffed firms. Even when the firms are 
corporatized rather than privatized (and thus remain in the state sector), job guarantees 
can limit the efficiency gains that often motivate the desire for reform in the first place, 
which can make it hard to acquire the support of actors supportive of reform because of 
those originally-envisioned potential gains.53 
Building reform packages that provide compensatory transfers is another 
straightforward way to win over parties reliant upon support from organized labor. For 
workers, these transfers may take the form of severance pay, contract arrangements, or 
early retirement. Compensatory transfers can be difficult to enact as well, however, 
because the required collection of tax revenues can involve distortionary costs; workers 
with low exit costs can gain high rents; and the coalition in power today cannot commit 
future coalitions to continuation of given policies, thereby creating a problem of weak 
commitment power that can make it difficult to gain the acceptance of the losers.54 This is 
where institutions with a commitment to compensatory transfers can enter the picture. 
Although policymakers cannot, in general, commit in advance to keep paying flows of 
compensating transfers, they may be able to create institutions with such a commitment. 
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These include, for example, active labor market programs that retrain or employ laid off 
workers and, in the case of privatization, employee share ownership schemes.55 
Finally, where carrots do not work, coalition-builders can use the stick and turn to 
divide-and-rule tactics to make the status quo less attractive. Coalitions can be built for 
laying off a series of small groups without full compensation for those groups, making 
each group worse off. When confronted with such tactics, the status quo no longer looks 
so safe or attractive, as it now includes the chance of suffering forced losses. “With the 
ground prepared in this way, a majority of workers may be willing to support a 
restructuring plan, as long as the compensation they receive is better than that what they 
would receive if they were caught up in one of the next rounds of ongoing partial 
layoffs.”56 A similar strategy can be employed in relations with private-sector 
beneficiaries by pushing through isolated reforms at a loss for some firms, then dangling 
the opportunity of compensation for other firms should they accept reform. Since initial 
economic, political, legal, and institutional conditions will vary across time and space, the 
most efficacious mix of these tactics will inevitably differ from pro-reform coalition 
builder to builder. 
If, after using these tactics, civilian coalitions are still short of the necessary votes, 
or if the military side has not yet crossed the coalitional finish line, both sides must forge 
broader coalitions with other actors, parties, or factions, and their ability to do so is 
                                               
55 Sunita Kikeri, Privatization and Labor: What Happens to Workers When Governments Divest? (New 
York: The World Bank, 1998). 
 
56 Roland, 34. 
 
  63 
affected by a number of factors. The most important of these are the mutual interests, 
ideological compatibility, and interparty discipline of the actor’s faction and another 
legislative group.57 Parties to a pro-reform, pro-civilian coalition must see a clear political 
or economic benefit to working with outsiders to push for a serious, long-term, structural 
reform of the defense sector, just as parties to an anti-reform, pro-military coalition must 
see such a benefit to pushing for measures that preserve arrangements which undermine 
governmental leverage. 
After interests, ideas come into play. Where two or more factions are 
ideologically compatible, voters will consider them to be similar, and since the parties 
already share ideas about an issue, coalition brokers will have to expend less political 
capital to get and keep parties on board as new groups are incorporated or as others exit.58 
Finally, partners will be more confident that partners will deliver on their ends of a 
multiparty deal where parties exhibit discipline, for that gives partners a reason to trust 
them. Trust is as vital as ideology, but trust depends on actors’ expectations about how 
others will behave, which are strongly shaped by past behavior.59 Trusting relationships 
form only if party leaders possess the electoral and political leverage to control their 
members and actually use their leverage to impose discipline on the rank-and-file. 
Interests and ideology are not necessarily immutable. To the contrary, there are 
races to shape interests and ideology within the wider coalition building struggle. Once 
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again, the critical tool is the use of the state or defense industry itself as a mechanism to 
deliver benefits or compensations to actors or, in the military’s case, to create rents for 
actors vested in the military-centered order. With the right mix of inducements and 
persuasion, the civilian and their brokers can transform traditional opponents of military 
industry reform into proponents of the industry’s market or corporate-driven reform. The 
military, meanwhile, may use its economic or organizational resources to create 
incentives for social and political actors to follow the military’s star. It may even create 
new relationships of indebtedness with political leaders or groups. 
Multiparty coalition formation is less successful where interest, ideology, and 
discipline vary more from group to group. Differences are more numerous and sharper 
and the potential political fallout from cooperation is more acute where interests do not 
align and great ideological or disciplinary distance spans the groups. Without a mutual 
interest in the status quo or its alteration, actors lack the initial motivation to absorb the 
steep costs of collective action. Without greater ideological affinity, leaders must 
reconcile radically opposing views and absorb the high political and electoral costs of 
changing or moderating positions. Coalitions are fragile and fleeting where they do 
materialize, as member parties more readily abandon brokers on key votes or abscond 
from the bloc at will with ease. That throws coalition brokers into tough circumstances, 
as they must attract and absorb distant new partners and yet “ensure that their vital horse-
trading does not induce the desertion of other, often weakly-committed actors.”60 
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Where mutual interest, ideology, and discipline are not enough, actors may also 
seek to facilitate exchange by complementing or substituting trades with distributive side 
payments.61 Proffering party leaders and individual mavericks with patronage and other 
dividends, the leader bids to secure credible commitments from weakly-committed or 
vulnerable actors who are otherwise able and often willing to veto the military industry 
reform bill or thwart the opposition campaign. Transfers, warts and all, are negotiated and 
delivered, entailing transaction costs and efficiency losses absorbed by the coalition 
leader. All the while, the leader controls mechanisms to keep member parties in line, 
including committee appointment control and agenda-setting power.62 
In legislative environments in which constraints have been relaxed, mutual 
interests and interparty discipline and ideological compatibility exist, and recalcitrant 
parties have been sufficiently patronaged, a legislative alliance can be created and used to 
promote or suppress an actor’s military industry reform agenda. The multiparty coalition 
internalizes disputes and facilitates the creation of clear, coherent, encompassing agendas 
where no single actor can take credit or accept responsibility for an outcome. First, the 
coalition helps to satisfy diverse interests and multiple veto players. As an informal 
institution, it is large and orderly enough that deals can be made within it more 
effectively, cheaply, and reliably than on the floor of a fragmented legislature. Second, 
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the coalition creates more credible commitments. Coalition partners have strong 
incentives to uphold the coalition agreements because doing so ensures that the support 
available for their own projects in the future will also be forthcoming. And third, the 
coalition reduces mobilization costs, especially early in the process, because allies can be 
readily identified and the unified entity can speak with one voice.63 By reducing the 
transaction costs of supporting or opposing policy change while increasing the costs of 
promoting the opposing outcome, these factors make it politically possible for leaders to 
choose change or stasis over the protests of narrow actors and influential lobbies. In the 
end, a dominant coalition leads to more support or opposition than existed before or 
would be attainable through threats, persuasion, or other strategies. This is so even with 
regard to the reform or preservation of firms where it would be least expected because of 
the outsized difficulty or ease of undertaking or blocking reform in that particular area of 
the military sector or in the particular economic or political circumstances. 
The efforts by civilian and military allies to absorb the same set of political actors 
result in the creation of two separate, opposing coalitions: the civilian coalition and the 
military coalition. These two coalitions are seldom created equal. Rather, there are a 
number of structural characteristics of coalitions that affect their ability to achieve their 
goals in the face of invigorated competition from rivals, and these characteristics will 
vary among any two coalitions. For the sake of simplification, we will focus on two of 
the most important of these traits: the relative scope of an actor’s coalition, and the unity 
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of the actor’s coalition. Scope refers to the effective reach of a coalition; unity refers to 
the effective cohesion of a coalition.  
Scope is essential to successful political action. Without a broad scope, even a 
highly unified coalition is unable to shape outcomes; all else being equal, that coalition 
lacks the structural potential to exert meaningful influence. In some ways, military 
coalition brokers enjoy a structural advantage that offsets the higher early mobilization 
costs they face. Groups sharing strong distinctive identities and dense networks are 
highly organized and, hence, more readily amassed because, by providing prior 
solidarities and moral commitments, these identities and networks provide a basis for the 
operation of collective incentives.64 Military ownership and management, for its part, 
already created and motivated the various anti-military industry reform stakeholders, 
while the civilian and their allies who pay the costs of the status quo are more loosely 
organized and—without a comparable existential threat—more difficult to motivate. 
Even so, civilian brokers can exploit the established loyalties of military coalition 
partners, particularly through the use of a combination of divide-and-rule tactics and 
invigorated competition from rivals.  
But unity, argues Mancur Olson, is just as vital as scope to group effectiveness.65 
Before a coalition can leverage its reach, it must overcome any internal rifts, dissent, or 
infighting over how to act.66 Doing so is a challenge for any group. In the civilian 
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coalition, differences can emerge around everything from the pace, timing, and priority 
given to reform; to characteristics of the specific bill to be made law; to the distributional 
consequences of the reform, including the distribution of the proceeds from reform when 
privatization is the chosen method. Again, the military coalition will enjoy an advantage, 
as uniting around a way to block change is easier than uniting around a way to impose 
change. Still, the military coalition can fragment too, particularly over how much to cede 
to the civilian coalition under certain political conditions as part of a broader strategy. 
Should their coalitions fragment, civilian and military allies will try to extract 
tailored commitments from weakly committed, vulnerable, or problem actors. Coalition 
brokers know that splits undermine their ability to exploit their reach and absorb other 
actors as well as make their coalition vulnerable to existential threats from more unified 
but smaller groups, including, for example, opposition takeovers of the legislature or 
even a redrawing of coalition boundaries. For these reasons, wrote Samuel Huntington, 
“A [civilian or military] group which is structurally united possesses great advantages in 
dealing with a group which is structurally disunited.” Nicos Poulantzas agreed, equating 
“the inability of any class or class fraction to impose its hegemony” with “the inability … 
to overcome its intensified contradictions.”67 
The relative strength of the civilian and military coalitions, as captured by their 
relative scope and unity, affords the civilian varying possibilities regarding policy change 
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and affords the military and allies varying veto possibilities vis-à-vis such changes. The 
incorporation of other actors into an actor’s unified coalition—which we will call 
boundary expansion—and restriction of the incorporation of other actors into their rival’s 
coalition—which we will call boundary control—alter the balance of power between the 
actors.68 Because it avails one side of greater influence and legislative resources than it 
originally had while denying the other side access to the same, this alteration makes it 
more likely that the dominant coalition builder will prevail in the conflict. So, where the 
civilian coalition is broad and united and the military coalition is not, the civilian’s ability 
to shape legislative outcomes is enhanced and the military’s ability is weakened. Where 
the military coalition is broad and united and the civilian coalition is not, the military’s 
ability to shape legislative outcomes is enhanced and the civilian’s ability is weakened. 
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Figure 1.2. Boundary Expansion and Control 
Military coalition expands,  
civilian coalition contracts 
Reform  
threatened 
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Stitching together a winning pro-reform coalition provides the civilian leader with 
an opportunity to make a practical difference in what she can accomplish under existing 
law. The coalition avails the civilian of the resources necessary to create the best and 
most effective legal tools for a policy goal of reforming the military industry. In 
particular, the coalition can be used to create a special military industry reform law 
determining that that civilian leader rather than the military handles policy for the defense 
industry and its individual firms. As long as the proposal expands government power in 
relation to the defense sector in key ways and is not duplicative of laws that already exist, 
such a law creates major and substantive new civilian powers while simultaneously 
limiting the military’s powers. That, in turn, permits the civilian leader to assert 
jurisdiction in the area of defense industry policy, which is necessary in order for the 
civilian to become able to take the lead in designing an encompassing reform policy. 
Without a winning coalition of her own, and perhaps facing a dominant military 
coalition, a pro-reform civilian leader may turn to Thor’s hammer and utilize executive 
authority. Without the participation of the legislature, the civilian can cite legal powers of 
the executive in order to create new legal tools for presenting defense industry policy 
goals. This means searching for existing statutory powers or the chief executive’s 
constitutional authorities. And should the civilian discover such executive tools available 
to her, using them can be advantageous; while the dispersion of power in the legislature 
can keep the legislature from making decisions quickly and with full information, the 
vast, specialized, hierarchically-controlled executive branch can make decisions more 
decisively. Yet, in most cases, executive action is limited in its scope and possibilities, as 
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it is useful only for defining a policy goal of reforming part of the industry or part of each 
firm rather than the whole sector. Thus, civilians can use their statutory authority to 
present part of their policy goals when the military coalition blocks (or threatens to block) 
legislation, but the potential for unilateral action of this kind is restricted. 
Two caveats are in order. First, the military coalition requires a narrower scope in 
order to provide the military with a veto possibility and deny the civilian a change 
possibility than the civilian coalition requires in order to provide the civilian with a 
change possibility and deny the military a veto possibility. In order to change policy, the 
civilian coalition must encompass all three veto points—the legislature, executive office, 
and defense portfolio. Only then does the power structure deny the military every last 
opportunity to veto a change. For the same reason, however, the military need only 
occupy one veto point in order to acquire the opportunity to stop legislative reform. The 
upshot of this is that the military can, peso for peso, be outperformed by the civilian in 
the coalitional battle and yet still wind up on top if the civilian does not succeed in 
expanding the radius of their coalition to its necessary reaches. 
Second, the military does not always need an actual coalition partner or partners 
to obtain the functional equivalent of a coalition. Sometimes the civilian will benefit from 
the convergence of their positions and those of potential allies within the legislature, 
executive branch, and defense portfolio, however, the military will be able to successfully 
encourage the divergence of the reform strategies of civilian leaders and those of one or 
more of these three veto players. When the military succeeds in driving splits into the 
ranks of the civilian-aligned veto players in this way, the veto players will work against 
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rather than with each other, and the effect will be the same as if the military had one or 
more coalition partners. This is a circumstance in which the military has an effective 
coalition as a result of employing a divide-and-rule strategy. 
 
1.3. Institution Building and the Problem of Generating Institutional Capacity 
Coalition building is but one of two power building struggles in which civilian 
and military engage. The other is an institution building process wherein both players 
compete to cultivate bureaucratic institutions that can shape the design of their chosen 
defense industry policies. Scholars acknowledge that just as actors cannot work alone to 
translate their preferences into policy, they cannot work alone to translate their chosen 
policy goals into practice. Instead, actors must delegate policy design to governmental 
agencies and servants who have the time, resources, ability, and authority to do the job. 
Yet actors cannot take it for granted that agencies will follow. The actors may lack 
control over key bureaucratic institutions, and the civilian’s goal of reform in particular 
generates demands for new types of state capabilities that are weak or nonexistent.69 
These kinds of insights have led scholars to conclude that the political economy of reform 
must be seen not just as an issue of coalition building, but of institution building as well. 
This institution building is just as important for civilian and military. 
Again the civilian is greeted by a range of obstacles when she attempts to achieve 
her policy goals. This time, those obstacles stem from the fact that the defense industry 
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bureaucracy is structured in a way that facilitates military power. First, the bureaucracy 
may enhance the military presence. Civilians may not occupy the top post in the defense 
ministry or its staff positions; a defense ministry may not exist, the defense minister post 
may be reserved for the top-ranking officer, or there may be a tradition of selecting a 
military officer as defense minister. In this case, the desired changes would not be 
ordered from above and would not be supported from below. The defense minister and 
the heads of agencies would just preserve the status quo, allowing the military an entry 
into the ministry to exert its influence.70 Our discussion earlier clarifies why—self-reform 
is very hard; the military would resist because divestiture and restructuring mean giving 
up vital interests. That is why Barry Posen argues that military doctrine cannot be 
changed from within military organizations, but rather must be prodded from the 
outside.71 
Even if the defense portfolio maximizes the civilian presence, the defense 
ministry itself may not limit the military’s vertical authority. Command authority may not 
belong to that minister. Rather, the military chain of command may end at the 
commanders of the different service branches. Such an arrangement crowds out the 
civilian point of view and deprives the executive of the requisite feedback to adequately 
assess military compliance with the civilian’s policies. And “if… [the military’s] vertical 
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position is second only to the sovereign head of state, it will have privileged access and 
therefore tremendous political power.”72 
Second, the defense ministry may not be empowered to make defense industry-
related decisions. It is the military commanders who enjoy key defense industry-related 
powers. Those functions are the jurisdiction of military agencies, with each firm being 
administered by the service branch ministry or other military agency associated with its 
production. While reassuring to the military, this bureaucratic arrangement will not 
achieve the requisite levels of compliance to implement a policy of reform. Like the firms 
they oversee, the military industry agencies operate with few constraints. They do not 
formally answer to any other institution, coordinate their activities, cooperate with 
civilians, or rationalize their use of resources. Instead, they enjoy autonomy to direct 
enterprises under their watch to pursue any economic, political, or geo-political objective 
they see fit. 
These limits to compliance are magnified by the complexity of military industry 
reform and the need for the legislature to grant the defense industry bureaucracy a wider 
mandate. Like any sectoral transition, military industry reform is a logistically and 
technically challenging process of discovery— “a search through a large space of 
possible institutional arrangements” for structures that can work in a particular 
environment.73 Though the civilian coalition knows which general interests should be 
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represented, it is not possible for the civilian coalition to write specific guidelines for the 
agencies because it does not know the impact of every alternative, or what its specific 
interests are and how the process will affect their constituency. Consequently, the 
bureaucracy will get to choose its program, define its goals, and determine its procedures, 
and this expansion of purview is further magnified by distinct limits to information and 
transparency.74 That enhanced agenda control creates a possibility of mischief on behalf 
of the military bureaucracy, which can easily subvert the will of the civilian and their 
coalition by making decisions that directly or indirectly continue military control. 
Nor can military and coalitional allies take their own bureaucratic decision-
making capacity for granted. The military side cannot ensure its institutions and 
institutional allies will fall faithfully in line with their policy preferences and craft the 
same policy of military industry development administratively that was crafted 
legislatively, however much legislative power the military wields. Institutional 
decentralization may render interbranch coordination and unity from military branch to 
branch more difficult. The more military institutions there are, the harder it may be for 
military actors to defend their institutions from civilian encroachments because multiple 
institutions create multiple points of entry as well as the possibility of competing 
demands and visions between the institutions. Not only that, but the civilian government 
may absorb or co-opt the military’s erstwhile defense industry institutions and turn them 
to new ends, thus weakening the military’s grip on its own agencies. Thus, civilian as 
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well as military face challenges to generating the bureaucratic capacity to implement their 
military industry reform and development goals efficiently and effectively. 
Yet, once again, neither civilian nor military must acquiesce to the obstacles. To 
the contrary, both actors can innovate out of the constraints they face. The civilian can 
overcome them if a new civilian government comes to power, builds a strong coalition 
for reform, and then, with executive leadership, reforms the defense industry bureaucracy 
from the top down. First, a president or prime minister who is pro-reform and at the 
center of a winning coalition makes political appointments in the defense ministry that 
help set in motion bureaucratic reform, beginning with the appointment of a pro-reform 
defense minister. Those top-level political appointees then take charge of the hiring of 
civil servants, experts, and party members at lower rungs who will head up the 
departments or create new ones. 
Next, that civilian and the civilians in the defense ministry create and empower a 
department for crafting policy for individual military industry enterprises that is 
controlled by the democratically-elected government through the command of the 
defense ministry. Administration of the military firms may be transferred to the new 
defense ministry defense production department’s orbit, and the defense production 
department absorbs all available information as well as the functions of the former 
military authorities. Those functions include the duties to respond to firms and 
employees, appoint or propose firm directors, approve budgets and operational plans, and 
preside over the creation, merging, or liquidation of defense-related enterprises. The 
equivalent powers of residual military agencies are rescinded and the agencies are 
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dissolved or subordinated to the new civil authority. The chief executive herself enjoys 
tools for influencing the new institution’s activities and development, including a say 
over whom is appointed to head the department and influence over administrative 
procedures and budget submissions for agency appropriations. 
The emerging civilian defense production bureaucracy gradually acquires a 
permanent nucleus of disciplined and well-paid civilian staff who replace military staff 
and temporary civilian contractors. People from other ministries, academics, lawyers, 
accountants, and other skilled individuals are recruited into the defense production 
department and provided with the means and incentives to learn on the job through 
training seminars at home and abroad and then to remain on the job for a long time, if not 
permanently.75 In the process, the defense production department not only accumulates a 
fixed stock of specialized capacities, but establishes a system for replenishing them 
through the same such processes of systematic learning, knowledge-creation, and 
retention. Meanwhile, audit and review emerge as vital tools for assessing enterprise 
viability; clear transparency and discipline guidelines are established, and agents are 
socialized to professional norms.76 
As a result of these changes, the bureaucracy begins to grow, develop more 
expertise, assume greater authority, and serve the interest of reforming the military 
industry. The institution begins to function as a regenerative nucleus in which new 
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abilities and expertise are developed and transferred across space and time. The universe 
of approaches at the disposal of bureaucratic agents expands dramatically, to include not 
just corporate governance and administrative reforms but domestic and foreign 
privatizations, corporatizations, bankruptcies, liquidations, listings and de-listings, debt-
for-equity swaps, voucher programs, auctioning of state firms and their assets and 
liabilities, and more.77 
Strengthening the central administration by creating a functional defense industry 
bureaucracy within the defense ministry produces an institutional environment where 
divestiture, restructuring, and regulatory activities can be planned, arranged, and executed 
more dependably and more effectively.78 Together, the civilianization of the defense 
ministry’s top ranks and staff, empowerment of the defense minister and new defense 
production department, and subordination of the military and their holdings to the civilian 
defense minister and defense industry agency achieve four things. First, they redirect 
policy and decision-making flows to favor civilians, thus insuring that the creation of 
policy moves from the top down, not bottom up. Second, they add layers of authority 
between president or prime minister, defense minister, and the service heads, which 
insures that the reform directives handed down from the chief executive are translated 
into plans, and not thwarted by the military.79 Third, they avail the civilian of the ability 
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to perform tasks that the former military authorities were not fully capable of performing. 
And forth, the functionality of the ministry changes from serving the parochial interests 
of service branches to serving general defense objectives, as defined and prioritized by 
the civilian government.80 
As the above shows, the defense production bureaucracy does not change on its 
own, nor does it change simply because a civilian coalition gains influence. Rather, the 
changes depend upon the vital connection between the defense ministry bureaucracy and 
the chief executive himself. There is a president or prime minister at the center of a 
winning coalition who is in a position to make political appointments in the defense 
ministry which will help set in motion bureaucratic reform. Guided by this civilian 
leader, these coalitions establish new rules or overhaul the system entirely, “such that 
actors who were not involved in the original design of an institution and whose 
participation in it may not have been reckoned with, take it over and turn it to new 
ends.”81 Writes Terry Moe: 
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“… [T]he public authority employed to create and design [political institutions] 
can be exercised by whatever coalitions gain the necessary support in the 
legislature (often a majority). Whoever wins has the right to make decisions on 
behalf of everyone, and whoever loses is required by law—backed by the police 
powers of the state—to accept the winners’ decisions. This means that any groups 
that prevail under the formal rules can legitimately use public authority to impose 
bureaucratic institutions that are structurally stacked in their own favor…”82 
 
Just as “whatever coalitions gain the necessary support in the legislature … [to] 
legitimately use public authority to impose bureaucratic institutions that are structurally 
stacked in their own favor,” dominant civilian coalitions give way to legislation, which 
gives way to the chief executive’s ability to impose bureaucratic changes in the defense 
ministry. Those changes come in the form of more centralized decision making, more 
expertise, bureaucratic differentiation, redirection of policy and decision-making flows to 
favor civilians, and the addition of layers of authority to distance military officers from 
the centers of power. And then the military must accept the institution’s authority. 
In most cases, the bureaucracy will remain weak where military coalitions are 
strong; military coalition partners are driven to facilitate bureaucratic path dependence 
because the military bureaucracy supports the arrangement of military control upon 
which the coalition’s benefit depends. Yet the bureaucracy need not remain weak in all 
cases where the military coalition is strong. Under some conditions, the civilian coalition 
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will be missing a leg but still afford the civilian leader the ability to make changes that 
initiate bureaucratic strengthening. If the locus of the reform effort is the chief executive 
herself and the civilian coalition includes that executive and her defense portfolio but not 
the legislature, then the military coalition has a slight advantage, however, bureaucratic 
strengthening is still possible if the civilian leader can decree orders that give way to 
executive ability to make bureaucratic changes. In this case, that civilian reformer and 
focal point of the civilian coalition will promote bureaucratic institutions in a way that 
will facilitate the ability to create institutional strength. 
There are a number of structural characteristics of defense industry bureaucracies 
that affect whether policymakers achieve their goals in the face of military resistance. For 
purposes of simplification, we will focus on three of the most important of these: the 
relative civilianization of the bureaucracy, the relative empowerment of the bureaucracy, 
and the expertise of the bureaucracy. Civilianization refers to the extent to which control 
of the bureaucracy is in the hands civilian officials and appointees; empowerment refers 
to the extent to which the defense ministry assumes key defense industry-related powers, 
and expertise is the degree of advanced knowledge about enterprise reform among the 
bureaucracy’s personnel. 
Civilianization is critical to the crafting of industry reform policy goals because it 
insures that the policy reform preferences of the civilian get translated into planning 
actions and that the defense industry bureaucracy serves the policy goals of the 
government rather than those of the military. Empowerment is equally vital. It entails the 
granting of certain abilities necessary to administer firms and the wider industry, 
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including making policy for firms and the sector, approving firm budgets and operational 
plans, and performing audit and review. Some civilian institutions may wield the power 
to appoint firm directors directly rather than merely present the chief executive with 
options, in which case the civilian bodies enjoy an unparalleled degree of autonomy from 
real and potential military pressure. More often, the institutions will lack this degree of 
power and autonomy and yet provide the civilian executive with the requisite capacity to 
use executive authority to mobilize the institutions to make specific ownership and/or 
managerial changes to a subset of firms without going to the legislature. Such sources of 
power embolden the civilian executive and the defense industry bureaucracy by creating 
a situation in which civilian judgments rather than those of the military are deferred to on 
politically decisive issues.83 
Finally, designing policy is not possible without the creation of expertise. 
Knowledge-creation expands the universe of opportunities by making it possible for 
bureaucrats to select and implement a range of different reform plans.84 Creating a 
knowledgeable civilian staff is a two-step process. It, first, requires recruiting skilled 
people from other ministries as well as academics, lawyers, accountants, and others. Then 
these individuals must be provided with a career track leading toward jobs in the defense 
industry bureaucracy through training institutes at home and abroad, educational 
opportunities, and educational links to government. Once civilianization, empowerment, 
and the creation of expertise have occurred and the defense industry bureaucracy is 
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functional, it becomes very hard for the military to weaken it, unless there are major 
political changes underfoot. 
The military, on the other hand, can ensure its institutional strength by forging a 
dominant coalition and using it prevent the cultivation of civilian authority. In essence, 
this means using its legislative strength and resources to block the initiation of processes 
of civilianization, empowerment, and generation of expertise while simultaneously 
guaranteeing that likeminded military or even civilian personnel fill key positions in 
defense industry agencies. The military can prevent civilianization by using its coalitional 
strength to choose leaders of the same persuasion. It can prevent the creation and/or 
empowerment of certain civilian agencies by leveraging its strength to block legislation 
to create new agencies and resources. And, as in the case of preventing civilianization, 
the military can stop the development of civilian expertise by crowding civilians out of 
contention—that is, ensuring that civilians do not fill important roles or enter the defense 
industry institutions in large enough numbers to contribute to a meaningful process of 
civilian knowledge creation, retention, and transmission. 
The relative strength of civilian and military institutions, as captured by 
civilianization, empowerment, and expertise, affords the civilian varying possibilities 
regarding policy design and affords the military varying veto possibilities vis-à-vis such 
decision-making. The logic of boundary expansion and control introduced earlier, when 
applied in turn to the study of bureaucratic politics, explains why: the creation or 
retention of functional abilities by one actor—which we will call function expansion—
and the simultaneous restriction of the functional abilities of the actor’s rival—which we 
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shall call function control—alter the original balance of institutional strength between the 
actors. That change makes it more likely that the actor will prevail in the bureaucratic 
conflict because it avails them of greater institutional resources than they originally had 
while denying their rival access to the requisite bureaucratic power to influence 
outcomes. Thus, where the bureaucracy is civilianized, empowered, and possesses a high 
level of expertise, the ability of the civilian to effectively pursue defense industry policy 
goals is enhanced, while the ability of the military to prevent the pursuit those policy 
goals is weakened. Where the bureaucracy is not civilianized, empowered, and possessive 
of a high level of expertise, the ability of the civilian to effectively design policy goals is 
weakened, while the military’s ability to veto the crafting of policy goals is enhanced. 
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1.4. (Re)Shaping Military and Society: A Model of Military Industry Reform 
Now that we have developed the key concepts to be deployed in this study, we 
can use them to formulate a simple model of the military industry in transition. 
Proponents of a power-centered view of politics pose political life in terms of actors 
Figure 1.3. Function Expansion and Control 
Military function expands,  
civilian function contracts 
Reform 
threatened 
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legitimately using public authority to impose measures that constrain their rivals while 
promoting and protecting their own interests.85 In this drama, it is the actors themselves 
who are the causal agents, as they use their sources of power to bring about outcomes that 
otherwise would not have been brought about.86 By the same token, civilian and military 
actors will use coalitional strength and institutional strength to shift some, all, or none of 
the defense industry from military to civilian ownership and management. Thus, we 
should expect military industry reform to vary with differing configurations of coalitional 
strength and institutional strength. 
The military industry should be fully reformed where the civilian’s coalitions and 
institutions are relatively stronger than those of their military rivals, as represented by 
quadrant A. in Figure 1.4. The civilian coalition can impose ownership and management 
reform legislation and the bureaucracy can design the changes; the coalition encompasses 
the legislature, executive power, and defense portfolio, thus denying the military 
opportunities to veto legislation, while the bureaucracy is sufficiently functional to deny 
the military opportunities to prevent the crafting of the reform policies for individual 
firms. Thus, the executive and defense portfolio set the agenda to include reform, the 
civilian introduces or facilitates the introduction of bills authorizing the defense industry 
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bureaucracy to transfer ownership and management of defense industry firms to civilian 
entities, and the coalition facilitates the passage of the bills. The bureaucracy then uses its 
statutory authority, information, and analytical resources to restructure and value the 
firms; package and mark assets; draw up contracts; seek out, identify, and evaluate new 
owners, and then close the transaction or transfer. 
The industry should be partly reformed where the military coalition and the 
civilian institution are relatively stronger than their rivals (quadrant B. of Figure 1.4.). 
The military coalition can block legislation, but the bureaucracy can act under orders 
from a reform-minded executive to design and implement policies for the managerial 
reform of each firm or the managerial and ownership reform of select enterprises; the 
military coalition encompasses the legislative power, thus permitting the military 
opportunities to veto legislation, but the civilian executive controls a bureaucratic 
apparatus that provides the executive with the capacity to pursue complex changes but 
denies the military opportunities to thwart them. Therefore, the civilian and defense 
portfolio put managerial or incremental reform on the agenda and the executive orders 
the crafting of that policy. Then the bureaucracy, employing civilian academics, lawyers, 
engineers, accountants, private industry leaders, and career bureaucrats originating from 
other state agencies proceeds to replace military with civilians in the directories of 
industrial firms or design corporatization, privatization, or other reform policies for a 
selection of individual military firms. 
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Finally, the military industry should not at all be reformed where military 
coalitions and institutions dominate their civilian rivals (quadrant D. of Figure 1.4.). The 
military coalition can block legislation and the military bureaucracy can ignore executive 
orders; the military’s coalition spans the defense portfolio, legislative power, or executive 
power (or any of these three), permitting the military opportunities to veto legislation, 
while its bureaucratic institutions are powerful enough to block design and enforcement 
of the civilian leader’s policy goals. Thus, military coalition partners block reform 
legislation in open conflict or prevent its introduction by exercising agenda control or 
denying quorum. In response to executive orders to initiate reform, the bureaucracy drags 
its heels and resists providing information that would make reform more probable. 
Civilian Military 
Coalitional Strength 
Institutional Strength 
Civilian 
Military 
Figure 1.4. Reform Outcomes and Coalitional and Institutional Strength 
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1.5. Operationalization and Measurement 
This study treats power as a historically-informed phenomenon. To turn the 
study’s theoretical expectations into testable hypotheses, we must address the thorny 
question of how to conceptualize and measure its two power-related concepts. Power is 
the ability of an actor to shape outcomes, or “to get things done” effectively, “in 
particular when their goals are obstructed by some kind of human resistance or 
opposition.”87 Like capital, power poses problems of conceptualization and measurement 
due to its theoretical abstraction. It is a capability and, thus, cannot be gauged directly. 
Even so, write John Gerring and team about such concepts, “the ambiguities of capital-
based theories may be redeemed by the theoretical leverage that they offer… They allow 
us to think about the role of political institutions and relationships over time,” which is a 
“significant theoretical advantage… [that is] not well captured by other terms (for 
example, ‘governance,’ ‘good institutions,’ ‘property rights’).”88 
Nevertheless, existing notions of civil-military power frequently hinge on a 
problematic assumption in which power is treated as essentially an immediate quantity. 
Work on civil-military power and policy has tended to focus on the possible causal role 
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of a civilian or military actor’s contemporary level of power on a country’s subsequent 
policy outcomes.89 Thus, the level of power available to a given actor this year is said to 
influence outcomes in the following period. That ensuing window of time may be one 
year, two years, or some larger temporal increment, but the fact remains that scholars 
have often conceived of the problem as the impact of an actor’s given level of power on 
outcomes at time T plus some specified period of time. These studies look forward in 
time, but not backward. This is at best a fragile postulate.  
If an actor’s power affects political outcomes today, it stands to reason that the 
actor’s current access to power stems from what are essentially historical events, rather 
than from purely contemporaneous events. An actor’s power does not reset again each 
year. Rather, it stems from legacies that go back multiple years. Thus, the foregoing 
discussion showed that an actor’s power can stem from exchanges or favors done for 
allies or partners that are banked for future use. Alternatively, as the focus on trust 
revealed, power can be a more sophisticated quantity that results from a pattern of past 
behavior establishing a reputation for fidelity and competence.90 On the institutional side, 
power builds up as a result of the creation of relationships of dependence or coordination 
between firms and governmental entities containing civilian bureaucrats who possess of 
high levels of expertise. Fundamentally, it was shown that power is cumulative, not 
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contemporaneous. For these reasons, I submit that power must be treated as a stock rather 
than level variable.91 
Considering power as a stock variable means looking both backward in time at 
flows affecting power relations and forward in time at the specific power dynamics 
resulting from all hitherto inflows and outflows. To this end, coalitional strength can be 
measured contemporaneously by jointly examining the scope and unity of the civilian and 
military coalitions and historically by jointly examining the flows of political and 
legislative actors into and out of the civilian and military coalitions. Institutional strength 
can be measured contemporaneously by assessing the civilianization, empowerment, and 
expertise of the defense industry bureaucracy; historical measurements of institutional 
strength can be taken by assessing the flows of skilled personnel subordinate to a given 
actor into and out of the bureaucracy with jurisdiction over military industry policy. The 
remainder of this section develops these measures. 
 
Coalitional Strength  
Coalitional strength is the distribution between civilian and military allies of the 
ability to shape legislative outcomes, and it is a function of the relative scope and unity of 
the military and civilian coalitions. Scope is the effective reach of a coalition, and it takes 
the values of high and low. The indicator for scope is the presence or absence of 
                                               
91 A stock variable is some entity that is accumulated over time and/or is depleted over time. A stock is 
changed over time by flows, and we can distinguish between inflows (which add to the stock) and outflows 
(which subtract from the stock). Flows normally are measured over a certain interval of time; for example, 
the number of births over a day or month when the stock is population. Stocks typically have a certain 
value at each moment in time. Thus, in the example of population, the value is the total number of people at 
a given moment). Irving Fisher, “What is Capital?,” The Economic Journal, 6, 24 (1896), 509–34. 
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convergence, defined as a merging of policy preferences between the actor in question 
and the executive office, the political party faction(s) in control of the legislature, and the 
defense portfolio. To determine the scope of each coalition, for each veto player, I code 
the actor’s preference as civilian-convergent or military-convergent. I examine the 
player’s pronouncements about the efficacy of the specific military industry reform being 
proposed. If I find evidence of favoring reform, I code the actor’s preference as civilian-
convergent. If I find evidence of opposing reform, I code the actor’s preference as 
military-convergent. These measurements are taken continuously. 
Unity is the effective cohesion of a given coalition, and it takes the values of high 
and low. The indicator for unity is coalescence, defined as the extent to which actors in a 
coalition have rallied around a most-optimal strategy for achieving their shared policy 
goals. Here, we must distinguish between the positions (preferences regarding a proposed 
reform) and strategies (methods for realizing preferences) of actors. For sets of actors 
whose positions have converged, I code the set as unified or divided after doing the 
following: first, I examine the actors’ pronouncements about the efficacy of different 
reform strategies or different opposition strategies. If I find evidence that the actors have 
coalesced around a reform or opposition strategy, I code the set’s unity as high. If I find 
evidence that the actors have not coalesced around a given strategy, I code the set’s unity 
as low. Scope and unity are jointly necessary and sufficient for coalitional strength, but, 
as we saw, military and civilian must build unified coalitions of different sizes in order to 
ensure their influence over outcomes. Those differences are depicted in Figure 1.5. 
Figure 1.5. Strong and Weak Civilian and Military Coalitions 
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The relative strength of a given civilian or military coalition, as measured by 
scope and unity, can be represented as a level variable at any time. As we have noted, 
however, the volume depicted by that level represents a historical quantity, or stock, for 
the resource accumulated over a period of time. The actors’ respective volumes of 
coalitional strength, as stocks, can be jointly conceived of as the distribution between the 
actors of the accumulated ability to shape legislative outcomes. The units of these stocks 
are likeminded actors, that is, actors who agree with the existing actors in the coalition on 
the most optimal reform or opposition strategy. The units of flow are likeminded actors 
per year, while the inflows are likeminded actors entering the coalitions and the outflows 
are the actors leaving the coalition (see Table 1.5). 
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Table 1.5. Stock and Flow of Coalitional Strength and Institutional Strength 
Stock Units of Stock Inflows Outflows Units of 
Flow 
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Institutional Strength 
Institutional strength is the distribution between civilian and military of the ability 
to shape administrative outcomes, and it involves the relative capacity of the military and 
civilian bureaucracies to design and implement military industry policy goals. The de 
facto setting includes a relatively strong military bureaucracy that directly and indirectly 
supports the industry itself, so measuring institutional strength requires examining the 
degree of movement or lack thereof away from status quo military bureaucratic rule and 
toward civilian bureaucratic rule. Institutional strength is measured contemporaneously 
by assessing the civilianization, empowerment, and expertise of the bureaucracy. 
Civilianization, the extent to which civilian officials and civilian appointees 
control key governmental agencies, takes the values of high and low. I code the 
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bureaucracy as civilianized or not civilianized by examining the association of the 
bureaucracy’s personnel. If I find evidence of civilians (department heads and a majority 
or more of staff), I code the bureaucracy as civilian. If I find evidence of control by 
military (department heads and a majority or greater of staff), I code the bureaucracy as 
military. Empowerment, the extent to which the military bureaucracy or civilian defense 
ministry assumes key defense production-related powers, takes the values of high and 
low. I examine the distribution of powers and responsibilities between civilian and 
military institutions, then code each bureaucracy as sufficiently or insufficiently 
empowered by comparing its powers to those in the categories in Figure 1.5.1. 
Expertise is the extent of advanced knowledge about enterprise reform among the 
civilian bureaucracy’s personnel, and it takes the values of high and low. I code the 
bureaucratic structure as more capable or less capable. I examine the educational 
attainment as well as the experience of 1) the chief administrator and 2) the sub-
administrator of the relevant bureaucratic entity or entities. If I find evidence of advanced 
degrees (for instance, PhDs or JDs) and experience in public administration, public law, 
accounting, academia, engineering, corporate governance, and similar areas, I code the 
key personnel as more capable. If I find evidence of a lack of such educational attainment 
or experience, I code the key personnel as less capable. The combination of 
civilianization, empowerment, and expertise is necessary and sufficient for institutional 
strength. Strong civilian institutions are civilianized, empowered, and possessive of 
expertise. Weaker institutions lack one or more of these essential features, with the 
weakest institutions lacking all three. 
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Figure 1.5.1. Strong and Weak Civilian and Military Institutions 
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Military Industry Reform 
Military industry reform is the transfer of the firms of a domestic defense-
industrial complex from military to civilian ownership and management. It is a composite 
ordinal dependent variable measured by assessing two conceptually distinct dichotomous 
variables: managerial reform and ownership reform. Fortunately, agreement exists about 
how to measure variables like military industry reform. Military enterprise reform, for 
example, is typically understood as being measurable by the percentage change in 
enterprises transferred from military to civilian control, with ‘control’ conceived of as 
command of enterprise governance structures like boards of directors (in the case of 
management) and shareholder arrangements (in the case of ownership).92 This study 
analyzes management as well as ownership, treating them as two sides of the same 
composite variable. 
Managerial reform takes the values of high and low, and its indicator is the 
percentage increase in firms transferred to civilian management. For each firm that was 
under military management at the start of the time period under study, I code the 
directory as civilian-managed or military-managed. To do so, I examine the composition 
of the directory. If I find evidence of a civilian majority, I code the firm as civilian-
managed. If I find evidence of a military majority, I code the enterprise as military-
managed. The proportion of firms the directory of which changed from military to 
civilian-managed during the period determines the percentage increase in firms 
                                               
92 David Pion-Berlin and Rafael Martínez, Soldiers, Politicians, and Civilians: Reforming Civil-Military 
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transferred to civilian management. To determine the managerial reform category, that 
proportion is compared with and categorized according to the following cutoff points: 
0%–50% = low managerial reform; 50.1%–100% = high managerial reform. 
Ownership reform takes the values of high and low, and its indicator is the 
percentage increase in firms transferred to civilian ownership. For each firm that was 
under military ownership at the start of the time period under study, I code the ownership 
structure as civilian-owned or military-owned. I examine the distribution of equity with 
regard to capital and the identity of the equity owners. If I find evidence of a civilian 
public or private majority, I code the firm as civilian-owned. If I find evidence of a 
military majority, I code the enterprise as military-owned. As with management, the 
proportion of firms whose structure changed from military to civilian-owned during the 
period determines the percentage increase in firms transferred to civilian ownership. To 
determine the ownership reform category, that proportion is then compared with and 
categorized according to the following cutoff points: 0%–50% = low ownership reform; 
50.1%–100% = high ownership reform. 
Military industry reform itself takes the values of high, medium, and low. To 
determine the overall reform category, the managerial reform and ownership reform 
categories are classified according to the following cutoff points: low management 
reform and low ownership reform = failed military industry reform; high management 
reform and low ownership reform = partial military industry reform; low management 
reform and high ownership reform = partial military industry reform; high management 
reform and high ownership reform = radical military industry reform. 
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As we discussed, in some cases, a subset of firms will be subjected to both 
managerial and ownership reform (as opposed to, say, only the management of all firms 
being reformed). In such cases, the above measures would fail to capture the real degree 
of partial change because both the percentage increase in firms transferred to civilian 
management and the percentage increase in firms transferred to civilian ownership would 
fall below 50.1 percent. In order to avoid this pitfall, I deploy a second measure that is 
simply the sum of these two percentages. The reform category is determined by 
comparing the sum to the following cutoff points: 0%–33.33% = failed reform; 33.34%–
66.33% = partial reform; 66.34%–100% = radical reform. 
 
1.6. Methodology and Cases 
This study of military industry and reform deploys process tracing within the 
framework of a small-N comparative analysis. Cross-country comparisons are a powerful 
tool for making valid causal inferences because of their ability to achieve independence 
among the cases. Comparing nations with similar economic, socioeconomic, cultural, 
historical, geographic, and ecological conditions—a ‘most similar systems design’—is an 
effective way to explore how the different political arrangements of the two countries 
influence their different political-economic outcomes, just as comparing nations with 
very different conditions—a ‘most different systems design’—is an effective way to 
examine how the similar political arrangements of the two countries influence their 
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similar political outcomes.93 Yet the benefit of increasing the independence among cases 
can come at the expense of equivalence among cases, that is, establishing control over 
other potential explanatory factors.94 No two nations, however similar or different they 
are in quantities of general interest, are perfectly similar or perfectly different in all 
quantities of potential interest. Cases that seem most similar or most different may mask 
differences or similarities that plausibly exerted an influence on the outcome.  
Another characteristic limitation of small-N cross-national research is that the 
deliberate focus on a few cases inevitably decreases the number of observations and with 
it the ability to adjudicate between rival explanations. In small-N comparative research 
designs, the number of explanatory factors approaches the number of cases almost by 
definition because the objectives of such designs are to achieve high conceptual validity, 
develop new hypotheses, examine the hypothesized role of causal mechanisms, and 
address causal complexity.95 Nevertheless, because with fewer cases the capacity to 
arbitrate between explanations through comparison diminishes, this same characteristic 
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may pose a problem of having more rival explanations to evaluate than cases to 
observe—the quandary of ‘many variables, small N.’96 
Combining within-nation and between-nation comparisons in the same study is 
one way of increasing the number of observations while mitigating the trade-off between 
imposing control over potential explanatory factors and achieving independence among 
the cases. Comparative studies that focus on or compare single countries often treat 
periods of time as cases and engage in systematic comparison in this fashion.97 Such 
temporal cases not only increase the number of observations by creating multiple cases 
out of that individual unit; they can also be more easily matched on relevant dimensions 
than can national units.98 That enables a tighter control between cases than is possible 
with cross-country comparisons, and the closer together are the time periods, the tighter 
is the control. Temporal comparisons also carry an added benefit: They show the 
direction of causal influence where cross-country comparisons do not.99 Indeed, the 
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patterns of covariation that arise from temporal comparisons “offer the empirical clues 
one needs to reach conclusions about causation.”100 
Using temporal comparisons alone carries its own risks, as it sacrifices the 
independence among cases that is achieved by spatial comparisons.101 Jeffrey Haydu 
points out that the problem of such ‘historical reversals’ is that “although successive time 
periods may be more equivalent than two national cases, they are certainly less 
independent”102 because “identifying larger trajectories means showing how one case 
becomes another.”103 But this is why it is important to combine national cases and 
temporal cases as opposed to relying on either of the two methods on their own, because 
putting temporal and spatial comparisons together permits the researcher to harness the 
benefits of both independence and equivalence among cases.104 For these reasons, I 
combine cross-country and within-nation temporal comparisons in the same research 
design in this study of military industry reform. 
I have selected five cases that, as a set, isolate on key configurations of similarity 
and difference: Argentina (1983–1989), Argentina (1989–1997), Chile (1990–2018), 
Portugal (1976–2018), and Turkey (1983–2018). The three Argentine and Chilean cases 
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are ‘most-similar’ cases, where values on the explanatory variables—coalitional strength 
and institutional strength—differed dramatically. In Chile (1990–2018), the dominant 
military coalition emerged and held together and dominant military institutions developed 
while civilian institutional counterparts remained relatively weak, and the military 
industry reform effort failed. In Argentina (1983–1989), the dominant military coalition 
and dominant civilian institution formed relatively simultaneously and were assiduously 
maintained, and the industry reform effort partially succeeded. Argentina (1989–1997) 
beheld the formation of dominant civilian coalitions and institutions, and reform 
succeeded in its entirety. Argentina and Chile match other political, economic, social, 
geographic, and historical variables that may have plausibly influenced the outcome. 
The Chilean military emerged from authoritarian rule in a stronger position than 
did the Argentine military, yet both had built tacit bases of support either in parties and/or 
among politically-connected economic actors. Both countries had had bouts with 
repressive military rule that lasted a decade or more, during which democratic institutions 
were disabled and their development arrested. The intervention of the military also 
introduced a discontinuity in civilian thought and discourse that resulted in the recycling 
of 1960s and 1970s-era policy. Similarly, military role expansion began in each country 
prior to military rule and continued unabated during it, and in the transitions back to 
democracy, the militaries left powerful obstacles to the establishment of civilian 
control.105 Argentina in 1983 had high budget deficits and inflation and Chile in 1990 did 
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not, but, by 1985, the democratic government in Argentina had begun to close the gap, 
bringing inflation under control. 
The Chilean and Argentine militaries created part, or all, of the military industry 
during military rule, when their growth also reached its crescendo; the defense industries 
were second-tier defense industries; and the military-controlled portion of national 
industry constituted most or all of the domestic defense sector. And in both, the military 
industry’s constituent firms were legally autonomous; evolved from the original 
maintenance and operational infrastructure of the armed forces; were created in the 
context of international arms embargoes imposed by advanced powers, and were part of a 
strategy of import-substitution industrialization and state ownership of heavy industry.106 
Neoliberal ideology was embraced by democratically-elected civilian governments in 
both places. Likewise, both had presidential systems of government and had considerable 
experience with democracy, were urbanized and literate, had medium or medium to high 
per capital incomes, and were predominately Roman Catholic. They were linked 
geographically, culturally, and historically, particularly with regard to the long period of 
state formation each experienced beginning in the early 19th century, after independence. 
In both, political and economic development were shaped by relations with the United 
States, and their relationships to the international community were not fundamentally 
different. 
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Turkey (1983–2018) and Chile (1990–2018) are two ‘most-different’ cases, where 
values on institutional strength and coalitional strength matched closely. As in Chile, in 
Turkey, military coalitions and institutions arose and dominated their civilian rivals, and 
the military industry reform effort failed. Yet the similarities end there. Though the 
military ruled once but did so for nearly two decades in Chile, the Turkish military, 
assuming a moderating role, took power intermittently and remained there for no more 
than three years at a time. And whereas the Chilean military used military rule to impose 
and preserve many of its privileges, the Turkish military mainly secured its prerogatives 
via the extraction of executive decrees.107 In Chile, a small perceived internal security 
threat was eliminated almost immediately by the military regime, but the Turkish state 
faces a persistent internal threat to this day. In Chile, the firms in the military industry 
were a product of military rule and import-substitution industrialization policies. In 
Turkey, defense industry companies pre-dated the democratic transition but were 
consolidated in 1987 during civilian rule, in the context of the embrace by the civilian 
government of neoliberal policy.108 
Having improved economic performance through reforms, the Turkish and 
Chilean militaries were better positioned to influence the pace and substance of economic 
reforms once democracy was restored because they had built tacit or explicit bases of 
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support for the new policy regime. Yet those policy regimes themselves differed, 
presenting democratic governments with different incentives regarding which direction of 
public policy to take. While the Chilean military had privatized almost all state firms 
(with the obvious exception of military firms and, additionally, several mining 
companies, among some others), the Turkish military had privatized none, but rather 
maintained upheld a classic import-substitution model. Thus, much greater potential 
support for neoliberal reform of the defense industry may have existed in Chile in 1990 
than in Turkey in 1983, where the state remained a more important economic actor. In 
Chile, military firms are all autonomous public-sector enterprises. In Turkey, military 
defense firms are legally private entities, although they are also autonomous. 
Turkey was a parliamentary democracy until 2017 (when it became a presidential 
system), while Chile was a presidential system. They had dissimilar economic 
institutions, with market-oriented structures in Chile and mixed markets in Turkey. And 
Turkey had less experience with democracy, as independence came in the 1910s, a 
century after it had arrived in Argentina and Chile. Likewise, state building occurred 
more quickly and much later in Turkey (in the 1920s) than in Chile, where the post-
independence process of extending central control took much longer and involved a raft 
of internecine struggles. And while Turkey and Chile are high-income developing 
countries, they are worlds apart geographically, culturally, and historically: The former 
occupies a halfway point between Europe and Asia, the latter a thin strip along the 
western coast of South America. Chile is predominately Roman Catholic; Turkey is 
predominately Muslim. 
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Finally, the comparison of Portugal (1976–2018) with Argentina (1983–1989) is a 
‘most-different’ configuration, where values on coalitional strength and institutional 
strength differed dramatically. In Portugal (1976–2018), as in Argentina (1983–1989), 
dominant military coalitions and dominant civilian institutions faced off, and reform 
efforts partially succeeded and partially failed. Otherwise, the Portuguese and first 
Argentine cases were very different. The Argentine military ruled directly, only to lose 
all control of a transition to democracy that it opposed, but in Portugal, the authoritarian 
regime was a civilian regime, and the transition to democracy was controlled by the 
military after the military itself suppressed a pro-authoritarian uprising and imposed 
democracy by force. More generally, whereas the Argentine military was heavily 
interventionist, the Portuguese military was not (apart from the role of a faction of 
officers in imposing Portugal’s democratic transition). And once the transitions to 
democracy were complete, the Portuguese military emerged in a stronger position vis-à-
vis civilians than did its Argentine counterpart. Similarly, the two cases exhibited 
different initial economic conditions, with Argentina bearing higher inflation, slower 
growth, and larger external debt. And last but not least, Portugal was a semi-presidential 
democracy; Argentina a presidential one. 
The data come from an array of primary and secondary source materials. Among 
the primary sources were newspapers and newsletters, government documents, 
legislation, speech and interview transcripts, and recently declassified intelligence reports 
generated by foreign governments and international governmental and non-governmental 
organizations at the time of the events. In particular, I relied on transcripts from 24 in-
  107 
depth elite interviews that I conducted over five months of field work in Argentina and 
Chile as well as on more than 800 pieces of original archival evidence gathered in the 
collections of the Center of Studies of the Situation and Perspectives of Argentina 
(CESPA), which is the political economy archive of the Institute of Economic Research 
at the University of Buenos Aires. The recently declassified intelligence reports came 
from the digitized archives of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, World Bank, and 
International Monetary Fund. Secondary sources consulted included academic sources, 
reference materials, and histories. To organize and discipline the collection of the data, I 
employed the method of structured, focused comparison, which enables “the systematic 
comparison and organization of findings by asking the same questions of each case and 
examining only those aspects of the cases selected.”109 
Between them, the most-similar and most-different designs allow me to identify a 
causal candidate (configurations of coalitional strength and institutional strength) for 
radical, partial, or failed military industry reform (see Table 1.6). Yet these data-set 
observations provide a weak basis for causal inference because they do not allow me to 
make the observations on context, process, or mechanism that are necessary in order to 
determine whether the hypothesized mechanisms are evident in the five cases.110 To 
make those causal-process observations, I turned to within-case process tracing. 
 
                                               
109 George and Bennett, 67. 
 
110 Stanley Lieberson, “Small N's and Big Conclusions: An Examination of the Reasoning in Comparative 
Studies Based on a Small Number of Cases,” Social Forces, 70, 2 (1991), 307–20, 312–15. 
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Table 1.6. Cases of Military Industry Reform and Coalitional and Institutional Strength  
 
Case 
 
Coalitional 
Strength 
 
Institutional 
Strength 
 
Managerial 
Reform 
 
Ownership 
Reform 
 
Industry 
Reform 
 
Chile, 1990–2018 
 
 
   Military 
 
Military 
 
Low 
 
Low 
 
Failed 
 
Argentina, 1983–1989 
 
Military 
 
Civilian 
 
High 
 
Low 
 
 
Partial 
 
Argentina, 1989–1997 
 
 
Civilian 
 
Civilian 
 
High 
 
High 
 
Radical 
 
Turkey, 1983–2018 
 
 
Military 
 
Military 
 
Low 
 
Low 
 
Failed 
 
Portugal, 1976–2018 
 
 
Military 
 
Civilian 
 
Partial 
 
Partial 
 
Partial 
 
 
Process tracing is the use of evidence from within a case to make inferences about 
causal explanations of that case. The analyst begins with a theory on the causal 
mechanisms that might plausibly explain the case, then examines the observable 
implications of the hypothesized causal mechanisms in order to test whether the theory 
on these mechanisms does in fact explain the case.111 Like micro-correlation in historical 
explanation, process tracing involves the “minute tracing of the explanatory narrative to 
the point where the events to be explained are microscopic and the covering laws 
                                               
111 Andrew Bennett and Jeffrey T. Checkel, eds., Process Tracing: From Metaphor to Analytic Tool 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014). 
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correspondingly more certain.”112 This means analyzing processes, sequences, and 
conjunctures of events within a case. In our case, observable implications of the 
mechanistic theory of boundary and function expansion and control developed earlier 
include the timing of policy change and stasis relative to the timing of dominant coalition 
and institution formation. In general, we should expect policy change or stasis to closely 
follow the emergence or bolstering of these essential political arrangements 
In order to use process tracing to find out whether the hypothesized boundary and 
function expansion and control cycles are evident in our fives cases of military industry 
and reform efforts, for each of the five cases, I constructed a body of evidence. Then I 
identified a continuous chain of events at a fine level of detail, building sequential and 
contiguous developments into an explanatory narrative. In turn, I compared the causal 
theory of boundary and function expansion and control developed earlier to that chain of 
events, paying close attention to the precise timing of dominant coalition and institution 
formation and of defense industry policy change or stasis. Each of the case studies that 
follows this chapter reports the results of one of these within-case analyses by presenting 
the explanatory narrative developed for that case.  
The case studies demonstrate that process tracing confirms the theory of brokers 
and bureaucrats. Dominant coalition and institution formation alter the original balances 
of political and institutional power between actors. Because it makes it more likely that 
the dominant actor will prevail in the conflict, this alteration drives the dominant actor to 
                                               
112 Clayton Roberts, The Logic of Historical Explanation (University Park: Pennsylvania State University 
Press, 1996), 66. 
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change or perpetuate defense industry policy. Not only that, but the case studies reveal a 
striking degree of causal complexity while still corroborating the overall causal theory. 
The chapters go to a granular level, “fleshing out a causal story… linking cause and 
outcome in a series of interlocking and interacting parts,” revealing the unique character 
of each case and the astounding diversity of nature.113 
 
Conclusion 
All political actors, James Madison and Max Weber highlighted between them, 
work to achieve their goals in two different ways. The first, in Madison’s view in The 
Federalist, is through a governing faction. Actors form alliances with people who are 
most similar to them and, “united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or 
interest,” gain control of the government and use their power to impose measures that 
redistribute wealth and property in a way that works against the interest of others who are 
most different from them.114 The second, in Weber’s telling in Economy and Society, is 
through a bureaucracy. Actors create a new autonomous political authority with power 
invested in legalities, procedures, and rules, and that new social form—using the 
legitimacy of the rational-legal authority it embodies as well as its control over technical 
expertise and information—shapes and carries out the policy directives of politicians.115  
                                               
113 Derek Beach and Rasmus Brun Pederson, Causal Case Study Methods: Foundations and Guidelines for 
Comparing, Matching, and Tracing (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2016), 306. 
 
114 James Madison, “Federalist No. 10” in Jacob E. Cooke, ed., The Federalist Papers by Alexander 
Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison [1787] (Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1961), 56–65. 
 
115 Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology 1 (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1978). 
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The distinction between these two types of capability mirrors the two kinds of 
power examined in this chapter. In the case of coalitional strength, respective civilian and 
military allies band together, mobilize, and act collectively to impose their military 
industry policy preferences upon their weaker adversaries, who must accept the outcome. 
When it comes to institutional strength, actors create a new, autonomous defense industry 
bureaucracy or perpetuate an existing one, and that central organ goes on to mobilize 
administrative sources of information, analysis, and expertise before implementing the 
military industry policy goals of the actor. Owners and managers of defense industry 
firms, enveloped by the administrative orbit of the institution, must accept the rules, 
policies, and patterns of relations imposed by it.  
No political actor governs alone. As with all would-be change agents and status 
quo defenders, their success depends upon the strength of the coalitions that they 
deliberately forge in a competitive struggle for political power. Equally important are the 
clusters of officials, secretariats, and technocrats whom actors are able to deliberately 
create and empower in a legitimate, constructive quest to extend their administrative 
reach. As Adam Przeworski explained in his study of political and economic reforms in 
Eastern Europe and Latin America, “multiple political forces compete inside an 
institutional framework” and “dispose unequal economic, organization, and ideological 
resources…”116 In any such system of competitive rule wherein battles are processed in a 
rule-bound way, “[t]hose with greater resources are more likely to win conflicts.”117 
                                               
116 Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and 
Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 11. 
 
117 Ibid. 
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Thus, even the most imposing and established militaries are not free of constraints 
on their power. As the society returns to democratic form, powerful militaries counter 
this danger with a range of mechanisms. They may coopt a preexisting political party or 
parties;118 create a party or parties directly under the sponsorship of the military,119 or 
cultivate the foundations of a new political party or parties.120 The military then uses 
these alliances to preserve their responsibility for bureaucratic functions that support their 
interests—in this case, the military’s ownership and control of defense industry 
enterprises. According to existing explanations, such instruments protect the military’s 
privileges by civilianizing the military’s dominance.121 Yet the concept of coalitional 
strength developed in this chapter points to a more elaborate and symbiotic relationship 
between the military and civilian groups, revolving around mutual interest and a sense of 
linked fate. 
Indeed, the most striking feature of military coalitions is not even the 
establishment of political links between the military and civilian actors, but the economic 
foundations of their construction. Links are forged over shared benefits deriving from the 
                                               
 
118 Prominent examples include Partido Nacional de Honduras (National Party of Honduras—PNH) and 
the Asociación Nacional Republicana (Republican National Association—ANR) in Paraguay. 
 
119 Examples include Aliança Renovadora Nacional (National Renewing Alliance—ARENA) in Brazil; 
Partido Revolucionario de Unificación Democrática (Revolutionary Party of Democratic Unification—
PRUD) and Partido de Conciliación Nacional (National Reconciliation Party—PCN) in El Salvador; 
Partido Institucional Democrático (Democratic Institutional Party—PID) in Guatemala, and Partido 
Revolucionario Democrático (Democratic Revolutionary Party—PRD) in Panama. See Negretto. 
 
120 Probably the most important example of this strategy is the creation of Unión Demócrata Independiente 
(Independent Democratic Union—UDI) in Chile. For a discussion of the first two strategies, see Negretto. 
 
121 Ibid. 
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militarized status quo, not from the military’s latent ability to shape formations of parties 
to its benefit because of the military’s pre-existing institutional strength, ideological 
resources, or historical role. This suggests that the common primary purpose behind these 
practices is to bind the mutual interests of powerful civilian and military actors, not to 
coerce or outright constitute those civilian groups. 
Hence, the Argentine military depended on the loyalty of the party allies it could 
find in the late 1970s and retain after the return of democracy in 1983. Yet those parties 
benefitted mightily from the ability to use the military’s large industrial firms to 
distribute patronage and to maintain the backing of corporatist interest groups who 
themselves depended on military ownership and management for their bargaining power 
(in the case of labor) and for access to cheap inputs and established markets, lucrative 
state contracts, and an absence of competition from state enterprises (in the case of the 
private sector).122 The fact that in post-authoritarian Argentina political parties would 
defend the military’s industrial honor even after those same parties sent the military 
scurrying back to the barracks after the collapse of military rule only further testifies to 
the overarching role of the mutual interests binding parties and the military. The point is 
obvious: Under democracy, the dovetailing of civilian and military interests is more 
important than the military’s latent influence or accumulated institutional power. 
The key feature of military institutions, moreover, is their potential to preserve the 
military’s formal, administrative power while preventing the development of a strong 
                                               
122 Corrales. 
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civilian administrative state through the formation of civilian expertise and human 
capital. Without the ability to access administrative capacities, civilian governments 
cannot begin to plan (much less impose) their encroachment upon military terrain. This 
suggests that the common primary purpose behind military-led bureaucratic drift is to 
restrict the development of civilian state autonomy. Thus, in Chile, when early drafts of 
the country’s landmark defense ministry reform law passed in 2010 assigned 
considerable autonomy to a proposed civilian agency charged with administering the 
military industry, the concern of the military was not just that the change would end 
military functions; it also fretted that civilian actors would become able to access and 
handle sensitive information the acquisition of which would make it easier for the 
bureaucracy to consolidate power.123  
But the merging of a relatively stronger set of disciplined, likeminded political 
forces and the creation and development of the ability to wield bureaucratic authority are 
equally important for the civilian who would reform the military industry. In a 
competitive, rule-bound environment, civilian leaders must find partisan and legislative 
allies who can craft policy changes that will gain the support of the broader political 
constituencies who will ultimately decide the leaders’ fate. Without such backers, 
reformist campaigns will dissipate. And even if they can find such stewards, civilian 
leaders cannot translate policy into practice unless they possess the institutional means to 
actually redesign and reshape the relationships between military and society. Thus, in 
                                               
123 Interview with Dr. Miguel Navarro, professor at the National Academy of Political and Strategic 
Studies, a graduate school administered by the Chilean National Ministry of Defense, May 8, 2018. 
  115 
Ecuador, where civilian coalitions emerged but military institutions still dominated 
civilian rivals, the approval of a celebrated military enterprise privatization law in 2006 
was insufficient to realize the legislation’s policy goal of near-total reform. The 
unreformed, military-heavy body tasked with implementing the policy essentially chafed 
at the order, and five years later, fewer than half of the firms whose sale was required by 
the law had been privatized.124 
This is why coalition formation and institution formation, as opposed to coalition 
formation alone, are the hallmarks of consolidated democracy. Unlike coercion, the 
purpose of which is to reduce the space for dissent, a military coalition aims to operate 
within the boundaries created by the solidification of competitive rule, rule of law, and 
formal democratic institutions. So, too, does a civilian coalition, whose creators resign 
themselves from undemocratic acts because it is clear to them, too, that democracy “is the 
only game in town.”125 And unlike institutions created under authoritarian rule, which do 
not exercise rightful authority, the replacement of a dominant military institution with a 
dominant civilian one aims to bring about a bureaucratic apparatus that can impose costs 
on political losers on the basis of precisely the legitimacy lacked by the former, military 
authorities. In addition to underscoring how civilian would-be reformers become the 
change agents they envisioned themselves as being and how military stalwarts become 
the status quo-defenders they imagined themselves as being, the arguments in this chapter 
                                               
124 Mani, 2011, 44. 
 
125 Mainwaring, O’Donnell, and Valenzuela; Andreas Schedler, “What is Democratic 
Consolidation?” Journal of Democracy, 9, 2 (1998), 91–107, 91. 
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illuminate why traditionally powerful militaries can—and frequently do—fail to preserve 
some or all of their control of domestic industry or other valued military prerogatives, as 
observers sometimes wonder.126 Yet these arguments also reveal why those same 
militaries, as well as far weaker ones, can succeed in prolonging theirs.127  
This is the chapter that focuses on the problem of democratic power building. I 
have focused on the problems of generating political support and institutional capacity in 
a democracy as the unique challenges facing a civilian seeking to restructure the 
relationship between military and society and a military elite seeking to preserve that 
relationship, on the other. We saw that in the context of dominant civilian coalitions and 
institutions, the threat of insufficient political support and institutional capacity for the 
civilian’s reformist cause evaporates, overcoming opposition from the military and other 
vested interests. By contrast, the threat of insufficient political support and institutional 
capacity for the military’s cause dissipates in the context of dominant military coalitions 
and institutions. In between, where military coalitions and civilian institutions dominant, 
the threat of insufficient support partially disappears for each actor.  
The fluidity of democratic power relations is a consequence of the distinctive, 
complex social conditions under which democratic power building takes place. Military 
elites cannot rely on their accumulated institutional might to preserve their ownership and 
management of the defense industry, and reform-minded civilians in government cannot 
depend on their electoral windfall or their partisan association to catapult them to victory. 
                                               
126 See Mani, 2011, 191–2; Maiah Jaskoski, “Private Financing of the Military: A Local Political Economy 
Approach,” Studies in Comparative International Development, 48, 2 (2013), 172–95, 182. 
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Instead, each side must find supportive political and legislative allies who can cooperate 
to craft or defeat policy initiatives that affect their vital interests, on the one hand, and 
concentrate the formal decision-making authority to facilitate or impede the actual 
reconfiguration of military and society, on the other hand. 
None of these factors are beyond the control of political actors. The process of 
coalition formation and institution creation can be facilitated by cultivating robust 
democratic institutions. Section 1.2, for example, explains that strong political parties—
as measured by party discipline and clarity of interests and ideology—help to begin to 
mitigate the threat of limited political support available to a reformer or status quo 
defender. The dynamics under dominant coalitions may therefore be used as a yardstick 
for viable democratic power building in contexts that lack rule of law and competitive 
political institutions. That, in turn, suggests a vital rationale for political institutions in a 
democratic society: Constant interaction between and among parties, legislatures, 
coalitions, and bureaucratic institutions may permit actors to reassure one another that the 
necessary political resources can be forthcoming when actors choose to undertake reform 
or continuity efforts. I investigate the contribution of such brokers and bureaucrats to the 
management of military industry reform in five cases in the next four chapters. 
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2 
 
Political Stasis in a Fiscal Enclave: Chile, 1990–2018 
 
“Economists must not only know their economic models, but also understand politics, 
interests, conflicts, passions—the essence of collective life. For a brief period of time you 
could make changes by decree; but to let them persist, you have to build coalitions and 
bring people around. You have to be a politician.”  
Alejandro Foxley (former Chilean Minister of Finance)1 
 
Introduction 
The failure of four consecutive efforts to transfer defense industry enterprises 
from military to civilian management in post-authoritarian Chile signaled a striking 
departure from the status quo in this South American country. The miscarriage was a 
breakdown in the expansion of a neoliberal order that, for decades, utterly dominated the 
Chilean political economy. Between 1975–1988, the military government’s civilian 
economic team, the neo-liberal “Chicago Boys,” embarked on a series of massive 
privatization processes, and, by 1990, all but a handful of the largest and most important 
state-owned enterprises had been sold to private bidders. Successive reformist 
Concertación governments upheld the neoliberal order in the decades after the restoration 
of democracy in 1990, fueling expectations that the military’s three defense-industrial 
                                               
1 Interview in Pedro Aspe, Carlos Boloña, Ricardo Hausmann, and Alejandro Foxley, The State of Latin 
American Finance (Washington, D.C.: The Inter-American Dialogue, 1992), 22. 
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firms and their subsidiaries would be privatized or turned over to civilian management. 
The failure of leftist and rightist governments to succeed in their many efforts to do so 
instead threatened to weaken market institutions by perpetuating the protection of the 
defense industry from competition through immunity from reporting requirements, 
guaranteed contracts to service arms purchased with off-budget copper revenues, and 
other dubious privileges. 
The failed transition also signified a breakdown in the establishment of civilian 
control of the military. Due to the force of the constitution it wrote in 1980 while in 
office, the military benefitted from lasting obstacles to the establishment of civilian 
control—at least until September 2005, when the Concertación and Alianza coalitions of 
legislative political parties teamed up to approve constitutional changes eliminating the 
military’s arbiter role and the designated senators and lifetime senators, civilianizing and 
curtailing the powers of the members of the National Security Council, and empowering 
the president to remove military commanders. Many wondered if the government would 
hand the satellites of the defense industry over to civilians next. Yet the sector remained 
impervious to the growth of civilian authority. As David Pion-Berlin and Rafael Rafael 
Martínez, writing in 2017, observed, “The one area where the military does retain 
considerable autonomy is in defense production” [italics mine].2 
To explain this apparent anomaly, many scholars would no doubt point to the 
existence of real or de facto alliances between the military and the rightist Alianza 
                                               
2 David Pion-Berlin and Rafael Martínez, Soldiers, Politicians, and Civilians: Reforming Civil-Military 
Relations in Democratic Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 102. 
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coalition of parties in the Chilean Congress, and especially in the Senate.3 For many 
years, such alliances thrived. But this conventional wisdom breaks down in the context of 
the politics of defense industry reform. The idea that, in 2018, the Chilean Right links 
arms with the military in defense of military firms “is a myth,” said Jaime Baeza Freer, 
Deputy Director of the National Academy of Political and Strategic Studies (ANEPE), a 
graduate school and research center administered by the Ministry of National Defense, 
between 2014–2017.4 As we shall see, though the rightist coalition did stand with the 
military in opposition to reform in the early post-transition period, it switched positions 
later, after 2005. Besides, as we just saw, in 2005, Alianza cooperated with Concertación 
to solidify civilian control, suggesting that any military-Right alliance had collapsed. 
Why did Chile fail to transfer its defense industry firms from military to civilian 
management? 
This chapter argues that relative military coalitional and institutional strength 
jointly contributed to the outcome. The military always appreciated the need to 
outperform its civilian rivals in the competitive search for party and political allies. When 
presidents announced initiatives to turn defense industry firms over to civilian 
management legislatively, the military cultivated alliances with other actors whose party 
supporters could shape policy outcomes. Between 2005–2014, the military aligned itself 
                                               
3 See, Collin Grimes and David Pion-Berlin, “Power Relations, Coalitions, and Rent Control: Reforming 
The Military's Natural Resource Levies,” Comparative Politics, 51, 4 (2019), 625–43; Marcelo Pollack, 
New Right in Chile (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999); Lisa Baldez and John M. Carey, “Presidential 
Agenda Control and Spending Policy: Lessons from General Pinochet's Constitution,” American Journal of 
Political Science, 43, 1 (1999), 29–55. 
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with the defense-sector organized labor movement. Labor opposed reform because it was 
expected to reduce wages, jobs, and the sources of its labor power. Not only that, but the 
unions had close ties to the Concertación coalition of leftist legislative parties, which was 
strong enough to prevent the rise of the supermajorities necessary to change key 
constitutional defense industry laws. Presidents could not persuade labor that its benefits 
would be protected. And so, as the military and labor coalesced, a dominant anti-reform 
coalition formed, altering the original balance of political power, making it more likely 
that the military would prevail in a legislative battle to shape the fate of the reforms. 
Thus, civilians in government had no recourse when Concertación defended the military 
and its defense industry.  
Between 2016–2018, labor fragmented, and Concertación and Alianza converged 
in pro-reform position and strategy. Yet the military replied to the announcement of a 
new reform bill by positioning itself to engineer the defection of the executive office 
from the reform coalition. The party-coalitions in Congress could not increase the costs 
of inaction by the executive due to the broader political crisis in which the executive was 
mired. Thus, when the military continued its strategy of increasing the costs of action, the 
executive chose to exit the pro-reform coalition and abruptly withdrew the defense 
portfolio from the civilian coalition as well. As the executive and the military merged, a 
new dominant anti-reform coalition formed, keeping it more likely that the military 
would prevail in a political battle over the outcome of the conflict. In the end, the parties 
in Congress could only watch as the president and the defense ministry defended the 
military and its defense industry. 
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The military appreciated the need to prevail in the struggle to build institutions for 
reform or continuity as well. When the defense ministry pushed an initiative to partially 
reform the management and capital of defense firms administratively, the military was in 
a stronger position than the civilians to shape the outcome because it had fought off the 
government’s efforts to create a civilian bureaucracy empowered to appoint enterprise 
directors, alter industrial structure, and develop other control mechanisms. The military 
had thrown its weight behind a weaker alternative favored by the opposition, resulting in 
the creation of an apparatus vested with little more than an advisory and audit role and 
the perpetuation of parallel military agencies. Now the president lacked the requisite 
support to carry out the desired policy changes, while the military was in a position to 
eschew the making of the desired changes. Consequently, when defense ministry 
civilians tried to push the program forward, it was blocked by the military and its allies. 
Those actors challenged the program on the basis that the civilian defense ministry lacked 
the rightful authority, resulting in the review and striking down of the decision by the 
comptroller on the same grounds. 
 
2.1. The Chilean Military Industry in 1990 
In Chile, the page turned on the military’s rule in 1990, but, as of 2018, that 
military remained an important player in the national economy. By organic constitutional 
law, each armed force continued to operate its own legally autonomous force-oriented 
business. Fábricas y Maestranzas del Ejército de Chile (Factories and Arsenals of the 
Army of Chile—FAMAE) was the Army’s munitions and maintenance firm, Astilleros y 
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Maestranzas de la Armada (Shipyards and Arsenals of the Navy—ASMAR) was the 
Navy’s naval construction and repair firm, and Empresa Nacional de Aeronáutica de 
Chile (National Aeronautical Company of Chile—ENAER) was the Air Force’s aircraft 
manufacturer and repair company. Though FAMAE, ASMAR, and ENAER were owned 
by the Chilean Treasury, each firm had a directory, formed according to the relevant 
organic law, which established who the directors were by linking to specific officers of 
rank in the service branch associated with the firm’s production (see Table 2.1.). 
But military power did not stop there. Due to ASMAR’s rapid growth upon being 
commercially reorganized in 1960 under the aegis of the Navy, the military held leading 
roles in a range of ASMAR affiliates and subsidiaries. In 2018, three of the four directors 
of Ingenieria de Sistemas y Desarrollos Funcionales Limitada (Defense Systems 
Engineering Company Limited—SISDEF)—a defense system and equipment analytics 
firm created jointly with Ferranti International of England in 1983—were named by 
ASMAR, and all three were active or retired military officers. Military influence was 
equally pronounced in Sociedad Iberoamericana de Reparaciones Navales Limitada 
(Iboamerican Society of Naval Repairs Limited—SOCIBER)—a subsidiary of SISDEF 
in which ASMAR took 50 percent participation—where three of the six directors, 
including the president, were military officers.5 Finally, the military also took leading 
roles in Fabricaciones Militares (Military Manufacturers—Fabmil), ASMAR’s own 
independent electronics division, created in 1982; Servicio de Apoyo a Emergencias 
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(Emergency Support Service—SAEM), in which ASMAR took 50 percent participation; 
and ASOM, a SISDEF affiliate, in which ASMAR took 46 percent participation.6 
Chile produced its own small arms, munitions, and explosives for centuries; 
FAMAE, for instance, was one of the oldest military industries in Latin America, with 
one official account tracing it to the Jesuits’ creation of a pottery industry beginning in 
1593.7 Nevertheless, the program for developing the defense sector truly began during the 
period of military rule (1973–1990). The military government established the firms as 
legal entities by instituting their own organic laws requiring majorities of 4/7ths to 
change. It also actively propelled the rapid growth of the sector. In response to weapons 
embargoes imposed on Chile by the United States and Western Europe, the regime 
prioritized the development of the sector and modernized its facilities and assets.8 New 
FAMAE facilities were created, ASMAR was constantly expanded and improved, and 
ENAER incorporated new and modern technologies in manufacturing and aircraft 
maintenance. As a result, by 1994, the firms employed around 10,000 workers (1,000 
more than in 1985), 80 percent of whom were civilians.9 
 
                                               
6 Rex A. Hudson, ed., Chile, A Country Study (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1994), 
321. 
 
7 Gregory Bart Weeks, The Military and Politics in Postauthoritarian Chile (Tuscaloosa: University of 
Alabama Press, 2003). 
 
8 Raúl Sohr, La industria militar chilena (Santiago: Comisión Sudamericana de Paz, 1990). 
 
9 Hudson, 320–23; Patrice M. Franko, “Small-Scale Competitiveness in the New International Arms 
Market: The Case of Chile,” Security Dialogue, 26, 4 (1995), 449–62; Augusto Varas and Claudio Fuentes, 
“La industria de bienes de uso military en Chile,” Documento de Trabajo FLACSO (Santiago: FLACSO, 
1991). 
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Table 2.1. Chilean Military Firms and the Composition of Their Directories 
Firm Law Date Directors 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Asmar 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
18.296 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
February 7, 1984 
- General Director of the Services of the 
Navy (President)  
- Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the 
Navy  
- Armaments Director of the Navy 
- Director of Naval Engineering 
- Director of Supply and Accounting of 
the Navy 
- Director of ASMAR 
- A representative of the Commander-in-
Chief of the Army (General Officer in 
active service) 
- A representative of the Commander in 
Chief of the Air Force (General Officer 
in service active) 
- ASMAR Prosecutor, without the right to 
vote 
 
 
 
 
 
Famae 
 
 
 
 
 
375 
 
 
 
 
 
December 28, 1978 
- Commander of the Military Industry and 
Engineering Command (President) 
- Undersecretary for the Armed Forces (on 
behalf of the Superior Council of National 
Defense) 
- The Director of each of the divisions 
indicated below or a representative 
designated annually by the Commander 
in Chief of the Army:  
• Army Operations Directorate  
• Army Logistics Directorate  
• Directorate of Rationalization and 
Development of the Army 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Enaer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
18.297 
 
 
 
 
 
 
March 16, 1984 
- Commander in Chief of the Air Force 
(President) 
- A representative of the President of the 
Republic 
- General Officer of the Air Force in 
active service appointed by the President 
of the Republic 
- General Officer of the Air Force in 
active service appointed by the President 
of the Republic 
- General Officer of the Air Force in 
active service appointed by the President 
of the Republic 
- Executive Director 
Source: República de Chile, Ley No. 18.296. Ley organica de los Astilleros y Maestranzas de 
la Armada (Santiago: Diario Oficial de la República de Chile, February 7, 1984); Decreto 
Supremo No. 375. Ley organica de las Fabricas y Maestranzas del Ejercito (Santiago: Diario 
Oficial de la República de Chile, February 15, 1979); Ley No. 18.297. Ley organica de la 
Empresa Nacional de Aeronautica de Chile (Santiago: Diario Oficial de la República de Chile, 
March 16, 1984). 
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FAMAE, ASMAR, and ENAER enjoyed a raft of dubious privileges. In addition 
to being tax exempt, the firms controlled their own budgets, benefited from rules 
prohibiting their workers from bargaining collectively, and did not officially answer to 
the defense minister or any other government official.10 They did not submit to the 
common system of administration by the state via the Sistema de Empresas (Public 
Enterprise System—SEP) charged with representing the state as owner and shareholder, 
but rather were free to prepare their accounting and financial statements according to 
their own criteria, among other autonomies.11 Though some insisted that national security 
concerns inspired these exceptions, it was telling that only the largest and most politically 
consequential state firms—such as mining giants Corporación Nacional del Cobre de 
Chile (National Copper Corporation of Chile—CODELCO) and Empresa Nacional de 
Minería (National Mining Company—ENAMI)—also resided outside of SEP rule.12 
Moreover, the firms enjoyed near-exclusive power to provide maintenance, engineering, 
and repair services to the three service branches; FAMAE, for example, was virtually the 
only firm that worked with the Army, winning 80 to 90 percent of that branch’s service 
contracts.13 
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Most importantly, the firms were a core beneficiary of the spending of large 
volumes of guaranteed copper export revenues provided to the military under Chilean 
Law No. 13.196, the infamous Ley de Reservada del Cobre (Restricted Law on Copper—
a.k.a. the Copper Law). The Copper Law forced the state copper company, CODELCO, 
to turn over 10 percent of its annual export earnings to the military in order to generate 
funds for arms acquisitions.14 For decades, the military had been the annual recipient of 
hundreds of millions and even billions of U.S. dollars due to this obscure legal relic: 
Between 1992–98, copper revenues rose from 15 to 18 percent of the military budget, 
while between 2000–16 they averaged 29 percent of the budget, peaking at 53 percent in 
2006 (for a total of more than 2.5 billion U.S. dollars that year).15 CODELCO is the 
world’s largest copper company and produces a third of the copper in Chile, which is the 
world leader in copper production by a fivefold margin.16 By protecting the military’s 
entitlement to a significant portion of the largest copper company in the world’s export 
revenues, the Copper Law made the military a de facto owner of the mineral.  
The military never shied away from using the power of the state to ratchet up its 
claim to Chile’s vast copper wealth. Though the levy was originally set at 7.5 percent of 
foreign-currency earnings from exports of copper by CODELCO, in 1958, in 1973 the 
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military government revised the law to apply to CODELCO’s gross sales, not just its net 
profits, as well as raised the tax to 10 percent and established the equal division of the 
revenues between the Army, Navy and Air Force, thus eliminating joint decisions for 
weapons acquisitions.17 Three years later, the regime established the right of the military 
to finance high-cost purchases with funds borrowed from future anticipated resources.18 
In 1985, it increased the minimum annual revenue under the law from $90 million to 
$180 million, such that the state must pay the military the difference if the transfer sum 
falls below the $180 million floor (even if doing so requires incurring debt).19 Arms 
procurement decisions were also reserved to a few military officers in each armed force. 
A special committee was formally responsible for authorizing funds for procurement, but 
in practice the committee was expected not to question proposals submitted by the 
different armed services.20  
Funds provided to the military for arms purchases under the Copper Law were 
used by the military to purchase weapons from the United States, Germany, the United 
Kingdom, and the Netherlands, such that the Chilean military was the most modern and 
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20 Francisco Rojas Aravena, “Chile,” in Ravinder Pal Singh, ed., Arms Procurement Decision Making 
Volume II: Chile, Greece, Malaysia, Poland, South Africa and Taiwan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2000), 9–38, 17. 
 
  129 
best-equipped military in Latin America.21 Those arms were, in turn, assiduously 
maintained by the military firms. Though the Chilean military industry produced more 
military equipment for export and military use in the 1980s, in recent decades, the 
industry provided only 3 percent of the Chilean military’s arms and weapons. The 
remaining 97 percent were obtained overseas, according to Chilean defense analyst 
Eduardo Santos.22 Indeed, the firms’ main function was not to produce their own 
equipment but to service foreign arms and weapons systems bought with guaranteed 
copper export revenues. By all accounts, business was booming in the Chilean military 
industry because of the relentless flow of those guaranteed revenues.  
This configuration of formal and informal economic institutions encircling the 
military industry formed what can be described as a fiscal enclave.23 The Copper Law 
provided military coffers with large and continual transfers of off-budget copper 
revenues. Military officers used these copper revenues to purchase Western arms. Those 
officers’ subordinates awarded the public contracts for the maintenance and engineering 
of these imported arms to none other than the military’s own defense firms, from which, 
as we shall see, military officers derived substantial economic rewards and political 
power. Not only that, but the patterns were countercyclical; the floors to annual transfers, 
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the possibility of financing high-cost purchases with funds borrowed from future 
anticipated resources, and the accumulation of excess revenues in the copper reserve fund 
all served to facilitate the acquisition of new weapons even during periods when copper 
prices (and thus government revenues) were low. Absent the Copper Law, the military 
industry would have seen no such torrent of contracts, and may well have struggled to 
justify its existence: “I’m not sure if they were alone in the market they would survive,” 
said Felipe Illanes Poullangan, a lawyer and advisor in the Planning and Policy Division 
of the Undersecretariat of Defense of the Ministry of National Defense.24 
 
2.2. Civilian Presidents and Copper Soldiers 
Civilians in government from across the ideological spectrum developed a keen 
interest in the fate of this protected military industry. Their preference was to throw off 
the military yoke and shift its commanding heights from military to civilian control. 
Noted Hoy columnist Mauricio Gallardo observed as much in the weekly’s last issue of 
May 1992. Gallardo raised the specter of a protracted fight for the defense industry and 
warned against ignoring the struggle: “The Chilean political community is dealing with a 
long-term definition of [the military’s] role that at the present time has shaped only the 
preliminary debate.” In the context of this “rather obscure controversy marked by rigid 
positions,” said Gallardo, “[W]e must avoid the temptation of… taking a pessimistic view 
that sees the dilemma as a black and white distinction between… military or civilian … 
                                               
24 Interview with the author, June 12, 2018, Santiago, Chile. 
  131 
And we should avoid the already classic government strategy for dealing with the 
military: postponing a conflict.” He continued: 
 
Although that style may have worked in dealing with the first few problems of the 
transition from a military to a civilian government, it is clear that it will not work 
in dealing with the problems of the second phase because the subject covers in 
such a central way our structure of fiscal expenditures, the outline of our foreign 
relations, the potential of our defense, and the possibilities for our international 
trade. Postponing conflict also implies avoiding the precision with which such 
policies should be redefined over time.”25  
 
Yet the conflict was postponed indeed. It was not until 2005 that defense industry 
reform finally found its way onto the political agenda. Even so, defense industry reform 
stayed on the agenda once it got there, as actors within every presidential administration 
beginning with that of Ricardo Lagos (2000–2006) of the Partido por la Democracia 
(Party for Democracy—PPD) incorporated it into their government program and 
proposed legislative or administrative initiatives for achieving it. Each of these policy 
entrepreneurs—namely, President Michelle Bachelet (2006–2010; 2014–2018) of the 
Partido Socialista de Chile (Socialist Party of Chile—PS) and Minister of National 
Defense Jaime Ravinet of the first presidential administration of Sebastián Piñera (2010–
2014) of Renovación Nacional (National Renewal—RN), in addition to Lagos—had clear 
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incentives to bring about reform. In every case, doing so promised to deliver political and 
economic dividends. 
For Presidents Lagos and Bachelet, reform would help bypass external scrutiny 
and enforcement associated with Chile’s accession to the Organization for Economic 
Development (OECD).26 Chile was seeking to join the OECD, which required aligning 
the corporate governments of state enterprises with OECD and international standards.27 
Presidents had an incentive to adapt corporate governance to these norms because it 
would ensure that norm violations were kept in check and accountability was dealt with 
at home, while simultaneously credibly signaling their commitment to global standards. 
Lagos, in particular, had already invested considerable political capital in the project, 
presiding over the creation, in 2001, of the SEP and other reforms relating to the 
appointment and performance of directors. Thus, his legacy was bound to be intimately 
tied to the fate of this next peg of the transparency agenda.28 
President Piñera had his own interest in turning the defense industry over to 
civilians, and particularly by involving the private sector in defense production. The 
right-leaning voters and interests on whom Piñera and his party and coalition depended 
for votes and support tended to believe that the neo-liberal economic model inherited 
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from the military government was best for growth and development. That was why 
Piñera (2010–2014) wrote in his national strategy of security and defense that “it is 
desirable that they [the defense companies] seek associations with private companies 
related to their activities, to generate economies of scale and synergy in technological 
processes and innovations. In this context, the development of a private defense industry 
in the country in order to the aforementioned challenges will be encouraged.”29  
Piñera’s top defense official, Minister of National Defense Jaime Ravinet, stood 
to benefit from strengthening his existing ties with international capital. Ravinet had 
already invested a great deal of time and resources establishing partnerships with foreign 
capital dating back to July 2005. It was then that the lawyer, academic, and politically-
minded entrepreneur signed an agreement with the president of Airbus Military for 
ENAER to build the new European military transport aircraft A-400M and declared 
afterward that “there is a technological transfer from the most advanced European 
aerospace industry, with which ENAER will join the group of the most modern aviation 
companies in the world.”30 Now, fully incorporating Airbus capital into ENAER was the 
next political investment for Minister Ravinet (and, subsequently, Ravinet’s replacement, 
Andrés Allamand). It would enhance his portfolio’s international standing and deepen his 
ties with Airbus, with the potential for lucrative opportunities later. 
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The military elite were always outraged by the announcement of a new defense 
industry reform proposal. Their opposition to such change was apparent even before the 
transition to democracy began. In 1986, the Chicago Boys burned to privatize military-
linked firms. Their Carmona Project would permit the sale of FAMAE, ASMAR, ENAER, 
and CODELCO, among other large industrial enterprises related to a given ministry.31 
Pinochet and the Junta were not amused. Pinochet, who maintained an active and close 
policy involvement, always opposed selling firms he believed had national security 
importance.32 In the end, Pinochet and the junta got their way, as the sales of the firms of 
the fiscal enclave were not so much as programmed.33 In 1989, Patricio Aylwin argued 
for a transition to a civilian-military defense industry in the Concertación government 
program.34 Military officers “made no secret about their direct concern about the subject 
of the Chilean military industry” in response.35 A full 26 years later, remarkably little had 
changed: “The receptivity of the military [to reform]? There is a better environment, but 
they continue to show reluctance,” it was reported in October 2014.36 
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Officially, the military’s opposition—in 1986 and in 2014—stemmed from 
concerns about the potential consequences of defense industry reform for national 
security.37 Pinochet justified his objections on the basis of national security 
considerations, and the newest generations of armed detractors were also overcome by 
similar apprehensions: “They are fundamentally afraid of the possible politicization of 
these companies and that people outside the defense will access information that they 
consider strategic,” said one expert, in 2014.38 “In the military industry there are things 
that are reserved and that do not circulate in specialized magazines: The electronic 
warfare systems and the encryption keys of some military equipment, for example, 
cannot circulate freely,” explained one former high officer of the Navy, in 2014.39 
Nevertheless, these wider concerns masked self-interested drives. 
Make no mistake, military had a lot to lose. The defense industry provided 
lucrative executive opportunities for active or retired officers and serviceman, many of 
whom earned supplemental incomes via management positions. The beneficiaries were to 
be found throughout the ranks, starting, naturally, at the very top. Military commanders 
who served in a firm directory collected a salary in that firm as well as one in their 
respective branch, as did many middle and lower-ranking managers appointed by those 
top managers. And retired servicemen named to posts in defense companies had it even 
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better, receiving a salary in their respective firm in addition to a generous pension from 
the Caja de Previsión de la Defensa Nacional (National Defense Provident Fund—
CAPREDENA), the pension fund of the Ministry of National Defense.40 This went not 
just for ASMAR, ENAER, and FAMAE, but also the various subsidiaries of ASMAR in 
which the military held leading roles, including SISDEF, SOCIBER, and others. 
Not only that, but the uniformed beneficiaries of this rent market were more 
multiple than would typically be the case. Over the years, the military engaged in a kind 
of administrative featherbedding whereby a larger-than-necessary managerial apparatus 
was deliberately created and maintained in order to create jobs for military officers and 
cultivate unity by spreading the rents more widely. As a result, the military firms were 
overstaffed. And this, too, started at the top and filtered down. In each firm, eight 
managers at the administrative level were to be found when no more than two were 
justified, giving the companies more managers than much larger international players in 
their respective industries—ENAER, for instance, had more managers than much larger 
firms like Boeing, Airbus, and BAE Systems. Technical managers and other middle and 
lower-ranking administrative personnel appointed by these top managers were also 
overrepresented.41 
Retaining control of defense industry firms in the face of civilian efforts to reform 
them promised nothing less than to fortify the military’s instrument for extracting wealth 
from the whole society and transferring it to itself. The military could continue to 
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unaccountably colonize and extract wealth from society and nature, in the form of the 
capturing of copper export revenues. The shift of power from the military to civilians, by 
contrast, would necessarily come at the military’s expense. As control shifted from 
military to civilian hands, the flow of economic benefits vis-à-vis the military industry 
would shift from the military to civilians correspondingly. Military commanders would 
lose their roles as firm directors collecting a second salary. Those commanders would 
then no longer be able to appoint their subordinates to lower ranks, thus sacrificing the 
latter’s rewards. Retired officers would be similarly displaced. Civilian administrators, in 
turn, would restructure the corporate governments of the enterprises to eliminate 
unnecessary administrative staff, thus further reducing the space for the military to enter 
the firm and extract rewards.  
 
2.3. Reform Efforts 
Lagos Administration Corporate Governance Initiative 
The encounter between civilian and military began in November 2005, in the 
twilight of the leftist government of Ricardo Lagos (PPD). By then, Lagos could declare 
that he was finalizing legislation that would modify the organic laws of ASMAR, 
FAMAE, and ENAER to force them to integrate two independent directors appointed by 
the executive (whom could delegate that task to the SEP’s Superior Council of Public 
Enterprises) into their directories42 as well as require them to adopt accounting and 
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financial standards akin to those of other state firms.43 This was as part of a suite of 
changes designed to improve corporate governance in all 32 state firms. The centerpiece 
was the creation of the powerful Superior Council of Public Companies (SEP Council), a 
decentralized public service lead by nine directors. Seven of these directors would be 
directly appointed by the president, while the remaining two would be appointed by the 
president, with the prior agreement of the Senate, as independent directors. The vast 
powers with which the SEP Council was to be vested were numerous (see Table 2.3). 
Lagos saw these changes as uncontroversial changes that were necessary to bring 
corporate governance in Chile up to speed with that of advanced nations. 
 
 
Table 2.3 Powers of the Proposed Superior Council of Public Companies, 2005 
• Appoint two directors and two independent directors to each non-defense firm. 
• Fix the remunerations of the directors. 
• Revoke the directory totally or partially. 
• Accept the resignation of directors. 
• Appoint independent external auditors. 
• Examine the situation of the company. 
• Approve or reject the balance sheet. 
• Acquire knowledge of company operations and approve them when appropriate. 
• Designate private risk classifiers in appropriate cases. 
• Present an annual report of companies before the Special Budget Commission. 
• Send the financial statements of companies to the Finance Commissions of the 
Congress. 
• Analyze company development plans, strategic business plans, and investment 
projects. 
• Inform Ministry of Finance of assessments of company plans. 
• Establish common norms of general application for companies with state 
participation. 
Source: Presidente de la República, 58–9. 
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The military was unpersuaded. It objected to the creation of a new authority and 
to the incorporation of so-called independent directors. Tanks and aircraft were better 
cared for by the military than civilians.44 And though the top brass used defense ministry 
meetings to channel their grievances, before long word trickled out about soldierly 
opposition to the plans.45 Lagos, however, was unfazed because he thought he could 
count on support from the Concertación de los Partidos por la Democracia 
(Coordination of Parties for Democracy), a coalition of center-left parties in Congress 
that included the center-left Partido Demócrata Cristiano (Christian Democrat Party—
DC) and the left bloc consisting of the Partido Socialista (Socialist Party—PS), the 
Partido por la Democracia (For Democracy Party—PPD), and the Partido Radical 
(Radical Party). Originally formed to organize the ‘No’ campaign during the 1988 
plebiscite, Concertación established itself as the vanguard of the opposition to the 
legacies of Pinochet and the military regime.46 In March 2000, when Lagos and the 
Senate President, Andres Zaldívar (PDC), brokered an agreement with the Right whereby 
the Concertación and Alianza each would submit a bill to reform the 1980 Constitution in 
July 2000, Concertación proposed to eliminate almost all military enclaves, while the 
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rightist Alianza, by contrast, submitted a bill that reduced the power of the executive, 
including by increasing the required supermajorities in subjects concerning public 
spending and reducing the president’s ability to transfer resources from one agency to 
another without legislative approval.47 There could be no mistaking who the heart of the 
reform was. 
Or could there be? To Lagos’s surprise, Concertación remained noncommittal as 
regards his corporate governance project. The party-coalition appeared to have no 
appetite for the corporate governance reform initiative—why? The military was not the 
only powerful societal interest group to object to the reforms. Public sector labor unions 
as well as managers in state enterprises also aired their grievances. The unions, in 
particular, had voiced “total disagreement” with the government’s plan to hand mining, 
defense, and other firms over to majority or minority SEP control.48 In a joint statement, 
the federations and national unions of the companies of CODELCO, ENAP, 
BancoEstado, ENAMI, Correos de Chile, and Railways of the State and Port Companies 
objected to creating a body whose role would be akin to that exercised in the 
shareholders’ meetings of private companies. Equally inappropriate in their eyes was 
handing power to directories constituted by that quasi-private council, while creating the 
SEP Council and supporting Technical Secretariat would create inefficiency and 
duplicate functions. Meanwhile, firm representatives also vented frustrations: 
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“CODELCO has its own statute, so why bring it under the same regulatory framework as 
other firms?” asked then CEO Juan Villarzú. If CODELCO—the largest contributor to 
the Treasury, Villarzú reminded readers—submitted to SEP rule and surveillance by the 
Superintendency of Securities and Insurance, it would create friction with other entities 
already supervising or directly related to the firm, including COCHILCO (The Chilean 
Copper Commission) and the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic.49 
Concertación parties (most notably PDC and PS) had strong ties to public sector 
labor unions linked to the defense and mining industries, including the two ENAER 
unions and multiple ASMAR syndicates and the unions of CODELCO representing the 
five divisions of the company; of ENAMI; and of the Empresa Nacional del Petróleo 
(National Petroleum Company—ENAP). These unions, most of which were controlled by 
PS and PDC militants, were well organized and played a vital role in the electoral base of 
Concertación.50 Public sector unions were the strongest unions in Chile, and the strongest 
of them all were the five CODELCO unions and their more than 18,000 workers. Not 
only that, but the influence of unions within the party apparatus was far greater than their 
membership numbers would seem to indicate because unions could mobilize organized 
voters, man campaigns, and disseminate information to workers. Union leaders had 
strong influence over their members, whether formally or informally, and the power to 
threaten political and economic stability through demonstrations, strikes, and work 
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stoppages.51 Consequently, when the unions (and managers) stood with the military in 
opposition to reform and, like the military, argued against creating a new authority, it 
significantly increased the political and electoral costs for Concertación of rendezvousing 
with Lagos on this issue. Leftist parties (especially the PS and PDC) found it difficult to 
adopt a position on the Lagos public corporate governance reform initiative that would 
alienate their strong union base of support. 
Lagos could always look elsewhere for help. And, indeed, he found plenty of 
support within the party Right. Alianza por Chile (Alliance for Chile), the coalition of the 
center-right parties that included Renovación Nacional (National Renovation—RN), 
Unión Demócrata Independiente (Independent Democratic Union—UDI), and the 
smaller Unión de Centro Centro (Center Union Center—UCC),52 issued few objections 
to the inclusion of changes in the defense firms (or indeed in many of the firms).53 
Instead, it admired Lagos’s rationale for the changes, such that, before long, it was 
nodding to supporting Lagos’s corporate governance initiative, including its changes to 
military enterprises. 
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This marked a radical shift in the stance of Chilean rightist parties. Alianza was 
not always an exponent of curtailing military interests. To the contrary, it came of age 
literally joined at the hip with Pinochet’s armed forces.54 In September 1973, after 
waging a coup in defense of “private property” and ousting the democratically-elected 
Socialist Presidential Administration of Salvador Allende before handing power to 
themselves, the military elite pronounced its faith in the neoliberal ideas of a clique of 
civilian technocrats from the economics department at the University of Chicago. These 
so-called “Chicago Boys,” backed by the three largest business conglomerates, took 
control of the Chilean economy in 1975 and began privatizing the 350 firms nationalized 
by Allende. Meanwhile, a group of rightist politicians linked to the Chicago Boys called 
the Gremialists provided Chile’s ruling president, Commander in Chief of the Army, 
General Augusto Pinochet, with the political basis for his program.55 
Gradually, this coalition concentrated on revamping the rightwing parties in 
Chile, of which the formation of UDI, RN, and UCC resulted. “The goal,” writes Carlos 
Huneeus, “was to form a power group that would become sufficiently influential to 
constitute the principal political force when the military called elections.”56 Thus, the 
military and their rightist civilian allies also revamped the institutional framework itself, 
creating the 1980 Constitution to stipulate that nine of the Senate’s thirty-five members 
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were to be designated or appointed directly by Pinochet for eight-year terms.57 Military 
commanders could also convene the powerful National Security Council (NSC), without 
the president’s consent, to exercise formal oversight over any presidential decisions they 
believed had “grave consequences for the country's institutional stability or national 
security.”58 Finally, the Constitution imposed stringent supermajority requirements to 
change military organic laws, including qualified majorities of 4/7ths (57 percent) to 
change the ASMAR, FAMAE, and ENAER organic laws.  
Pinochet and the military’s strategy paid off for many years. Though it lost the 
1988 plebiscite held to determine whether Pinochet should extend his rule for another 
eight years beginning in 1990, and though Concertación won the presidency and 
majorities in the Chamber of Deputies for almost two straight decades after the ensuing 
return to democracy, Alianza maintained a near-hammerlock on legislative power in the 
Senate. With the help of the military’s “bionic” senators, Alianza continually possessed 
the capacity to veto any objectionable legislation issued by the Concertación-held 
Chamber of Deputies.59 
But despite all of this, the Right’s loyalty to the military was far from immutable. 
It began to realign itself after the turn of the millennium. Pinochet’s arrest in London in 
1998 on charges of human rights violations deflated his stature and catalyzed action in 
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Chile, which reduced the military’s political power and put it on the defensive.60 
Meanwhile, the Right began to realize that it would never attract the moderate Chilean 
voters whose support was vital if it was to contend for the presidency unless it began to 
distance itself from Pinochet's armed forces. Finally, the advantages Alianza derived from 
the enclaves had diminished as Concertación appointees to the Senate, NSC, and 
Constitutional Tribunal replaced the original Pinochet appointees.61 By December 2004, 
therefore, they were retooling, nodding to working with Concertación to solidify civilian 
control over the military.62 In their first cut, in September 2005, the two sides eliminated 
the military’s arbiter role and the designated senators and lifetime senators, civilianized 
and curtailed the powers of the members of the NSC, and empowered the president to 
remove military commanders.63 Now, in November 2005, Alianza was turning its ire on 
the military’s defense industry. 
And yet, even with the unexpected support of Alianza, Lagos’s military industry 
reforms would not stand a chance of passing without support from the Concertación, 
since the seats held by the latter surpassed the qualified minorities necessary to block the 
passage of the reform bill (see Table 2.3.1). Thus, Lagos enlisted Finance Minister 
Nicolás Eyzaguirre (PDC) (2000–2006) to lobby executive officials and legislators to 
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support the program. After undertaking careful negotiations with the various ministers 
whose jurisdictions would be affected and subsequently acquiring the blessing of Defense 
Minister Jaime Ravinet (PDC), Eyzaguirre turned to the groups in Congress. The Senate 
Finance Committee’s three members—Jaime Orpis (UDI), Edgardo Boeninger (DC), and 
Carlos Ominami (PS)—were aligned with Eyzaguirre on the importance of the reform in 
part because Eyzaguirre gained credibility as a former IMF consultant, CEPAL analyst, 
and Chilean Central Bank Director of Research and Chief Economist. Hence, the 
members signed an agreement that made it possible to carry it out within the committee.64 
More generally, the members served as a proxy for Lagos’s effort to build broader 
coalitions with the main factions within the legislature.65 They reached out to lawmakers 
and, using their expertise, vied to persuade and galvanize support among the Senators. 
Eyzaguirre’s star shone brightly in the defense portfolio. It began to fade in 
Congress, however, because the coalition builders could not break down the opposition 
within leftist parties. At first, Lagos obtained the blessing of Alianza and the Right, as we 
saw, but Eyzaguirre’s allies in the Finance Committee walked away from their outreach 
to the Left with a very different sensation— “that it [the proposed corporate governance 
reform] was going to cause controversy because… strong interests were going to be 
trampled.”66 For leftist parties, the costs of supporting defense industry and public sector 
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corporate governance reform still outweighed the benefits. Lagos had not persuaded those 
parties’ allies in labor (or in state management, for that matter) that their benefits would 
be protected in the new setting, and labor considered dubious the claims that state firms 
would not be restructured or fall into private hands in the future if the SEP Council were 
enshrined. So, labor and state managers, in line with the military, remained firmly 
opposed to reform, and threatened to retaliate if labor’s party allies took a different line. 
Facing this potential backlash if they joined hands with the Right and blessed 
Lagos’s bill, leftist parties coalesced with labor and the military instead.67 As they did, a 
dominant anti-reform coalition began to form between the military-labor alliance and the 
leftist parties. The emergence of that coalition restored the original balance of political 
power between military and civilian. Now the military had more power to exert its 
influence in Congress than before the period between 2000–2005, when the military’s 
alliance with the rightist Alianza was collapsing and it was hemorrhaging party allies. At 
the same time, the civilian executive now had less power to exert its influence in 
Congress than before when the leftist parties had not yet defected from the pro-reform, 
pro-civilian coalition. Because it put the military-labor coalition in a unique and 
privileged position for exerting influence over specific actors in Congress, all of this 
made it more likely that the military would prevail in a legislative conflict over the fate of 
Lagos’s reform bill. 
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Table 2.3.1. Party Strength in Chile, 1990–2014 
  Deputies Senators 
Coalition Year (n) % (n)(1) % 
Concertación 1990 69 57.50 22 57.89 
 1994 69 57.50 21 55.27 
 1998 70 58.3 20 52.63 
 2002 62 51.67 20 52.64 
 2006 65 54.17 20 52.64 
 2010 57 47.50 20 52.64 
 2014 67 55.84 21 55.27 
Alianza 1990 48 40.00 16 42.10 
 1994 45 37.50 15 39.47 
 1998 47 39.17 17 44.73 
 2002 57 47.50 17 44.73 
 2006 54 45.00 17 44.73 
 2010 58 48.33 17 44.73 
 2014 49 40.83 16 42.11 
(1) From 1990 to 2006, 8 appointed “bionic” senators, as well as 
former heads of state, held senate seats. 
Source: The author compiled data from Servicio Electoral de Chile. 
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The tensions over the future of the corporate governance reform came to a head 
not long after the forces had lined up on opposing sides. Finance Minister Nicolás 
Eyzaguirre began aggressively promoting the policy with the public blessing of Defense 
Minister Jaime Ravinet and indeed of all those whose portfolios were to be affected.68 
Unmoved by Eyzaguirre’s ringing endorsement and the benediction of the ministers, 
Concertación legislators came forward with technical reasons for why Senate President 
Sergio Romero (RN) should delay voting until after the then-imminent election of a new 
government and Congress.69 Alianza disagreed, and insisted that governance reform was 
urgently needed in light of the meteoric rise in the international price of copper and other 
commodities and the resulting surge in public sector revenues and contracts. Argued José 
García (RN):  
 
“One of our central problems as a country is that we ignore what state companies 
do. They are true “black boxes!” We have no idea how, what, and with what they 
invest. We know their results, through the financial statements, but we know 
nothing about their operation. And when we ask, they respond systematically to 
the Chamber of Deputies that the oversight faculties that they [the Chamber of 
Deputies] have do not reach them. That is… a complete obscurantism. This was 
understood by the Minister Mr. Eyzaguirre. And we must recognize that he was 
                                               
68 The ministers also included Economy, Development, and Reconstruction Minister Jorge Rodríguez 
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brave in pushing this initiative, breaking it down from the original project and 
trying to take it forward… The essence of this project is to give state companies 
all the dynamics of a company, so they can execute their businesses with a modern 
structure and also respond to the requirements of Congress. It is we, the 
representatives of the citizens, who are called to inform them in detail about what 
public companies are doing. We are the ones who represent the fifteen million 
shareholders of these companies. And, therefore, expressing our willingness to 
vote favorably on this important bill in this session seems to me an inescapable 
duty.”70 
 
Other Alianza senators grew impatient with the intransigent and aired their grievances: 
“Why don’t they say why they don’t like the initiative,” lamented Senator Evelyn Matthei 
(UDI). “At least then the country would know. But this oblique way of torpedoing things, 
with reasons that in one case are met and not in others, does not seem appropriate.”71 
Shifting gears, the Left scrutinized the controversial and risky nature of the 
project and the apparent need for committees besides that of finance to approve it. Of 
particular concern were the implications for CODELCO, “the company that continues to 
represent and constitute the central beam of the country’s finances” which, consequently, 
“you cannot play with.”72 In language startlingly similar to that of CODELCO CEO Juan 
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Villarzú, Concertación lawmakers objected to potential conflicts of interest and 
jurisdiction sure to abound between any newly-created SEP Council and the authorities 
that already shared responsibility vis-à-vis the company. The grave omens drove a frantic 
Ricardo Núñez to try to halt the vote, blurting out, just as Senate President Romero 
initiated voting, “In my case I will vote against, as the project is proposed, which we have 
been able to know very briefly,” for “both the Mining Commission and the Government 
Commission should have been able to analyze it very seriously.”73  
But for all the Left’s desperation, the Lagos corporate governance reform bill 
would not be the hill that it died on. While Alianza mostly voted in the affirmative, 
Concertación largely voted the bill down, or effectively did so by leaving the lower 
chamber and, thus, abstaining from voting altogether (see Table 2.3.2). In any case, its 
opposition proved fatal. Though it was a close call, without the Left, the constitutional 
quorum could not be achieved, and the bill was defeated.74 
 
 
Table 2.3.2 Lagos Corporate Governance Bill Quorum Vote Totals 
Bloc Yes No OR Abstain Yes % No OR Abstain % 
Left 7 16 28.00 73.00 
Right 16 6 72.00 27.00 
Total 23 22   
Source: República de Chile, Legislatura 353, 92–3. 
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The alignment of the military and labor was the decisive element in the 
competitive coalition-building process. Consider the formation, three years earlier, of a 
coalition for capital market reform that included both Left and Right. In early 2003, 
investigators uncovered a corruption plot dubbed “MOP-Gate,” alleging that since 1997, 
members of the Ministry of Public Works (MOP) had paid bonuses to 129 employees of 
the company Gestion Territorial y Ambiental (Territorial and Environmental 
Management—GATE) for work never completed. Lagos seized the moment and, in 
January 2003, forged an agreement with the Left and Right in Congress to promote 
measures advancing transparency, the modernization of the state, and growth in the 
public and private sectors. The agreement identified the strengthening and 
professionalization of public management and the reorganization of the management 
system of public enterprises as one objective central to combatting corruption.75 
This encompassing framework facilitated the approval of a capital market reform 
bill in the Chamber of Deputies in 2003. The bill embodied the objectives of the pro-
transparency, anti-corruption movement. Then, in proposing its corporate governance 
reform in 2005, the Lagos Administration simply added the governance initiative to the 
existing capital market bill. Yet when Lagos did that, the public sector labor unions 
joined the military and went on the warpath, and immediately the support of leftist parties 
collapsed.76 Thus, it was not until labor and its military partner sided against the 
                                               
75 Mario Waissbluth, La Reforma del Estado en Chile 1990-2005: de la confrontación al consenso 
(Santiago: Departamento de Ingeniería Industrial, Universidad de Chile, 2006), 42–4. 
 
76 Fernández and Heras, 18–28. 
 
  153 
legislative initiative—in response to the corporate governance statute being added to the 
capital market bill—that leftist parties defected from Lagos’s coalition and started 
organizing the opposition. That was the moment when the capital market initiative ceased 
being politically viable and became a victim of distributive conflict. 
 
Bachelet Administration Corporate Governance Initiative 
Lagos’s bill was killed by leftist Senators arguing that the next Senate ought to 
determine the bill’s fate. President Michelle Bachelet, Lagos’s successor and party-
coalition partner, did the detractors one better and presented them with a brand-new bill. 
In early 2007, Bachelet announced that a similar reform initiative would be dispatched to 
the Chamber of Deputies in April. CODELCO would be spared, as the government was 
working on a separate corporate governance statute for that company, and Bachelet’s bill 
gave appointment power exclusively to the SEP Council.77 Otherwise, the initiative 
would be identical to its predecessor. Yet to the military, it made no difference which 
civilians gained power. The problem was the civilians themselves, for they lacked the 
expertise to lead companies called to construct, maintain, and repair ships, military 
weapons, and aircraft. The military class, on the other hand, had always shown itself not 
just to be capable of helming those firms, but to manage them effectively, presiding over 
an industry that was efficient and relatively free of debt and a generator of foreign 
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exchange and a continuing level of employment. And so, though civilians challenged 
these claims about performance, the military returned to an oppositional stance. 
 The main social and political forces also returned to form. Union leaders did not 
rest on their laurels. ENAMI and ENAP workers— “on the warpath facing SEP transfer,” 
screamed one Economía y Negocios headline—manned the frontlines.78 The drillers and 
mudloggers at ENAP indicted the plan for opening the door to privatization: “All the 
companies that have been transferred to the SEP, such as sanitary companies, have ended 
up being sold,” the ENAP Magallanes union president, Jorge Balich, said. Equally vexing 
was the absence of a channel for worker representation, which may have helped to stave 
off such a sale. Branding the bill as anti-union, Blalich embraced mobilization: 
“Everything we can do to reverse this decision we will do.” The sense that “obviously we 
are going to mobilize” was just as widely shared by the miners at ENAMI, declared the 
Matta plant union president, Nora Miranda. In the next breath, Miranda raised the specter 
of militancy, reporting that ENAP and ENAMI workers had already begun planning a 
coordinated campaign with lawmakers and others to thwart Bachelet’s reform bill.79 
Bachelet responded in kind, such that by March, coalition-building was in full 
swing in the Chilean polity. Once again, the civilians in government got off to a fast start. 
Finance Minister Andrés Velasco had thrown his weight behind the project and embarked 
on a quest to acquire the blessing of Defense Minister José Goñi and others and of the 
Left in Congress. The government sought to curry favor with both Left and Right by 
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stressing the generation of “surplus profits and increasing economic value” (for the 
Right) but also the social dividends from the “fulfillment of the social purposes 
determined by the Executive” (for the Left).80 In total, the changes would enhance 
transparency, management, and supervision; expand prosperity, opportunity, and 
equality; and align corporate governance in Chile with that of developed countries. In this 
context, the decision to so align was an easy one for both Velasco and the priestly as well 
as the rightist Alianza parties. The initiative would complement a policy program in 
whose success they all shared an interest—namely, the Bachelet Administration’s 
vaunted Chile Invierte Plan (Chile Investment Plan), which aimed to spur growth by 
designating a manager of investment initiatives, creating tax incentives, and forming an 
agency to report the progress in the public sector.81 And the Right, still receptive to state 
reform, dubbed themselves friends of Bachelet on this issue as well. 
But despite these nods to social dividends, the sparing of CODELCO, and the 
project’s dispersion of power at the executive level, Concertación did not budge. Finance 
Minister Velasco struggled to persuade his cohorts of the virtues of the state reform bill 
even more than his predecessor had, even though rightist parties were again receptive to 
the plan. Changes that could usher in reformist administrations in state companies were 
not palatable to the Chamber of Deputies’ leftist majority, which relied on support from 
unions who could be hurt by the legislation. Leftist senators had scarcely any more 
appetite for change. With pen in hand, Senator Pedro Muñoz (PS) declared opposition to 
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shifting ENAP to SEP control and conveyed concern for the workers in a letter to the 
Minister Secretary General of the Presidency, José Antonio Viera-Gallo. Muñoz also 
formally requested that the secretary of state analyze the matter and receive the union 
leaders. Calling the proposed SEP Coucil “a management system that points towards its 
[ENAP’s] privatization,” Muñoz said that what he called the public interest must prevail: 
“We all need public companies to have professional, serious, and responsible 
management teams, but this cannot lead to hasty decisions and to the mixing of 
companies whose importance and political, economic, and social relevance is diverse.”82 
The military and workers’ backlash against the Bachelet’s reform proposal proved 
decisive. As the unions increasingly lobbied the government to call off the reform effort, 
threatening to behave collectively in ways that threatened social stability if they did not 
get their way, leftist parties again peeled off to organize and lead the political opposition 
to the initiative. A dominant coalition began to form as the partners of the anti-reform 
alliance that emerged in response to the Lagos governance initiative began to re-amass.83 
That upheld, in turn, the military balance of political power originally restored by the 
military in 2005, when the military responded to the defection of its traditional rightist 
partner from the pro-military coalition by eliciting the cooperation of the party-backed 
anti-reform labor movement. Continuity of the coalitional dynamic made it more likely 
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that the military would again prevail upon the civilians in a legislative battle over the fate 
of the reform initiative. 
The moment of truth came not long after the unification of the military and labor. 
Bachelet was set to unveil the bill, as we saw, in April. Yet April came and went without 
the appearance of the legislation, the finalization of which was delayed by union and 
Concertación wrangling. As the end of the year neared, Finance Minister Velasco again 
affirmed that the bill would be dispatched to Congress imminently, this time in 
December. But the opposition of the Left and anti-reform union stakeholders again kept 
the government from meeting its deadline.84 By the time the bill was at last forwarded to 
the Finance Committee in the Chamber of Deputies, in March 2008, nearly a year had 
passed since its originally-scheduled drop-off date. In the interim, coordinated union and 
party pressure had so diluted its contents that the project now completely excluded 
ENAP, BancoEstado, and ENAMI.85 And when Bachelet tried to put the difficulties 
behind her, the situation only deteriorated, as the neutered bill abruptly ran aground in the 
Finance Commission, where it languished, never to be processed.86 As La Tercera wryly 
recounted in a retrospective two years later, “a week later, President Bachelet gave up on 
the Finance Commission, and the project was not heard of any more.”87 
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Defense Ministry-Led Mixed Capital Program 
The civil-military interaction entered a new phase in mid-2010. In June, Defense 
Minister Jaime Ravinet caused quite a stir when he said that his portfolio planned to 
incorporate private capital into ASMAR and ENAER without Congress, and that it had 
not ruled out extending the approach to FAMAE.88 Ravinet was drawn to the idea and 
began negotiating with Airbus Military, a subsidiary of the European holding, European 
Aeronautic Defence and Space Company (EADS). Ravinet resigned from his post in 
January 2011,89 but Piñera replaced Ravinet with another likeminded long-time 
politician, RN founder and leader Andrés Allamand, who kept up the talks with Airbus 
Military and, in March 2012, received executives from French company DCNS 
Shipbuilding looking to purchase ASMAR and interested in exporting vessels. 
Though plans for ASMAR never materialized, they did for ENAER. In May 
2012, Defense Minister Allamand announced a deal with Airbus Military whereby the 
Air Force would remain the manager in the firm’s repair and maintenance divisions and 
the ownership of the firm would stay in the hands of the Ministry of Finance, but the 
military would be subordinated to Airbus Military’s commercial and industrial 
management in a relationship similar to that of a subcontractor. Airbus Military would 
take the lead in the firm’s commercial and industrial activities or ventures, acquiring the 
power to adapt the organization, structure, and plant of ENAER to its needs. The defense 
                                               
88 Infodefensa.com, “El gobierno de Chile estudia incorporar capital privado en las companies publicas 
Asmar y Enaer a traves de un modelo mixto,” June 28, 2010. 
 
89 A public uproar forced Ravinet out after he claimed that the military might not help during humanitarian 
crises if it required them to provide information about their expenses. 
 
  159 
ministry would transfer ENAER’s domain, property, and 100% of its capacity to design, 
build, and manufacture aircraft and aircraft parts and components, including land, 
facilities, and machinery currently owned by the firm through the Air Force. A total of 
234 workers would be delinked from the manufacturing area and 160 from logistics, 
DAF, commercial, and quality.90 
The military officers in control of ENAER were furious at the appearance of yet 
another new reform initiative, and all the more so because of the clear effort to evade 
Congress. The vested interests of the officers, along with the disproportionately large 
number of them whose power and privilege were threatened by the pending 
reorganization of ENAER along partially private lines, were considerable. One inside 
source with boots on the ground at the time described the situation this way: 
 
“The adjustment of the plant personnel is inevitable, mainly at the administrative 
level, where no more than two managers are justified but there are in fact eight… 
But the adjustment must also reach technicians and operators, because there is also 
an excess. But all these areas include people drawn from the Air Force who, along 
with receiving a salary in ENAER, are receiving pensions from CAPREDENA and 
who, therefore, will not stand idly by.”91 
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Sharing the frustration of Air Force officers were the ENAER unions, who denounced the 
program and promptly mobilized to call on Congress to intervene and stop it.92 Air Force 
officers in control of ENAER, aware of organized labor’s objections, reached out to the 
leaders of the ENAER unions and made suggestions about how to stop partial 
privatization from going forward in the company. ENAER unions leaders were 
conditioned to respond favorably to the invitations to coordinate extended by the 
company’s Air Force managers, for three reasons. 
First, the ENAER unions had a great deal of skin in the game. In the preceding 
three years, ENAER had laid off 800 of their comrades, and the unions had long feared 
that the adjustments any new administration would make would further reduce or renew 
the current plant. Now, in 2012, their nightmares were seemingly coming true, as the 
planned sale of the production wing of the firm stood to dismiss 400 of the 860 workers 
still with the company. Second, most ENAER union leaders and company staff and many 
employees were themselves linked to the Air Force, either as former or retired members 
or as family members of active or retired members—“in fact,” said one unnamed inside 
source, “many children of officers and non-commissioned officers have settled there at 
different levels.”93 And third, an affinity between the military and labor which served to 
normalize coordination between them was already in embryo. Over the years, the unions 
had come to recognize that they shared an interest with the military in the preservation of 
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many of the most visible economic institutions in the public sector. The realization was 
thrown into sharp relief in the late 2000s, when a cadre of CODELCO union bosses went 
knocking on the doors of the defense ministry and, once inside, pledged their undying 
support for the Copper Law94— ‘Let Chileans eat cake; the levy protects the firm from 
the privatizers,’ declared the bosses. Consequently, the unions listened to the military 
officers when they advised them on how to oppose the initiative effectively.95 
As ENAER unions and elements of ENAER’s Air Force management 
increasingly positioned themselves to try to halt the mixed capital program, a coalition 
began to form between them. In turn, ENAER union leaders began maneuvering to 
cultivate alliances with sympathetic Concertación lawmakers. President of Syndicate No. 
2 of Productive Workers of ENAER Bernardo Tapia emerged as the leader of the union 
front, publicly questioning the defense ministry’s assessment that ENAER lacked 
profitability, and even delivering documents to the ministry which allegedly 
demonstrated that the existing works in the area exhibited more than 40% of profitability 
to the company.96 This series of actions catalyzed the Left in Congress. After 100 
workers from the firm demonstrated outside La Moneda in opposition to the partial 
privatization plan and the looming dismissal of 400 of them, lawmakers took notice of 
the growing rebellion and began plotting how to force the government to call off the 
initiative.  
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Concertación parties opposed the mixed capital program not just because the 
initiative denied it power to legislative, but because the leftist parties had their own 
vested interest in the continuation of state ownership of the firms. They saw the firms’ 
publicly-owned status as serving goals of national and social interest, the satisfaction of 
which generated political dividends for leftist and labor-linked parties. One such goal, 
that of full employment, had been served effectively by the defense firms. As much 
became apparent in January 2009, just as the effects of the Great Recession reached 
Chilean shores, when Deputy and PDC Vice President Renan Fuentealba appealed to the 
monarchs of the military firms to use their budgets and ability to invest to preserve jobs 
and generate new ones.97 Incorporating private capital and reducing state control would 
make it harder to use the firms in these kinds of politically-productive ways, because 
restructuring would reduce jobs and because the loss of state control would forfeit the 
power to use the firms to distribute patronage. Thus, as Tapia lobbied the government and 
Concertación increasingly voiced its own objections to what it dubbed “undercover 
privatization,” a renewed coalition began to form between Concertación leaders in 
Congress and Tapia and the military-backed ENAER unions.98 
Neither Ravinet nor Allamand were fazed by this frenzy of political activity in the 
defense sector. They believed that the political opposition was irrelevant because the 
defense ministry had the authority to execute the mixed capital program. In 2009, 
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Ravinet’s predecessor, José Goñi, ordered a study which ultimately determined that 
ENAER’s partnership with a private company was possible and completely legal. Just as 
important, after passage of the landmark New Defense Ministry Act in 2010, many 
wondered if the reformed ministry could take the lead in the drive to reform the defense 
industry. As its name implied, the law heralded a new day in military policymaking in 
Chile. Civilians would at last enjoy the authority to decide: “Each branch for the past 200 
years developed its force according to its own view.”99 The new structure changed the 
planning relationship between the armed forces and civilian government, such that 
“[now] it’s completely impossible for an armed forces plan to be produced 
autonomously,” said Felipe Illanes Poullangan, who was with the ministry and advised in 
the process.100 Could the defense ministry succeed where Congress had failed and bring 
the defense firms under partial civilian control? Defense Ministers Goñi, Ravinet, and 
Allamand certainly thought so. 
Yet there were some hitches. Despite the organizational reforms implemented in 
2010, the defense ministry bureaucracy as yet lacked the requisite authority, information, 
and expertise to effectively implement the changes, or at least do so and have the changes 
stay in place. The new defense ministry law created the Department of Defense Industry 
within the Technological Development and Industry Division of the Undersecretariat of 
Defense, but that new bureaucracy lacked essential powers and competencies and was 
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largely confined to a vaguely defined responsibility of “coordinat[ing] the relationship 
with the Supreme Government of FAMAE, ASMAR, and ENAER.”101 No power to 
develop policy, name firm directors, or create or reorganize companies or divisions was 
vested in it. Instead, the bulk of its work consisted of supporting the existing military 
defense industry by functioning as an advisory commission for export and as an activator 
or facilitator of agreements.102 
And that was only the half of it. The new bureaucracy was actually layered on top 
of an existing institutional apparatus which afforded the armed forces considerable 
autonomy in the oversight and administration of defense industry firms. Until 2010, each 
branch of the military had an under secretariat in charge of the needs of their branch and 
led by a uniformed undersecretary appointed by the executive. These under secretariats 
housed the services’ own defense production-related units from the confines of which 
armed bureaucrats made industry-related decisions and choices about development 
projects and enjoyed near-automatic support from civilian ministers. The 2010 law 
demoted the armed force under secretariats by putting them under a under secretariat 
which concentrated the administrative functions of the existing ministry, however, the 
military bureaucracies remained in charge of such tasks as formulating and coordinating 
the objectives and policies of the productive units in their particular sector of the military 
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industry, promoting the development of industries that met national defense needs, and 
identifying measures to encourage industrial activities connected with defense 
production. Thus, in 2018, the Army could boast that its Comando de Industria Militar e 
Ingeniería (Command of Military Industry and Engineering—CIMI) “is the agency in 
charge of coordinating and centralizing the patrimonial order of the Military Industry.”103 
Concertación reformists had long burned to turn this apparatus to new ends by 
creating a division of the defense ministry empowered to name directors and intervene in 
companies.104 Lagos seized the opening in 2001 to put that reform and others on the 
agenda. Yet when the military was given the opportunity to discuss several drafts, it came 
out strongly against the changes. Not only that, but the military-Alianza link had not yet 
disintegrated, and Alianza happened to share its military partner’s skepticism because 
Alianza opposed creating an entity of the executive in which such extensive power would 
reside, said a former official who was close to the proceedings and preferred not to be 
named.105 In response, the reformists sanitized the bill in search of support, and the final 
version—submitted to Congress by Lagos on September 14, 2005 and approved on 
February 4, 2010—bore little resemblance to its predecessors. The arrangement afforded 
the military continued power while denying civilians any real control, especially because 
the problems and solutions in this policy area were less visible and more complex. 
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Allamand was forced to try to acquire the requisite expertise and information to 
develop the mixed capital program in a different way: by hiring outside advisors and 
charging them with performing functions that would otherwise be performed by the 
civilian directors or interventors a stronger bureaucracy would appoint. In May 2011, 
Allamand hired a close ally, Luis Hernán Paul Fresno, as an advisor to the defense 
portfolio and the directories of ASMAR, FAMAE, and ENAER. Paul was a civil 
engineer and professor in the School of Management at the Pontifical Catholic University 
of Chile (UC) and a research associate at the Centro de Estudios Públicos (Center for 
Public Studies—CEP), the well-known think tank of the liberal Right. He had also just 
joined the board of directors at La Polar, the fourth largest retail company in Chile, a 
month earlier.106 Allamand tasked Paul with attending military firm board meetings, 
analyzing “information that serves as a basis to support decision making and control of 
companies,” and “studying proposals for necessary adjustments to current legislation that 
regulates the operations of these companies.”107 According to Paul, his main task was 
negotiating with the military and developing a set of best practices to be incorporated into 
initiatives.108 
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But this was no antidote to the fundamental weakness of the civilian bureaucracy, 
and neither did it do anything to weaken the relatively stronger military bureaucracy. To 
the contrary, the delayed development of the civilian bureaucracy and the relative 
endurance of the military bureaucracy perpetuated the original balance of institutional 
power. Since the reform of the defense ministry in 2010 did not significantly alter the 
pre-reform bureaucracy in this area, the military had as much power to influence 
administrative decision making as it had before 2010 when the ministry had not yet been 
reorganized. Civilian defense officials, moreover, had somewhat more power than before 
2010, but not enough to obtain detailed information about viability and future prospects, 
much less to use institutional mechanisms to shape corporate governance and industrial 
structure. That made it more likely that the military would prevail in an administrative 
battle over the fate of the mixed capital program. With an edge over the civilians, the 
military bureaucracy was poised to frustrate the process. At the very least, without more 
authority and information, and in the face of such an established and powerful military 
bureaucracy, the civilian bureaucracy would be unable to mobilize the requisite capacities 
to execute the program or to keep the changes from being reversed or overturned. 
The fighting began when the emboldened defense ministry civilians moved on 
their maiden defense industry reform project. When Allamand sought to mobilize the 
resources needed to executive the partial transfer of ENAER in May 2012, the leftist 
parties in Congress took up arms and sought to crush the rebellion. In June 2012, the 
Senate Defense Commission—headed by Senators Víctor Pérez (UDI) and José Antonio 
Gómez (Radical Party), president and member of the body, respectively—conducted 
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three rounds of hearings to analyze the financial and labor problems faced by ENAER. 
The process permitted seeing which decisions “would allow revitalizing and empowering 
the company in a way that is least invasive towards the workers,” said Gómez, who, 
incidentally, had close links to the labor movement.109 Thus, the commission listened to 
presentations from invited guests representing the company, organized labor, and the 
defense ministry, respectively, including the executive director of ENAER, Rafael 
Sánchez; the company’s manager of administration, Yuri Grlica; lawyer Hernán 
Barahona; representatives of the Syndicate No. 2 of ENAER, Bernardo Tapia and 
Rodrigo Arias; and, finally, Defense Minister Andrés Allamand.110 
This event seemed to bear all the trappings of a benign moment. Nevertheless, the 
real purpose of the hearings was to serve as an intervention from upon high, intended to 
discredit the reform program and strengthen the labor and leftist opposition. Gómez sided 
with his coalition’s labor ally at the end of the sessions. Referencing the opinion of a 
lawyer, he insisted that ENAER could only carry out the type of integration with a private 
company presently underway if a new legal framework was created beforehand. Since 
current law gave ENAER the responsibility of developing both production and 
maintenance, the delivery of either function—in this case, production—to a private 
company “necessarily requires law,” he said. Not only that, but too many workers would 
be hurt: “To reach the levels that this strategic partner [Airbus Military] wants, they will 
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have to lay off about 400 workers, and they have already fired 800 in three years. It’s a 
difficult situation for the workers.”111 
Some doubts about the intentions of the Senate Defense Commission persisted 
despite its conclusions. Yet they dissipated when a chorus of defenders in the Chamber of 
Deputies quickly joined labor’s allies in the Senate. Like unionist Tapia, Deputies 
Tucapel Jiménez (PPD) and Chamber Defense Committee member Ricardo Rincon (DC) 
repudiated the notion that ENAER was inherently unprofitable. “ENAER is facing low 
natural cycles that exist in the aviation sector,” said Rincon.112 And like union leaders, 
Rincon stressed alternatives he said had been overlooked, including corporate governance 
reforms and “the decision of the ministry to finance the certification of ENAER rather 
than the company manufacturer.”113 All of this showed the defense ministry’s lack of 
political will and—ironically for Chile’s usual military reformers—the comparative 
intelligibility of the Air Force: “Here there is an absolute lack of public policy for the 
sector by the Ministry of Defense and the government… Even with a press of three 
ministers, it goes nowhere.” And while “the Ministry of Defense has no clarity,” the Air 
Force “is totally and absolutely clear [about] what to do on this subject.”114 
At this point, President Piñera stepped in and tried to calm everyone’s nerves by 
offering jobs guarantees for all workers affected by any privatization initiative 
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undertaken by his administration. Yet Piñera found himself sitting across the negotiating 
table from a stridently leftist labor leadership, and the gulf between them profoundly 
affected his efforts to reduce the political costs for the unions of entering into an alliance 
with his government. Consequently, the offer fell flat, with neither labor nor its 
legislative partner exiting the dominant pro-military, anti-reform coalition.115 More 
generally, the civilians’ efforts at peacemaking did not stop Deputies Rincon and 
Jiménez—with the strong support of Tapia and the ENAER unions—from proceeding to 
persuade the Comptroller General of the Republic to review the legality of the strategic 
association between ENAER and Airbus Military, which the group argued ought to be 
stopped because “the political and strategic convenience of such privatization for the 
State of Chile has not been analyzed.”116 Meanwhile, flanked by leaders of the 
Agrupación Nacional de Empleados Fiscales (National Association of Tax Employees—
ANEF), the presidents of ENAER Syndicates No. 1 and 2, Luis Pedrero and Bernardo 
Tapia, delivered a letter to President Piñera denouncing alleged legal and administrative 
irregularities in the privatization process being undertaken by the administration and 
requesting that the process be halted.117 
Tapia and the Concertación Deputies ultimately got their way. The venture was 
deemed unconstitutional and suspended in decision No. 45.717 of July 30, 2012, in which 
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General Comptroller Ramiro Mendoza Zúñiga held that the strategic alliance exceeded 
the powers to form partnerships that the law conferred on ENAER. Article 3 of the 
ENAER organic law required all aviation operations to be under the control of the state 
of Chile and its armed forces. Although Law 18.297 allowed ENAER to constitute or 
form a part of companies (i.e. subsidiaries), “this power cannot mean that said public 
company fails to perform, principally and directly, the object that has been defined by the 
law,” wrote Zúñiga.118 The judgment made it clear once and for all that without first 
strengthening the civilian bureaucracy, which would require amending the ENAER 
organic law, the defense ministry did not have the clear and uncontested authority to 
facilitate ENAER’s reform along partially private lines. 
But despite this victory for labor and the Left, isolated skirmishes continued. 
Deputy Rincon remained unsatisfied and angry about the arrogance of the defense 
ministry civilians. And so, on August 8, 2012, a week after the strategic venture was 
declared “not adjusted to Law,” Rincon called on Defense Minister Andrés Allamand to 
pronounce on the latter’s compliance with Zúñiga’s determination.119 The interpolation 
became a microcosm of the failure of the mixed capital program itself. Defense Minister 
Allamand’s advance of the mixed capital program in defiance of his ministry’s 
weaknesses and the military’s continued institutional strength created a legal and political 
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vulnerability which could be seized upon by a powerful opposition. And so, when the 
military, its labor partner, and labor’s legislative ally all exerted strong countervailing 
pressure, the civilian bureaucracy ran aground and its mixed capital program collapsed. 
 
Executive Branch-Led Corporate Governance Initiative 
The civil-military relation departed equilibrium for the fourth time in the post-
authoritarian period beginning in late 2014. In October, the second Socialist Michelle 
Bachelet Administration (2014–2018) revealed that it was finalizing a draft initiative to 
facilitate the entry of majorities of qualified civilians into the corporate governments of 
the three defense firms. In 2012, Bachelet’s rightist predecessor, Sebastián Piñera, told 
the Senate that he planned to incorporate professional management and control into the 
defense industry’s boards of directors and general management,120 and Defense Minister 
Allamand (RN) was vetting options for adjusting legislation regulating the firms at the 
time at the time.121 Now, Piñera and Bachelet’s vision was becoming more distinct. Four 
of the seven members of each firm’s directory would be chosen by one of three civilian 
government agencies: the Public Enterprise System (SEP), Ministry of Defense Ministry, 
or Finance Ministry. Consistent with the status quo, the remaining directors would be 
selected by the commander of the military branch associated with the firm’s 
production.122 
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Bachelet was greeted by a receptive Congress and defense portfolio. Defense 
Minister Jorge Burgos (PDC) (2014–15) was already hard at work trying to create a path 
to victory for the initiative. Recognizing that he had an interest in enhancing his political 
power and reducing the resources allocated (or misallocated) on his watch,123 Burgos 
hired well-known economist and former Economy Minister and director of public 
companies Carlos Mladinic in June 2014, calling on the specialist to 
 
“perform highly qualified consultancies related to the military industry, especially 
complying with the following specific functions: a) advising the Assistant 
Secretary of National Defense regarding the military industry, with special 
mention of the union situation of these industries and the situation of their 
relationship with the management of companies, in particular regarding 
negotiation with the company; and b) advising the Assistant Secretary of National 
Defense in the preparation of a new corporate government project for the military 
industry.”124 
 
Mladinic was to conduct extensive negotiations with military representatives of the firms 
and union representatives of the civilians working in them.125 Burgos also assembled a 
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team of economists and defense specialists with Mladinic at its center as part of the 
process of finalizing the completion of the corporate governance bill.126 He used the 
occasion of a September 2014 seminar held at ANEPE, entitled “Corporate Governance 
and its Application in the Defense Industry,” to discuss Bachelet’s objectives regarding 
the reform, broadcast the position of the government and his portfolio, and demonstrate 
his portfolio’s initiative in overseeing the finalization of the proposed organic law.127 
Shortly after, the initiative gained approval from Ministry of Finance, which favored it 
because it did not imply an expense.128 
The Right and Left in Congress were also busy partnering up. In 2014, a crack 
began to appear in the union edifice. For many defense-sector unions (namely, the 
ENAER syndicates), corporate governance reform rather than partial privatization was no 
refuge— “the incorporation of independent directors will be the first step towards the 
privatization of the company,” said Bernardo Tapia, still President of ENAER Workers’ 
Union.129 But this was not the position of all unions, for ASMAR unions broke ranks 
with the ENAER syndicates and backed the reform plan. Just about all ASMAR unions 
could remember was years of bitter conflict between themselves and their company’s 
high military management over the unions’ simple demand for the right to collectively 
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bargain with their armed bosses.130 Now, they liked the idea of simply sending the 
uniformed back to the barracks once and for all and possibly then obtaining their right to 
bargain. “It seems good that there are civilians in the directory,” said president of the 
Trade Union of ASMAR Professionals, Manuel Tornes, who added that the workers 
knew of the union leadership’s idea of promoting the initiative, and valued the idea.131 
The ASMAR unions’ defection from the military-labor alliance reverberated 
throughout society and polity. It produced nothing less than a shift in power relations. 
ASMAR workers represented the single largest segment of organized laborers in the 
defense industry. Numbering at least three thousand, they dwarfed their fewer than 1,000 
counterparts in ENAER, and FAMAE workers were also fewer in number as well as less 
organized. Thus, when the defection of the ASMAR syndicates split the defense union 
opposition, it weakened Tapia and the anti-reform stalwarts in the military-backed 
ENAER ranks. That, in turn, made it politically possible for the Left in Congress to throw 
its weight behind corporate governance reform and to begin organizing the support 
alongside their rightwing counterparts. As the Left increasingly repositioned itself, the 
Left and Right in Congress began to see more and more eye to eye. At that special 
moment, the party-coalitions were converging in military industry reform position and 
strategy for the first time ever, edging closer to linking arms in holy matrimony. 
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The military was alarmed by the shifting alliances and growing unity of the 
civilians. Recognizing the need to look for allies or engineer a crucial defection within 
the executive, it resorted to a more primitive strategy of issuing warnings during defense 
ministry meetings about the social conflicts that would result from mixing civilians and 
military leaders in firm directories. The clashes would be particularly intense between the 
military and union representatives, whose incorporation in the boards the draft initiative 
was still considering at the time. These warnings—which Bachelet and Burgos had every 
reason to believe, given the ongoing struggle inside ASMAR itself—introduced a 
contradiction, the inescapable implication of which was that reform amounted to a self-
defeating enterprise.  
At first, this strategy did not bear fruit. Bachelet and Defense Minister Burgos 
remained as committed as ever to advancing the reform, with Burgos in particular making 
it a top priority. Yet the civilians’ moment in the sun did not last. The political context 
began to change all over again in 2015. In May, Bachelet’s popularity was in freefall and 
her government in crisis. She had pursued an ambitious agenda that also included tax, 
educational, constitutional, labor market, and pension reforms, but many of these other 
initiatives began to fail, in design or in implementation, prompting widespread 
disillusionment with the pace and content of the initiatives and with her government. A 
slowing economy deepened the malaise, as did allegations that her son, Sebastián 
Dávalos, participated in a real-estate corruption scandal involving parts of the political 
and financial elite. Public criticism reached a fever pitch with the revelation of yet more 
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charges, this time that one of her closest allies, Interior Minister Rodrigo Penailillo, was 
connected to one of the companies at the center of a campaign finance scandal.132 
The military’s warnings, combined with the fallout from the governmental crisis, 
mixed to create a noxious brew. According to former defense ministry sources, the toxic 
potion changed Bachelet’s calculation of her capacity to prevail in a battle with the 
military. With students, unions, business groups, and virtually every other sector of 
society turned against her, Bachelet judged herself as being weaker than before when she 
enjoyed windfall support, even though Congress as yet remained firmly behind her with 
regard to her defense industry reform initiative.133 And so, Bachelet defected from the 
reform coalition. For good measure, she then withdraw the defense portfolio from the 
civilian coalition as well by sacking Penailillo and shifting the trusted Jorge Burgos from 
Defense to Interior and then appointing the former Radical Party Senator and member of 
the Senate Defense Committee, José Antonio Gómez, as Defense Minister. An 
established politician closely tied to the labor movement, whose opposition during the 
2012 hearing helped defeat then Minister of National Defense Allamand’s mixed capital 
program, Gómez “represented no threat to the military, and the military knew it.”134 
                                               
132 Roland Benedikter and Miguel Zlosilo, “Chile’s 2017 presidential election: Evaluating the second 
Bachelet government,” Latin American and Caribbean Centre, London School of Economics and Political 
Science (blog), November 18, 2017, blogs.lse.ac.uk. 
 
133 Unnamed former high-ranking Defense Ministry official, interviews with the author, May 3, 2018 and 
June 8, 2018, Santiago, Chile; Felipe Illanes Poullangan, who was involved in the preparation of the 
legislation, interview with the author, June 12, 2018, Santiago, Chile. 
 
134 Jaime Baeza Freer, interview with the author, April 24, 2018. 
 
  178 
These realignments restored the original balance of political power briefly disturbed in 
2014. If history was any guide, the military’s strength would again exhibit itself. 
By 2015, the Defense Ministry was finishing up the bill and almost prepared to 
forward it to Ministry General Secretariat of the Presidency (SEGPRES) for its final stop 
before being dispatched to Congress.135 The rightist Alianza and leftist Concertación 
party-coalitions in Congress were waiting anxiously. Nevertheless, Bachelet and her 
defense ministry both went silent on the matter. It was not until late 2016, more than a 
year after Gómez replaced Burgos in the defense portfolio, that the ministry quietly 
forwarded the legislation to SEGPRES.136 Yet at this point, according to sources close to 
the situation, Bachelet elected to hold the bill.137 Nothing was heard from the presidential 
ministry regarding the initiative. As the weeks turned into months, Deputy Marcelo 
Schilling (PS) and other Deputies in the House Defense Committee, growing irritated and 
then concerned, resorted to using Defense Minister Gómez’s presence in their chambers 
to ask why the government had not yet complied with its promise to present the bill. 
Gómez assured the honorable that the bill had left his orbit.138 But when weary legislators 
pleaded with SEGPRES to transmit the legislation to Congress once and for all, their 
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appeals fell on deaf ears. SEGPRES neither dispatched the bill to Congress nor so much 
as pronounced again on the matter. 
Members of Congress felt snubbed. As word trickled out about the executive’s 
detachment from its own bill, irate legislators protested the indifference. A simmering 
Deputy Jaime Pilowsky (DC) accused Bachelet of lacking the spine to persist, even when 
the other actors had worked together to create a path to victory for the initiative: Despite 
the formation of broad agreement in Congress, the “political will to advance [in the 
executive] was lacking,” said Pilowsky.139 Others laid the blame for the bill’s 
disappearance at the feet of Gómez. The minister could have taken ownership of the 
reform and pointed to the clear legislative support in an effort to persuade Bachelet that 
she possessed control of powerful forces capable of diffusing the military opposition. 
Instead, he dragged his heels, such that by the time the baton was passed, all of the 
momentum built up over the preceding five years had drained. As a result, the defense 
industry reform bill became “one of many bills and reforms [that were] killed or 
effectively killed” during Gómez’s tenure.140 
 
Conclusion 
Chile’s failed defense industry transition cannot be understood without 
considering the outcomes of the coalition and institution building struggles between pro-
reform civilian politicians and an anti-reform military elite. These civilians targeted the 
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military firms for reform because it promised to enhance the civilians’ political viability, 
power to govern, and democratic legitimacy while bypassing rising external scrutiny 
associated with Chile’s accession to the OECD. Retaining control was just as vital to the 
military, whom had assiduously developed the military industry as an institutional 
mechanism for transferring wealth from the whole society to the military and for whom 
the defense industry provided a disproportionately large number of high, middle, and 
lower-ranking military officers with lucrative supplemental incomes. As a result of the 
coalition and institution-building processes, however, the civilians and the military 
contesting them differed appreciably in their capacities to craft or defeat specific reforms. 
The military understood early on that it was crucially important to outperform the 
civilians in contests to find social and political allies who could shape legislative 
outcomes. When presidents announced corporate governance initiatives between 2005–
2014, the military cultivated alliances with labor unions aligned with the Concertación 
coalition of center-left legislative parties, which was strong enough to prevent the rise of 
the supermajorities necessary to change key constitutional defense industry laws. The 
civilians could not persuade labor or the parties that labor and other interests, including 
state managers, would be protected in the new setting. When a dominant anti-reform 
coalition between the military, labor, and Concertación began to emerge, it altered the 
original balance of power between civilian and military, making it more likely that the 
military would prevail in battle. And so, the civilian could only watch when the parties 
defended the military and its industry in both committee and open conflict. And when the 
leftist and rightist parties coalesced between 2016–18, just as a new legislative initiative 
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was proposed, the military sought to drive the president into defecting from the pro-
reform coalition. The parties could not make defection costlier for the president due to 
the effects of the crisis racking the government. Thus, the executive proceeded to 
withdraw from the coalition and took the defense portfolio with it, and an executive-
military alliance emerged. That altered the original balance of power yet again. In the 
end, the parties in Congress had no recourse when the tables turned and the executive 
defended the military and its defense industry. 
But the military also took the politics of institution-building seriously. When the 
defense ministry announced that it would incorporate partial private capital and 
management into military firms on its own in 2010, the military was in a relatively 
stronger position to shape the outcome of the administrative reform effort. The civilians 
had tried to create and vest a bureaucracy responsible for overseeing the defense 
industries with appointment and other powers, but the military objected on national 
security grounds. The military’s then rightist coalition partner, Alianza, agreed, and the 
alignment forced the leftist administration to abandon its plans and settle for a much 
weaker civilian bureaucracy. That preserved, in turn, the original balance of institutional 
power between civilian and military, making it more likely that military would prevail in 
any looming administrative battle. Consequently, in 2012, the civilian bureaucracy could 
only watch as its adversaries blocked the partial reform plan at its inception. 
These results suggest the need to rethink the conventional wisdom about 
coalitional civil-military relations. As the literature can be read to suggest, it is by no 
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means obvious that the military would enter into a coalition with organized labor.141 
Indeed, the same military actor analyzed in this chapter allied with key rivals of labor—
the societal and party Right—between 1973–2005, and the military systematically sought 
to eliminate elements of organized labor during the 1973–1990 dictatorship.142 Moreover, 
a recent study of the politics of military economics points out how the military defeats 
policies that affect its interests by allying with key political and legislative actors, starting 
with parties within the congress.143 This analysis shows, by contrast, the role of the 
military’s creation of alliances with societal interest groups who themselves can exert 
influence over parties with veto power. Indeed, the military’s decision to court party-
backed unions rather than parties themselves might suggest that the labor alliances 
analyzed here, and not party alliances, were the more crucial for the military. 
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3 
 
Political Stalemate in a Rent Market: Argentina, 1983–1989 
 
“Argentina holds a morbid fascination for students of political economy because it has a 
system in which power is so thoroughly spread out among well-organized and entrenched 
interests that it is an almost perfect example of entropy.” 
Lewis, The Crisis of Argentine Capitalism1 
 
Introduction 
Argentina’s transfer of defense industry firms from military to civilian 
management during the period from 1983 to 1989 marked the first time in this South 
American country’s history that civilians succeeded soldiers as leaders of the nation’s 
vast defense industries. The rotation of the directorates of defense-industrial enterprises 
was a watershed in the civilianization of a political economy. For decades the military 
had jealously guarded the sector’s commanding heights, which, by law, could not be 
presided over by civilians. In control of budgets and jobs, the armed forces favored some 
civilian concerns by investing in them and squeezed out others by competing with them, 
while in government corridors the firms’ muscle gave the military an unrivalled edge in 
the perennial struggle for rents. The shift of direction from the military to civilians 
destroyed that military powerbase while greatly expanding the scope and domain of 
                                               
1 Paul Lewis, The Crisis of Argentine Capitalism (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992), 
1. 
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civilians and, indeed, the universe of possibilities. Civilian management itself promised, 
in turn, to drive economic growth, reduce fiscal pressure, stop the wholesale transfer of 
wealth from society to the military, and ensure the survival of democracy. 
But Argentina did not finish all that it started. Its effort to transfer ownership of 
the very same defense industry firms did not succeed. For all of the nation’s feats 
replacing soldier with civilian direction, the failure to reshuffle the ownership of the same 
enterprises was a caldera in the civilianization process. Argentina fought unsuccessfully 
in a similar quest during the Proceso dictatorship (1976–1983), when initiatives to 
privatize military holdings ground to a halt on multiple occasions. The restoration of 
democracy raised hopes that civilian control of the state would produce a different 
outcome. The renewed failure of the bid to restructure the defense sector, instead, 
fortified and perpetuated the military’s vested interest in a large, diverse segment of the 
Argentine economy. That reinforced the military’s financial stakes and claim to control 
rights and economic rents and rewards, which threatened the prospects for economic 
growth and democratic consolidation. 
That Argentina would succeed in reforming management of its defense industry 
but fail in reforming ownership of that same sector presents a curious puzzle. Political 
economists tend to conceive of reform “as a neat, coherent policy shift” unlike the pattern 
of fragmentary change observed in the Argentine defense sector during this period.2 
Moreover, the outcome of partial reform flatly contradicts some of the most conventional 
                                               
2 Victor Shih, “Partial Reform Equilibrium, Chinese Style: Political Incentives and Reform Stagnation in 
Chinese Financial Policies,” Comparative Political Studies, 40, 10 (2007), 1238–62, 1238. 
  185 
wisdom about Argentine politics and political economy. The literature generally holds 
that, around 1982–1983, the balance of power swung sharply from favoring military to 
favoring civilian, the military ceasing being a formidable obstacle to economic and state 
reform.3 The partial reform observed here problematizes this thesis. Argentina should 
have had little trouble changing defense industry enterprise ownership, as civilians so 
empowered should have encountered few if any serious obstacles to imposing that clear, 
well-defined preference. 
Another prevailing idea is that the Argentine state in the late 20th century was a 
relatively weak actor—a “feeble state surrounded by massive social forces.”4 Some 
scholars take exception and stress the clout of certain ministries after 1983.5 
Nevertheless, a near constant is a view of the defense ministry in particular as unable to 
design and implement policy goals or to take the lead as a political actor in its own right. 
Thus, David Pion-Berlin stresses the low concentration of authority and decision-making 
                                               
3 Jorge Zaverucha, “The Degree of Military Political Autonomy during the Spanish, Argentine and 
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autonomy enjoyed by policymakers at the ministry’s key decision sites.6 But here, too, 
partial reform of defense industry firms seriously challenges existing wisdom. The 
defense ministry should have been unable to structure the shift of management of the 
sector, which, as a colossal, unprecedented task implicating the structure of the hard core 
of the economy, should have resulted in the same leadership failures and resultant 
dispersal of authority to the separate service branches that plagued similar efforts. Why 
did Argentina between 1983–1989 fail to shift its defense industry enterprises from 
military to civilian ownership while succeeding in turning those same firms over to 
civilian management? 
This chapter argues that relative civilian institutional strength and relative military 
coalitional strength jointly contributed to the outcome. When the defense ministry 
announced that it was going to replace military presidents and boards with civilian heirs 
entirely administratively, civilians were in a relatively stronger position than military to 
influence the crafting and implementation of the policy. Originally, military commanders 
appointed directors, but President-elect Alfonsín had obtained a law empowering the 
defense ministry and demoting the commanders; creating a new under secretariat in 
charge of defense production that was vested with appointment power and led by 
civilians; and subordinating the firms to the new secretariat’s command. Once created, 
the new bureaucracy altered the original balance of institutional power between civilian 
and military, making it more likely that the civilian would prevail in a battle over the fate 
of administrative reform initiatives. And so, even though the military fought it, in the end, 
                                               
6 Ibid., 41. 
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the military could only watch as the new bureaucracy seized and consolidated managerial 
control of defense industry firms. 
But that was not the end of the military. It wisely knew that it needed find allies 
capable of blocking initiatives to divest it of enterprises legislatively, and quickly, as that 
was likely to be what civilians would try to do next. When Alfonsín proposed such 
ownership reform on three separate occasions, the military aligned itself with its private 
suppliers and partners and especially with the defense-sector labor unions, whose 
strengths included its sway with the Peronist Party, the ruling party in the Senate. 
Alfonsín sought to negotiate with peak organizations, but he never could persuade labor 
that it had an incentive to support reform because he eschewed the use of monetary 
suasion. And so, as the military and labor increasingly coalesced, the resulting alliance 
increasingly lobbied the Peronist Party in Congress to block reforms, and a coalition 
began to form between the actors. That altered the original balance of political power, 
making it more likely that the military would prevail in the heat of battle. And so, when 
Alfonsín persisted, the tables turned. Now it was Alfonsín and his small coalition of 
technocrats who could only watch as the military, through its coalition, torpedoed 
legislative ownership reforms at inception or in open conflict. By 1989, the Argentine 
defense sector was occupied by opposing armies: civilian managers and military owners.  
 
3.1. The Argentine Military Industry in 1983 
In land, labor, and capital, the military was the single biggest player in the 
Argentine economy at the dawn of restored democracy in December 1983. Each branch 
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of the armed forces controlled a domain of firms concentrated in the industrial and 
service sector. The Army controlled the notorious Dirección General de Fabricaciones 
Militares (General Directorate of Military Industries—DGFM), an autonomous holding 
company that owned and managed in whole or in part the 13 industries of Fabricaciones 
Militares and 23 Argentine industrial firms. DGFM firms enjoyed a monopoly or near-
monopoly in the mining, weapons, steel, petrochemical, and lumber sectors and produced 
everything from these inputs to ground force material and weapons systems. The Air 
Force and Navy owned and managed wholly or partly 22 other service-sector and 
industrial firms proffering everything from airplanes and aircraft repair, to ships, naval 
arms, and ship repair, to construction and transportation services (see Table 3.1). 
Argentine law established who each firm’s directors were by linking to specific 
classes of officers of rank in the service branch associated with the firm’s production. 
Thus, DGFM depended on the Estado Mayor General del Ejército (General Staff of the 
Army—EMGE), and the holding company’s corporate government, which was embodied 
in a board of directors, was the province of a president who took the form of a member of 
the military engineering corps in active service—historically, an Army major general 
engineer or scientist trained at the Army’s Escuela Superior Técnica (Higher Technical 
School) established in 1930. The remaining six DGFM directors were officers in active 
service in an engineering specialty, as were the presidents of the 13 FM industries. In 
steel, mining, and petrochemical firms, DGFM appointed representatives in firm 
directories and, in many cases, the company president as well.7 
                                               
7 Ernesto López, “La industria militar Argentina,” Nueva Sociedad, 97, 42, (1988), 168–77, 164. 
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Table 3.1. Ownership and Management of Argentine Military Firms, 1983 
Sector Enterprise Capital Ownership Management 
Petrochemical Petroquímica Rio 
Tercero 
Mixed 8.6% Army Army 
 Carboquímica 
Argentina 
Mixed 42% Army Army 
 Petroquímica Bahía 
Blanca 
Mixed 17% Army Army 
 Petroquímica General 
Mosconi 
Mixed 50% Army Army 
 Atanor Mixed 21% Army Army 
 Monómeros Vinílicos Mixed 30% Army  Army 
 Induclor Mixed 30% Army  Army 
 Petropol Mixed 30% Army  Army 
 Polisur Mixed 30% Army Army 
Steel/Mining/ 
Aluminum 
SOMISA Mixed 99.9% 
Army 
Army 
 SIDINSA Mixed 98% Army Army 
 HIPASAM Mixed 90% Army Army 
 Aceros Ohler Mixed 67% Army Army 
 Ferroaleaciones Public Army Army 
Arms Industry TAMSE Public Army Army 
 FM de Tolueno 
Sintético 
Public Army Army 
 FM de Vainas y 
Conductores Eléctricos 
(ECA) 
Public Army Army 
 FM de Acido Sulfúrico Public Army Army 
 FM General San Martín Public Army Army 
 FM Pilar Public Army Army 
 FM San Francisco Public Army Army 
 Altos Hornos Zapla Public Army Army 
 Altos Hornos Zapla 
Construcciones 
Public Army Army 
 Centro Forestal Pirané Public Army Army 
 FM Rio Tercero Public Army Army 
                                               
 
  190 
 FM de Armas Portátiles 
“Domingo Matheu” 
Public Army Army 
 Establecimiento Minero 
“Capillitas” 
Public Army Army 
 FM S.J. De La 
Quintana 
Public Army Army 
 FM de Pólvoras y 
Explosivos 'Azul' 
Public Army Army 
 FM Fray Luis Betrán Public Army Army 
 FM de Pólvoras y 
Explosivos Villa María 
Public Army Army 
 M Materiales 
Pirotécnicos 
Public Army Army 
 Forja Argentina Public Army Army 
Aircraft FM de Aviones Public Air Force Air Force 
 Technología 
Aerospacial 
Public Air Force Air Force 
 Seguro Aeronáutico del 
Estado 
Public Air Force Air Force 
 Industrias Mecánicas 
del Estado 
Public Air Force Air Force 
Shipyard TANDANOR Public Navy Navy 
 AFNE Public Navy Navy 
 Saopin-AFNE Public Navy Navy 
 Astilleros Domecq 
García 
Mixed 75% Navy Navy 
 Naval 
Arms/Mining 
EDESA Public Navy Navy 
Naval Repair/ 
Construction 
SATECNA Mixed 40% Navy Navy 
 SISTEVAL Mixed 72% Navy Navy 
 COVIARA Public Navy Navy 
Source: El Cronista Comercial, “¿Que hacer con las empresas militares?,” January 16, 1984. 
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Air Force and Navy firms depended directly on the Estado Mayor General de la 
Fuerza Aérea (General Staff of the Air Force) and Estado Mayor General de la Armada 
(General Staff of the Navy), respectively. Those commanding powers formed the 
directories of the shipbuilding, construction, aviation and other enterprises under Air 
Force and Navy auspices, with some role for the Defense Production Department run 
jointly by the Army and Navy.8 The corporate government of the Navy-owned Astilleros 
y Fábricas Navales del Estado (Shipyards and Naval Factories of the State—AFNE) was 
of the garden variety. Per an organizational chart set at the Public Statute Company and 
established by Decree 16,385 in 1959, the firm was chaired by a senior officer of the 
Navy or head of the Navy Board, and both the president and directors were appointed by 
the executive on the proposal of the marine minister.9 The Directory Board, as it was 
called, had to include at least two other members of high rank of the Navy.10 
So, DGFM was unique as regards Argentine military firms, insofar as neither the 
Air Force nor Navy had established its own such company created to buy and possess the 
shares of other companies which it then controlled. Nevertheless, the similarities in 
organizational form between Army, Navy, and Air Force firms loomed larger than the 
differences. Due to their military origin, Army, Navy, and Air Force firms were 
                                               
8 Graciela P. Cavicchia, “The Dismantling of the Argentine Defense Industry,” in Sean DiGiovanna, ed., 
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characterized by a bureaucratic and pyramidal—that is, military—structure. “Conceived 
in the “image and likeness” of the hierarchical-military model that imposed, in turn, strict 
internal discipline of the workforce,” writes Cintia Russo, “the highest authority was the 
president and then the chain of command comprised six hierarchical levels: managers, 
coordinators, heads of department, division chiefs, section heads, and supervisors.”11 
Argentina did not develop this gargantuan military defense industry by accident. 
The 1923 Ley Secreta—which provided the legal basis for the creation of a military 
industry and initiated the creation of a set of factories able to produce planes, armaments, 
munitions, and explosives—was crafted at the military’s behest.12 Later on, a new thirst 
for nationalization inspired the birth of a coalition between the nationalistic military and 
most of the working class when an Argentine Army general named Juan Perón became 
president in 1946. The coalition carried to victory one General Manuel Savio, whom 
secured legislative approval in 1941 and 1947, respectively, of two vital laws: 12,709 
creating DGFM, and 12,987 (the National Metallurgy Plan, a.k.a. the Savio Act or La 
Sabia Ley de Savio—Savio’s wise law) creating the basis for Argentina’s steel industry as 
well as a supporting military research organization composed of scientists and engineers, 
the Instituto de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas para la Defensa (Armed Forces 
Scientific and Technical Research Center—CITEFA).13 It was not a consensual affair: 
                                               
11 Ibid. 
 
12 Patrice Franko, “Defense Production in Argentina, Brazil and Chile: A Comparative Perspective,” 
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“The opposition of agrarian interests, fearful that giving industry protection would lead to 
the countervailing closure of export markets, was overcome by the military’s desire to 
reach self-sufficiency in heavy industries, especially steel,” observed Andrea Goldstein.14 
Thereafter, the military industry expanded rapidly as new arms-producing, industrial, and 
service-sector firms were created or nationalized and put under military control, with the 
military industry’s most meteoric rise coming during the Proceso, when it also reached 
its crescendo.15 
The military’s political clout manifested in the size, power, and privilege of its 
enterprises. By December 1983, the armed forces helmed a sprawling industrial and 
service-sector conglomerate the total output of which, some estimated, generated 30 
percent of Argentina’s gross national product (GNP).16 A mostly-civilian workforce of 
more than 30,000 people labored under these giants, many of which were the largest 
employer in their sector and province. SOMISA, for example, employed 14,000;17 AFNE 
3,500.18 Fábrica Militar de Aviones (Military Aircraft Factory—FMA), the biggest boss 
in Córdoba Province and Argentina’s largest aircraft manufacturer, had more than 5,000 
                                               
14 Andrea Goldstein, “The Politics and Economics of Privatization: The Case of Argentina,” Canadian 
Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies, 23, 45 (1998), 55–87, 60. 
 
15 Roberto Roth, Porqué no funciona la Argentina (Buenos Aires: Ediciones La Campana, 1980), 96. 
 
16 Jose Manuel Ugarte, a professor at the University of Buenos Aires and former advisor to the portfolio of 
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September 14, 2018, Buenos Aires, Argentina. 
 
17 Foreign Broadcast Information Service-Latin America (FBIS-LAT), “Defense Minister Borras Speaks of 
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on its rolls in 1985. The Army was one of the biggest landowners in Argentina. Under 
Army tutelage, DGFM’s output accounted for 6 percent of GNP and 14 percent of 
manufacturing GDP, while its turnover of US$2.2 billion made it the largest firm in 
Argentina and among the largest in Latin America.19 
This is not to say the military was alone in the market, however. To the contrary, 
it benefited from a range of artificial supports. Argentine state enterprises were notorious 
for borrowing, but “the public firms that did the most,” writes Jeffry Frieden, “were those 
involved in investment projects in industries the military favored (especially steel and 
armaments)”—that is, those belonging to the military.20 Tariff protection, subsidies (often 
hidden), and tax promotions figured prominently. And though legally the military firms 
were autonomous entities responsible for generating their own revenue, the treasury often 
covered their losses, with the firms receiving important allocations listed in the budget 
under the item, “Development of the Economy.”21 Nor did the military have to fret about 
word getting out about these casualties, as the latter were deemed a military and state 
secret. As a result of all this, military firms regularly gobbled up over 7 percent of the 
annual federal budget in transfers; by 1983 more than $7 billion had been invested in 
                                               
19 Jose Maldifassi and Pierre Abetti, Defense Industries in Latin American Countries: Argentina, Brazil and 
Chile (Westport: Praeger, 1994), 69. 
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them; and, by one estimate, 25 core military firms received $300 million annually from 
the national budget—13 percent of the total for the public sector.22  
Control of this shielded juggernaut afforded the military extraordinary power to 
shape state and society. Perched above both, the military could behave “like a state within 
a state” and determine the structure of large productive sectors.23 It did this not just 
through direct action and its enormous indirect promotion of other economic actors, but 
through its powers of veto guidance in the political arena, which routinely prevailed over 
private projects in strategic areas, according to a team led by Marcelo Rougier, a 
Professor at the University of Buenos Aires and a leading expert on Argentine economic 
institutions.24 The military, “in control of budgets and jobs, could favor some civilian 
concerns by investing in them and squeeze out others by competing with them,” while in 
government corridors the firms’ muscle gave the military an unparalleled edge in the 
market for Argentina’s public revenues and substantial rents.25 And so, in December 
1983, any democratically-elected civilian leader was bound to come upon, as Kristina 
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Mani describes this kind of situation, “the daunting task of eroding a discreet, but 
nonetheless established, prerogative to economic power and autonomy.”26 
 
3.2. Raúl Alfonsín and Soldier Capitalist 
The Argentine military was the kind of unruly military industrializer Mani has in 
mind. It was always furious at the mere mention of reform and showed no intention at all 
of voluntarily leaving the boardroom or divesting itself of its holdings. The defiant stance 
came naturally to a military with a long history of blocking change. In 1983, military 
obstructionism was just about all Argentines could remember. A study by the 
distinguished Argentine economist Raúl Prebisch for the interim military government of 
1955–1958 recommended that all state enterprises except the railways and oil industry be 
sold, but no action was taken, in the military industry or elsewhere.27 Though the stated 
vision of General Savio himself was to “deliver [FM] to private capital when that 
industry makes a profit,”28 military governments after Perón would not diminish the 
military’s power by ceding FM-related companies or indeed any other enterprises. And 
the military’s hostility to change only hardened in subsequent decades, as military 
governments categorically exempted military firms from closure or privatization and 
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even refused to allow a reduction in tariff protection for them, which would have forced 
the military to lower its prices and operate more efficiently.29 
In 1979, civilian Minister of the Economy José Martínez de Hoz labored tirelessly 
to convince the military of the efficacy of market reform and succeeded in persuading the 
junta to grant him wide powers over economic decision-making, but he never could 
persuade the military to relinquish shares it held in certain petrochemical firms. When 
labor leaders recognized that they shared head of DGFM Division General Diego 
Urricarriet’s differences with Martínez de Hoz and met not only with Urricarriet, but with 
Generals Liendo and Viola and Admiral Emilio Massera—who was also a member of the 
Junta—the officers and their labor comrades linked arms and began working to stop the 
plan.30 Pressuring the junta to oppose it, they soon persuaded the General Videla 
Administration to halt the project.31 The second economy minister after Martínez de Hoz, 
Roberto Alemann, “an even more devout exponent of pure economic liberalism,” also 
foundered in his quest.32 A study was done on the privatization of some of the plants that 
belonged to DGFM, but no conclusion was reached.33 “We couldn’t privatize,” said a 
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former economics ministry official from the Proceso. “As they say, the Army has 
everything on the ground, the Navy everything in the water, and the Air Force everything 
in the air.”34 
Publicly, the military justified its heavily qualified economic liberalism by 
invoking national security concerns. The brass promoted a kind of military statism, 
according to which vital tasks were left to the military on the grounds that “military 
management, if not full military control, was crucial to defense development because 
such enterprises were likely to be… too strategic for the nation’s security to leave in 
private hands.”35 Military statism was presented as the creed of a heroic and noble 
military establishment to whom all Argentines owed a life debt. During Martínez de 
Hoz’s tenure, the military insisted that “an industrial Argentina” could not be forged with 
someone else’s capital—it was “evidently for strategic reasons that the military blocked 
the sale of the potentially profit-making petrochemical complex, which was then under 
construction,” reported Martínez de Hoz.36 All in all, the military postured as principled 
statesman to great effect, as scholars, the international community, and even political 
leaders adopted the military’s portrayal of itself and dubbed it a creature of ideology.37 
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Nevertheless, the military was really a creature of interest. Ideology was the 
handmaiden to interest, as the military had a lot to lose both economically and politically. 
For starters, it directed substantial revenues to armed forces coffers as well as dominated 
a large domestic market, obtained large subsidies and other rents, and wielded political 
influence and veto power in the budgetary and procurement process, as we noted. But the 
industries also brought training for military personnel and an influx of foreign capital. 
And then there were the lucrative executive opportunities for active or retired officers and 
serviceman, whereby military officers in the management of a company earned 
supplemental incomes as well as possible kickbacks, such that many officers made their 
careers as managers of defense enterprises.38 These opportunities were to be found in the 
private sector as well, as it had become prudent in private firms who had contracts with 
military firms (and with DGFM especially) to appoint a well-connected, retired officer to 
the board of directors.39 Thus, Industria Argentina de Aceros (Argentine Steel Industry— 
Acindar) hired a much-respected general, Alcides López Aufranc, to be its new 
president— “a move which surely enhanced its influence within the military regime.”40 
While ideology may have unified the military, it was interest that drove it to act. 
Interest told the military that fighting off challenges to the status quo, however small, was 
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vital to preserving its power, wealth, and claim to economic rents, as it was upon that 
status quo that these myriad benefits depended, and all the more so because of the 
military’s loss of direct political power. A transition from to civilian ownership and 
management, by contrast, would necessarily come at the military’s expense. The flow of 
political and economic returns from investment vis-à-vis the sector would shift from 
benefitting the military to benefitting civilians correspondingly. The handover of even 
one firm threatened a hemorrhaging of power and wealth, prompting General Urricarriet 
to insist that all changes ought to be avoided because even the smallest fluctuation would 
disrupt the “balance in the system.”41 And so, as democracy dawned, we find a military 
hostile to all reform and prepared to go on the defensive. 
Enter Dr. Raúl Ricardo Alfonsín (1983–1989), Argentina’s first post-authoritarian 
president and the leader of the Unión Cívica Radical (Radical Civic Union—UCR). 
Alfonsín was the kind of democratically-elected civilian leader Mani has in mind. 
“Alfonsín,” writes Wendy Hunter, “took office determined to break the political power of 
the armed forces and subordinate them decisively to civilian control.”42 The new leader 
demonstrated as much in his inaugural address to Congress when he castigated certain 
actors for believing “the state must own all enterprises,”43 and again in his second when 
he rebuked “a profit-seeking and aggressive minority which manipulated the state, 
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regardless of the profound convictions of its personnel.”44 With scorching statements like 
these, perhaps it is unsurprising that the ‘civilian called to command Argentina’ was 
intent on seizing control of the defense industry once and for all.45 
Alfonsín recognized that his political success all but depended on that key reform. 
He knew, for example, that while generating democratic legitimacy for himself and 
identifying economic resources to be distributed as pork would please his constituents, 
improve his ability to realize his policy objectives, and strengthen the viability of the 
UCR and his own persona, he would never be able to take those vital steps unless he 
dismantled the military’s powerbase and created the conditions for economic growth first. 
As Gary Wynia observed in 1986, “the military’s economic power created all sorts of 
problems for anyone who wants to set policy in Argentina, as every president has 
discovered.”46 Indeed, the military’s economic clout afforded it preponderant influence 
during the budgetary and procurement process and veto power that routinely prevailed in 
important areas, as we saw. 
And it was not just that the defense industry altered power relations in the 
military’s favor. The economic effects of the defense industry as it developed under 
military control put Alfonsín in a fiscal straightjacket from the moment he took office. 
The Revolución Argentina (1966–1973) and Proceso dictatorships afforded the defense 
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industries virtually unlimited funding, allotting the lion’s share of the defense budget 
(itself then between 4–5 percent of GNP) to help modernize the facilities of all three 
services in the late 1970s and early 1980s.47 But the firms misfired—less than a third of 
them were profitable, with losses estimated at $600 million in 1980—and were induced 
to offset the heavy casualties by financing themselves via foreign debt, racking up $1.5 
billion of Argentina’s $39 billion in the stuff during the period.48 The 1982 international 
debt crisis then exposed how severely the problems had been compounded under military 
rule, as the military industry’s share of the foreign debt contributed (after accounting for 
rampant financial speculation) to interest on foreign debt increasing from US 515 million 
in 1976 to US 5.4 billion in 1983.49 Now, with Alfonsín in office and democracy 
restored, the problems became his own. By 1984, his government was locked in 
negotiations with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and international banks over 
refinancing an inherited foreign debt of some $45 billion disproportionately accrued by 
military firms; by 1985, the military and military industry combined had accrued a 3.5 
billion-dollar debt.50 To say the debt was odious would be an understatement. 
Alfonsín immediately brandished the tools at his disposal in a bid to mitigate the 
problems. In addition to creating a commission to study Argentine arms production and 
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recommend ways to streamline the industries and increase their cooperation, he 
subordinated the requirements of the military to the need for an increase in revenue-
generating exports as well as slashed the expenditures for developing the industry and 
buying its products from a 1982 high of four billion to two billion in 1984.51 While that 
began to reduce the role of the military and relieve fiscal pressure, Alfonsín set his sights 
on diluting the military’s control over the defense industry itself. Already Alfonsín had 
promised to privatize the military industry during the 1983 presidential election 
campaign. Now in power, to this he added his resolve to ensure that “the military-
industrial complex controlled by the generals” was “fully under the control of the civilian 
Ministry of Defense.”52 The scene was set for yet more distributional struggle. 
 
3.3. Reform Efforts 
Management Modernization Policy 
The interaction between civilian and military economicus began soon after 
Alfonsín took power in December 1983. During a pool spray in the press room of the 
elegant Casa Rosada on January 10, 1984, Minister of Defense Raúl Borrás announced 
the imminent launch of the policy of modernizing the management of defense firms. A 
UCR Deputy for Buenos Aires Province during the last constitutional government before 
military rule and one of Alfonsín’s closest allies, Borrás, like Alfonsín, saw diminishing 
the military’s power as being the single-most pressing task facing the new democratic 
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government. The management reform policy fit the bill. First, Undersecretary of 
Production for Defense Raul Tomas would become the new general manager of DGFM, 
the 13 FM factories and 23 other Army firms, and all Navy and Air Force firms—in other 
words, of every last military firm. Then, with the only selection criteria being “capability 
and efficiency as is established by the National Constitution,” Ministry of Defense’s 
(MoD) Undersecretariat of Production for Defense (hereafter “UPD”) would reshuffle the 
directory of each firm with the support of Ministry of Labor, Secretariat of Commerce, 
Secretariats of Economy and Finance, and Secretariat of Industry.53 
Borrás insisted that this policy was socially neutral: “In no way can this action of 
appointing civilians in those companies be taken as an encroachment of military 
authority; it is simply putting things in their place. Injustice existed before when a 
civilian could not occupy certain executive positions and now civilians and military are 
going to be on an equal footing for assuming the management of any company.”54 But the 
military was not so easily deceived. Instead, it fiercely opposed its imminent loss of 
managerial control and, citing DGFM’s founding statute (Law 12,709)—which 
prohibited military personnel being commanded within it by a civilian—argued that the 
structural changes underfoot were illegal.55 Besides, putting civilians in charge broke the 
chain of command of a military entity: “In the military mentality, DGFM was a military 
organism, with a military structure, led by the military and governed by particular laws. It 
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did not respond to production needs set by the defense ministry and the guidelines 
defined by Congress, but to the decisions of the military,” observed Rut Diamint.56 
With pen in hand, Undersecretary of Production for Defense Dr. Raul Tomas 
responded to the military by expounding upon the policy of management modernization 
and announcing further actions in a January 19, 1984 El Cronista Comercial editorial. It 
was vital to ensure civilian control in public administration, “even in those activities 
which were under the jurisdiction of the commanders in chief of the armed forces.” 
Therefore, the past activities of the military firms would be audited by outside 
organizations beyond the scope of the defense ministry, beginning immediately with an 
inspection by General Trusteeship of Public Enterprises (SGEP)— “Even an autonomous 
agency, as is the case of the Military Industries, will be subjected to an outside audit.” 
Finally, the role of military industries in steelmaking, petrochemicals, and other areas 
would now depend on the programs put together by those sectors, which themselves 
would be drafted “with the participation of all the interested state and private sectors.”57 
As far as Tomas was concerned, the days of military autonomy were over. 
The military was furious with Tomas, who otherwise led an unexciting life as an 
accountant. At DGFM, tensions had been simmering ever since Borrás named Tomas as 
the new general manager of the military galaxy and all of the satellites in its solar system, 
such that Tomas’s pursuit of audits triggered a mini-crisis among rank-and-file officers at 
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the institution. The underlings staged a revolt in protest and demanded the cessation of 
the changes.58 More generally, just as physicists clung to a logic of time-reversible 
determinism despite the crisis in physics, at this point in time the military clung to a logic 
of coercion despite the crisis in the military.59 Yet the bullying would not last. Furor 
yielded to a more measured tone from the military brass after Borrás forcefully retired 
more than 70 officers who opposed the policy of management reform. Henceforth, the 
military would eschew coercion and wage only its battle of politics, laws, and ideas. The 
military statute was the way to salvation, it increasingly believed, and in short order the 
men of arms donned a powdered wig and transformed into men of law. 
But the military had one big problem. The administrative arena in which the 
management modernization program was being crafted had changed dramatically since 
the days of its rule. For decades, the military lorded over not just the defense industry, but 
what passed for the parts of the state tasked with overseeing it. While MoD languished in 
an underutilized and weakened state, “emptied through the years due to the political clout 
and institutional autonomy of the Forces,” command and appointment authority 
effectively belonged to the military service commanders rather than the president through 
the latter’s defense portfolio.60 The 1853 Constitution said that the president was the 
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commander-in-chief,61 but in practice the military chain of command ended at the 
commanders of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, as it had since 1930. These military 
actors jealously guarded the custodial right to appoint industry top management. 
That all changed on December 8, 1983. That day, the uniformed outgoing 
president, Reynaldo Bignone, approved a decree that greatly empowered MoD in relation 
to the military as well as the defense industry, doing so in accordance with a request 
submitted by President-elect Alfonsín. Law 23,023, the Ministries Act, reformed Law 
22,520, the Law of Ministries, which the military government imposed upon taking 
power in 1976.62 Two days later, President Alfonsín took office and signed a decree (no. 
132) that arranged the various earlier legislative provisions adopted by previous military 
governments (especially Laws 22,520 and 23,023) in a coherent manner, without 
changing their text. Article 1 of Decree 132 stipulated that the document would 
henceforth be referred to as “Ministries Act – codified text, 1983.”63 
The Ministries Act demoted the commanders and tasked the president both with 
assuming the functions then performed by the commanders and with sharing these 
functions with the defense minister. More directly, Alfonsín issued Decree 436 
subordinating the military to the president as the commander-in-chief and delegating 
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some of the president’s authority to the defense minister and to the re-designated military 
chiefs of staff, bypassing the commanders in chief of the armed forces, on January 31, 
1984.64 The Ministries Act and Decree 436 to fortify it imbued the defense minister with 
far broader authority in administering the military-industrial complex than before. 
Specifically, it granted defense ministers powers to decide on military employment and to 
transfer to civilian management all of the firms run by the military, then invalidated all 
provisions “requiring that management or direction of the central or decentralized public 
administration, and of nonmilitary security or intelligence organs be exercised by Armed 
Forces officers on active service or in retirement.”65 
Additionally, the act created a defense industry agency to be in civilian hands and 
housed with the defense ministry, the Undersecretariat of Production for Defense (UPD). 
As a principal civilian assistant to the defense minister and that minister’s chief 
undersecretary, UPD was to be appointed by the defense minister and responsible for 
administering the military’s holdings, managers, and employees, among other tasks (see 
Table 3.3). To that end, Decree 280 handed down two weeks later, on December 23, 
1983, removed the administration of both the management and capital stock of defense 
industry enterprises from the armed forces’ jurisdiction and then placed both within the 
jurisdiction of UPD.66  
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Table 3.3. Powers of the Argentine Undersecretariat of Production for Defense, 1983 
• Appoint directors 
• Make policy and plan for the public defense industry 
• Approve budgets and operational plans for the military’s holdings 
• Preside over the amalgamation, liquidation, closure, or creation of defense 
industries 
• Harmonize enterprises operating in the sector 
• Form objectives and policies guiding enterprises and agencies in the sector 
• Plan and coordinate defense-relevant research and development activities 
• Promote the development of industries that would meet national defense 
requirements 
• Identify measures calculated to encourage industrial activity 
Source: República Argentina, Decreto 132, cited in Carasales, 33–9. 
 
 
These administrative changes put Alfonsín and his defense team on a collision 
course with the military, and the civilians knew it— “Everyone in the new administration 
is aware that this course of action is fraught with tension, but they believe there is no 
other way of firming the bases of Argentina’s new-found institutional life,” disclosed 
Latin American Weekly Report.67 Indeed, by mid-December, the rivals had already come 
to blows over the changes. When President-elect Alfonsín asked outgoing President 
Bignone to enact Law 23,023 before leaving power, irate military commanders—
considering “practically unacceptable” the reduction in the functions of the armed forces 
chiefs of staff and the expansion of the jurisdiction to be assigned to MoD68—responded 
by seeking to negotiate on their own terms.69 In their frequent consultations with their 
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companion in arms in Bignone, military leaders sought to dilute the contents of the new 
legislation and preserve their vital appointment and other powers. But haggling would 
fail Argentina’s generals and admirals. Alfonsín and Borrás countered that they would 
“only negotiate in Congress,” adding, “either you approve it as it stands or we take it to 
Congress for a comprehensive debate on this problem.”70 That posed a serious problem 
for the military, as a coalition of the main political parties had already been lobbying the 
military government for a political opening since early 1981.71 Thus, the military was 
unoptimistic about its chances of escaping legislative debate unscathed. Keeping the 
conflict as private as possible became important, even if it meant sacrificing its 
administrative power. And so, it relented.72 At that point, Alfonsín proceeded to refine 
administrative changes that sharply altered the original balance of institutional power 
between the military and civilians in government. 
Now, in 1984, the president had more power to determine the management of the 
defense industry than before when he was, at best, limited to greenlighting military 
appointments or selecting firm presidents from a slate of military-approved candidates. 
At the same time, the military elite had less power than before when it dominated the 
administration of the management and ownership of the defense industry. The new 
administrative dynamic made it more likely that Alfonsín would prevail in a conflict with 
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the military over the fate of the managerial reform program. Alfonsín was likely to 
encounter few formal obstacles to the desired changes administratively, while the military 
would be relatively powerless to stop him without resorting to coercion or violence. 
It was not long after that the conflict reached its zenith. With the institutional 
changes in place and top management authority in each firm vested in UPD as established 
by Borrás, UPD and its support proceeded to, first, reshuffle the DGFM board of 
directors to consist of four civilians and two military.73 Then, UPD extended civilian 
control down to the board levels of the 13 military factories and other holdings in the 
mining, naval, forestry, petrochemical, steel, and construction sectors, in which the 
largest and most politically and economically complex firms in the defense industry were 
concentrated. A desire to render them more attractive to the private sector in the future 
drove UPD to consider outside management contracts, particularly in the cases of 
SOMISA and certain petrochemical firms.74  
As Alfonsín took a wrecking ball to military managerial control, the Partido 
Justicialista (Justicialist Party, a.k.a. the Peronist Justicialist Party or Peronist Party—PJ) 
intervened and raised questions about the legality of parts of the initiative. At issue was 
whether the Ministries Act afforded MoD the right to hand the respective presidencies of 
the 13 FM factories over to a civilian. While few disputed that non-FM firms could 
change hands, the problem was more complicated in those 13 “purely military” entities. 
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Among the dozens of enterprises to the military’s name, only these 13 were legally 
military institutions rather than some form of state-owned enterprise.75 Crucially, that 
meant that those 13 firms could be plausibly interpreted as subject to the military statute’s 
stipulation that military personnel may not be commanded within a military institution by 
a civilian. 
At first, the military’s pressure, legal argument, and party support threatened to 
halt the managerial reform drive. Though the Ministries Act had not amended the DGFM 
statute, Alfonsín had attempted to craft the former to invalidate all legal provisions 
requiring that military officers head defense firms, as we noted.76 Even so, putting the 
legal substance of the matter aside, the introduction of uncertainty created a political 
vulnerability that was ripe for exploitation that could threaten all of the civilians’ 
managerial gains, not just those in the 13 FM industries. The military—and particularly 
the Army—was intelligent enough to know this, and seized on the legal hurdles to argue 
that all managerial changes ought to be terminated in the name of preserving the 
legitimacy of the legal and economic order. Embattled and determined not to lose 
momentum and forfeit the entire drive, Alfonsín cut his losses and permitted the heads of 
the 13 military factories to stay in uniform.77 
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Neither the military in its powdered wig nor the PJ rushing to its aid caught 
Alfonsín off guard, and they did not faze him either. But Alfonsín would not take 
chances, and reinvested the political gains accrued from the reform drive in the 
institutions that carried him to victory. The consolidation of forces occurred in late 1984, 
when Alfonsín emboldened the offices of Undersecretary of Defense Horacio Jaunarena 
and Undersecretary of Production for Defense Raul Tomas, upgrading the former to 
Secretariat of Defense and the latter to Secretariat of Production for Defense (SPD). A 
new body of relevance to defense production, the Defense Finances Secretariat, was also 
created.78 Far from done, Alfonsín further empowered SPD by giving its secretary a 
second in command, the newly-created Undersecretariat of Production for Defense, 
which would support the SPD and also be placed under the direction of civilian 
appointees.79 
But even without these enhancements, the military’s counterinsurgency did not 
stand a chance of seriously threatening the advance of the management modernization 
policy. After all was said and done and the uniformed had aired their final grievance, the 
fact remained that the public authority created to administer the management and 
ownership of the defense industry rested with Alfonsín. It was Alfonsín who prevailed 
under the formal rules and whose forces gained the right to legitimately make decisions 
that affected everyone, the military included. The military, on the other hand, lost that 
battle, and was therefore required to accept Alfonsín’s decisions, however much it 
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disliked them. And though it did not have to participate in its ouster, the military could 
not take its capital and walk away, and certainly could not take it and leave the country. 
Thus, the military had no real recourse to the advances of SPD and its ground troops, 
save for hoping the military’s war of attrition through prolonged legal argument would 
weaken the SPD’s commitment to completing the grueling work demanded of it. 
But that resolve never did wane, and the military was left wanting. The military 
could only watch as Alfonsín not only consolidated previous changes but continued to 
extend managerial control throughout the sector. Top management authority in each firm 
remained centralized in the hands of SPD, and, by 1985, SPD had ousted and replaced the 
military—and withstood pressure to reinsert it—in the directories of key petrochemical, 
steel, naval, and other firms. Thus, though SOMISA did not come under the direction of 
outside management, it did come under that of a civilian board consisting of President 
Carlos Amancio Magliano, Vice President Jorge Otto Díaz, and Directors Miguel Ángel 
Alvarez, Miguel Ángel Nicodemo, Juan Carlos Azzari, and José María Lladós.80 
One military actor was not content to suffer the impending overthrow opposed, 
but rather opted to collaborate with Alfonsín in an attempt to preserve its power from the 
inside, and Alfonsín struck a deal to co-opt it as the aura of inevitability about his 
emergence as the defense industry’s next strongman grew. That actor was the Air Force, 
whose leadership went to Alfonsín’s men and indicated that it was prepared to support 
the modernization of the management of Army and Navy firms in exchange for, as noted 
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columnist Iglesias Ruoco wrote at the time, “certain aeronautic industries [being allowed] 
to remain in the hands of retired Air Force generals and to operate with relative 
autonomy, that is, without too much “interference” from MoD civilians.”81 Though not 
insignificant, the Air Force’s shire was smaller than the Army’s or Navy’s (see Table 
3.1). Thus, limiting changes to Air Force firms in exchange for Air Force support in 
seizing Army and Navy enterprises would permit Alfonsín’s men to conserve their 
strength for the major reform battles. The civilians therefore accepted, and, in turn, such 
airborne liveried as the respective Brigadiers General Simari and Waldner began working 
closely with the SPD. Air Force support even “reached the point of placing several of its 
units on alert so as to thwart from the air any attempted uprising of Army or Navy,” 
reported Ruoco.82 
Yet the forbidden fortune of some Air Force firms was “a fate unlike that of 
Military Industries, the State Shipyards and Naval Factories, and other corporations.”83 
The latter, and the bulk of the military industry, came under civilian managerial control. 
Not only that, but in a sign of the consolidation of civilian managerial supremacy at both 
the firm and administrative levels, SPD emboldened its audit regime by establishing an 
external control policy exercised by the auditor’s office of public enterprises. That policy, 
combined with the sector’s new, civilian management, Alfonsín told Congress in May 
1985, “enabled us to overcome the problem of a lack of control which existed at the 
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beginning of the constitutional administration.”84 And so, by mid-1985, it was clear that 
the civilian defense team’s management reform program had largely succeeded despite 
strong military and even party opposition. 
 
General Savio Corporatization Initiative 
After deposing military management, Alfonsín took aim at military ownership. In 
April 1985, MoD announced its submission to the executive of a draft bill authorizing the 
former to create a General Savio State Corporation. General Savio was instrumental in 
the creation of the military industry, but his namesake was to be military in name alone. 
The spirit of the draft initiative was the creation of the new corporation, as a state-run 
holding, to absorb the military’s shares in 44 firms; replace the DGFM and repeal its 
statute; and group all firms and plants then linked to the Navy and Army through 
DGFM.85 The corporation’s directory would consist of the secretaries of Departments of 
Defense; Foreign Affairs; Internal Trade; Foreign Trade; Planning; Finance; Industry; 
Science and Technology; and Mining. Its chairman would possess the rank of Secretary 
of State (see Table 3.3.1). 
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Table 3.3.1. Provisions of the General Savio State Corporation Draft Bill 
• Create conglomerate to absorb the military’s holdings and group military 
companies. 
• Empower the holding to set policy for the sector. 
• Institute modern management methods. 
• Institute a system of tax exemptions for private capital. 
• Permit the new holding to issue securities on the national stock exchange. 
• Centralize in the MoD, jointly with the Armed Forces Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
all decision-making regarding military weapons purchases, exports, and 
service contracts. 
Source: FBIS-LAT, “New Military Industrial Complex Proposed,” April 26, 1985. 
 
 
One observer later called this proposal “a heavy but bureaucratic agenda that is 
typical of calm times.”86 The armed forces seemed to agree. The uniformed entered the 
game and channeled their grievances in the offices, halls, and boardrooms of the 13 FM 
factories, such that word about the soldierly fits trickled out when the weary Asociacion 
de Profesionales Universitarios de Fabricaciones Militares (Association of Professional 
University Workers of Military Factories—APUFAMI)—a union representing many of 
the 14,000 workers employed in the factories—bought ad space in the daily, La Razón, 
and warned the civilians not to again dare to provoke such “adverse reactions in certain 
sectors.”87 Yet Alfonsín remained resolute. He believed that he could prevail upon the 
men of arms  because the latter remained thoroughly discredited and politically weakened 
after the loss of all ability to shape the democratic transition at the hands of an energized 
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coalition of civilian political groups. He did not change his behavior, apart from ordering 
his men to bury the political rationale Tomas advanced for managerial reform and, 
instead, frame corporatization as an escape from the country’s financial crisis.88 
To Alfonsín’s surprise, however, no sooner had he started stumping than his star 
began to fade, as the military and its allies in the FM unions were not the only ones to 
clutch their pearls at the mention of creating a new organization. UCR and PJ leaders also 
came out against or were cagey about the project. In May 1985, the PJ demanded that the 
unions be represented in the directories, that the Peronist-controlled Senate confirm 
candidates to the board of the holding, and that Congress control its policy.89 The 
military’s opposition to the Savio plan was matched in intensity only by that of old guard 
industrial unions. As much became apparent when APUFAMI penned a scorching 
editorial issuing a laundry list of demands, including legislative action to preserve FM’s 
leading role in Argentine industrial development; the maintenance of national industry 
and the supremacy of “state over private capital”; job security for all personnel involved; 
policies that facilitated “industrial takeoff” and the creation of new jobs; and, above all, 
“the participation of workers in the definition, compliance, and control of the objectives 
set, through extensive executive participation at all levels of the corporation, as well as in 
all previous stages of discussion and implementation of the project.”90 
                                               
88 James D. Rudolph and Thomas E. Weil, Argentina, a Country Study (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1985), 320. 
 
89 SOMOS, “Holding militar: Perspectivas para los capitales privados,” May 31, 1985. 
 
90 La Razón, May 31, 1985. 
 
  219 
Industrial unions from the Confederación General del Trabajo de la República 
Argentina (General Labor Confederation—CGT), the main confederation of trade unions 
in Argentina, were the backbone of Peronism. The PJ had a dense web of local branches 
and maintained extensive ties to unions and other social organizations. Not only that, but 
union leaders virtually took over the party in the 1983 elections: “The politicians could 
not rival the union leaders’ ready-made grass roots organizations, and unionists won 
many congressional and provincial seats,” observed Edward Schumacher.91 In 1983, 
union leaders also held the acting party presidency and more than a third (37.5 percent) of 
the seats on the National Council executive board.92 The influential Lorenzo Miguel, the 
head of the 62 Organizations (the CGT’s political arm) and the leader of the powerful, 
military firm-worker-dominated Unión Obrera Metalúrgica (Metalworking Workers’ 
Union—UOM), was PJ first vice president, meaning he ran the party in the absence of 
Isabel Perón, who was the party’s elected president. 
Peronist-led defense-sector unions, like the military itself, had a lot to lose. Since 
the 1930s, governments had sought to inoculate their rule against popular uprisings by 
maintaining an array of practices designed to avoid unemployment. Featherbedding—that 
is, deliberately retaining unnecessary workers in order to create jobs—had helped keep 
Argentina’s combined unemployment and underemployment at a very low level by Latin 
American standards (13 percent in October 1985) while simultaneously permitting the 
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state to spend little on social welfare or unemployment compensation.93 The defense-
sector unions were core beneficiaries of such policies, as their numbers and the sources of 
their labor power depended upon them (SOMISA alone had 5,000 excess employees on 
its rolls in 1986, it was estimated). Not only that, but the unions and the military were 
linked. In 1942, an Army Colonel named Juan Perón obtained control of the then 
insignificant Secretariat of Labor and used the state apparatus to stimulate the creation of 
a new coalition of classes that would support the military’s nationalist program of 
industrial development. Perón’s labor policies offered the workers an opportunity to 
increase their living standards and political power. In return, the proletariat allied 
themselves with the military, whom the workers perceived as the author of their good 
fortune.94 In subsequent decades, the military essentially ruled the defense industry in an 
alliance with the Peronist-led organized labor movement. 
Peronist labor was viciously repressed by the Proceso, whose most conservative 
elements feared it and sought its elimination. The junta sanctioned abduction, 
disappearance, torture, and murder of workers, as it did militarization of the factory, 
arrest of workers, and repression of meetings and strikes. At AFNE alone, for example, 
the military disappeared 42 workers, murdered 11, and demobilized labor.95 But despite 
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these horrific atrocities, labor did not disappear as a power broker. Its collaborationist 
faction retained access to policy, and many military intervenors in trade unions kept on 
old trade union leaders as advisers.96 As Judith Teichman points out, these kinds of 
linkages gave labor leaders the contacts and the space to lobby against certain aspects of 
market reform.97 More generally, the military-labor alignment rested on the shared 
nationalism of statist military officers and leaders of key industrial unions, and consisted 
of groupings of military and labor elites with similar ideological positions. The members 
of the groupings adopted the same anti-reform policy positions, as well as made legal and 
policy arguments against reform that aligned closely and tended to follow in close 
succession.98 And so, when civilian economy ministers sought to privatize some military 
industries in 1979 and 1981, the military and labor were among the key actors that helped 
to block the reform attempts. 
Neither labor’s strong ties to the PJ nor the military’s alignment with labor 
changed commensurate with the return to democracy. Consequently, when APUFAMI 
and other unions aligned themselves with the military and opposed the Savio initiative, 
the PJ found it very difficult to adopt a position that would alienate APUFAMI or the 
CGT. When push came to shove, the party took no such position, but rather aligned itself 
with labor and adopted the demands of the unions. And though the UCR—the ruling 
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party in the Chamber of Deputies—lacked the PJ’s kinship with organized labor, the 
UCR (like the PJ) already maintained a practice of opposing any policy involving worker 
layoffs.99 And the party had its own reasons for reserving judgment on the Savio plan. 
Namely, this traditional, interventionist-nationalist party which used the defense firms to 
distribute patronage did not particularly like the vast concentration of power the creation 
of the civilian holding supposed. 
The UCR’s objections were thrown into sharp relief early on in the process of 
debating the Savio initiative. When a late April 1985 cabinet meeting played host to a 
preliminary discussion about the draft bill, the debate descended into a bitter struggle 
between Borrás and the party stalwarts tableside. These caudillos raised questions about 
the impact on the military’s private sector partners, arguing that the blessing of the largest 
firms and those in which private partners of the military held shares ought to be obtained 
before proceeding. As the discussion intensified, Justice Minister Carlos Aramburu 
(UCR) put his foot down and stipulated that no further moves could be made without 
consulting SOMISA.100 A commercial lawyer who headed the Commercial Law Institute, 
Aramburu had to have known that requiring Borrás to obtain the blessing of that 
company’s management would be the death knell of the proposal. The 99.9 percent 
Army-owned company’s private partners—who were expected to oppose reform because 
it would sever their intimate link with the powerful and privileged armed forces—shared 
equal representation on the board despite the military’s domination of the share 
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ownership.101 And the SOMISA workers were no more likely to follow. The locus of 
power and agency within the CGT was the SOMISA San Nicolás section of the UOM—
UOM-SN—whose 14,000 well-organized and combative workers were well represented 
by the seasoned Lorenzo Miguel and other strongmen. And the opposition of the UOM-
SN stemmed not just from its ritual objection to changes that could trigger layoffs. It also 
did not trust MoD civilians, and all the more so because a conflict about the salary scale 
of the technical staff of SOMISA had already erupted between the union and the firm’s 
new, SPD-appointed civilian management.102 
Now, in May 1985, Alfonsín was caught off guard when these various vested 
societal and political interests arrayed themselves against him—before the 1983 
elections, the UCR and others (though not the PJ) proposed to reform or curtail the 
military’s economic activities, with the UCR calling for their total ban, but now the key 
parties were baulking at reform.103 Equally disorienting was how rapidly the anti-
reformers coalesced, as both labor and the PJ had staked out the same countervailing 
position dovetailing with that of the military within a mere two months. As more and 
more social, political, and legislative actors took positions against the Savio plan and 
began lobbying the government to suspend it, an imposing anti-reform coalition began to 
form between parties, labor, and the military. And as these actors increasingly converged 
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in response to the civilians promoting the new initiative, the window of opportunity for 
goading the anti-reform stakeholders into defecting and joining the pro-reform coalition 
began to close. 
The emerging coalition altered the balance of political power between Alfonsín 
and the military. Despite the military’s loss of all power to shape the terms of the 
transition to democracy, it regained the strength to defeat reforms legislatively by 
cultivating its alliance with labor. Now the military had more power to exert its influence 
within the legislature than during the period before 1943, when the military, having not 
yet allied with a powerful social class, was at the mercy of the good graces and lobbying 
of key officers in order to get the policies it desired. Alfonsín, by contrast, now had less 
power to exert his influence within the legislature than before 1943, when presidents’ 
grip on Congress had not yet been weakened by the emergence of a military ally. This 
dynamic made it more likely that the military would prevail in a legislative battle over the 
Savio plan, as well as lent credibility to military ownership and control and promised to 
make the military’s economic decisions more acceptable to citizens, organized political 
forces, and institutional actors in the decision-making process. 
The intervention had its intended effect. Alfonsín’s ardor cooled, and he and his 
small coalition of civilian bureaucrats decided to keep their powder dry. While the idea to 
create the Savio holding was displaced by priorities that enjoyed more support, the draft 
bill itself was abandoned to the gnawing criticism of the mice. By June 1985, scarcely 
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two months after the announcement of the program, it was clear that the military and its 
capital had prevailed, and by more than a hair’s width.104 
 
Plan Austral Privatization Program 
After his corporatization plan blew up after takeoff, Alfonsín set his sights anew 
and shifted gears after the smoke cleared. He put the military on new notice on January 
30, 1986 with his first-ever proposal to privatize military holdings. Minister of Economy 
Juan Sourrouille announced a slate of new policy proposals in a major address, the 
showpiece of which was MoD’s plan to sell the military’s 99.9% percent stake in 
SOMISA and majority or minority interests in the petrochemical concerns General 
Mosconi, Bahia Blanca, Atanor, and Rio Tercero.105 A bill providing the legal authority 
to divest the military of these holdings was being prepared and would be dispatched to 
Congress by April. Though the proposal represented Alfonsín’s continued interest in 
gaining control of the military industry, it was also part-and-parcel of a stabilization 
strategy for reducing high inflation which also included the implementation of a new 
currency (the austral), wage and price controls, and currency devaluations. 
The Economist considered overambitious “the bold privatization plans announced 
by Mr. Sourrouille.”106 Also taking exception was the military, who saw the loss of the 
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plants it built “as another blow against the institution.”107 Asserting that the world trend 
in steelmaking “is precisely the one against privatization” and that “the subject presents 
very dangerous edges,” the elder emissary General [R] Horacio A. Rivera—who had 
been the president of DGFM, Hipasam, and SOMISA—opined that selling SOMISA in 
particular “would mean nothing less than yielding benefits to third parties.”108 The 
handwringing was thrown into comic relief when the Argentine satirical magazine 
Humor featured military comments like Rivera’s (‘yielding benefits to third parties’) in 
an uproarious article about the impossibility of growth, even with privatization, “in an 
economy based on the exploitation of financial income.”109 
Yet the joke was on the civilians because the military, however humorously 
caricatured, was but one among a well-organized “catalogue of objectors” that also 
included the political parties and Congress, while Alfonsín and his defense team were 
relatively isolated.110 The PJ and labor immediately went on the offensive. The rough-
hewn unionist and Peronist Deputy Jorge Triaco reminded Alfonsín that “we have said in 
Congress that we totally oppose the measure and we will continue to insist,”111 while 
Peronist leaders pledged to insert language amending the bill to forbid sales at less than 
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book value or by expanding the list of companies not to be privatized.112 The UCR also 
waxed nationalistic. Ultraconservative Energy Minister Conrad Storani said he would 
oppose “categorically” the sale of the Bahia Blanca and General Mosconi petrochemical 
plants, insisting that the state should retain 51 percent or more of those firms.113 
The parties also had another good reason to, with Storani, “argue and debate… 
with President Alfonsín and whomever else necessary.”114 Namely, the military’s deep-
pocketed private-sector suppliers and minority partners formed a whole class of large and 
powerful business actors with close ties to both the military and the Peronist-led unions, 
and this class staunchly opposed the divestiture plan as well. These capitalists clung to 
access to cheap outputs and established markets and to the ability to exploit “comfortable 
competition”—that is, compete against obsolete and poorly-run firms whose management 
were not commercially-oriented.115 And many small and medium-size firms were 
suppliers or clients of military firms and derived huge rents from military operations. 
Some depended on a certain military firm as their major or only customer. Many enjoyed 
sweetheart contracts, selling under exclusive supply relationships to military bedmates 
who netted them windfall profits.116 And middling capitalists were not even the most 
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visible private industrialists to side against the Austral privatization plan. That distinction 
went to the so-called patria contratistas, a group of the biggest holding companies in the 
country (which numbered about a dozen). This group had squirreled away huge fortunes 
made via multimillion-dollar public works contracts during military rule, when it 
absorbed smaller firms, diversified its operations, and grew handsomely from financial 
speculation.117 Between patria contratistas and the small and medium-sized firms, most 
of the private sector depended on the rent-dependent state market with the powerful 
military-industrial complex at its epicenter. 
The civilians sought to relax the opposition of these powerful interests with a 
combination of outreach and sweeteners of their own. While Alfonsín engaged with 
capitalists and workers by seeking to negotiate with their peak organizations, Economy 
Minister Sourrouille promised that the government would help new company owners to 
obtain foreign financing, that World Bank support would be available, and that the funds 
obtained from privatization would be used to create a fund for industrial development and 
modernization.118 But the paltry overtures were the exception to the rule, as few actors 
found an Alfonsín at their bedside. This was by design. A key challenge was shielding 
policy formation from the relentless pressure bearing down on them from the military and 
other vested interests.119 Yet since he had MoD at his disposal and his quest to fix 
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Argentina’s institutions enjoyed high popular support, Alfonsín thought that the civilians 
could barricade themselves off at the policy development stage before Alfonsín quickly 
got the nod at the policy approval stage.120 At the very least, support from the UCR (the 
ruling party in the Chamber until 1987) was thought to be forthcoming despite the 
misgivings of some party diehards, as was a Radical victory in the Senate in the coming 
off-year elections in 1987.121 
And so, Alfonsín thought that he had a winning strategy. But the strategy never 
did bear fruit, as no major political group joined him. Instead, Alfonsín’s halting 
advances were spurned by the corporatist private sector and labor actors whose influence 
was so strong with the parties. As a result, the PJ maintained an unwavering opposition, 
even redoubling its opposition as elections neared. The UCR’s objections persisted in 
both legislative houses as well. With the November 1987 congressional and gubernatorial 
races fast approaching, the party’s opposition hardened as it concluded that the short-term 
political dislocations of a major defense industry reform effort outweighed the long-term 
benefits. And the military, in lockstep with the PJ and its military-backed union partner, 
remained firmly opposed.122 Ultimately, no agreement, with any actor, was arrived at to 
sustain the advance of the initiative. 
                                               
120 Diamint, 2007. For the results of public opinion polling, see Latin American Weekly Report, February 
28, 1986. 
 
121 Charles H. Blake, “Economic Reform and Democratization in Argentina and Uruguay: The Tortoise and 
the Hare Revisited?,” Latin American Politics and Society, 40, 3 (1998), 1–26, 6. 
 
122 Rougier et al., 48. 
 
  230 
The military and its allies promptly filled the void created by the civilian 
government’s failure to widen the radius of its support. As the military, labor, and private 
sector increasingly lobbied the Alfonsín Administration to call off the planned sale of the 
military’s steel and petrochemical concerns, a coalition began to form between the 
military and labor and the PJ and UCR in Congress. That coalition upheld the military 
balance of political power first brought about during the societal and political debate over 
the Savio plan. As it did when the military participated in a dominant anti-reform 
coalition formed in response to the appearance of the Savio plan, the coalitional dynamic 
made it more likely that the military would prevail in the legislative battle to shape the 
outcome of the reform effort. At the same time, the preservation of power relations made 
it less likely that Alfonsín would prevail because he possessed only a fraction of the 
capacity to shape legislative outcomes effectively possessed by the military. 
Once again, almost immediately, the partners of the anti-reform coalition began 
behaving collectively in ways that threatened the fate of Alfonsín’s proposal. Emerging 
as the locus of the coordinated opposition was the Committee of Industry in the Chamber 
of Deputies. Inter-party negotiations began taking place between Committee Chairman 
Hugo Socchi of the UCR, who led the talks, and Deputy Jose Luis Manzano of the PJ. 
Socchi and Manzano decided to coordinate the joint introduction of two bills, whose 
presentation and debate, it was decided, would coincide with that of the Executive’s bill, 
which was then expected to arrive in April.123 Socchi’s bill proposed a flexible and 
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modern framework for privatization activities.124 But though its text embraced 
privatization, its political sub-text did anything but; like his cohorts in the UCR and like 
Manzano, Socchi held that any decision to privatize public firms had to obtain the 
blessing of both Congress and the main opposition party, that is, the PJ.125 
Manzano’s bill was intended to defend organized labor by selling the state shares 
totally or partially to workers. Nevertheless, even this was a purely theoretical exercise, 
as the real purpose of Manzano’s bill, like Socchi’s, was to stop the privatizers. Manzano 
thus incorporated a range of stipulations, including that a privatization policy should not 
affect those firms that “provide a strategic good or service for both development and 
national security” and whose sale would aggravate monopolistic conditions in the 
country.126 Moreover, while the ruling PJ Senators requested the presence in the Senate 
for interrogation of Defense Minister José Horacio Jaunarena (1986–1989), Socchi 
formally requested that the executive amend its forthcoming proposal by adding a list of 
public enterprises that could not be privatized and upon which the UCR “did not intend to 
act.”127 Socchi also worked on a texto conformado (common text) in which the two bills 
were being coordinated.128 
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Table 3.3.2. Party Strength in Argentina, 1983–1989 
  Deputies Senators 
Party Year (n) % (n) % 
PJ 1983 111 43.7 21 45.7 
 1985 101 39.8   
 1987 104 40.9   
 1989 120 47.2 26 56.5 
UCR 1983 129 50.8 18 39.1 
 1985 129 50.8   
 1987 115 45.2   
 1989 90 35.4 14 30.4 
Other Parties 1983 14 5.5 7 15.2 
 1985 24 9.4   
 1987 38 15   
 1989 43 16.9 6 13 
Source: James McGuire, “Political Parties and Democracy in Argentina,” 
in Scott Mainwaring and Timothy Scully, eds., Building Democratic 
Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1995), 200–46, 240–6. 
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Startled at the interpolation of Defense Minister Jaunarena and unprepared for a 
sustained battle with the dominant military coalition, Alfonsín was forced to cede to it. 
Submission of his bill was delayed six months, and by the time it was presented to the 
lower house, in October 1986, Alfonsín had made heaps of compromises, including 
incorporating Socchi’s do not privatize list and granting newly-privatized firms import 
protection, tax exemptions, and preferred prices on goods and services bought from other 
state firms.129 And shortly after Alfonsín introduced his bill, Deputies Socchi and 
Manzano, as planned, jointly presented bills which “practically eradicated any 
privatization attempt.”130 Socchi had drawn up a new bill of his own (the third such trojan 
horse in this drama) that identified 29 firms that could only be sold via specific laws and, 
thus, were beyond the scope of the executive bill. With the forces aligned and the ground 
prepared in this way, there was little hope for Alfonsín and his bill. And so, though its 
first destination—the Committee of Industry of the Chamber of Deputies—was not its 
last, the bill was not approved, as it died in that chamber (see Table 3.5).131 After Defense 
Minister Roque Carranza (1985–1986) had declared that Argentina’s power brokers must 
choose between acero o satélites (steel or satellites), the pro-military coalition chose 
steel.132 
                                               
129 U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, 1987, 6. 
 
130 Llanos, 59. 
 
131 U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, Office of African and Latin American 
Analysis, South American-Caribbean Division, “Argentina’s Economic Reforms: A Scorecard,” July 28, 
1988, 4. 
 
132 Germán Antón, “La cuestión es si el estado fabrica acero o satélites,” La Razón, March 9, 1986. 
 
  234 
Incremental Privatization Initiative 
After the defeat of his legislative initiative to privatize military holdings in steel 
and petrochemicals, Alfonsín lost his patience with Congress and took matters into his 
own hands. His solution was to launch a privatization process that circumvented 
Congress altogether. On December 30, 1986, Defense Minister Jaunarena announced that 
he would be signing a decree with the president’s signature to proceed with the sale 
through bidding of the military’s shares in the petrochemical firms Atanor, Carboquímica 
Argentina, and Petroquimica Rio Tercero as well as the four satellites of the Bahia 
Blanca Petrochemical Complex: Polisur, Monómeros Vinílicos, Induclor, and Petropol. 
Offers made for the companies would be analyzed by a committee made up of delegates 
from the Ministries of Public Works, Economy, and Defense, together with 
representatives of the National Development Banks. After the study of this committee, 
only the approval of a bid by the executive would remain.133 
Predictably, the military’s partners were outraged. The PJ demanded that Alfonsín 
obtain the blessing of Congress before proceeding, while some of the military’s private 
sector partners threatened court action to block sales on the grounds that privatization 
would “forfeit some of the main inducements that had attracted their capital in the first 
place, including tax and tariff advantages and the intimate link with the firms’ major 
customer, the state.”134 Not to be outdone by their comrades in capital, the unions 
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exhibited a permanent state of mobilization in 1987. Real wages had been in decline for 
years due to the subsidy tourniquet in which Alfonsín had dressed the defense firms, and 
now privatization promised further restructuring, job losses, and dilution of worker 
strength.135 For nine whole months, the new privatization drive idled at the starting line 
while labor unrest paralyzed state, market, and society. The unions would use any and all 
means necessary, up to and including violence, and had a tendency towards 
thuggishness.136 
Alfonsín knew that the latest incarnation of his reform agenda was the bane of the 
military and labor’s existence. Yet by September 1987, the tumult in industry showed 
signs of abating; several economic groups had begun to evaluate the purchase of the share 
capital of the petrochemical firms, and the board of Atanor was expected to greenlight the 
decree for the Petroquimica Rio Tercero tender after first resisting.137 And so, Alfonsín 
seized the opening, at last signing his decree requiring the privatization of the military’s 
shares in six mixed-capital petrochemical firms—Induclor, Petropol, Polisur, 
Monómeros Vinílicos, Atanor, and Petroquimica Rio Tercero. Notably, the decree’s 90-
day application period coincided with the legislative fair period during which Congress 
                                               
135 By 1988, the CGT had called nearly a dozen general strikes against Alfonsín’s economic policies since 
1983. James W. McGuire, “Strikes in Argentina: Data Sources and Recent Trends,” Latin American 
Research Review, 31, 3 (1996), 127–50, 141, 144. 
 
136 Alfonsín knew this and had made his misgivings with the unions known early, stressing the need for 
them to democratize themselves and even pushing one (ultimately failed) bill to that effect. 
 
137 While the military held 39.45 percent of the capital of Petroquímica Río Tercero, Atanor controlled a 
little more than 50 percent of it, and was deciding about whether to increase its participation in the 
company. It could make such a decision because a clause in the contract between the state and Atanor’s 
private shareholders established that the private shareholders could make the first offer. El Cronista 
Comercial, “Ultiman detalles para la venta de acciones en poder del Fisco,” August 28, 1987. 
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was not in session, thus preventing Congress from objecting. This was another sign that 
Alfonsín thought not just that the recalcitrant could be circumvented, but that this could 
be achieved by leaving the legislature out of decision-making. The anti-reform coalition, 
however, was neither done with Alfonsín nor down for the count, but rather began 
behaving collectively in ways that transcended the limits of the legislature. 
The first to act was the military itself. In early October 1987, an important sector 
of military engineers sent politicians and national officials an extensive memorandum 
containing its objections to Alfonsín’s initiative. The lengthy confidential document—
leaked to the Argentine press and quickly the talk of the town in Buenos Aires—
condemned not only the “privatizing” decision of the civilian authorities and how it 
disregarded the “legal autarky” of the “autarkic company of DGFM,” but also the way in 
which the process was taking place outside of normal parliamentary channels. And the 
military engineers insisted that the state would be worse off than ever if it sold the 
military’s petrochemical interests, which were among the state investments turning a 
profit.138 After the document’s publication, interest among capitalists in buying the 
military’s shares began to dissipate. Suitors stopped coming. Phones stopped ringing. 
Few if any bids appear to have been tendered. Though it is unclear what befell the writers 
                                               
138 For the two installments in which the full text of the confidential document was published, see El 
Informador Publico, “Los ingenieros castrenses objetan la “privatización” del paquete accionario de 
Fabricaciones Militares (I),” October 30, 1987; “Los ingenieros castrenses objetan la “privatización” del 
paquete accionario de Fabricaciones Militares (II),” November 6, 1987. 
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of the explosive document, the intervention had a clear chilling effect, as the 90-day 
bidding period elapsed without the sale or programing of the sale of a single enterprise.139 
He had his share of detractors, but Alfonsín could not have been accused of 
giving up. Between late 1987 and early 1988, he reinitiated the sale of the military’s 
shares in the same slate of petrochemical firms covered by the September 1987 decree. In 
late May 1988, he expanded the scope of the program to include the military’s 
participation in four more large enterprises: AFNE, Domecq García State naval 
shipyards, the Tanque Argentina Mediano Sociedad del Estado (Argentine Medium 
Tank—TAMSE) factory, and metallurgy firm Forja Argentina.140 Already renewed 
interest in acquiring the military’s share packages in the petrochemical concerns was 
percolating among local and foreign groups, including Garavaglio Zorraquín—the group 
which then held 70 percent of the shareholding of Polisur—and the Richard group, 
already the holder of the majority of the shares in Petropol, Monómeros Vinílicos, and 
Induclor. Therefore, Alfonsín saw to it that by June 1988 the resolutions for domestic and 
international bids were nearly prepared.141 With those motions in the holster and the 
official intention being to disseminate, Alfonsín had at last cleared the opposition. 
Or so he thought. The stakeholders in the anti-reform coalition still would not 
abide. In early June, the PJ not only announced its opposition, but issued an anti-
                                               
139 Evidence is scant, but suffice it to say that private capitalists may have become weary of the 
consequences of coming into conflict with the military when the military remained in the sector. 
 
140 FBIS-LAT, “State Defense Industries to Go Private,” June 1, 1988. 
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privatization argument uncannily similar to that made by the military in its manifesto. 
The PJ said that the petrochemical firms were profitable and a needed hedge against the 
potential losses incurred by other firms, thus aligning themselves with the military so 
closely that Ambito Financiero could quip that the PJ “aspire, surely like the men of the 
Proceso, to manufacture and export submarines, airplanes and tanks.” In turn, the PJ 
threatened to cancel every last privatization realized by decree once the party regained 
power— “If the parliamentary avenue for this or any other privatizing process is not 
used, the Peronist Party reserves the right to review, in case of government, everything 
done by the present administration,” warned Deputy Miguel Angel Toma and the 
secretary of the party’s Commission of Defense, Hernan Patino Mayer [italics mine, to 
emphasize correspondence with previous usage by the military].142 
In turn, private firms who had intended to acquire the military’s shares in the 
petrochemical concerns got cold feet, concerned about the security of their property 
rights should they go through with the purchasing of military capital. Before long, the 
capitalists soured on the idea and walked away completely. The weak pro-reform 
coalition, increasingly desperate, tried to save face with the investors by promising to 
relinquish its claim to decree power. Now Defense Minister Jaunarena said that the 
defense ministry would submit to Congress a draft law on production for defense which 
would provide “a more appropriate legal framework for the measures the ministry is 
sponsoring.”143 Yet it was too late, for the die had been cast. The capitalists were not 
                                               
142 Ámbito Financiero, “Penosa debate por fábricas militares,” June 8, 1988. 
 
143 FBIS-LAT, “Planned Defense Enterprise Restructuring Viewed,” June 10, 1988. 
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coming back. And Defense Minister Jaunarena and his portfolio’s troubles were but the 
half of it, as Alfonsín fought unsuccessfully to relax the opposition of the military’s 
private sector partners in Carboquímica Argentina in the meantime. 
Before long, the spring in Alfonsín’s step became a limp. SPD could program 
bidding for the military’s shares in Atanor, Petroquímica Río Tercero, Forja Argentina, 
AFNE, Domecq García, and TAMSE, but it could not reignite interest in privatization 
itself. As a result, the process began to atrophy. The schedule for August 1988 included 
the sale of Atanor and the evaluation of the assets of Petroquímica Río Tercero, but 
neither occurred. By September 1988, Petropol, Monómeros Vinílicos, and Induclor were 
still negotiating a call for public bids, while MoD was still ironing out objections from 
the military’s private partners in Carboquímica Argentina. November 1988 was the 
supposed to be the deadline for the receipt of bids for the purchase of Forja and Polisur, 
but it too came and went without a stir, the firms bringing few to the yard.144 Finally, a 
bill for defense production supplying the legal basis for such sales, which, in June 1988, 
was said to be forthcoming, never came.145 
 
Conclusion 
Argentina’s failure to shift its defense industry firms from military to civilian 
ownership while successfully shifting that same sector from military to civilian 
management between 1983–1989 cannot be understood without jointly considering the 
                                               
 
144 FBIS-LAT, “Economic Recovery, Growth Program Issued,” September 7, 1988. 
 
145 Whether one was created remains a mystery to the author. 
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outcomes of coalition and institution-building struggles between a pro-reform civilian 
leadership and an anti-reform military elite. President Alfonsín and his defense portfolio 
targeted defense industry firm ownership and management for reform because only 
radical change promised to strengthen the president, jumpstart growth, and reduce the 
range of problems threatening Alfonsín’s political viability and survival. Retaining total 
control was just as vital to the military because of its vested interest in off-budget 
revenues, a claim to rents and subsidies, and vast market and political powers affording it 
transfers of wealth from the whole society and veto power in strategic areas. Yet Alfonsín 
and the military differed sharply in their relative capacities to craft or defeat initiatives to 
transfer firms from military to civilian owners and managers. 
Alfonsín always keenly appreciated outperforming the military in a contest to 
develop institutions for reform. When the defense ministry announced a program to 
transfer presidencies and boards to civilians administratively, the civilians were in a 
stronger position than the military to craft and implement the policy. Alfonsín had 
obtained a law correcting the chain of command; creating and empowering a defense 
industry under secretariat and staffing it as a functional body, and subjugating military 
firms to the new body’s authority. The military opposed these changes, but the president 
threatened to escalate the issue to Congress—where parties who lobbied for the end of 
the military dictatorship resided—and the military was therefore forced to relent. The 
changes altered, in turn, the original balance of institutional power between the military 
and civilians, making it more likely that the civilians would prevail in a battle to shape 
the outcome of the managerial reform drive. And so, the military had no recourse when 
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the civilian bureaucracy proceeded to replace entire directories and gradually consolidate 
managerial control over the sector. 
The military, by contrast, always had a taste for outperforming the civilian in a 
contest to shape coalitions for reform or continuity. When Alfonsín proposed initiatives 
to divest the military of the share capital of defense industry firms legislatively, the 
military responded by aligning itself with other actors—namely, defense-sector labor 
unions and the military’s private sector partners and suppliers—whose party allies in 
Congress had the power to determine policy outcomes. Alfonsín, on the other hand, put 
his faith in a revitalized defense ministry, his own popularity, and the fact that the 
military was weakened and discredited after losing all power to shape the democratic 
transition. But these proved to be miscalculations. As the parties and the military-labor 
and private sector alliance coalesced, a dominant coalition began to form. The statist-
nationalist alliance was ideologically coherent, road-tested, and generally held together 
well as it did battle with the Alfonsín government. Thus, over and over, Alfonsín could 
only watch as the parties defended the military and its defense industry. 
These results suggest a need to rethink conceptualizations of military industry 
reform. With some notable exceptions, the literature, analysts, and the international 
community tend to think of military industry reform as a neat, unidimensional shift. 
According to this view, a country advances from a military to a civilian political 
economy along a one-dimensional path.146 Studies of the politics of defense industry 
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reform in Argentina, for example, tend to focus on the ownership and managerial changes 
which occurred simultaneously when many defense firms were privatized between 1989–
1997 (see next chapter).147 But in reality, military industry reform, like economic 
liberalization, “is a game played in various arenas.”148 This analysis shows why: The 
military can be more capable of defeating ownership reform than managerial reform 
while the civilian can be more capable of crafting managerial reform than ownership 
reform. The complexity forces us, in turn, to recast the logic of reform itself. The process 
is characterized not by linear change from one system to another, but by false starts, mid-
points, and partial reforms. 
 
 
 
                                               
147 Thomas Scheetz, “Military Business in Argentina,” in Jörn Brömmelhörster and Wolf-Christian Paes, 
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4 
 
Political Revolution and the End of Military Capitalism: Argentina, 1989–
1997 
 
“What was changed in the nineties in Argentina was not the “Peronist” state built in the 
forties, nor the postwar ISI economy; instead, what was reformed was the state apparatus 
built by the military since the sixties (untouched during the democratic transition) and its 
related economic organization of “assisted capitalism,” which was characterized by an 
active state that used inflation as a tax to extract income from society, and public contracts 
and state-owned firms as instruments to redistribute that income…” 
      Rodolfo Díaz (former Peronist Deputy and Labor Minister)1 
 
Introduction 
The transfer of more than three dozen defense industry firms from military to 
civilian ownership and control in Argentina between 1989–1997 is a milestone in the 
political economy of civil-military relations. The strong vested interest of the military and 
the size, speed, and scale of the process landed Argentina among only a handful of 
countries in the world that have achieved such a major reform of their defense sector. Not 
only that, but though the transition is typically understood as an economic or sectoral 
transition, it was, in fact, simultaneously an institutional transition, as it involved changes 
from rigidly pyramidal, military organizations into decidedly more horizontal, civilian 
                                                        
1 Rodolfo Díaz, “The Reforms of the Nineties in Argentina,” Ph.D. Dissertation, Harvard University, 2001, 
7. 
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ones. And when the transition was complete, privatized military firms exhibited a 
significant improvement in enterprise performance, while Argentina itself experienced 
sustained economic growth. Reform also altered domestic power relations, weakening a 
military that once derived great influence from economic rule as well as other societal 
and economic interests whose own rents had come to depend upon military capitalism. 
This double transition was not a simple byproduct of the growing importance of 
neoliberal ideology beginning in the 1980s.2 That would only be true if there had been no 
formation of economic interests vested in the old military-centered system. As the 
military industry grew and expanded, not just the military, but labor and business actors 
increasingly invested their resources in it. These actors developed highly specific 
economic and political benefits which depended upon the continuation of the economy’s 
structures of military ownership and control. Consequently, the rise of neoliberal 
ideology cannot explain the evolution in the positions of the key actors involved in the 
process—why, initially, key political parties and economic and social actors opposed the 
proposed military industry reforms. Nor can it explain why many large unions whose 
support became vital to reform moving forward in specific military enterprises never 
abandoned their statist leanings. 
                                                        
2 Thomas Scheetz, “Military Business in Argentina,” in Jörn Brömmelhörster and Wolf-Christian Paes, 
eds., The Military as an Economic Actor (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 18–32; Marcelo Rougier, 
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Nor was reform the result of a changing international security environment.3 That 
would only be true if international circumstances exerted greater influence than domestic 
interests within the context of the national debate. When the international environment 
began to change in the late 1980s, the desire of domestic interest groups for continuity of 
tax, tariff, contract, and employment advantages derived from lucrative financial 
relationships with military enterprises prevailed over arguments for projecting a more 
peaceful image and aligning the domestic climate with the new global situation. And 
when reform occurred in the 1990s, the core of the arms industry was initially spared; the 
official policy was to preserve it, under military control, where it stayed for seven years. 
Only when a surprise fluctuation in the domestic political environment occurred was that 
portion reformed. And so, the evolving international security environment explains 
neither the sequence or timing of reform nor the key positions in the national debate. 
And the upheaval in the Argentine defense sector did not stem solely from the 
collapse over the course of the 1980s of a statist-developmentalist coalition which had 
made military participation in strategic industries possible.4 This development was only 
one of multiple stages in a complex process engineered by a calculating civilian agent. 
Though the military’s loss of coalitional partners was a key factor, it occurred later, in 
1989, and the coalition did not collapse on its own, but rather was disassembled by 
President Carlos Menem. Finally, the construction of reform coalitions was as vital as the 
                                                        
3 Graciela P. Cavicchia, “The Dismantling of the Argentine Defense Industry,” in Sean DiGiovanna, ed., 
From Defense to Development?: International Perspectives on Realizing the Peace Dividend (London: 
Routledge, 2003), 101–20. 
 
4 Etel Solingen, Regional Orders at Century’s Dawn: Global and Domestic Influences on Grand Strategy 
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destruction of statist status quo coalitions, as reform became possible only when the void 
created by the cessation of one coalition was filled by the emergence of another. This 
complexity and process is not captured by focusing exclusively on the side of the 
equation represented by the military. Nor can the collapse of the old coalition alone 
explain the rapid pace with which reform was crafted an implemented. Why did 
Argentina successfully transfer its defense industry enterprises from military to civilian 
ownership and control between 1989–1997? 
This chapter argues that relative civilian coalitional strength and relative civilian 
institutional strength jointly contributed to the outcome. From the beginning, President 
Menem aggressively sought to build up his capacity to shape legislative outcomes. 
Menem was greeted by military, labor, and party opposition when he proposed bills to 
authorize the privatization of military firms. Undeterred, he encouraged a division within 
labor while reaching agreements with the Peronist Party and rightist and provincial 
parties based on bargains, tradeoffs, and transfers. Reliant on its alignment with the 
Peronist-led unions and, thus, de-linked from parties, the military could not defend the 
boundaries of its coalition from Menem’s advances. As Menem, the Peronists, and 
rightist and provincial allies coalesced, a dominant coalition began to form, altering the 
original balance of political power between Menem and the military, making it more 
likely that Menem would prevail in a battle over the destiny of his privatization bills. And 
so, when those battles occurred, the military lacked allies with which to stop Menem, and 
the bills were approved. 
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But Menem knew the fight was fought on two fronts and that military and allies 
would rise again. Menem worked equally hard to develop his capacity to shape 
bureaucratic outcomes. When Menem announced that three dozen enterprises would be 
privatized, military, labor, and private sector challengers tried to stop reform from 
moving forward in their companies. Yet Menem’s predecessor, Raúl Alfonsín, had 
strengthened a key civilian governmental bureaucracy, demoted its military equivalents, 
and charged it with administering military enterprises. Now Menem delegated the task of 
designing and executing the reform policies for military enterprises to that bureaucracy, 
then fortified its expertise and consolidated its functions by transferring the economy 
ministry structure and team to that of the defense ministry and specifically charging it 
with reforming defense industry firms. Because of its authority, information, expertise, 
and control of the reform process, the bureaucracy was capable of shaping the interests of 
social actors and creating pro-reform constituencies out of groups vested in the old 
military-centered system. The bureaucracy accomplished this coalition building by 
crafting policies that granted these actors rents in the new civilian setting or intentionally 
narrowed the scope of reform in sectors where it would hurt traditionally powerful actors. 
That upheld the balance of institutional power first brought about under the Radical 
government, making it more likely that Menem would prevail in administrative battles to 
shape the crafting and implementation of policies for individual defense industry firms. 
And so, when those battles occurred, the military lacked the power to intercede, and 
defense firms passed to civilians, ending decades of struggle. 
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4.1. The Argentine Military Industry in 1989 
In Argentina, the first democratic government performed well regarding 
managerial aspects of defense industry reform, but the basic ownership structures of the 
defense industry remained intact. In June 1989, when the second democratically-elected 
president, Carlos Menem of the Partido Justicialista (Justicialist Party, a.k.a. the Peronist 
Justicialist Party or Peronist Party—PJ), took power, the military owned in whole or in 
part 45 defense-related industrial and service-sector enterprises (see Table 3.1 in Chapter 
3).5 Menem’s predecessor, Raúl Alfonsín (1983–89) of the Unión Cívica Radical 
(Radical Civic Union—UCR), successfully transferred the presidencies and directorates 
of most enterprises to civilian managers, but he failed in his repeated efforts to hand the 
firms over to civilian owners.6 Moreover, the military retained a presence at the middle-
ranking and staff levels of many firms, and in Air Force firms and the 13 ‘mine-to-
ammunition’ vertically-integrated factories of the Dirección General de Fabricaciones 
Militares (General Directorate of Military Industries—DGFM), the military was never 
thrown from the commanding heights. Together, military firms employed at least 33,000 
people; enjoyed tax and tariff advantages and a monopoly or near-monopoly in the 
                                                        
5 World Bank, Trade, Finance and Private Sector Development Division, Country Department IV, Latin 
America and the Caribbean Regional Office, Amil Kapur, “Report and Recommendation of the President 
of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development to the Executive Directors on a Proposed 
Second Public Enterprise Reform Adjustment Loan (PERAL II) in an Amount Equivalent to US$300 
Million to the Argentine Republic,” Report No. P-5811-AR, December 10, 1992, 12. 
 
6 Though the administration of enterprise ownership was shifted to the Ministry of Defense, which was 
acting as a shareholder, the military as yet remained the owner. Rougier et al., 48. 
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mining, weapons, steel, petrochemical, and naval sectors; and contributed a large share of 
gross national product.7 
Continued control of this juggernaut preserved the military’s role as a key player 
in the state and market. But it also perpetuated more insidious patterns of development. 
Former Peronist Deputy and Labor Minister Rodolfo Díaz argues that the economy built 
by the military since the 1960s was designed to extract income from society and, using 
public contracts and state-owned firms, redistribute that income to certain actors in the 
private sector.8 That benefitted both the military, which collected rents in return for 
extracting the requisite income from society to begin the cycle, and a third sector 
consisting of private firms institutionally subsidized by the state through income transfers 
from military and state enterprises. The acceleration of the extractive process resulted in a 
growing deficit for the public sector, with the participation of state enterprises in the 
public expenditure increasing from 11.9 percent in 1970 to 23.9 percent in 1989.9 The 
patterns helped drive the hyperinflation crisis then hobbling the government. 
 
 
                                                        
7 The military actually expanded its holdings during the first post-authoritarian period. In October 1987, the 
government inaugurated the formation of Fabrica Argentina de Materiales Aerospaciales (FAMA), which 
was to build military and civilian aircraft with foreign firms. The Air Force would participate with 46 
percent of the shares; Aeritalia 44 percent, and Techint 10 percent. Air Force Brigadier Generals Ruben 
Oscar Corradetti and Roberto Engroba would run the place, Engroba already being the director general of 
FMA Cordoba. Before the period ended, the Air Force obtained four more enterprises: Interbaires, 
Intergargo, Edcadassa, and Integradora Aeroespacial. Foreign Broadcast Information Service-Latin 
America (FBIS-LAT), “Joint Ventures to Build Aircraft Planned,” October 8, 1987. 
 
8 Díaz, 9. 
 
9 Ibid., 16. 
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4.2. Carlos Menem and Men of Arms 
President Menem knew that short of sweeping change, this political economy 
would breed ever more powerful and extractive institutions. Menem wanted to turn every 
last military firm over to private hands.10 To be sure, this position puzzled those who 
remembered his opposition to privatizing military firms under the Radical government 
(1983–1989). The then Peronist Senator helped block such reform by outlining strict 
criteria to be met in any privatization process, including the exclusion of firms vital to 
national security. And as Peronist presidential candidate, Menem’s electoral program did 
not announce an intention to implement market-oriented defense reforms,11 but rather 
promised increased salaries to workers and a moratorium on the debt.12 In general, 
Menem was expected to prolong the status quo. The future looked so grim to the reform-
minded that they feared “the possibility that Carlos Menem, the Peronists’ nationalist, 
populist candidate for office, might gain the presidency next year.”13 
Yet Menem was a pragmatist and opportunist who recognized which way the 
political winds were blowing. Even before Menem became a presidential candidate, an 
increasingly powerful bloc of the Peronist Party had developed a clear interest in 
reforming the military industry. In the mid-1980s, a new faction emerged within the PJ 
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11 President Menem’s message on the 135th anniversary of the Stock Exchange, July 20, 1989. 
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when office-holding politicians used patronage resources to challenge labor’s central 
position in the party. Unions dominated the PJ in the 1980s, yet when these “Renewalist” 
politicians and technocrats gained control of it in 1987, “the party’s weakly 
institutionalized mechanisms of union participation collapsed, paving the way for a 
decline in union influence” and, with it, the reduction of internal opposition to economic 
liberalization.14 And when the economic crisis hit, it served to weaken and discredit labor 
and opponents of market reform while strengthening the Renewalist technocrats and their 
case for an alternative. Now, in 1989–1990, the Renewalist bloc wanted all military 
enterprises to be sold. Such reform would useful for weakening the bloc’s union rivals, 
whose sources of labor power depended upon the featherbedding and protectionist labor 
policies rife in the military sector.  
Menem decided that the cost of opposing the Renewalist bloc exceeded the 
benefit at the point when he started recognizing the Renewalist technocrats “as having 
decisive political weight within the Peronist Party and as the only source of expertise.”15 
Should he have attempted to promote traditional statist solutions to the economic crisis, 
he was likely to have been thwarted by the Renewalist bloc. Entering into an alliance 
with the Renewalist faction and pursuing its goals, on the other hand, carried the potential 
                                                        
14 Thus, the percentage of the PJ bloc in the Chamber of Deputies belonging to a union dropped from a high 
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for political and economic gain from the spoils generated by conquering its rivals in the 
unions, military, and state bureaucracy. Not only that, but the economic collapse 
threatened Menem’s own survival, as “hyperinflation [had] led the economy to the brink 
of dissolution, uncontrolled conflicts put the society at risk of explosion, and lack of 
governability strained the polity to the limit.”16 Understanding the political power of the 
Renewalist faction and its capacity to ensure his survival, Menem aligned himself with 
that bloc and called upon its technocrats to help him assemble a team of advisors.17 Such 
figures as Domingo Cavallo, in turn, shaped Menem’s interests, such that by the time 
Menem took office in 1989, he, too, had decided that all military firms must be sold. 
But the military would not follow. It had fought off civilian efforts to divest it for 
decades and was not about to cede ground now. In 1989, 80 percent of 110 military 
officers supported Menem and opposed the UCR’s presidential candidate, Eduardo 
Angeloz, because Menem was not expected to pursue privatization, while Angeloz and 
the UCR were.18 As it had in previous years, the military argued that preserving military 
control was essential on national security grounds. Keeping the status quo, or at least 
maintaining an industry, was a matter of national independence and “self-sufficiency,” 
said General Isidro Caceres in early October 1989.19 But despite its emphasis on the 
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common good, the military institution had a lot to lose even after having been thrown 
from the top rungs of enterprise management during the first post-transition period. 
The military retained a vested interest in the defense industry and had the 
expectation of political and financial gain. As the owner of the share capital of the 
enterprises, the military enjoyed a claim to rents and rewards generated by the enterprises 
as well as stood to benefit indirectly from the circulation of enterprise revenues 
throughout the defense establishment. Politically, the military still gained influence from 
its entrenchment in the middle management and staff of many “strategic” enterprises, and 
even more from its control of those establishments in which the military’s managerial 
control had not been diluted (Air Force enterprises and DGFM factories).  The military, 
knowing this, had no intention of relinquishing its remaining control voluntarily. And so, 
with Carlos Menem and the men of arms at loggerheads, the stage was set for yet more 
distributional conflict in the Argentine defense sector. 
 
4.3. Reform Efforts 
Policy on State Reform 
The interaction between Menem and the military began almost immediately after 
Menem took office in July 1989. Once in power, Menem promptly dispatched Act 
23,696, the Acto de Reforma del Estado (Act of State Reform), to the Senate Industry 
Committee. The bill declared a state of emergency affecting all state enterprises and 
initiated their reform by incorporating a list of enterprises declared “subject to 
privatization.” Initially, seven of the firms listed were mixed capital petrochemical or 
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steel enterprises with minority military participation, but the executive expanded the list 
to include shipyard Tandanor in late July (see Table 4.3).20 The bill designated Ministry 
of Defense (MoD) as the application authority for the firms, meaning it empowered that 
ministry to craft the reform policies for those enterprises. The bill established the first 
steps in the privatization process: Articles 8 and 9 gave the executive the power to issue a 
decree declaring an enterprise “subject to privatization,” but, in all cases, the decree had 
to be approved by a law of Congress before a firm could be considered for privatization.21 
 
 
Table 4.3. Military Enterprise Reforms Proposed Under the State Reform Act 
Sector Military 
Enterprise 
Military 
Participation 
Military 
Owner 
Personnel, 
Sept. 1991 
Proposed 
Reform 
Steel Forja Argentina 100% Ministry 
of 
Defense 
419 Privatization 
Naval Tandanor 100% Navy 714 Privatization 
Petroche-
mical 
Carboquímica 
Argentina 
42% Army 74 Privatization 
 Petroquímica 
Río Tercero 
8.6% Army 355 Privatization 
 Polisur 30% Army n.a. Privatization 
 Monómeros 
Vinílicos 
30% Army 36 Privatization 
 Petropol 30% Army 19 Privatization 
 Induclor 30% Army 39 Privatization 
Source: Ámbito Financiero, June 29, 1989; El Cronista, July 26, 1989. Employment figures 
from World Bank, 1992. 
                                                        
20 It was a familiar bunch. As we saw in the last chapter, Alfonsín launched his incremental privatization 
drive of 1987–89 with the proposed sale of seven of these firms. For the full text of the Act of State 
Reform, see Ámbito Financiero, “El decisivo proyecto de ley para que el Justicialismo pueda privatizer,” 
June 29, 1989; El Cronista, “Amplían lista de empresas privatizables,” July 26, 1989. 
 
21 Congress was otherwise tasked with some aspects of control and supervision. 
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Menem introduced this bill within the framework of an agreement between the 
Radical Party and his administration. Menem took office six months early after the 
Radical government proved unable to tame the economic crisis. In return, since Menem’s 
Peronist Party lacked a majority in both chambers of Congress, the UCR would support 
any reform bills issued by Menem during the six months before the newly elected 
Congress was in place (see Tables 4.3.1 and 4.3.2). Far from subservient forces, however, 
the power brokers in Congress did not toe the line. The UCR agreed to cooperate until 
December 10 as promised, but it clarified that it reserved the right to dissent or propose 
alternatives to articles. More troublingly, many Peronists were concerned by the program. 
In 1989, 21 percent of the Peronist bloc in the Chamber of Deputies as yet belonged to a 
union.22 Naturally, these members doubted the legislation or fretted the risks involved in 
promoting legislation that threatened to weaken the party’s union base.23 
When Menem set about trying to mitigate this opposition, his first response was to 
start outside of it. The object of his desire was a small conservative party and traditional 
enemy of Peronism, Unión de Centro Democrático (Union of Democratic Center—
UCD). Argentina’s conservatives ruled for decades in unholy alliance after alliance with 
repressive military dictators, persuaded that their armed compatriots would do what no 
civilian government could and shrink the size of the state. But after the monolith reached 
its zenith during the Proceso (1976–1983), the traditionally weak, divided, and 
uninfluential right abandoned its military partner and opened up for business. Alfonsín 
                                                        
22 Levitsky, 133–5. 
 
23 Díaz, 241. 
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passed up the new eight, fearful of the potential fallout from trying to bridge the gap 
between his Radicals and the conservatives.24 Menem, the opportunist, would not let this 
one slip away. He allied with UCD, the most elite-connected and best-represented of the 
rightist parties, appointing its leaders to key positions in his cabinet.25 
Winning over the dissidents and labor-linked legislators in Menem’s own party 
stood to be no small task. Traditionally, the PJ opposed efforts to seriously reform 
defense and state enterprises because the Peronist-led unions regarded perpetrators of 
such efforts as mortal enemies. Indeed, the PJ and defense-sector unions were among the 
actors that helped to block reform attempts under both the 1976–1983 dictatorship and 
the 1983–1989 UCR government, as we saw in Chapter 3. Nevertheless, the labor-linked 
legislators who remained despite the coalitional transformation then underway within the 
PJ recognized that the reform process would create opportunities to engage in rent-
seeking behavior. They did not want to defy Menem, “but rather intended to gain 
economic interests on behalf of the labor union, the CGT.”26  
 
 
 
                                                        
24 Luigi Manzetti, Privatization South American Style (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 44–5. 
 
25 See Edward L. Gibson, “Democracy and the New Electoral Right in Argentina,” Journal of 
Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, 32, 3 (1990), 177–228. 
 
26 Confederación General del Trabajo de la República Argentina (General Labor Confederation) was the 
main confederation of trade unions in Argentina and the traditional backbone of Peronism. Sang-Hyun Yi, 
“The Political Economy of Privatization of YPF in Argentina,” Asian Journal of Latin American Studies, 
21, 3 (2008), 123–60, 129. 
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Table 4.3.1. Party Strength in the Argentine Senate, 1987–1997 
  Senators 
Party Year (n) % 
PJ 1986 21 45.7 
 1989 26 56.5 
 1992 30 62.5 
 1995 37 57.8 
UCR 1986 18 39.1 
 1989 14 30.4 
 1992 11 22.9 
 1995 15 23.4 
Provincial Parties 1986 7 15.2 
 1989 6 13.1 
 1992 7 14.6 
 1995 12 18.8 
Source: Mariana Llanos, Privatization and Democracy in Argentina: An Analysis of 
President-Congress Relations (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 33. 
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Table 4.3.2. Party Strength in the Argentine Chamber of Deputies, 1987–
1997 
  Deputies 
Party Year (n) % 
PJ 1987 96 37.8 
 1989 120 47.2 
 1991 117 45.5 
 1993 128 49.8 
 1995 131 51.0 
UCR 1987 114 44.9 
 1989 90 35.4 
 1991 84 32.7 
 1993 83 32.3 
 1995 68 26.4 
UCD 1987 7 2.7 
 1989 11 4.3 
 1991 10 3.9 
 1993 4 1.5 
 1995 2 0.8 
Other Parties 1987 37 14.6 
 1989 33 13.1 
 1991 46 17.9 
 1993 42 16.4 
 1995 34 13.3 
Source: Llanos, 32. 
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Menem recognized the fondness for rents of these actors and created incentives 
for the partisans to follow his star. The administration promoted its sponsorship of 
employee share ownership programs for all state firms. These programs sought to reserve 
shares for employees in privatized enterprises. Per the Programa de Propiedad 
Participada (Participated Ownership Program) unveiled in Chapter III of the State 
Reform Act,27 employees of a firm undergoing privatization could buy, hold, and sell 
significant proportions (up to 10 percent) of the capital stock of their companies. Shares 
would also be reserved at discounted prices and with special financial assistance. 
Moreover, the government was committed to giving preference to workers whose 
activities were spun off from the enterprise being privatized.28 Besides giving employees 
a direct stake in the performance of the firm, these programs were likely to produce large 
financial gains for employees thanks to share appreciation resulting from the investment 
and management changes made by new owners. Equally vital, Menem was signaling that 
the government would allow unions to be the exclusive administrators of the workers’ 
shares, which meant that unions would earn a part of the shares’ profits. These 
concessions helped take the sting off for many legislators, who began to rethink their 
position.29 
                                                        
27 Articles 21 and 40 of Chapter III. 
 
28 Ana S. De Kessler, “Privatization of the Enterprises in the Argentine Ministry of Defence,” The 
Columbia Journal of World Business, 28, 1 (1993), 134–143, 138. 
 
29 Mariano Tommasi, “Federalism in Argentina and the Reforms of the 1990s,” in Jessica Wallack and T. 
N. Srinivasan, eds., Federalism and Economic Reform. International Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006), 25–84, 45. 
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The general agreement attained with the opposition UCR guaranteed that the PJ 
would always have the required votes to obtain quorum and pass legislation in Congress. 
Nevertheless, the opposition of the UCR persisted in the Chamber of Deputies. It was not 
at all clear that its support would, in fact, be forthcoming. And as the Radicals’ credibility 
became ever more in doubt, the meaning of Menem’s alliance with the UCD became 
clearer. Yet a coalition between the PJ and UCD support would not be enough to create a 
path to victory. Menem had allied with the conservative UCD less for its votes than for 
its ties to Argentina’s moneyed classes. Those ties to the Argentine elite would become 
critical later, after legislative approval, when it came time to find the requisite suitors for 
privatization to move forward in military and state enterprises. But for now, the UCD was 
more effective as a pressure group than a kingmaker, as the party had less than 10 percent 
of the vote in the Lower Chamber. And so, Menem would have to find others. 
He responded to this situation by seeking to buy in provincial party support. 
Realizing that “no national legislative coalition could be put together without the support 
of the regional structures of power in the periphery,” Menem turned to small provincial 
parties who were numerically insignificant on their own but would be enough to round 
out a winning legislative coalition.30 The small parties in the periphery represented 
provinces in which military enterprises were often the largest firm and employer, so these 
parties were less predisposed to support market and defense-related reforms than was 
                                                        
30 Edward L. Gibson and Ernesto Calvo, “Federalism and Low-Maintenance Constituencies: Territorial 
Dimensions of Economic Reform in Argentina,” Studies in Comparative International Development, 35, 3 
(2000), 32–55, 36. 
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UCD. Indeed, the provincial parties had denied Menem their support during the first 
rounds of negotiation regarding the State Reform Act.31 Yet the same calculations that 
drove the provincial parties to initially defend the military also made them amenable to 
monetary suasion. And so, when Menem used exchange relationships to buy in provincial 
support, the positions of the provincial parties changed to be aligned with the PJ.32 
The military was alarmed at the pace, scope, and sophistication of Menem’s 
coalition building, but it was also relatively powerless to stop it. During the Radical 
government, the military aligned itself with the Peronist-led defense-sector labor unions 
and benefited from labor’s close ties to the Peronist Party. Thus, when labor’s influence 
within the PJ began to erode and labor-linked legislators were increasingly being co-
opted by Menem, the military’s influence—though always de facto, distant, remote—
began to erode correspondingly because the military lacked the requisite partisan ties to 
defend its coalition boundaries from encroachment by the civilian outsiders. Suddenly 
without a party and without recourse, the military cut its losses and initiated a dialectic of 
courting and contesting the executive and defense portfolio. 
These developments facilitated a convergence between Menem and the PJ, UCD, 
and provincial parties in Congress. That altered the original balance of power between the 
pro-reform Menem and anti-reform military. Menem now had more power to exert his 
influence legislatively than before when he had the support of the Renewalist bloc and 
                                                        
31 M. Valeria Palanza and Gisela Sin, “Estudios de caso: Ley 23,696 (reforma de estado), Ley 23,697 
(emergencia económica), Universidad del Salvador, 1996. 
 
32 Valeria Palanza and Gisela Sin, “Partidos provinciales y gobierno nacional en el Congreso (1983–1995),” 
Boletín SAAP, 3, 5 (1997), 46–94. 
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economy and defense ministry technocrats but faced the opposition of the UCR, 
provincial parties, and the rest of the PJ. The military, by contrast, suddenly had less 
power to exert its influence legislatively than before when the legislative bulwark of the 
anti-reform coalition it had joined had not yet been dismantled and turned to new ends. 
For the first time in the decades-long conflict over the defense industry, a civilian 
president was poised to prevail upon the military in a legislative in a legislative battle. 
From then on, the tide turned. It all started in open debate in the Senate—
Menem’s preferred drop off point—on July 26 and July 27, 1989. Two weeks earlier, 
Public Works and Utilities Minister Roberto Dromi had obtained the agreement of the 
senators after Dromi repeatedly visited Congress to promote the initiative and hold 
extensive discussions with legislators.33 Now Menem’s brother, Senator Eduardo Menem 
(PJ), sustained the support for the bill in Dromi’s stead, arguing that it would effect a 
crucial overhaul of the state and was necessary because the public expected it and 
appreciated the gravity of the economic crisis. Flanked by cohorts Senators Luis 
Brasesco, Hipolito Solari Yrigoyen, and Fernando De La Rua, Senator Antonio 
Berhongaray (UCR) lamented the new role of the state and limits on the services 
provided to firms being privatized, then called for curbing the issuing of states of 
“administrative emergency” more generally.34 But in the end, Berhongaray and the 
                                                        
33 La Nación, “Dromi acordó con senadores el proyecto de privatización,” July 13, 1989. 
 
34 Díaz, 245. 
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concerned said that the UCR would honor the political compromise, and the bill was 
approved nearly unanimously.35 
And when Menem’s path to victory was nearly foreclosed on multiple occasions 
in the always-troublesome Chamber of Deputies, his ability to enforce coalitional 
loyalties by affecting the costs and benefits of defecting from the reform coalition 
became critical. The Lower Chamber persisted in its opposition to the specific military 
enterprise reforms proposed under the State Reform Act when the legislation reached its 
floor in late July.36 The resistance reached a fever pitch on August 11, 1989 when the 
rogue chamber modified the text of the State Reform Act to exclude all of the military-
owned petrochemical firms that the bill had initially declared “subject to privatization”: 
Carboquímica Argentina, Petroquímica Río Tercero, Polisur, Monómeros Vinílicos, 
Petropol, and Induclor.37 In response, the Senate promptly reinserted those enterprises in 
the annex of firms declared subject to privatization by the legislation, then returned the 
bill to the Chamber of Deputies.38 In parallel, pro-government deputies held discussions 
with fellow partisans,39 and Menem enlisted Minister Dromi to lobby hard in the Senate 
                                                        
35 El Cronista, “El Senado aprobó la ley de reforma del Estado,” July 27, 1989. 
 
36 Clarín, “Dromi denunció que la privatizacion tiene resistencias,” August 10, 1989. 
 
37 Clarín, “Diputados introdujo cambios al proyecto de reforma del Estado,” August 12, 1989; Clarín, 
“Dromi denunció que la privatizacion tiene resistencias,” August 10, 1989. 
 
38 El Cronista, “La ley Dromi volvió otra vez la Cámara Baja,” August 16, 1989. 
 
39 Carlos Acuña, Sebastián Galiani, and Mariano Tommasi, “Understanding Reform: The case of 
Argentina,” in José María Fanelli, ed., Understanding Market Reforms in Latin America: Similar Reforms, 
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and Chamber of Deputies. But when Dromi and the Menemists ran into opposition when 
they tried to move to pass the bill nevertheless, Menem was forced to intervene.  
Menem telephoned the holdouts and issued a stern warning: If they did not 
approve his legislation, he would invoke the powers granted by Law 22,177 promulgated 
by the military government and immediately proceed to privatize state companies. That 
law authorized the divestment of state assets but left untouched other key pieces of 
legislation, including regarding the status of enterprises providing public services. So, 
there was an element of bluff in Menem’s threat.40 Nevertheless, the move gave 
legislators a stark choice between opposing the bill only for sales to proceed without 
Congress having any control, and supporting it with the vow of some influence. Since 
Menem could exert influence over Peronist legislators because of his weight within the 
party, the warning fell on attentive ears, and the recalcitrant began to fall in line. On 
August 18, 1989, the Chamber of Deputies approved the bill for Law 23,696, the Law of 
State Reform, with the affirmative vote of the PJ, UCD, and provincial allies. The UCR 
voted against, breaking the agreement.41 
Ministry of Defense (MoD) began preparing to sell the enterprises declared 
subject to privatization by the State Reform Act immediately after it became law.42 Yet 
no sooner had the ministry embarked than it encountered fresh challenges. Labor 
opposition was not necessarily the main issue; the mixed capital enterprises with minority 
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41 Díaz, 246. 
 
42 El Cronista, “Analizan la privatizacion de empresas de Defensa,” September 21, 1989. 
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military participation were relatively small, with fewer than 100 employees in many 
cases (see Table 3.3). And military opposition within these less economically and 
politically complex enterprises did not preoccupy the bureaucrats either. Instead, the 
obstacles were primarily economic in nature. Fewer private investors showed interest 
given the dour economic climate, which also made it more difficult to stimulate interest. 
This was not necessarily to be expected. Argentina had a comparative advantage in the 
petrochemical sector due to the ready availability of gas feedstock and a sophisticated 
industrial base, and it was thought that the relative profitability of these particular firms 
would help bait the capitalists as well.43 Thus, it was quite a puzzle for Menem and his 
bureaucrats, and the military knew it. 
Menem was undaunted, however, because the defense industry bureaucracy at his 
disposal had the capacity to craft reform policies to reduce the risks and costs borne by 
investors, while the military bureaucracy was in no position to reinforce the economic 
challenges facing the government or to obstruct reform in other ways. We saw in Chapter 
3 that the Secretariat of Production for Defense (SPD) was a powerful agent of the 
democratically-elected president. Staffed by civilians and charged with administering the 
ownership and management of defense enterprises, SPD afforded the president the power 
to exert control over the development of the reform policies for those firms, and to use its 
time, authority, and resources to innovate around obstacles in its path. The military 
bureaucracy, on the other hand, had been greatly weakened, the commanders demoted 
                                                        
43 Indeed, both Alfonsín (1983–89) and Menem proposed to sell the military’s mixed capital petrochemical 
concerns first partly for that reason. 
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and shorn of appointment and other powers and military agencies separated from 
enterprises and subordinated directly to SPD rule (see Table 3.3 in Chapter 3). SPD as yet 
remained so empowered under Menem—whose rise to power initiated the renewal of its 
leadership but preserved its integrity—while the military clawed for its lost influence.44 
This dynamic perpetuated the balance of institutional power brought about in 1983, 
keeping it more likely that Menem would prevail in a battle over the crafting and 
implementation of the policies for the mixed capital petrochemical concerns. 
As the belligerents lined up on opposing sides, it became increasingly clear that 
this would be an asymmetric struggle, as civilian and military possessed unequal political 
and institutional resources. The civilian defense team took stock of the imbalance and 
proceeded to take the obstacles in stride. While weakened military opponents struggled to 
position themselves to shape the process, SPD leveraged its authority and information to 
make the most out of a hard situation. SPD staff carried out an exhaustive evaluation of 
each firm in order gauge the firm’s economic viability and determine the requisite steps 
to create a reform policy for it that maximized economic incentives and minimized 
economic costs for prospective buyers. In some mixed petrochemical enterprises with 
minority participation of the military, SPD put the firms into a packet—30 percent of the 
shares of Petropol, Monómeros Vinílicos, Induclor, and Polisur, for example—in order to 
make it easier and less costly to buy the units in the prevailing economic climate. SPD 
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also decided to sell the enterprises without their debt obligations, which greatly reduced 
the risks and costs associated with acquiring them.45 
And so, when bidding began on July 23, 1990 for the military’s shares in 
Petroquímica Río Tercero, Polisur, Monómeros Vinílicos, Petropol, Induclor, and Forja 
Argentina,46 private investors came and the military could only watch. The first four were 
sold as a package to the existing private partners in October 1990.47 Where SPD did not 
first succeed, it learned from its experience. Thus, when competitive bidding for 
Petroquímica Río Tercero was declared void for lack of bidders, SPD issued a new 
invitation to bid.48 Aware that the price had been too high,49 this time it did not include a 
cost estimate.50 One bid was submitted, and, on December 6, 1991, Egerton Finance was 
awarded the firm.51 One firm put up for sale, Forja Argentina, found no bidders, and SPD 
chose to reform it in another way, which we will examine in the next section. 
 
 
                                                        
45 De Kessler, 137. 
 
46 MoD resolution no. 1018/90 and Decree No. 1385, cited in Ministerio de Defensa, Subsecretaría de 
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Military Enterprise Privatization Program 
The battle entered a new phase on July 23, 1990, when the executive sent the 
Senate Industry Committee the first privatization bill issued since the Law of State 
Reform: legislation declaring “subject to privatization” 27 of the firms owned in whole or 
in part by the Army, Navy, or Air Force and designating MoD as the application 
authority. Four days later, on July 27, 1990, the executive dispatched its third 
privatization initiative: a bill for Law 23,809, Privatization of Altos Hornos Zapla, which 
amended the Law of State Reform to declare the so-named Army-owned firm subject to 
privatization and naming MoD as the application authority. The Radicals responded to 
the proposed Altos Hornos Zapla (AHZ) amendment by claiming Congress’s right to 
control and supervise the actions of the executive, and demanded, in turn, that the AHZ 
bidding process be approved by Congress. More than a dozen Peronist Deputies joined 
the Radical opposition and challenged the AHZ amendment, led by the dissident 
Movimiento Peronista or Grupo de los Ocho, the group that emerged on the PJ’s left 
flank in December 1989 to contest the privatization program. 
This opposition to the AHZ amendment was not that troublesome. Peronist 
opponents of Menem’s military enterprise reforms were weaker than before after the 
installation of the new Congress elected in 1989. The Peronists now had a clear majority 
in the Senate. In the Chamber of Deputies, the Radicals lost huge ground (24 seats—9 
percent of the vote share) while the PJ approached a majority, the UCD picked up seats, 
and Menem remained in the good graces of the provincial parties (see Tables 4.3.1 and 
4.3.2). The bulk of the PJ retained its supportive posture and followed Menem’s lead, as 
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did UCD’s 11 deputies. And Menem could buy in the support of the five deputies of 
small provincial parties Movimiento Popular Neuquino (MPN), Partido Renovador de 
Salta (PRS), Partido Blanco de los Jubilados (P. BI. Jub), and Partido Liberal de 
Corrientes (PLC). The dissident Peronists led by Grupo de los Ocho were outgunned by 
this right-oriented interparty coalition stitched together with exchange relationships. And 
so, on August 23, 1990, one month after its introduction, the amendment was approved.52 
But where resistance scarcely affected the processing of the bill for the 
privatization of AHZ, the opposition to the legislation to privatize 27 other military 
enterprises was stronger and more troublesome. The massive privatization bill 
immediately triggered divisions within society, polity, and party. Naturally, the military 
was alarmed by the plan, and its worries began to leak out of the defense ministry before 
the bill was even announced.53 The Radical Party also stood opposed, arguing that 
limiting privatizations to firms with civilian or dual civilian-military uses and sparing 
purely defense firms was necessary for national defense.54 All of this was standard fare. 
The truly distressing dissent, on the other hand, came from within the Peronist Party. In 
mid-July 1990, Defense Minister Humberto Romero announced that all proceeds 
generated by MoD’s forthcoming privatization program would be returned to the military 
in a bid to quell military dissent.55 Economy Minister Erman González demurred, arguing 
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that this would undermine the fiscal discipline direly needed at that time and that MoD 
ought to hand privatization decisions themselves over to Ministry of Economy (MoE). 
Yet Romero reasserted his portfolio’s control.56 Menem, in a bid to bring the public 
finances under control, decreed the transfer of control of privatization decision making 
from Ministries of Defense and Public Works to Ministry of Economy, yet those 
ministries refused to cede control. Not only that, but while MoD claimed control of 
policy design and implementation, Public Works Minister Dromi and his allies sought to 
stop MoD from obtaining this power and retain it for themselves, as they had thus far 
controlled the privatization process. Before long, the Peronist legislative allies of the 
opposing Romero and Dromi factions were facing off in a pitched battle. 
The so-called Rojo-Punzo formed the bulwark of the Peronist support for the shift 
to defense and for the military enterprise privatization bill. This was a group of Peronist 
legislative allies of Defense Minister Romero who knew Menem through businessman, 
mutual ally, and Menem adviser Emir Yoma. The Rojo-Punzo and Yoma stood to gain 
handsomely not just from political control of military divestiture through public biddings, 
direct awards, and debt capitalization, but from the power to earmark the proceeds from 
privatization in subsequent processes of military reform. Fifty million in the stuff was 
already earmarked to finance the military reform as of January 1, 1991, and the defense 
team, Yoma, and the Rojo-Punzo expected more where that came from. Blessing the 
initiative, the Rojo-Punzo started trying to limit the changes made to it in Congress.57 
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Table 4.3.3. Firms Declared Subject to Privatization by Military Enterprise 
Privatization Bill 
Sector Military Enterprise Military 
Participation 
Military 
Owner 
Proposed 
Reform 
Naval AFNE  100% Navy Privatization 
 Astilleros Domecq Garcia 75% Navy Privatization 
 SATECNA 40% Navy Privatization 
 SISTEVAL 72% Navy Privatization 
Missiles/
Mining 
EDESA 100% Navy Privatization 
Steel HIPASAM 100% Army Privatization 
 SIDINOX 100% Army Privatization 
 SOMISA 99.99% Army Privatization 
 COMIRSA n.a. Army Privatization 
Petro-
chemical 
Petroquímica General 
Mosconi (PGM) 
50% Army Privatization 
 Petroquímica Bahía Blanca 
(PBB) 
17% Army Privatization 
Arms 
Industry 
TAMSE 100% Army Privatization 
 FM General San Martín 100%  Army Privatization 
 FM de Vainas y 
Conductores Eléctricos 
(ECA) 
100% Army Privatization 
 FM de Acido Sulfúrico 100% Army Privatization 
 FM Pilar 100% Army Privatization 
 FM de Tolueno Sintético 100% Army Privatization 
 FM de Armas Portátiles 
“Domingo Matheu” 
100% Army Privatization 
 FM Fray Luis Betrán 100% Army Privatization 
 FM de Pólvoras y 
Explosivos Villa María 
100% Army Privatization 
 FM Río Tercero 100% Army Privatization 
 FM San Francisco 100% Army Privatization 
 FM de Pólvoras y 
Explosivos ‘Azul’ 
100%  Army Privatization 
Aircraft Technología Aerospacial 
(TEA) 
100%  Air 
Force 
Privatization 
 Material Area Córdoba 
Fábrica Militar de Aviones 
(FMA) 
100% Air 
Force 
Privatization 
Source: Congressional Reports, Senate, September 26–27, 1990, 3970, cited in Llanos, 
123.  
FM stands for Fábrica Militar. 
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The Celestes, the Rojo-Punzo’s rivals, formed the Peronist opposition to the shift 
of power to the MoD and to the military enterprise privatization bill as written. These 
Peronist legislative allies of Public Works Minister Dromi and his subordinates so burned 
to regain control of privatization decision making that they began to ally with the 
Radicals in Congress to try to stall the bill. Their plan—hatched during a secret meeting 
led by Radical Deputies José Luis Manzano and Miguel Toma in Manzano’s house—was 
“to step up the incipient military crisis, even if among the top generals… as a way of 
encouraging the dissident sectors to cause internal disturbances that will affect the 
defense area.” The group would use “the strength that military nationalism is showing 
today to further their own objectives in the battle with the administration: to control the 
privatizations and to direct political accords with the Radical Party through a top echelon 
that is mostly on their side.” A Mr. Geraiges (Manzano’s economic agent) was to head 
the campaign against Romero and the Rojo-Punzo, and Manzano intended for Toma to 
replace Romero as Minister of Defense in the aftermath of the crisis.58 In parallel, the war 
between the ministries of defense and economy over control of the proceeds from 
privatization raged. All told, the military enterprise reform bill slumbered in 
congressional offices for 17 months while distributive skirmishes paralyzed the system. 
Growing impatient, Menem made the bill’s approval a top priority and personally 
lobbied Peronist legislators to that effect it in late 1991. The odds were in his favor 
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because the political environment had begun to change in the time since the bill’s 
introduction in July 1990. By late 1990, Menem had taken over the Peronist Party 
presidency and appointed loyalists to top positions in the party, consolidating his control 
over the party.59 “With tight control of the party’s primary patronage resource, the party’s 
list of candidates for electoral office,” Menem became able to marginalize those opposed 
to his defense industry reform program, including Grupo de los Ocho and other 
detractors.60 Now, in 1991, Menem’s new power made it more likely that the Celestes 
and others, when given a choice between obedience or obsolescence, would decide that 
the cost of continuing to oppose Menem exceeded the benefit. And so, when Menem 
gave legislators precisely that choice, the Celestes laid down their weapons and got in 
line. 
The military side struggled unsuccessfully to regain allies all the while. With no 
direct ties to parties, the armed again found it difficult to elicit the cooperation of partisan 
and institutional actors who could have helped them. And the going got tougher still after 
the failed uprising of December 3, 1990, the day the nationalist Army Colonel Mohamed 
Alí Seineldín led a failed coup attempt that resulted in 14 deaths—including of five 
civilians—in objection to the government’s efforts to prosecute human rights abusers and 
implement its economic reform program.61 Though it could not be blamed on the military 
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at large, the event nevertheless served to further discredit and weaken the military 
politically. The forces became virtually indefensible, said noted Argentine civil-military 
relations expert Jose Manuel Ugarte.62 As the military clawed unsuccessfully for 
influence and formerly-warring Peronist factions coalesced alongside a bloc consisting of 
UCD and small provincial parties, a dominant pro-reform coalition began to form. That 
upheld the balance of political power first brought about in the battle to shape the fate of 
the State Reform Act, keeping it more likely that Menem would prevail in a battle 
between him and the military over the destiny of the giant military enterprise 
privatization bill now in play. 
Once this pro-reform coalition was in place, the military’s space and options for 
opposing the legislation were vastly reduced. The coalition partners potentially available 
to the military in its fight to defend the defense industry were weak, divided, 
uninfluential, and ill-disposed to work with the military. Thus, though the return of the 
UCR to an opposition stance was notable, the Radicals had had no contact with members 
of the Armed Forces because Radical President Alfonsín (1983–1989)  expressly 
prohibited his collaborators from having such encounters.63 And even if the two actors 
had been linked, the Radicals faced Menem from a discredited and weakened position 
due to the disastrous economic performance of the Alfonsín government and the party’s 
agreement to support any reform initiatives issued by the executive during the six months 
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before the newly-elected legislature was in place. Finally, Menem’s tight control over his 
party and allies meant that the military’s coalition-breaking efforts would have to be 
especially potent in order to succeed—a tall order for any military, let alone this one at 
this particular time. Thus, it was clear to observers that “Menem [had] appropriated a 
substantial part of the civilian coalition that, in the past, often allied with the military 
against… civilian governments.”64 
Few were surprised, then, when struggle gave way to domination. The partners of 
the pro-reform coalition roused the military enterprise privatization bill from its slumber 
and began acting collectively in ways that threatened the status quo. With control of the 
relevant veto points, the Menemists took their positions and radioed to base. At last, in 
December 1991, the partners of the reform coalition leveraged their strength to prevail 
upon the Radicals and dissident Grupo de los Ocho, and the bill to privatize the military 
cosmos became law.65 Still, it was not a total loss for the military. The Committee of 
Defense in the Chamber of Deputies inserted a provision in the bill stating that the 
military would receive the proceeds from privatization (which, curiously, the Radicals 
also demanded). Moreover, the Senate included a provision obliging the Ministry of 
Defense to include clauses for the protection of manufacturing for defense in every 
tender.66 Menem was playing the long game, picking his battles. 
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The civilian bureaucracy waited with bated breath through it all. And when the 
military enterprise privatization bill was finally approved, the civilians moved with the 
sound of the guns. Even before the approval of Law 24,045, SPD was hard at work 
outlining the design and implementation of the reform policies for the military enterprises 
within the legislation’s scope of application. In February 1991, when Menem transferred  
MoE’s team and structure to MoD and charged the new defense team with carrying out 
badly needed reforms in the defense sector, the defense unit encountered fresh obstacles 
to moving privatization forward in military enterprises not long after.67 First, many 
middle-ranking military and civilian managers opposed the privatization of their 
companies and resisted supplying vital information. Various forms of heel-dragging had 
been extremely successful in blocking “all but trivial proposals for privatization” in the 
past. As former Proceso (1976–1983) Economy Minister José Alfredo Martínez de Hoz 
wrote in 1990, 
 
“some civilians, especially the staff of state companies, are real “untouchables.” 
Many of them look down on new directors or ministers, being sure they will 
outlast them. No matter how passive their opposition, it may become almost 
insurmountable.”68  
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Now, in 1991, with enabling legislation approved, such opposition stood to be more 
consequential than ever. This showed that the precise role of the military remained a 
difficult and complicated question and that partial, managerial reforms brought about 
under the Radical government (1983–1989) had, ironically, created a new class of 
civilian actors invested in the partially-reformed defense sector and incentivized to 
oppose a continuation toward full reform. At least in the Argentine experience, the ‘peril 
of partial reform’ was troubling indeed. 
And second, excess labor coupled with restrictive labor laws made the firms as 
well as their purchase unviable from an economic perspective. We saw in the last chapter 
that featherbedding was extensive in military enterprises because military as well as 
civilian rulers had sought to inoculate their rule against popular uprisings by using state 
enterprises to distribute patronage and retain excess personnel—SOMISA, for example, 
had 5,000 excess employees in 1986. Now, in 1991, the presence of these extra workers 
made the firms less than attractive to the capitalist. Moreover, investors would incur 
prohibitive costs if the task of reducing excess labor was left to them due to the presence 
of laws requiring employers to pay the salaries of former employees who have been 
dismissed. “It was clear that this [reduction of excess labor] should not be left to the 
private sector, which would find the task exceedingly difficult under the present labor 
laws in Argentina,” said former Undersecretary of Restructuring and Asset Management 
Ana de Kessler in 1992.69 
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Yet SPD was not inclined to fold in the face of adversity. In this case, it sought to 
innovate out of the gridlock by setting up institutions designed to reduce political 
opposition while minimizing the economic costs and maximizing the benefits associated 
with acquiring the firms. First, for each firm, it created an institutional arena in which the 
power of the civilian bureaucracy could be exerted and complex bargaining between 
civilian and military could occur as needed. This took the form of separate privatization 
committees created within MoD for each privatization, composed of government 
officials, including staff from within MoD and, in particular, SPD; representatives of the 
military, and private consultants. Defense ministers were responsible for appointing the 
members of the committees, and the planning and implementation of the privatizations 
was to occur primarily within the committees.70  
Second, Secretary of Production for Defense Carlos Carballo and other officials 
met with the management of the military enterprises separately on numerous occasions in 
the former’s capacity as the chief administrator of the enterprises. That the military was 
scheduled to receive the proceeds from privatization became an important selling point 
for the civilians in these meetings, as did the civilian government’s pledge to increase the 
military budget.71 The civilian agents sought lists of principle assets, boards of directors’ 
minutes, observations of the Sindicatura General de Empresas Publicas (the state 
institution responsible for the annual audit and operational review of state enterprises), 
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and other supporting information such as the sources and uses of funds statements 
provided in the balance sheets of these firms. With this data, they intended to examine 
each firm’s management and prospects.72 
And third, the civilians created a job reduction and severance plan for the largest 
firms affected by the bill. In negotiations with the unions in 1991, MoD agreed to provide 
workers who voluntarily retired early, departed, or agreed to be laid off or transferred to 
another government agency with severance payments, as well as agreed to provide for a 
transition period until workers found new jobs. This was as part of a much more 
ambitious plan—developed by the team of Secretary Carballo and begun in September 
1991—that also involved streamlining the DGFM directorate, privatizing military 
industries, and implementing a management optimization program.73 The objective, said 
the ministry, was to cushion the adjustment process. To establish its credibility, it set 
aside two loans: the second iteration of a World Bank Public Enterprise Reform 
Adjustment Loan (PERAL II) issued for the reform of defense industry enterprises, and a 
complementary US$200 million loan from the Export-Import Bank of Japan (JEXIM). 
The ministry also supplemented the funds with company resources and commercial loans 
as needed, including a Banco de la Nación Argentina loan.74 
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These interventions largely succeeded in reducing preliminary military opposition 
and reducing the steep labor costs associated with purchasing military enterprises. First, 
the inclusion of the military on the committees and the considerable power vested in them 
made divestiture and privatization more acceptable to military elites. They granted the 
military some control over the privatization process itself, which established the 
government’s credibility and inspired more trust in the process, while creating a theater 
for the exercise of the bureaucracy’s authority in the context of the relationship. 
Consequently, the civilian authorities finally obtained the cooperation of the military.75 
Second, SPD’s extended engagement of enterprise management and staff outside of the 
committees wore down the opposition of these vested interests and facilitated the 
acquisition of the necessary information. SPD had the time and the mandate to establish 
its authority. After various meetings with SPD, the military and civilian management of 
enterprises gradually accepted that legitimate power resided with the civilian 
authorities.76 
And third, many workers who had seen their wages stagnate decided that the cost 
of not participating in the job reduction program exceeded the benefit. We saw in the last 
chapter that while unemployment had not been an issue in Argentina for decades, 
stagnant and declining real incomes had been. Wages in military enterprises had been 
frozen or falling due to the subsidy tourniquet in which the Radical government (1983–
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1989) dressed the firms. The job reduction program, by contrast, was coming in above 
the going wage grades with generous severance payments. The average length of the 
payment was to be equivalent to a two year’s salary and the average amount per worker 
was to reach beyond $20,000, even peaking at more than $39,000 per worker at 
Petroquímica Bahía Blanca.77 As a result, the compensations looked mighty fine to many 
workers in military enterprises, such that the employment level for military enterprises 
had been reduced by 35 percent within six months of the plan going into force in 
September 1991 (see Table 4.3.4 for progress as of September 1992). Not only that, but 
because the program was largely voluntary, it succeeded in de-escalating the labor 
conflict while simultaneously reducing excess personnel.78 Finally, by thinning the herd, 
the program carried the added benefit of weakening many powerful defense-sector unions 
which were expected to rear their heads again when MoD began trying to privatize 
military firms.79 
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Table 4.3.4. Job Reduction Plan for the Ministry of Defense Privatization Program 
 
 
Military 
Enterprise (ME) 
 
No. 
Workers 
Sept. ‘91 
 
 
Planned 
Reduction 
 
Reduction 
Achieved 
Sept. 1992 
 
 
Est. 
Cost 
 
 
Avg. Cost 
(US $000) 
 
Banco de 
la Nación 
(US $000) 
A. World Bank-
Supported MEs 
      
 - SOMISA 13,970 8,467 8,467 169,221 21,153 141,914 
 - Altos Hornos 
Zapla 
3,071 2,189 1,484 24,470 11,179 22,695 
 - HIPASAM 1,370 1,370 1,369 12,397 11,600 12,396 
 - PGM 1,094 328 181 10,182 31,043  
 - PBB 383 0 14 0 39,763  
 - Carboquímica 75 0 0 0 14,520  
 - FM Acido 
Sulfúrico 
70 32 19 366 11,441  
 - FM Río 
Tercero 
1,168 823 247 10,561 12,832  
 - FM de 
Tolueno  
135 62 30 670 10,809  
 - FMA 2,950 1,500 157 9,779 6,519  
 - AFNE 2,246 1,000 140 12,279 12,279 2,400 
 - FM ECA 1,006 373 160 4,032 10,809  
 - FM San 
Francisco 
245 147 58 1,715 11,670  
 - FM San 
Martín 
498 428 272 4,577 10,695  
 - Forja 419 419 189 4,494 8,740 2,500 
 - FM Dom. 
Matheu 
563 178 113 2,289 12,858  
 - TAMSE 259 259 138 2,595 10,019  
        
B. Other MEs Not 
Bank-Supported 
      
 - Domecq 
García 
504 504 65 3,315 6,578  
 - FM Azul 307 192 141 2,390 12,449  
 - FM Beltrán 850 526 247 5,319 10,113  
 - FM Pilar 118 51 21 903 17,713  
 - FM Villa 
María 
562 363 100 3,508 9,665  
 - TEA 5 5 2 52 10,329  
 - SISTEVAL 83 83 0 1,094 13,183  
 - DGFM Staff 376 286 90 n.a. n.a.  
Total 32,327 19,585 13,704 286,208 15,154 181,905 
Source: World Bank, 1992, annex VII. 
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And once the civilian bureaucracy had planned the privatization drive and was 
ready to try to execute it, Menem adapted the bureaucracy’s organization to more 
effectively meet the required purpose. By October 1991, Defense Minister Erman 
Gonzalez and Undersecretary of Planning Jorge Pereyra de Olazabal had produced a 
timetable for privatizing military enterprises which envisioned selling 30 enterprises in 
1992 in anticipation that the military enterprise reform legislation could be approved in 
November 1991. Moreover, negotiations with military representatives of the firms were 
ongoing, and the job reduction plan was underway.80 Yet Menem wanted to see the 
process carried out more quickly, and was unhappy with the pace of defense restructuring 
thus far, so he chose to consolidate the roles and functions of the production, planning 
and budgeting, and military affairs secretariats under just two: the Secretariat of Military 
Affairs and Secretariat of Planning. The latter’s Undersecretary of Restructuring and 
Asset Management, who reported to the Secretary of Planning, was to concentrate on the 
execution of the military enterprise reform program. “The reform should begin today,” 
Military Affairs Secretary Juan Ferreira Pinho said in an October 1, 1991 interview. It is 
“a new phase, with more implementation than planning.”81 
Now, in December 1991, MoD began trying to move its program forward in 
individual military firms. Yet no sooner had it embarked on its quest than it encountered 
whole classes of vested interests opposed to privatization going forward in their 
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companies. The military, unions, and the military’s private sector partners and suppliers 
arrayed themselves against change in varying combinations between the dozens of 
military enterprises affected by the initiative. The precise locus of opposition varied from 
firm to firm (see Table 4.3.5). In some, the military led the opposition and proposed 
alternatives to the planned reform; in others, the military’s private sector partners and 
suppliers took the lead and threatened or prolonged court action; and in others, unions led 
the way, sometimes galvanizing military support for their cause. Wherever they aligned 
as partners in a defensive coalition, the military, labor, and private sector marshalled and 
were supported by nationalist and industrialist ideology. In all cases, opposition 
threatened to stop the implementation of the policy of privatization. These organized 
interests could alter the costs and benefits of reform for policymakers, private investors, 
or both, limiting the universe of potentialities to one in which only the continuation of the 
old military-centered economic order was politically possible. 
 
Table 4.3.5. Locus of Opposition to Proposed Enterprise Reforms 
Military Labor  Private Sector 
ECA 
FM de Tolueno 
Sintético FM de Acido 
Sulfúrico 
FM General San 
Martín FM Pilar 
FM San Francisco 
FM Río Tercero 
FM Domingo Matheu 
FM Azul 
FM Fray Luis Betrán  
FM Villa María  
FMA 
Tandanor 
SOMISA 
HIPASAM 
Altos Hornos 
Zapla 
Forja 
PGM 
AFNE 
 
 
PBB 
Carboquímica 
Argentina 
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The competitive power struggle was, therefore, far from over. Neither civilian nor 
military could escape the glaring reality that shaping the fate of the reform effort in a 
given company would require shaping the interests of the actor then leading the 
opposition to reform moving forward in that particular company. The military was savvy 
enough to realize this, and, to its advantage, was entrenched at multiple levels of the 
enterprise despite having lost control of most presidencies and directorates under the 
Radical government (1983–1989). But Menem and the civilian defense team recognized 
it too, as evidenced by Menem’s efforts to goad dissident unions into defecting and 
joining his coalition from the very beginning.82 More critically, the civilian bureaucracy 
possessed a number of its own distinct enterprise coalition-building advantages. Precisely 
because of its authority, information, and expertise combined with its control over the 
design and implementation of the enterprise reform policies themselves, it was in a 
position to shape the interests of social actors and create pro-reform constituencies out of 
groups traditionally invested in the old military-centered system by crafting reform 
policies that granted these actors rents or protections in the new civilian setting or that 
intentionally narrowed the scope of reform in sectors where it would hurt traditionally 
powerful actors. 
The civilian bureaucracy’s specific competitive advantages vis-à-vis the military 
were two-fold. First, its ability to amend earlier proposals by crafting partial reforms 
promised to help gain political acceptability by providing an option of early reversal that 
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lowered the cost of experimenting with reform. And second, the bureaucracy’s ability to 
administer compensations targeted to the military, union, and private sector structures 
promised to help lower the cost of experimenting with reform for these actors. Drawing 
on the ideas of Sebastián Etchemendy, we can say that the defense industry bureaucracy 
had two types of compensatory measures at its disposal: Subsidies would serve to help 
workers face greater competition through financial support and state-backed programs of 
technological innovation or labor training. These included direct monetary infusions, 
reemployment programs, or unemployment assistance in the context of downsizing. 
Market-share compensation, on the other hand, would serve to protect the economic roles 
and benefits of established actors in the new civilian setting. Such compensations 
included award of the proceeds from privatization to the military, direct award of 
ownership to workers or unions through privatization, and preferential bidding 
procedures for private sector partner and suppliers.83 
The military possessed nothing even close to these capacities. Many middle-
ranking military officers remained in control of factories and plants, as we have 
established, but civilians sat on the boards of directors, those boards and the civilian MoD 
controlled the budgets and decision making of the military enterprises, and MoD civilians 
were intervening in the management of enterprises, thus making it unlikely that dissident 
managers would remain in putative control very long anyway. All of this added up to an 
appreciable advantage for Menem and disadvantage for the military. By upholding and 
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consolidating the balance of institutional power brought about in 1983, Menem’s 
institution building and refining made it more likely that he would prevail in an 
administrative battle to shape the outcome of the effort to implement the military 
enterprise privatization program. The stage was set for Menem’s political strength to 
exhibit itself again, only this time within the administrative state and conference rooms 
and shop floors of military enterprises. 
The moment of reckoning that came not long after tested the power of the 
civilians and weakness of the military. The compensations that the civilian authorities 
employed varied with both the locus of opposition within the enterprise (see Table 4.3.5) 
and from enterprise to enterprise within those groupings. In the case of military 
enterprises in which labor led the opposition, MoD used virtually everything at its 
disposal—from subsidies, to partial reforms, to market-share compensation—to form 
coalitions with workers’ unions that would permit enterprises to be sold. Market-share 
compensation became important in the case of Tandanor. MoD’s ordering of the sale in 
late 1991 of the Navy’s 100 percent stake in this shipyard triggered a wave of labor 
backlash. The Sindicato de Trabajadores de Talleres y Astilleros Navales (Union of 
Workers of Workshops and Naval Shipyards—SITTAN), as promised, mobilized 
Tandanor workers and their families in demonstrations outside the seat of the national 
government. An enterprise-level union representing Tananor’s approximately 700 
workers whose main goal was to preserve its members’ source of employment, SITTAN 
was a force to be reckoned with, and not just because Tandanor had fallen through the 
cracks and been excluded from the job reduction plan. Indeed, while its leaders formed 
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alliances with other unions opposing the privatization of public enterprises and also 
supported by nationalist and industrialist ideology, so, too, did the union fix its gaze upon 
the Navy, “whose interests… [also] played in favor of resisting privatization.”84 The 
armed and the employed, arms linked, set about bidding to stop the sale of the shipyard 
and the sinking of their mutual interests. 
But SITTAN was not just a willing military ally. It was also a Peronist union with 
close links to the ruling party, which provided the Menem government with significant 
influence over the union. Consequently, Menem could pressure the union leaders to 
support privatization in exchange for Menem’s promises to keep the shipyard open and 
improve pay and working conditions. Thus, the union agreed, at least initially, to support 
reform and adjust to the new conditions. But when opposition persisted and threatened 
the viability of this particular reform, MoD had to resort to compensations, emphasizing 
its sponsorship of an employee share ownership program for Tandanor workers. Though 
the government had reserved 10 percent of the shares for workers, with discounts ranging 
from 5 to 10 percent, negotiating to obtain greater shares—a SITTAN strong suit—was 
possible. And so, with an eye to ownership, SITTAN agreed to support privatization at 
last, and, on January 1, 1992, Investing North Dock (INDARSA) acquired Tandanor; 
workers would own 10 percent of the shares per the stock ownership plan underwritten 
by the State Reform Law.85 
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On the other hand, subsidies targeted to the union structure became crucial in the 
cases of steel firms HIPASAM, Altos Hornos Zapla, SOMISA, and Forja Argentina. 
Restructuring and the attendant political challenges were the most substantial in the steel 
sector, which was the most complex sector of the military industry in terms of labor 
unions, vested private sector interests, and policy distortions.86 When it was decided that 
Army-owned mining firm HIPASAM would be closed rather than privatized as first 
planned, the firm’s cessation became an explosive issue for the firm’s 1,328 workers, 
with 200 of them camping out in the Plaza de Mayo in protest. Established in the frontier 
province of Río Negro to meet the military’s needs for the supply of specialized steel 
products and long subject to non-commercially oriented senior military management, the 
firm did not arouse private interest. So, while MoD prepared its assets for transfer to the 
Province of Río Negro, it simultaneously supported voluntary retirement as well as 
programs to retrain and redeploy workers.87 And it got creative, as the projects it 
sponsored for training personnel—for the fishing industry, for instance—exploited the 
unique geographic characteristics of the region.88 
The announcement of the privatization of the Army-owned Altos Hornos Zapla 
and the decision to lay off 500 workers outraged the more than 3,000 workers of a firm 
which generated 10 percent of the GDP in Province of Jujuy. Many workers set up camps 
in downtown plazas and hunkered down for 12 days of demonstrations, marches, burning 
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tires in the streets, and setting up road blocks and soup kitchens. Meanwhile, 10 union 
leaders peacefully occupied the provincial government palace. Before long, the Front of 
State Employee Unions, which encompassed the unions then protesting, had galvanized 
the support of Jujuy congressional representative Deputy Fernando Paz, who demanded 
that the bidding specifications for the future sale of Altos Hornos Zapla “guarantee job 
security for the personnel at the plant.” In turn, the government caved and promised to 
pay wage differentials it owed provincial workers and to deliver receipts to some of those 
workers. That appeased protesters, as did MoD’s institution of a voluntary retirement 
program for displaced workers.89 With the union machine mollified and weakened, the 
coast was clear, and Altos Hornos Zapla was a catch. In April 1992, MoD sold the firm to 
a consortium of private bidders. 
Of all the privatizations in the Argentine experience akin to what Etchemendy 
calls “protectionist liberalization,” none stands out more than that of SOMISA.90 In 
September 1991, when MoD announced that this 99.9 percent Army-owned steel giant 
would pass to private hands by June 30, 1992, the firm’s nearly 14,000 workers 
responded with marches, mass demonstrations, and hunger strikes. A month later, 40 
Unión Obrera Metalúrgica (Metalworking Workers’ Union—UOM) delegates entered 
the Maria Liliana blast furnace (the second of the company’s two furnaces), defying some 
300 heavily-armed guards, in order to maintain the normal temperature of the furnace in 
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defiance of the government’s plans to shut it down as part of the restructuring process.91 
Labor relations became more complex as the privatization process proceeded, with 
unions picketing the SOMISA headquarters daily to try to ensure that no jobs would be 
lost due to privatization. The strategy was clearly unrealistic, as the job reduction plan 
underway envisioned dismissing more than 8,000 of the approximately 14,000 workers 
employed before privatization—a whopping 57 percent of the labor force (see Table 
4.3.4). Nevertheless, labor’s strategy “created a volatile political issue for the government 
which tested the resolve of the Menem Administration to pursue privatization as an 
objective in this case,” as Reynold W. Mooney and Scott Griffith, private consultants 
involved in the sales process, observed.92 As labor issues grew, privatization was delayed. 
Undeterred, the civilian defense team responded in kind and adopted an 
increasingly complex approach. To persuade UOM to defect from the dissident anti-
reform coalition, the government forgave $25 million in debts owed by the union’s health 
plan. Not long after, in early 1992, the CGT itself reunited and made its official policy 
one of support for the privatization process.93 Meanwhile, in order to exert managerial 
control over the firm, MoD had designated interventores. These were appointed trustees 
who had full executive powers to operate the company until the privatization was 
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complete. They helped to expedite the process during periods of labor militancy as well 
as became coalition builders in their own right. Thus, in October 1991, as the plan to 
privatize SOMISA crystallized and the labor conflict climaxed, Menem ally, unionist, 
and former Labor Minister Jorge Triaca was appointed trustee. The move clearly signaled 
the administration’s desire to reach an agreement with labor that would permit the 
privatization process to go forward. 94 Eventually, that agreement came in the form of an 
offer from company authorities which included a rotation of 2,000 jobs between 
suspended and non-suspended workers, full indemnity and subsidy payments, and an 
extension of the deadline for the voluntary, stipend-supported retirement program.95  
And when the labor conflict had been resolved, Menem tapped a close 
conservative ally and coalition partner to take control of the massive company in the final 
stretch. In February 1992, Menem appointed conservative Menemist from the early days 
and former UCD Deputy Maria Julia Alsogaray. The “Steel Lady” had at her disposal 
155 million pesos to be distributed for voluntary retirement.96 The stage was set to hand 
SOMISA over at last. Thus, when the firm was sold to Propulsora Siderúrgica and 
SIDERCA of the Techint group in October 1992, no one was surprised. The only irony 
was that Propulsora Siderúrgica was the military’s historical rival.97 The ending of a 
saga that had always been satirized was, therefore, comical indeed. 
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Table 4.3.6. Enterprises, Reforms Under Argentine Ministry of Defense, March 
1992 
1. Total number of military enterprises (MEs)………………………...…...45 
                                                                   
2. Industrial-Oriented MEs………………………………...……………… 24 
 
MEs sold – Law 23,696 (Law of State Reform)…………………………. 7 
- Polisur 
- Induclor 
- Petropol 
- Monómeros Vinílicos  
- Tandanor 
- Petroquímica Río Tercero  
- Altos Hornos Zapla 
 
MEs closed by March 1992……………………………………...………..2 
- Meteor (Decree to be issued) 
- HIPASAM (Decree no. 160) 
 
MEs to be privatized – Law 23,696………………………………...……..2 
- Carboquímica Argentina  
- Forja Argentina 
 
MEs to be privatized – Law 24,045 (ME privatization law)………….....13 
- SOMISA 
- Petroquímica Bahía Blanca  
- Petroquímica General Mosconi  
- Material Area Córdoba Fábrica Militar de Aviones 
- AFNE 
- TAMSE 
- FM de Armas Portátiles “Domingo Matheu” 
- FM de Vainas y Conductores Eléctricos 
- FM San Francisco 
- FM General San Martín  
- FM de Acido Sulfúrico  
- FM de Tolueno Sintético 
- FM Río Tercero 
 
3. Other and Defense-Oriented MEs……………………………...………..21 
 
MEs under liquidation as of April 1991……………………...…………...7 
- Industrias Mecánicas del Estado  
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- EDESA 
- FAMA 
- Aceros Ohler 
- Consultora 
- SIDINSA 
- Altos Hornos Zapla Construcciones 
 
             Defense-Related MEs………………………………………..………….10 
- FM Pilar 
- FM de Pólvoras y Explosivos ‘Azul’ 
- FM Fray Luis Betrán  
- FM de Pólvoras y Explosivos Villa María  
- SATECNA 
- Domecq Garcia 
- SISTEVAL 
- COVIARA 
- Tecnologia Aerospacial 
- COMIRSA 
 
             MEs transferred from Air Force – Decree 161/92…………………..…...4 
- Interbaires 
- Intercargo 
- Edcadassa 
- Integradora Aerospacial 
 
Source: World Bank, 1992, Annex V. 
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Steel firm Forja Argentina, maker of railroad material, was unable to operate 
normally and accumulated losses that led it to a state of virtual cessation of payments. 
The firm aroused no interest in competitive bidding begun on July 23, 1990. Yet because 
of its labor issues, determining the company’s future was also an equally difficult 
process. Early on, MoD initiated a reduction of fixed capital and personnel in line with 
the eventual total liquidation of productive and human assets, but restructuring did not 
proceed before reaching a tacit agreement with the firm’s 419 workers whereby MoD 
would indemnify them all at an average severance salary of around $8,740 dollars per 
year. After obtaining the workers’ assent, MoD closed up shop and sold the company’s 
assets.98 
Finally, crafting partial reforms became crucial when the civilians came up 
against especially strong unions in the cases of AFNE and Petroquímica General 
Mosconi. The late-1991 announcement that the Navy-owned shipyard AFNE was on the 
chopping block was coldly received by the workers’ union and the Navy alike. 
Asociación Trabajadores del Estado (Workers’ Association of the State—ATE), the 
CGT-belonging union representing AFNE’s nearly 2,500 employees, decided early on 
that it would find a way to keep the firm in state hands. The Navy’s goal was to preserve 
AFNE’s role as the pulse of the local naval industry. Both opposed privatization, 
vigorously. In fact, ATE so despised Menem’s reform agenda that when the CGT 
reunited and declared its official support for the privatization policy in 1992, ATE broke 
ranks and joined Central de Trabajadores Argentinos (Argentine Workers' Central 
                                                        
98 MoD Resolution No. 381, cited in World Bank, 1996. 
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Union—CTA), a new central union created as a bulwark of union opposition to economic 
liberalization. And since the Navy and the union shared the nationalist ideology which 
inspired the firm’s creation, the Navy management let the workers have more power over 
the firm.99  
All of this strengthened the workers’ opposition and resolve, to great effect. Due 
to the workers’ sustained and enlarged opposition, the MoD made a tacit deal whereby in 
exchange for labor disarming the MoD would refrain from privatizing AFNE and transfer 
the firm, instead, to Province of Buenos Aires. Thus, it can be said that ATE managed to 
impose its will. It should be noted, however, that while the cancelation of privatization 
and subsequent transfer to a provincial owner was a clear labor triumph, the outcome 
nevertheless affected the military very differently. Indeed, it was yet another military 
loss. As Juliana Frassa observed, “although the navy sought to protect its own interests 
and resources which were threatened by the national government’s privatization policies, 
in the end, it lost its involvement in the company after the province took over.”100 
The union of the approximately 1,095 workers on the rolls at Petroquímica 
General Mosconi was also particularly strong. Sindicato Unidos Petroleros del Estado 
(United Petroleum Union of the State—SUPE) mobilized in opposition when MoD set 
July 15, 1992 as the deadline for privatizing the 50 percent Army-owned firm and 
                                                        
99 Juliana Frassa, “Production and Labour of a State-Owned Enterprise: A Case Study of an Argentinean 
Shipyard, Astillero Río Santiago,” in Raquel Varela, Hugh Murphy, Marcel van der Linden, eds., 
Shipbuilding and Ship Repair Workers Around the World: Case Studies, 1950–2010 (Amsterdam: 
Amsterdam University Press, 2017), 457–76, 473. 
 
100 Ibid. 
 
  297 
Argentina’s largest public-sector petrochemical concern. The unrest affected bidding 
when suitors Diamond Shamrock, Shell, and Perez Companc refused to make offers on 
consecutive occasions.101 In early 1993, MoD said that PGM would be put up for sale 
again by March, but the defense team was again delayed by union wrangling.102 Finally, 
MoD struck a deal whereby in exchange for the union’s consent the firm would be 
absorbed by the formerly fully state-owned petroleum firm, Yacimientos Petrolíferos 
Fiscales (Fiscal Oil fields—YPF). This outcome allayed SUPE’s worst fears. YPF had 
been only partially privatized in 1993; the state sold more than 50 percent of its stock, but 
it retained 20.3 percent of it. Management control was, therefore, not transferred to 
private owners. Moreover, via possession of a golden share, the state held veto power 
over decisions regarding merging with other corporations, accepting a takeover with 
more than 51 percent of the stock, transferring production rights to third parties, and 
triggering the voluntary dissolution of YPF as an anonymous society.103 
All the while, a host of military enterprises were also closed or placed in 
liquidation, their personnel and equipment turned over to other enterprises or 
governmental agencies. As of April 1991, the firms to be liquidated included Industrias 
Mecánicas del Estado; mining firm EDESA; steel firm Aceros Ohler; Consultora; 
SIDINSA; and Altos Hornos Zapla Construcciones. Meteor was to be closed due to non-
viability, but not before MoD arranged for the government to undertake an environmental 
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audit and cleanup of Meteor due to previous major pollution problems. All of these firms 
were relatively small operations and employed fewer workers than the larger firms in the 
sector that we have made the focus of our analysis. Consequently, MoD could persuade 
the unions representing workers in these firms to accept liquidation and compensation or 
transfer to other parts of the public sector on the grounds that it did not impose significant 
costs on the unions. 
In cases in which the private sector led the opposition, market-share compensation 
became the going currency for coalition builders. The military’s private-sector partners in 
42 percent Army-owned petrochemical firm Carboquímica Argentina put up a fight. 
Though the firm’s 70 workers were not an obstacle when it went up for sale on July 3, 
1992, its major private shareholder, Ragor, was inconsolable. Ragor was accustomed to 
tax and tariff advantages and the intimate link with the firm’s major customer—the 
state—and had a road-tested strategy of threatening court action on the grounds that 
privatization terminated the advantages that drew its capital in the first place.104 Yet it 
was a new day. Confident in the legality of their reform program after obtaining 
legislative approval, the civilians proceeded with the planning of bidding nevertheless 
and informed Ragor that it could exercise its right of pre-emption, that is, acquire the 
shares of the firm put up for sale by MoD. Certain MoD would proceed and faced with a 
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choice between gaining or losing influence over the company, Ragor took the opportunity 
and, in September 1993, the firm passed to the affiliated Safety S.A. – Procamet S.A.105 
But MoD could not get by private actors in all firms in which such actors led the 
opposition, and, in rare cases, success would only become possible once MoD transferred 
the power to privatize to another government agency better prepared to carry out the 
specific reform. Suggestively, however, the lone case in which this occurred was also one 
in which compensations did not play an important role in MoD’s strategy. The 
downstream private producers who owned the rest of 51-percent Army-owned ethylene 
manufacturer Petroquímica Bahía Blanca (PBB) dug in their heels in the arbitration 
process in which they were mired when MoD issued the sales memorandum for PBB in 
November 1992 without resolution of the arbitration issues. PBB dominated the 
Argentine ethylene market, as it was the largest of the fourteen chemical and 
petrochemical related military enterprises under the control of the defense ministry in 
terms of size, assets, and industrial structure. Thus, MoD had a clear incentive to 
privatize the firm while it had momentum. So, in lieu of the dispute’s resolution, MoD 
sought to ensure all interested parties that any adverse decision would be absorbed by the 
government, not by the new owners. The sale was said to be done by the second quarter 
of 1993, particularly if the arbitration process was agreed upon by early 1993, although 
the civilian defense team was committed to selling the firm regardless of the status of the 
arbitration process. But for all the pageantry, 1993 came and went without the sale. 
Unsuccessful settlement of the government and downstream owners’ differences—
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involving mutual claims of more than $800 million and allegations of unpaid bills and 
credits—set back the initial reform effort in 1992.106 
After the miscarriage, the civilian defense team did some soul-searching. It 
realized that despite all of its previous successes, it was unprepared for a sustained legal 
battle with the private producers in this case. The same contract battle had scuttled 
Alfonsín’s repeated efforts to sell PBB between 1986–1989, and the well-heeled waging 
it showed no signs of yielding. Prepared to swallow its pride and cut its losses, the 
civilian defense team pondered alternatives that would let it disregard the conflict and 
move on to other military enterprises while still ensuring the firm’s eventual reform. 
Plumbing institutional, organizational, and social links, it chose to freely transfer the 
power to privatize PBB to MoE, who graciously accepted. After that, the tide turned. 
MoE resolved the legal issues and retained a merchant banker to conduct the sale. 
Though it would take until 1995 to find the right suitor, PBB was eventually sold, ending 
a long and complicated battle over it.107 
Where the military led the opposition, partial reforms and to a lesser extent 
market-share compensation became fodder for coalition building. In the case of Área 
Material Córdoba Fabrica Militar de Aviones (FMA), backing down from fuller reform 
became vital to MoD’s satisfying the firm’s Air Force owner after the civilians initially 
sought to sell it lock, stock, and barrel. Like it did so many other military enterprises, 
Law 24,045 declared the enterprise subject to privatization. The plot thickened when 
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Planning Secretary Jorge Pereyra de Olazabal told a group of industrialists at the 
Argentine Industrial Union headquarters that FMA would be privatized as early as May 
1992. The plan foresaw the company’s total privatization and eliminated the possibility 
that the Air Force would keep control of the maintenance of airplanes produced by the 
firm.108 Since FMA was an Air Force property rather than a military enterprise, Defense 
Minister Erman Gonzalez would, first, present a decree transforming it into a corporation 
to President Menem for the latter’s signature, then MoD would sell all the shares. The 
MoD preferred transforming FMA into a corporation as soon as possible because the 
legal change would permit MoD to control the company and decide on when and how it 
would be privatized. Indeed, without the proposed administrative and corporate changes, 
those tasks “were reserved for brigadiers alone,” which did not inspire confidence in the 
civilians.109 
And the civilians were right to doubt the Air Force’s sense of duty to reform. 
Such commitment did not, in fact, exist. The airborne had already made it known that 
they wanted the state to keep a percentage of the shares, which would serve to prevent the 
transfer of management along with that of ownership.110 And in angling for this outcome, 
the Air Force derived an advantage from the fact that it had demonstrated managerial 
rareness by performing relatively well as the manager of the company. Indeed, the Air 
Force was the only branch whose firms had consistently turned profits and had not been 
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reduced to reliance on the Roman grain doll. And FMA—the maker and maintainer of the 
iconic Pampa airplanes—was an inescapable reminder of the Air Force’s successful 
organization of joint ventures with private international partners, which were areas where 
the Army and Navy had also failed or never taken flight. FMA was, in fact, a joint 
venture firm in which the Air Force worked closely with such firms as Germany’s 
Dornier and Brazil’s Embraer.111 
These factors worked in the Air Force’s favor even as the civilians proceeded to 
reform the company. On December 13, 1993, MoD subordinated FMA and its assets, 
liabilities, and contracts to the ministry’s planning secretariat and then transferred the 
company’s personnel to MoD until privatization was complete.112 But when negotiations 
began with a suitor, Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, in 1994, they did not end in the 
sweeping privatization or reorganization envisioned by the civilians, but with the 
concession of the maintenance of Air Force aircraft to Lockheed for a period of five 
years.113 Rather than permanently separate the Air Force and the company, this outcome 
promised to generate large future returns for the state or Air Force by enhancing the 
firm’s performance before its return to state control, which eventually came in 2010.114 
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At first, a civilian victory could not be won in the mine-to-ammunition industries 
of Fabricaciones Militares without narrowing the scope of the reform in response to the 
resistance of a particularly strong military actor. Civilians awoke the plants from their 
slumber when Defense Minister Erman Gonzalez appointed Jorge Pereyra Olazabal as 
planning secretary and Pereyra promptly named himself interventore in DGFM and its 
satellites. In 1991, the holding company lost $200 million, which had to be provided the 
treasury, and Gonzalez wanted to end their deficits, so Pereyra, staring into “the black 
hole of military industries through which millions of dollars were flowing,” used his 
power as trustee to stoke interest in the factories among private investors. Meanwhile, in 
addition to separating the management of military production from the management of 
production for civilian use, Pereyra announced that the future of civilian production was 
privatization or liquidation and that military production which “does not find a private 
partner… will have to face a new process of rational production.”115 
And investors came knocking. After discovering interest existed in FM de 
Tolueno Sintético, FM de Acido Sulfúrico, and FM de Vainas y Conductores Eléctricos 
(ECA)—the respective factories for synthetic toluene, sulfuric acid, and sheaths and 
electrical conductors—Pereyra contacted a lawyer to draft the bidding conditions, and, by 
February 1992, sales were said to be imminent. The labor issue was less pronounced in 
these enterprises. The Asociacion de Profesionales Universitarios de Fabricaciones 
Militares (Association of Professional University Workers of Military Factories—
APUFAMI) represented many of the 12,000 workers of the FM factories (which 
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accounted for 3.5 percent of all staff of public enterprise), but the herd was smaller in 
these three enterprises and fewer reductions were planned. Six months earlier, in 
September 1991, MoD intended to dismiss 62 of the 135 workers at FM de Tolueno 
Sintético; 32 of the 70 workers at FM de Acido Sulfúrico; and 373 of the 1,006 total 
workers at ECA. The interest of investors and docility of the workers notwithstanding, 
however, the military managers of FM factories stood opposed. 
The armed overseers linked rationalization with disappearance, seeing the two as 
“different stages in the same direction.” And as they voiced skepticism, so, too, did 
military allies sitting on MoD-created privatization committees. Gradually, “the military 
men working for Erman Gonzalez and the armed forces branches” found a new 
opposition strategy, consisting of seeking to protect the military’s core interests by 
promoting an alternative to sweeping privatization. Meant to keep the core of the military 
industry intact, the pill the soldier-planners pushed was to concentrate the production of 
the then eight military factories into just three: FM Fray Luis Betrán, FM Río Tercero, 
and FM de Pólvoras y Explosivos Villa María. The rationale was vintage military: Only 
those firms producing the war material actually used by the military (that is, these three 
firms) would remain in the military’s hands, while the balance would be closed or 
transferred to the private sector. Thus, the production of the so-called Migueletes—FM 
San Martín and FM Domingo Matheu—would be concentrated in Fray Luis Betrán; Río 
Tercero would take over the production of FM San Francisco; and the activities of the 
FM Azul and FM Pilar would be incorporated into Villa María.116 
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The military factories were probably the closest thing Argentina had to hallowed 
ground. The military engineers and scientists who ran them were a distinguished and 
baronial class. They were also a powerful one. Despite the financial woes of many of the 
factories, the officers in charge enjoyed a kind of claim to managerial rareness on account 
of the fit between their training and the very specific nature of production in the factories. 
The officers—schooled in the military’s own institution for military engineers and 
scientists, the Army’s Escuela Superior Técnica (Higher Technical School)—were well 
entrenched in the day-to-day operations of the factories, and this was especially the case 
in factories engaged principally in military production. And the limited expertise of 
civilians and entities in this area and the military’s monopoly on the information inside 
the firms reinforced the military advantage and the civilian shortfall, as did the vertically-
integrated industrial structure of Fabricaciones Militares itself, which increased the 
overall complexity and tacit knowledge required to run the place. As a result of all this, 
the military’s arguments that national security needs necessitated military control seemed 
to ring true in these firms. In exchange for permission to reform or shut down the 
remaining enterprises, the civilians agreed to preserve the core of the military industry. 
In turn, FM Fray Luis Betrán, FM Río Tercero, and FM Villa María were spared 
from the salvos of the advancing civilians. For years, military engineers and scientists of 
baronial habit ruled the holy trinity. In return, few soldiers objected when MoD issued 
calls for local and international competitive bidding for FM de Tolueno Sintético, FM de 
Acido Sulfúrico, and FM de Vainas y Conductores Eléctricos (ECA) in August and 
October 1992, or when MoD awarded bids to the lucky winners in March and February 
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1993. Nor did they disapprove when the lean and mean FM General San Martín and FM 
Pilar went up for sale and quickly found willing unmarried in 1993 and 1994. Neither the 
dissolution nor equipment transfer of FM Domingo Matheu inspired protest. Finally, FM 
San Francisco was being spruced up for sale without complaints. And when the tide of 
reforms abated, the civilians did not encroach upon the trinity, but rather anointed each 
new generation of a priestly military class. It appeared as though the military would 
remain ascendant in a shrunken but everlasting military industry. 
Yet no sooner had the beleaguered sighed in relief than its fortunes began to 
change again. In early 1996, then CEO of Ecuadorean defense company Prodefensa 
Roberto Sassen van Elsloo revealed that, in February 1995, Fabricaciones Militares sold 
weapons with the intention of illegally diverting them to Ecuador, which was then mired 
in a border war with Peru over an unmarked stretch of dense Amazonian highland jungle. 
Sassen negotiated the shipment of arms with the auditor of FM, Luis Sarlenga, and the 
company’s business coordinator, Colonel Edgberto Gonzalez De la Vega, was directly 
involved and knew where the arms were headed, Sassen said in an interview. Ironically, 
Argentina was one of four nations mediating the dispute between Ecuador and Peru when 
the allegations surfaced. In addition to embarrassing Argentina, the disclosure shattered 
the military’s remaining legitimacy and put it on the defensive, and Sassen’s complaints 
about the inferior quality of the arms in question only added to the humiliation.117 
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Table 4.3.7. Enterprises, Reforms Under Argentine Ministry of Defense, 
July 1994 
1. MEs sold – Law 23,696 (Law of State Reform Law)………..……..8 
- Polisur 
- Induclor 
- Petropol 
- Petroquímica Río Tercero 
- Monómeros Vinílicos 
- Tandanor 
- Altos Hornos Zapla 
- Carboquímica Argentina 
 
MEs closed, dissolved, or liquidated…………………..…………..13 
- Meteor 
- HIPASAM 
- Forja Argentina 
- Industrias Mecánicas del Estado 
- FAMA 
- EDESA 
- Aceros Ohler 
- Consultora 
- SIDINSA 
- Altos Hornos Zapla Construcciones 
- FM de Armas Portátiles “Domingo Matheu” 
- Technología Aerospacial 
- Integradora Aerospacial 
 
MEs sold – Law 24,045 (ME privatization law)…………..………. 8 
- SOMISA 
- Petroquímica Bahía Blanca 
- Área Material Córdoba Fabrica Militar de Aviones 
(concession) 
- FM de Vainas y Conductores Eléctricos 
- FM de Acido Sulfúrico 
- FM de Tolueno Sintético 
- FM General San Martín  
- FM Pilar 
 
MEs transferred to public sector………………..…………………...3 
- AFNE 
- Petroquímica General Mosconi 
- COMIRSA 
 
2. Defense-Related MEs………………..…………………………….13 
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- FM Río Tercero 
- FM Fray Luis Betrán 
- FM de Pólvoras y Explosivos Villa María 
- FM de Pólvoras y Explosivos ‘Azul’ 
- FM San Francisco 
- TAMSE 
- SATECNA 
- Domecq Garcia 
- SISTEVAL 
- COVIARA 
- Interbaires 
- Intercargo 
- Edcadassa 
Source: World Bank, 1992. 
 
 
Menem would not let this one get away. Seizing the moment, he decreed the 
transfer of FM from the orbit of MoD to that of MoE while ordering the preparation of 
legislation declaring the remaining FM firms subject to privatization (see Table 4.3.8).118 
In November 1997, the Senate and Chamber of Deputies approved legislation amending 
the Law of State Reform to declare “subject to privatization” the offenders: FM Río 
Tercero, FM Fray Luis Betrán, FM de Pólvoras y Explosivos Villa María, and FM 
Azul.119 Argentine authorities arrested Sarlenga and a wide-eyed uniformed Gonzalez de 
la Vega testified in the case before military heads finally stopped rolling, and Menem 
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swore more would if any inquiry revealed further official involvement in the scandal.120 
The debacle underscored the precariousness of residual military firms in a post-reform 
era. In the context of the Argentine case, it showed that the military’s lingering clout 
within DGFM between 1989–95 was always fragile and contingent. 
 
 
Table 4.3.8. Military Enterprises Transferred to Ministry of Economy, 1996 
Military Enterprise Status in 1996 
FM Río Tercero Chemical plant in production, mechanical plant 
in limited production 
FM San Francisco Privatized 
FM de Pólvoras y Explosivos ‘Azul’ Limited production activity 
FM de Armas Portátiles “Domingo 
Matheu” 
Dissolved and in process of being sold; 
equipment transferred to Fray Luis Beltrán 
FM Villa María Limited production 
FM Fray Luis Beltrán Limited production 
Source: Republic of Argentina, Chapter XVIII. 
 
 
By 1997, the military industrializer had been crushed under the wheel. Within 
eight years, no fewer than 38 of its firms had been purged or turned over to civilians in a 
transfer of wealth that became a shot heard round the world for its size, scope, and social 
complexity (see Table 4.3.9).121 And as the warring parties put down their weapons and 
Argentina returned to equilibrium, privatized military enterprises provided better and 
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COVIARA, Interbaires, Intercargo, and Edcadassa. Republic of Argentina, Chapter XVIII. 
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better goods and services, logging improvements in production efficiency, financial 
profitability, and services delivered. A World Bank document bore the good news: 
 
A World Bank-commissioned study on labor markets and productivity in 
Argentina reported that average labor productivity in the steel sector grew at 12 
percent between 1990–93 for crude product, and 22.1 percent for laminates (the 
latter practically doubling productivity in the three years). During the same period, 
capacity utilization in steel production increased from 53 to 60 percent, and, in 
laminates, from 60 to 79 percent. Further, a Bank assessment of productivity trends 
during 1991–94 reported a 13.9 percent rise in ethylene output. Its cost, 
meanwhile, fell by over one third as a result of lower producer prices and the 
greater opening of the economy. The consortium that purchased SOMISA reported 
operating profits in 1995, and has, so far (i.e. in 1996), reported positive net income 
for a complex that, in the 1980s, required major subsidies simply to stay open.122 
 
And as the weight of civilian control settled squarely on formerly military firms, so, too, 
did Argentina enter a period of prosperity. Workers could loosen their belts, shopkeepers 
could neglect their prices, and capitalists could not count their money. And the civilians 
were not looking back. A decade later, when Argentina chose to return to state control of 
defense enterprises, the civilians put themselves in charge and took soldiers under 
advisement.123 Civilian rule, at last, was there and there to stay. 
                                                        
122 World Bank, 1996, 7. 
123 Jorge Battaglino, “The Politics of Defense Revival in Argentina,” Defense & Security Analysis, 29, 1 
(2013), 3–15. 
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Table 4.3.9. Military Enterprise Reforms in Argentina, 1989–1997 
Sector Enterprise Date of 
Reform 
Type of 
Reform 
Type of 
Capital 
Ownership/
Management 
Personnel 
Late 1991 
Value US$ 
(millions) 
Petro-
chemical 
Polisur Oct. 
1990 
Privatization Private IPAKO 
S.A.C.I.F. 
n.a. 55.1 
 Petropol Oct. 
1990 
Privatization Private INDUPA 
S.A.I.C. 
19 17.5 
 Induclor Oct. 
1990 
Privatization Private INDUPA 
S.A.I.C. 
39 68.4 
 Indupa Oct. 
1995 
Privatization Private SOLVAY n.a. 185.8 
 Monómeros 
Vinílicos 
Oct. 
1990 
Privatization Private VINICLOR 
S.A. 
36 35.8 
 Petroquímica 
Río Tercero 
Mar. 
1992 
Privatization Private Egerton 
Finance S.A. 
355 7.3 
 Carboquímica 
Argentina 
Sept. 
1993 
Privatization Private Safety S.A.-
Procamet 
S.A. 
74 0.99 
 Petroquímica 
Bahía Blanca 
Oct. 
1995 
Privatization Private Dow 
Chemical 
383 171.1 
 Petroquímica 
General 
Mosconi 
 Transf. to 
YPF 
Public YPF 1,095  
       541.99 
Steel/ 
Mining 
Altos Hornos 
Zapla 
Apr. 
1992 
Privatization Private Albert Duval 
S.A. SIMA 
PENSA S.A. 
PENFIN S.A. 
CITICORP 
3,071 33 
 SOMISA Oct. 
1992 
Privatization Private Propulsora 
Siderúrgica 
(Techint) 
SIDERCA 
(Techint) 
11,564 152.1 
 SIDINSA  Liquidated   61  
 COMIRSA  Transf. to Pr. 
B. As. 
Public Buenos Aires 
Province 
n.a.  
 HIPASAM  Transf. to Pr. 
R. Negro 
Public Río Negro 
Province 
1,328  
 SIDINOX  Liquidated   n.a.  
 Altos Hornos 
Zapla 
Construcciones 
      
       185.1 
Arms 
Industry 
TAMSE  Transfer/ 
liquidation 
  259  
 FM de Tolueno 
Sintético 
Feb. 
1993 
Privatization Private Rutilex S.A. 
E. 
Hidrocarburo
s As. 
136 2.63 
 FM de Vainas y 
Conductores 
Feb. 
1993 
Privatization Private Metacab 
Consortium 
1,018 15 
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Eléctricos 
(ECA) 
 FM de Acido 
Sulfúrico 
Mar. 
1993 
Privatization Private MASPRO 
S.A. 
71 1.6 
 FM General San 
Martín 
Apr. 
1993 
Privatization Private Talleres 
Sudamerican
os S.A. 
506 8.5 
 FM Pilar Jul. 
1994 
Privatization Private IAMP S.A. 117 2.8 
 FM San 
Francisco 
Aug. 
1997 
Privatization Private Héctor 
Codini Cía 
SRL 
249 2.5 
 FM Río Tercero 1996 Transf. to 
Min. of Econ. 
Public Ministry of 
Economy 
1,171  
 FM de Armas 
Portátiles 
“Domingo 
Matheu” 
1996 Dissolution – 
Equip. transf. 
to F. L. 
Beltrán 
  566  
 FM de Pólvoras 
y Explosivos 
‘Azul’ 
1996 Transf. to 
Min. of Econ. 
Public Ministry of 
Economy 
317  
 FM Fray Luis 
Betrán 
1996 Transf. to 
Min. of Econ. 
Public Ministry of 
Economy 
856  
 FM de Pólvoras 
y Explosivos 
Villa María 
1996 Transf. to 
Min. of Econ. 
Public Ministry of 
Economy 
564  
 Forja Argentina Jul. 
1993 
Liquidated     
       33.03 
Aircraft Area Material 
Córdoba 
Fábrica Militar 
de Aviones 
Dec. 
1994 
Concession Public Lockheed 
Aircraft S.A. 
2,950 n.a. 
 FAMA  Liquidated   n.a.  
 Technología 
Aerospacial 
 Liquidated   5  
 Industrias 
Mecánicas del 
Estado 
 Liquidated   n.a.  
 Interbaires     n.a.  
 Intercargo     n.a.  
 Edcadassa     n.a.  
 Intregradora 
Aerospacial 
    n.a.  
Shipyard Tandanor Dec. 
1991 
Privatization Private Banco 
Holandes 
Unido 
Sud Marine 
Enterprises 
S.A.  
CIA 
Argentina de 
Transportes 
714 59.76 
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Marítimos 
S.A. 
 AFNE Aug. 
1993 
Trans. to Pr. 
Bs. As. 
Public Govt. Prov. 
of Bs. As. 
2,697  
 Astilleros 
Domecq García 
  Public 75% Navy 511  
Missile/
Mines 
EDESA   Public 100% Navy 63  
Naval  SATECNA   Public 40% Navy 9  
 SISTEVAL   Public 72% Navy 81  
 COVIARA   Public Navy 62  
Source: Scheetz, 23–6. 
 
 
Conclusion 
The sweeping transfer of three dozen defense industry firms from military to 
civilian ownership and control in Argentina between 1989–1997 cannot be understood 
without jointly considering the outcomes of coalition and institution-building struggles 
between a pro-reform civilian president and an anti-reform military elite. When 
Argentina’s second post-authoritarian president, Carlos Menem, took power in 1989, his 
desire to reform the defense sector was matched in intensity by the military’s desire to 
preserve its basic structures. A shrewd pragmatist seeking to gain political and economic 
advantages, Menem was driven to exploit both the decisive influence within the Peronist 
Party of the pro-reform Renewalist technocrats and the opportunities to engage in rent-
seeking to be created by the massive military divestiture and sell-off the Renewalist bloc 
envisioned. The military, meanwhile, like any other ruling class, was motivated to 
preserve its power, wealth, and claim to rents in the post-authoritarian setting, and 
especially as the rest of the economy was progressively liberalized. Yet Menem and the 
military differed sharply in their capacities to reform or defend the defense industry. 
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From the start, Menem appreciated the importance of building legislative 
coalitions for reform. After coming up against opposition within Congress when he 
introduced bills to privatize all firms held by the military and administered by the defense 
ministry, Menem encouraged divisions in the defense-sector unions and military-aligned 
private sector while using bargains, cabinet posts, and direct transfers to court the 
Peronist Party and smaller rightist and provincial parties as needed. The military could 
not defend the boundaries of its coalition from Menem’s efforts to induce defections. 
Having relied on the party ties of its labor ally, the military lacked direct links to parties, 
and was further weakened by uprisings and scandals. And so, as defections multiplied 
and the PJ-labor alliance disintegrated, Menem and his allies coalesced, forming a 
dominant pro-reform coalition. Lacking the legislative allies with which to compete 
against a reformist government that it once had, the military could only watch from the 
sidelines as the new coalition approved the defense industry reform legislation. 
But Menem also recognized the significance of building institutions for reform. 
Middle-ranking military managers and labor leaders within military firms began working 
closely to try to stop reform from moving forward in their companies when the defense 
ministry announced the sale or cessation of more than 30 military enterprises. 
Nevertheless, Argentina had institutions that afforded civilians the capacity to shape the 
interests of societal actors by constructing reform policies that granted them rents in the 
new, civilian-centered setting and deliberately avoided sweeping reorganization in sectors 
where reform would hurt traditionally powerful actors. Argentina’s first post-
authoritarian president, Raúl Alfonsín, enlarged and strengthened the bureaucracy by 
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creating a secretariat empowered to administer the ownership and management of 
defense industry enterprises, staffing the secretariat with civilians, and demoting the 
military commanders. Menem fortified this defense industry bureaucracy by transferring 
the economy minister structure and team to defense ministry in 1991. Without party and 
executive allies, the military could not contest or weaken this bureaucracy. Thus, in the 
end, the military could not stop labor and capital from consenting to reform, and all major 
enterprises were ripped from the military’s hands and turned over to new civilian owners. 
These results force us to reconsider our view of the priorities of politicians in a 
democratic era. Literature on civil-military relations sees politicians as lacking sufficient 
incentives to subject defense policy to the same scrutiny and debate as health, education, 
and public safety.124 Studies of the politics of military industry reform in Argentina 
exhibit the bias, emphasizing how neoliberal ideology—and not the specific interests or 
considerations of key civilian actors—deposed statist, nationalist doctrines and resulted 
in the privatization of strategic enterprises.125 This analysis shows, by contrast, not only 
that politicians and parties have a compelling interest in defense, but that these actors 
shape the interests of other key institutional actors in the decision-making process. At a 
certain point, those other actors decide that the cost of opposing these interested forces 
exceeds the benefit. Indeed, the fact that President Menem moved to support defense 
industry reform only after it became clear that the pro-reform Renewalist politicians had 
                                                        
124 David Pion-Berlin and Harold Trinkunas, “Attention Deficits: Why Politicians Ignore Defense Policy in 
Latin America,” Latin American Research Review 42, 3 (2007), 76–100; Thomas C. Bruneau, “Civilians 
and the Military in Latin America: The absence of Incentives,” Latin American Politics and Society, 55, 4 
(2013), 143–60. 
 
125 Scheetz; Rougier et al. 
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decisive weight and expertise within the Peronist Party suggests that the interests 
analyzed here, and not neoliberal ideology, were more central to the outcome. 
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5 
 
Power and Industry in the Mixed Markets of Turkey and Portugal 
 
“In the beginning, the defense industry was in the hands of the state because it 
existed to meet war needs, supplying the equipment of the armed forces. The 
defense industry had a single customer, who was also the boss. [And when] the 
defense industry developed a need for advanced technology, the actor who had to 
pay for this development turned out to be, directly or indirectly, the state.” 
 
“This has to be part of something called Economy of Defense. There is economy 
of defense and defense of the economy. The economy can only develop in a stable 
environment. That stability, which the defense industry and the military ensure the 
economy, also has a price, has a value. The Economics of Defense has to do with 
the defense industry.” 
General Mateus da Silva (Portuguese Armed Forces)1 
 
Introduction 
 When it comes to military industry reform, do power relations matter elsewhere in 
the world? Do varying configurations of coalitional and institutional strength shape the 
fortunes of civilians and soldiers on other continents? To find out, we turn to two 
                                                        
1 Interview, January 30, 2011, cited in Vasco Martins dos Santos, “A Indústria de Defesa Como 
Componente da Estratégia Genética Nacional, 1994–2010,” Ph.D. Dissertation, Instituto Universitário de 
Lisboa, 2011, 86–97. 
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countries that are very far geographically, historically, and culturally from the Southern 
Cone of Latin America: Turkey and Portugal, which we intend to compare to Chile and 
Argentina (1983–1989), respectively. Finding points of divergence between these pairs of 
cases is not at all challenging. Turkey and Chile had different political institutions—
parliamentary in Turkey (until 2017, when it switched to a presidential system) and 
presidential in Chile. They had dissimilar economic institutions, with market-oriented 
structures in Chile and mixed markets in Turkey. Portugal and Argentina (1983–1989) 
had different political institutions—semi-presidential in Portugal, presidential in 
Argentina—and differed in both initial political conditions, including the relative strength 
of the military and civilians at the beginning of the post-transition period, and initial 
economic conditions, such as levels of inflation, growth rates, and external debt. 
But as suggested in Chapter 1, the differences are not as intriguing as the 
similarities. The two pairs of countries hone in on key patterns of similarity in the 
distribution of coalitional and institutional strength. In Turkey, as in Chile, the dominant 
military coalition and dominant military institution emerged and held together, and the 
reform effort failed. In Portugal, as in Argentina (1983–1989), by contrast, the dominant 
civilian institution and dominant military coalition emerged and held together, and the 
reform effort partially succeeded. Consequently, since initial conditions and political and 
economic institutions did not co-vary with the outcome in the same way, we can say there 
exists a basis for ruling out a role for these conditions and, instead, examining how the 
similar coalitional and institutional politics of the pairs of countries influenced their 
similar political-economic outcomes. 
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One set of differences does stand out and demand closer examination, however. 
These post-authoritarian political economies did not have equal international obligations 
when they ventured down the path to military industry reform. Indeed, Portugal and 
Turkey pose rather difficult hurdles for a thesis about coalitional and institutional politics 
to clear because anticipated or actual external obligations were much greater than in 
Chile or Argentina. In Turkey and Portugal, mounting duties to multiple international 
organizations asked much of the country’s autonomy and sovereignty. Perhaps 
responsibilities associated with actual or anticipated accession to international 
organizations were sufficiently great to motivate actors to push through objectionable 
economic and military reforms. If that were true, it would make varying configurations of 
coalition and institution strength virtually irrelevant, leaving Chile and Argentina to stand 
as unique cases. 
Differences in external obligations can be traced to differing relationships to the 
international community. As we learned, in Chile, the accession to the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in May 2010 required a commitment 
to aligning the corporate governments of state enterprises with OECD and international 
standards. Still, Chile and Argentina’s patterns of global integration did not impart 
extensive military enterprise reform duties to an outside organization or state.2 Turkey 
and Portugal’s relationships to the European Union (EU), on the other hand, presented 
                                                        
2 See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), OECD Guidelines on Corporate 
Governance of State-Owned Enterprises (Paris: OECD, 2005); World Bank, Report on the Observance of 
Standards and Codes (ROSC), Corporate Governance Country Assessment: Chile (Washington, D.C.: 
World Bank, 2005). 
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leaders in those countries with greater duties. Portugal and Turkey were granted 
candidate status in 1977 and 1999, respectively, and negotiations began with the EU 
thereafter. That necessitated the adaption of their legal and political systems to EU 
policies. Accordingly, civil-military relations and the security sector came under scrutiny 
because the EU required democratic oversight of the military.3 
Thus, in both Portugal and Turkey, the military faced a tougher challenge, while 
civilian leaders had the wind at their back. The militaries there had to deal with a large 
organized external force that presented civilians with powerful incentives to carry out 
difficult reforms because those reforms would credibly signal the civilians’ commitment 
to meeting organization guidelines and, more importantly, help bypass external scrutiny 
and enforcement, thus ensuring that norm violations were kept in check and 
accountability was dealt with at home. From this, a central rival hypothesis emerges: the 
impact of power relations diminishes at higher levels of external obligations. Key 
legislative and bureaucratic relations of power fade from view as democratic leaders 
respond to anticipated or actual duties in a rush to save their skins from scrutiny while 
signaling commitment and credibility to a larger society of states. Obliged to comply or 
sacrifice their legitimacy in the modernization battle, leaders disregard the domestic 
balance of interests and capacities and opt for adherence to a social ethic of compliance. 
                                                        
3 For Turkey, see Umit Cizre, “Problems of Democratic Governance of Civil-Military Relations in Turkey 
and the European Union Enlargement Zone,” European Journal of Political Research, 43, 1 (2004), 107–
25; for Portugal, Thomas Bruneau and Harold Trinkunas. “Democratization as a Global Phenomenon and 
its Impact on Civil-Military Relations,” Democratization, 13, 5 (2006), 776–90. 
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As will be shown below, the evidence does not support the alternative hypothesis. 
Despite the advantages that external obligations conferred upon civilians in both 
countries, actively building political arrangements that altered the balance of coalition 
and/or institutional strength permitted the military to defend all or part of its defense 
industry while preventing civilians from completely overtaking the sector. In Turkey, we 
will detail why the military was able to defend its defense industry against repeated 
civilian efforts to reform it even as the military simultaneously lost ground to those same 
civilians in other policy areas. Portuguese leaders found ways of developing and 
exploiting the capacity of the executive branch to advance the first part of their defense 
industry reform program. Nevertheless, completion of their defense industry reforms 
eluded them, as the military’s party allies in parliament got in the way. 
 
5.1. Turkey 
In Turkey, the military returned to the barracks in 1983, but it did not leave the 
boardroom. The armed forces maintained a sizeable presence in the economy through its 
foundations. These were holding companies that financed other organizations with funds 
collected by levying “taxes” on the salaries of officers. Between them, the Air Force 
Foundation, Naval Foundation, and Ground Forces Foundation owned and ran large 
several large defense-related enterprises in whole or in part.4 In 1987, the armed forces 
merged their separate foundations, creating a unitary foundation—the Foundation for 
                                                        
4 Omer Karasapan, “Turkey's Armaments Industries,” Middle East Report, 144 (1987), 27–31, 29–30. 
 
  322 
Strengthening the Turkish Armed Forces (TSKGV)—and obtained the new foundation’s 
very own law (see Table 5.1 for TSKGV firms in 1998). The president of the foundation 
was the Minister of Defense, who was also the president of the Board of Trustees, which, 
as the decision-making organ of the foundation, consisted of the Vice-Chief of General 
Staff, the Undersecretary of the Ministry of National Defense, and the Undersecretary for 
Defense Industry.5 
Military firms enjoyed a smorgasbord of privileges. Law 3,388 of 1987 
sanctioning TKSGV also established its military-dominated organizational structure, 
subjected it to civil code, and exempted it from taxes—corporation tax (except for its 
enterprises), inheritance and transfer taxes concerning donations and assistance it 
received, and stamp tax concerning all of its transactions—and from audits of the 
foundation and its concerns.6 TSKGV-affiliated companies were legally private and civil, 
but they de facto belonged to and were run by the military, whose efforts they also 
financed.7 The military industry also enjoyed its own separate budget and source of 
guaranteed financing, which did not pass through parliament and was not audited by the 
Court of Public Accounts: the Defense Industry Support Fund (DISF), generator of $1.5 
billion in revenue annually through indirect taxes levied on luxury imports, alcohol, 
                                                        
5 Taha Parla, “Mercantile militarism in Turkey, 1960–1998,” New Perspectives on Turkey, 19 (1998), 29–
52, 43–5. 
6 Ibid. 
 
7 İsmet Akça, Military-Economic Structure in Turkey: Present Situation, Problems, and Solutions (Istanbul: 
TESEV Publications, 2010). 
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cigarettes, and petroleum.8 Between 1986–2001, DISF generated USB 11 billion, 80 
percent of which was invested in domestic military production by military companies.9 
When Turkey transitioned to democracy, civilians could not broach reforming the 
military defense sector because the military had tutelary-like powers. The uniformed 
chiefs of the armed services could dominate civilian cabinets by means of the National 
Security Council (NSC), the decisions of which the military had constitutionally required 
the council of ministers to prioritize before the military left power in 1982. The NSC 
became “a body through which the generals in effect laid down policy guidelines,” with 
ministers legally bound to comply.10 In 1986, the military forced Motherland Party 
(ANAP) Prime Minister Turgut Özal to decree a prohibition on private sector production 
of lethal equipment, as well as refused to comply with a new law requiring the military 
foundations to turn their financial assets over to the newly-created Defense Industry 
Development and Support Administration (DIDA).11All the while, the military occupied 
an increasingly dominant position in the defense industry, as TSKGV-linked firms were 
increasingly designated as prime contractors starting in the late-1990s.12 
                                                        
8 Manfred Sadlowski, “Turkish Armed Forces Receive Major Funding,” Military Technology, 10, 6 (1986), 
6. 
 
9 Sixteen percent was spent on direct purchases, and the remaining 4 percent went to advanced technology 
projects. “Recently Completed and Ongoing Turkish Defense Procurement Programs,” Military 
Technology, 25, 9 (2001), 12. 
 
10 Ersel Aydınlı, “Turkey Under the AKP: Civil-Military Relations Transformed,” Journal of Democracy, 
23, 1 (2012), 100–08, 101. 
11 Karasapan, 28. 
 
12 Arda Mevlutoglu, “Commentary on Assessing the Turkish Defense Industry: Structural Issues and Major 
Challenges,” Defence Studies, 17, 3 (2017), 282–294, 284. 
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Table 5.1. Turkish Military Defense Firms, Ownership Structures, 1998 
Military 
Enterprise 
 
Sector 
Military 
Participation 
Personnel 
in 1998 
ASELSAN Electronics TSKGV 83.1% 2,481 
HAVELSAN Software TSKGV 98.7% 309 
İŞBİR Electric-energy TSKGV 90.4% 198 
ASPILSAN Batteries-accumulators TSKGV 95.1% 51 
DİTAŞ Petroleum TSKGV 20.0% 262 
TUSAŞ Aircraft TSKGV 45.0% 38 
TAI Military/civil aircraft TSKGV 1.9% 
TUSAŞ 49.0% 
2,200 
TEI Aircraft engines TSKGV 3.0% 
TUSAŞ 50.5% 
450 
ROKETSAN Missiles TSKGV 15.0% 
ASELSAN 15% 
n.a. 
CANSAS Artillery TSKGV 2.1% 379 
NETAŞ Telecommunications TSKGV 15.0% 1,660 
Mercedes-
Benz 
Automotive TSKGV 5.0% 2,300 
Source: Parla, 46–7. 
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In 2003, the civilians threw off the military yoke and bridled the armed forces by 
redefining the NSC as an advisory body composed mainly of civilians and directing the 
council of ministers to freely evaluate NSC considerations.13 Henceforth, some civilian 
leaders set out to seize and turn control of military firms over to civilian owners and 
managers. The myriad stated goals of these would-be reformers included improving 
Turkish industrial capacity, entering international agreements, competing globally and 
increasing exports, and adopting and producing new technology. Yet the brass jealously 
guarded its control of firm and foundation despite the changing political landscape, 
showing no sign of backing down. When, by 2018, the fight for the defense industry 
which ensued had reached and passed a crescendo, the military remained in absolute 
control, and all civilian efforts to change the situation had failed. 
 
Defense Industry Restructuring Project 
The Turkish military defended its dominant position in the economy by invoking 
the civilians’ lack of interest in and knowledge about defense issues; that absence of 
interest, let alone expertise, meant that the military had to take the lead without meddling 
parliamentary scrutiny of its budget and enterprises.14 But civilians dispelled that notion 
when a bold vision for transferring the defense industry to civilian control surfaced in late 
2004. In September, Undersecretary for Defense Industries Murad Bayar and 
                                                        
13 See Acar Kutay, “Civilian and Military Relations in Turkey: A Historical Survey,” CMI Working Paper, 
11 (Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute, 2016), 15. 
 
14 Tuba Ünlü Bilgiç, “The Military and Europeanization Reforms in Turkey,” Middle Eastern Studies, 45, 5 
(2009), 803–24, 805. 
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Undersecretariat for Defense Industries (SSM) Representative Sedat Guldogan outlined a 
four-phase restructuring plan for the Turkish defense industry during a Turkish-American 
Defense Symposium hosted by SSM and the American-Turkish Council (ATC). The so-
called Turkish Defense Industry Restructuring Project would involve consolidating 
majority military-owned firms (including ASELSAN, HAVELSAN, TUSAS, TAI, 
ROKETSAN, and others and establishing a central holding company; consolidating other 
state-owned facilities; consolidating armed forces maintenance and repair facilities and 
capabilities; and, finally, privatizing the entire industry.15 
This plan faced immediate opposition from the military. The uniformed had 
always reacted swiftly in order to prevent objectionable plans from gaining momentum 
within institutions beyond their direct control. When the AKP-controlled parliament, the 
Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA), authorized the Court of Auditors to audit the 
accounts and transactions of the armed forces, including state properties, on the request 
of the parliament, in 2003, for example, the military fiercely objected right away, 
intervening in time to cause the parliament to exclude from the final authorization the 
auditing of the properties which were classified according to the constitutional principle 
of confidentiality.16 Now, scarcely a year later, the military had not moved off of its 
hardline position. Thus, Bayar was on the lookout from the beginning as he positioned 
himself to try to advance the restructuring project within the executive, the support of 
                                                        
15 Wikileaks, “Cablegate: Restructuring Turkey's Defense Industry—A Work in Progress,” Wikileaks, 
Thursday, November 4, 2004, wikileaks.org. 
 
16 Bilgiç, 805–6. 
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which would be needed in order for the executive to adopt the project as part of the 
government’s parliamentary agenda. 
But what Bayar did not anticipate were the reservations of Prime Minister and 
ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The 
secretary could not have been faulted for expecting Erdoğan to throw his weight behind 
the reform proposal. The AKP rose to power in 2003 as the first party to win an absolute 
parliamentary majority in the post-authoritarian period. The AKP parliament, “riding a 
wave of unprecedented popular support for European Union-inspired reforms,” granted 
itself oversight and control over the military’s off-budget funds, empowered the civilian-
controlled Ministry of National Defense to identify priorities for defense expenditures, 
and reformed the formerly military-dominated National Security Council.17 The military, 
meanwhile, having previously been able to dominate weak and vulnerable coalition 
governments in the 1990s, had no recourse against a strong government. The stage 
seemed set for deeper reform. Yet now Erdoğan was not prioritizing Bayar’s defense 
industry reform plan. Where Erdoğan vigorously pursued civilian control in many areas, 
he did not pursue it in the defense industry when Bayar offered his project—why? 
Many private firms linked to TSKGV-affiliated companies had a vested interest in 
the existing military order and expected financial losses were it to be discontinued and 
replaced with civilian arrangements. The Turkish bourgeoisie, grouped within the 
Turkish Industry and Business Association (TÜSIAD), was, besides the military, a main 
                                                        
17 Steven A. Cook, “The Weakening of Turkey’s Military,” Council on Foreign Relations, March 1, 2010. 
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beneficiary of the military’s emergence as the dominant actor in the defense industry. The 
military, observed Parla, 
 
“offered private capital, including themselves, a new mode of capital 
accumulation, one which is state-backed financially, and state-protected legally; 
one which minimizes entrepreneurial risks, one which lowers many costs and 
guarantees monopoly profits, one which provides secure investments with 
maximum profits in the shortest term, one which checks market fluctuations and 
the tendency of the rate of profit to fall, one which has clout in many crucial 
economic and political decisions.”18  
 
What resulted was “an organic integration of military capital with private capital, blurring 
the line between the private and public economy and between the economic and the 
political.”19 The major military and civilian private companies simultaneously became 
customers, partners, competitors, and suppliers to other defense companies, both Turkish 
and foreign.20 TSKGV’s general manager in 2008, Retired Lieutenant General Engin 
Alan, confirmed: 
 
                                                        
18 Parla, 49. 
 
19 Ibid. 
 
20 Anouck Gabriela Côrte Réal-Pinto, “A Neo-liberal Exception? The Defence Industry ‘Turkification’ 
Project,” International Development Policy, 8, 8 (2017), 299–331. 
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“The [TSKGV] foundation’s direct contribution to the defense industry is carried 
out by establishing new companies, being a partner of the present companies, 
increasing its shares in companies and participating in raising its companies’ 
capital. The funding required for these activities is met through 35% of the 
foundation’s income allocated for the defense industry.”21 
 
Military capital had become the secret weapon of private industrialists. 
The military-private sector alliance was a decidedly mutual affair from the 
moment of its inception. In return for the many advantages the military afforded them, 
the big firms co-opted retired senior officers to serve on their boards, “not only as 
compensation for services rendered, but to maintain links with the current army brass.”22 
Sealing the military-private sector relationship, TÜSIAD and another one of the most 
important business organizations in Turkey, the Union of Chambers and Commodity 
Exchanges of Turkey (TOBB), founded within their organizational structures working 
groups specifically dedicated to the defense sector, so-called “Defense Industry Working 
Groups.”23 Now, in 2004, Bayar’s plans to divest the military, if realized, would 
terminate the advantages that drove private actors to cement their links with military 
capital in the first place. The investments of these civilian actors would come to nothing, 
and the actors would have to absorb the cost. 
                                                        
21 As quoted in Andrew McGregor, Arming for Asymmetric Warfare: Turkey’s Arms Industry in the 21st 
Century (Washington, D.C.: Jamestown Foundation, 2008), 8. 
 
22 Eric Rouleau, “Turkey’s Dream of Democracy,” Foreign Affairs, 79, 6 (2000), 100–14, 109. 
 
23 Gerassimos Karabelias, “Dictating the Upper Tide: Civil–Military Relations in the Post-Özal Decade, 
1993–2003,” Turkish Studies, 9, 3 (2008), 457–73, 466–7, 472. 
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For their part, Erdoğan and the AKP were more than a little politically indebted to 
this military industry-entangled civilian bourgeoisie. The former owed their political 
success partly to other parties’ weakness and loss of legitimacy, but equally important 
was the support the AKP won from its unprecedented outreach to business. Turkey’s 
capitalists had suffered greatly during the economic crisis of 2001 and from the near-
permanent state of political instability in Turkey resulting from a string of seven 
tumultuous coalition governments stretching back to 1983. The AKP offered them a 
sturdy pro-EU, reform, and liberalization agenda (albeit one that did not necessarily flirt 
with military divestiture and privatization). In return, reform-minded democrats and the 
business class lent the party strong support. The private sector then intensified its support 
in return for the AKP’s provision of steady government and economic growth in its first 
two years in power, during which inflation fell to single digits for the first time since 
1976.24 
Moreover, Erdoğan’s personal ambitions in Turkey and abroad led him to 
calculate that his own interests were also better served by the existing military order than 
by any potential civilian-based alternative. The civilian leader was interested in 
establishing and consolidating his personal control over the defense industry because it 
promised to strengthen him both at home and in international negotiations, while also 
more easily permitting him to arm allies in proxy battles in Turkey and abroad. But 
consolidating power would be easier with the defense industry under military control 
                                                        
24 Zeyno Baran and Ian O. Lesser, “Turkey’s Identity and Strategy: A Game of Three-Dimensional Chess,” 
in Michael Schiffer and David Shorr, eds., Powers and Principles: International Leadership in a Shrinking 
World (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009). 
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because the military, as a part of the executive branch, had to report to the prime minister 
by law (as had been the case since 1961). Private enterprise, on the other hand, bore no 
formal relation and allegiance to the government, such that decisions within them would 
be reserved for non-subordinates and divorcees alone. Erdoğan could always support 
privatization while creating mechanisms that continued to secure his strategic interests 
and impose his will within formerly military-owned companies, but that strategy would 
carry considerable risk because there would be no guarantee that the more indirect 
mechanisms of influence would work, much less afford him the same power as just 
maintaining the status quo. 
As a result of all of this, Erdoğan would not adopt a position on the issue of 
defense industry reform that diverged from that of the military, even as he simultaneously 
joined the AKP parliament and challenged the military on other fronts. Yet the military 
did not rest on its laurels. The general staff returned to defensive form to protect its 
equilibrium. And it benefitted, as it had since 1961, from its intimate proximity to the 
prime minister. Neither the defense ministry nor any other civilian organization separated 
the military from the apex of power. To the contrary, the military’s vertical position in 
the chain of command was second only to the prime minister and sovereign head of state. 
That afforded the military privileged access and, therefore, tremendous power. The 
military could crowd out Bayar and Guldogan’s point of view as well as lobby Erdoğan 
directly to defend its defense industry from their advances. 
The intervention had its desired effect. Or, perhaps Erdoğan’s path had been set. 
In any case, as Bayar’s reform plan became a matter of debate within the executive, a 
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dominant anti-reform coalition began to form between Erdoğan and the military. This 
executive-military alliance, in combination with the defense companies in TÜSIAD, 
formed what Anouck Real-Pinto calls the Turkish “triangle of power.” This axis involved 
an assimilation of the AKP government and the traditional members of the military–
industrial complex, the increasingly large and centralized units of economic and political 
power of which were continually forging more and more elaborate explicit as well as tacit 
alliances. And though it was “difficult to draw a distinction between the actors separating 
public from private, military from civilian, and foreign from national,” one thing was 
clear: Erdoğan’s government served as the umbrella under which the military, industrial, 
scientific, and political elites whose several interests coincided came together to promote 
their shared interest.25 
The ascent of the military-Erdoğan alliance restored, in turn, the original balance 
of political power between military and civilian even while the military was losing 
ground in other areas. The military now had more power to defend its defense industry 
legislatively than before when Erdoğan had not as yet partially defected from the civilian 
coalition in the face of a proposed reform which threatened his and the military’s mutual 
interests. At the same time, Bayar, Goldogan, and other civilian would-be reformers now 
had less power to exert their influence than before because the military’s appropriation of 
the executive office denied the civilian reformists the opportunity to obtain the requisite 
support to introduce their project in parliament. It became more likely, therefore, that the 
military would prevail in a political battle to determine the future of Bayar’s defense 
                                                        
25 Real-Pinto, 12. 
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industry reform project. The climate was ripe for the military’s power to exert itself 
within the corridors of executive power. 
Ultimately, Bayar’s plan stalled out within those corridors; the support needed to 
insert his project in the AKP’s parliamentary agenda did not become available. The 
military-executive alliance held together well as it did battle with Bayar. Whereas the 
military’s power in some areas had dissipated with electoral, political, and partisan 
changes that convinced Prime Minister Erdoğan that weakening the military would 
benefit him, those same calculations drove Erdoğan to defend the military and its industry 
from privatization in order to avoid a politically costly loss of support from the military’s 
private partners and to prevent the loss of the ability to consolidate personal control over 
the sector. Erdoğan provided the direction and resources for the military and his office to 
act collectively, in effect absorbing the costs of collective action against reform. Thus, 
despite civilian triumphs in many policy areas by 2004, the military’s defense industry 
had not changed at all since 1993, when Feroz Ahmad observed that because the 
military’s primary concern was with the stability of the system, the high command 
worked harder to defend its industry than any party worked to reform it.26 
 
Defense Industry Privatization Plan 
All told, Undersecretary Bayar did not pursue defense industry reform again until 
early 2012, and when he returned to it, he sought to use defense ministry action to bring 
about some of his desired changes. In April 2012, Murad said that he planned to 
                                                        
26 Feroz Ahmad, The Making of Modern Turkey (London: Routledge, 1993), 131. 
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downsize and privatize a large portion of Turkey’s military enterprises while opening the 
defense sector up to competition. The first steps would be offering 15 percent of the 
military’s shares through TSKGV in ASELSAN and part of its shares in TAI to the 
public (preparations for opening up shares in TAI were already underway, Bayar said). 
After that, military corporations that had become a burden on the economy would be 
liquidated or privatized. Finally, some of the smaller TSKGV firms would either merge 
with private sector firms, terminate their operations, or be privatized as well. This was as 
part of a new incentive package proposed by the Turkish government that also included 
competitive bidding processes for defense contracts, said Bayar, who explicitly 
referenced how “in the EU, multinational [defense] companies merge to set up 
consortiums. In the 27-member EU, you have only three aeronautics firms.”27 
 The appearance of this new plan provoked the usual military opposition, with 
Erdoğan getting the typical earful. But Bayar was more optimistic than back in 2003 
because he had a few more political actors on his side, or at least this time they were 
more vocal about their mutual desire to civilianize the defense sector. Defense Minister 
Ismet Yilmaz, in particular, reacted to reports that TAI, ASELSAN, HAVELSAN were 
being mismanaged by insisting that military firms would have to improve their 
performance and compete successfully in open bidding if they wanted any hope of being 
                                                        
27 Lale Kemal, “Defense Privatization Plan Faces Opposition From Turkish Military,” Al-Monitor, April 
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spared. Though small, this development was a promising one for reform-minded civilian 
bureaucrats who had never been closer to gaining the upper hand.28  
The military was less concerned, however, because military and allies controlled 
the key bureaucratic institutions responsible for defense industry policy. When Prime 
Minister Özal created the autonomous Defense Industry Development Administration 
(DIDA) in 1986, DIDA was supposed to be a civilian agency at the service of civilian 
interests. As the arm of the government responsible for developing defense industry 
infrastructure and policy, DIDA administered the DISF support fund and carried out the 
decisions made by the powerful Defense Industry Executive Committee (DIEC), whose 
members included the Prime Minister, the Chief of General Staff, the service 
commanders, and various civilian cabinet and State Planning Organization officials. 
DIDA was reorganized, renamed, and subordinated to the Ministry of National Defense 
(MoND) as the Undersecretariat for Defense Industries (SSM) in 1989. In 2010, the 
members of the DIEC were the Prime Minister, the Chief of General Staff, and the 
Minister of Defense.29 In practice, however, military interests were given greater voice 
within these institutional arrangements than were civilian ones, for a bevy of reasons. 
First, formally and informally, the military Chief of General Staff had the upper 
hand in its relationship with the civilian Minister of National Defense. Formally, the chief 
did not report to the minister, but rather answered directly to the Prime Minister even 
                                                        
28 Ibid. 
 
29 Akça, 17. 
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though the defense minister was accountable to parliament in matters of defense policy. 
This meant that the military chief effectively replaced the defense minister. As Ali 
Bayramoğlu observed, “the Defense Ministry… acts as a ‘buffer’ between the TGNA and 
the Armed Forces, effectively blocking the supervision and administration by the former 
of the latter and enabling the Armed Forces to utilize its broader-than-defined authority to 
intervene more forcefully into the political arena.”30 Informally, the general staff had 
relatively closer ties to the chief executive and actor whose consent would be essential to 
advancing any MoND plan—Prime Minister Erdoğan. Agreements between Erdoğan and 
the military to keep the status quo had already been made, making it unlikely that 
Erdoğan’s support for Bayar would be forthcoming regardless of whether the defense 
minister had more power over the general staff. 
Second, as a result of its alliance with Erdoğan, the military had a powerful ally 
on the DIEC and therefore tremendous influence within SSM. During the 1980s and 90s, 
the military dominated the DIEC directly. Though the agency was a putatively civilian 
one, in practice, the general staff made the decisions about defense industries; civilian 
authorities did little more than approve military decisions presented to them.31 Prime 
                                                        
30 Ali Bayramoğlu, “Military and Politics,” in Ahmet İnsel and Ali Bayramoğlu, eds., A Community, A 
Party. The Military in Turkey (İstanbul: Birikim Publications, 2004), 69. 
 
31 The armed forces retained control over military tenders, procurements, contracts, and projects as well as 
the effective power to distribute licenses, technology, and know-how transferred to Turkey and to spend the 
revenues provided for investments in domestic military production. Naturally, the military diverted support 
funds as well as technology transfers to its own firms. The military’s dominance of the DIEC was clearly 
demonstrated when the Council of Ministers abolished a defense fund levy on petroleum products in 1998: 
The DIEC—which was headed by the prime minister but included the chief of the general staff—protested 
the decision, arguing that it would restrict funds and could delay several important defense programs, but 
the civilian government—which was also headed by the prime minister—defended the decision on the 
grounds that it needed to stabilize petrol pump prices and reduce inflationary pressures. See Gareth Jenkins, 
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Minister Erdoğan gradually gained the upper hand in DIEC decisions during the 2000s 
and 2010s, yet he retained similar preferences to the military’s regarding the future of the 
defense industry. Consequently, the military’s power to block defense industry reform 
was magnified by Erdoğan’s willingness to collaborate with it against such change even 
as the military lost direct control of DIEC decisions. And third, the SSM itself heavily 
consisted of inexperienced civilian staff, which made it more likely that civilian staff 
would disperse authority to the military service branches when the civilians encountered 
difficulty in the course of trying to craft reform policies for individual firms.32  
Bayar was not in a position to alter or strengthen this institutional apparatus for 
the purpose of reforming the defense industry for the same reason that he could not 
readily reform the defense industry itself—because doing so required the support and 
leadership of Prime Minister Erdoğan, who was unlikely to support changes that 
threatened the existing order because of his own vested interests and coalitional loyalties. 
Indeed, the ties between private firms linked to the military and Erdoğan and some 
members of the AKP and his cabinet appeared to be stronger than ever, as evidenced by 
the presence, in 2012, of the then economy minister at the wedding of the son of the Vice 
President of Nurol, a private partner of ASELSAN.33 As a result of all of this, Turkey’s 
military-controlled institutional arrangements were upheld and fortified, while civilian 
actors were further weakened and obscured. 
                                                        
“Context and Circumstance: The Turkish Military and Politics,” Adelphi Paper, 337 (London: International 
Institute for Strategic Studies, 2001). 
 
32 Uğur Burç Yildiz, “Rethinking Civil–Military Relations in Turkey: The Problems of the Democratic 
Governance of the Defense and Security Sectors,” Turkish Studies, 15, 3 (2014), 386–401, 393. 
33 Real-Pinto, 12–3. 
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This process of institutional development fully restored the original balance of 
institutional power between civilians and the military. The military now had as much 
power to exert its influence within key governmental agencies as it did before Erdoğan 
rose power in 2003 when the military still ruled the DIEC directly. Civilians like Bayar, 
on the other hand, had less power to exert their influence than they did before the military 
and Erdoğan aligned. The dynamic made it more likely that the military would prevail in 
an administrative battle between civilians and the military to determine the fate of 
Bayar’s defense industry privatization plan. And so, when Bayar sought to push his 
initiative through the executive, the reform stalled. The requisite support within key 
centers of power did not become available 
 
Imperial Defense Industry Policy 
Military-executive ties were a double-edged sword, however. Although close ties 
with the ruling civilian provided the military with political clout that enabled it to resist 
serious reform, the ties also provided Erdoğan with influence over the military. On 
several occasions, Erdoğan used this pull to pressure the military into accepting reforms 
that enhanced Erdoğan’s authority without altering the basic structures of military 
control. Empowered to issue decrees with the “power of law” authorized by the state of 
emergency declared after a July 15, 2016 coup attempt, Erdoğan subordinated both 
TSKGV and the air, land, and naval force commands long attached to the Chief of 
General Staff to the Minister of National Defense, thus giving himself the authority to 
issue orders directly to commanders without going through the formerly all-powerful 
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Chief of General Staff.34 It wound up being quite the haul: in 2013, of the top seven 
Turkish defense companies in terms of turnover, four were TSKGV firms.35 
After an April 2017 referendum in which Erdoğan won new, sweeping powers via 
amendments endorsing minimal checks on the president and simultaneously making him 
head of state, government, and the ruling party, Erdoğan decreed the subordination of 
TSKGV to his direct control, stipulating that its board of trustees would be chaired by the 
President.36 Though the change only formalized a de facto situation in which Erdoğan 
was the industry boss, industry sources expected it to embolden the president “to 
personally administer critical decisions, especially in milestone programs.” “With the 
procurement and military bureaucracy weakened, the president will run a one-man 
show,” said one. A top AKP government official agreed: “It is not a secret that our 
president views many of our indigenous programs as his pet projects. It is not surprising 
that he has officially taken charge of these programs, as the April referendum gave him 
the authority to act as an executive president.” Indeed, there was little wonder what drove 
him: in 2017, TSKGV firms generated $3.5 billion in revenues, accounted for 43 percent 
of Turkey’s military sales and 41 percent of its exports, employed 40 percent of defense 
industry workers, and ate up 60 percent of the sector’s research and development funds.37 
                                                        
34 Decree, July 31, cited in Al-Monitor, “How Turkey is Reforming Its Military,” August 8, 2016. 
 
35 Real-Pinto, 10. 
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Erdoğan authorized the privatization of the military’s Tank and Pallet Factory in 
December 2018,38 then promptly transferred control rights for a period of 25 years to 
civilian and military vehicle producer BMC. That company was helmed by businessman 
Adham Sancak, who occupied a seat on the AKP’s executive board and was known to be 
very close to Erdoğan. Sancak bought BMC in May 2014 under dubious circumstances 
after the formerly private firm’s seizure by the state. Now, in January 2019, ties to BMC 
were set to provide Erdoğan with a direct link to the Qatari military—with whom 
Erdoğan and Turkey already maintained strong military ties—because shortly after 
Sancak bought BMC in 2014, Qatar’s armed forces bought 49.9 percent of the 
company.39 Erdoğan gave Sancak a deal the latter could not refuse, as land, workshops, 
and existing structures were made available free of charge to BMC months before the 
privatization was even announced, and the company was also granted a series of “super 
state incentives” that included immunity from customs duties and value added taxes and 
an almost total exemption from corporate tax.40 
 
5.2. Portugal 
In Portugal, the authoritarian regime of 1928–1974 was not a military 
dictatorship, and the military initiated the transition to democracy during the volatile two 
years of military rule under a leftist military movement that ensued. Nevertheless, the 
                                                        
38 See Decree 481, cited in The New Arab, “Testing the Turkey-Qatar military partnership,” February 25, 
2019. 
 
39 Ibid. 
 
40 Al-Monitor, “Privatization of Turkish military factory draws strong criticism,” January 18, 2019. 
  341 
Portuguese military resembled its peers in later transitions in a crucial regard: it initiated 
no changing of the guard in the flock of defense enterprises it owned and controlled. In 
1982, when the Council of the Revolution, a military-dominated, non-elected committee 
vested with legislative veto powers, was abolished, the armed forces still controlled nine 
industrial firms which together employed more than 15,000 people. These firms had 
benefited greatly from Portugal’s waging of three counter-insurgency wars in Africa 
between 1961–1974, when the military grew to 200,000 men and absorbed half of the 
national budget. They had a monopoly in the domestic market and approached production 
and sales volumes rivaling those of the largest firms in Portugal (see Table 5.2).41 
The boom in the Portuguese defense sector was rivaled only by the magnitude of 
the privileges bestowed upon its uniformed protagonists. The military’s monopoly was de 
jure for by law in Portugal private forms could not produce or overhaul equipment meant 
for military purposes. These laws were interpreted to restrict to state-owned firms the 
production of war material, but defense production was effectively restricted to military 
enterprises because the armed forces’ firms were the state entities producing such goods. 
And the military showed no interest in letting go, arguing that continuing the status quo 
was a matter of security and national independence. Civilian presidents and prime 
ministers disagreed and sought to turn the firms over to their kin. In the ensuing decades, 
both civilians and the military notched victories, but neither side could totally dominate 
the other. By 2018, both civilian and military occupied the sector. 
                                                        
41 Filipe Themudo Barata, “Indústria militar nacional: como e para quê?,” Instituto da Defesa Nacional, 1981, 
88–90. 
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Table 5.2. Ownership and Management of Military Firms in Portugal, 1982 
Military 
Enterprise 
Legal Status Military 
Owner 
Military 
Manager 
Military 
Participation 
Personnel 
1981 
Oficinas Gerais 
de Material 
Aeronáutico 
(OGMA) 
Armed 
Forces (AF) 
manufacturer 
 
Air Force 
 
Air Force 
 
Air Force 
 
2,667 
 
Arsenal do 
Alfeite (AA) 
 
AF 
manufacturer 
 
Navy 
 
Navy 
 
Navy 
 
3,232 
 
Fábrica Nacional 
de Cordoaria 
(FNC) 
 
AF 
manufacturer 
 
Navy 
 
Navy 
 
Navy 
 
473 
 
Manutenção 
Militar (MM) 
 
AF 
manufacturer 
 
Army 
 
Army 
 
Army 
 
3,150 
 
Oficinas Gerais 
de Fardamento e 
Equipamento 
(OFGE) 
 
 
AF 
manufacturer 
 
 
Army 
 
 
Army 
 
 
Army 
 
 
2,040 
 
Laboratório 
Militar de 
Produtos 
Químicos e 
Farmacêuticos 
(LMPQF) 
 
 
AF 
manufacturer 
 
 
Army 
 
 
Army 
 
 
Army 
 
 
674 
 
Fábrica Militar 
de Braço de Prata 
(FMBP) 
 
AF 
manufacturer 
 
Army 
 
Army 
 
Army 
 
1,731 
 
Fábrica Nacional 
de Munições de 
Armas Ligeiras 
(FNMAL) 
 
 
 
AF 
manufacturer 
 
 
Army 
 
 
Army 
 
 
Army 
 
 
1,395 
Indústrias e 
Participações  
de Defesa 
(INDEP) 
State-owned 
enterprise 
(holding) 
Min. of 
Finance 
Army MoD n.a. 
Total                 15,362 
Source: Barata, 88–90; João Moreira Tavares, Indústria Militar Portuguesa: No Tempo da 
Guerra 1961–1974 (Casal de Cambra: Caleidoscópio, 2005). 
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Enterprise Consolidation Action 
The fight for the national defense industry was one theater in the larger struggle to 
shape the institutional foundations of economic activity in Portugal. The bout took center 
stage in 1985 in this semi-presidential system where executive power is vested in the 
President but the Prime Minister presides over the chief executive decision-making body, 
the Council of Ministers. By decree, the Council of Ministers of the government of Social 
Democratic Party (PSD) Prime Minister Cavaco Silva (1985–1995) ordered the transfer 
of FMBP and FNMAL to INDEP.42 In doing so, the government sought to shore up a pre-
existing law that had not been enforced. When the Council of the Revolution (CR) 
created INDEP and put it under Ministry of National Defense (MoND) control on 
October 31, 1980, CR’s decree law also stipulated that INDEP would replace the Army-
held FMBP and FNMAL and incorporate the assets of each firm, which were to be 
merged and extinguished in their current form.43 Yet the military edict was never 
followed through.44 FMBP and FNMAL were never merged and completely absorbed by 
INDEP, but rather continued to exist under Army management, and the MoND also never 
took total control of INDEP, requiring authorization of the Finance Ministry.45 
                                                        
42 Decree-Law 485, cited in Portuguese Cartridge Collectors Association (APCM), “Munições em 
Portugal,” APCM, February 18, 2007, apcm.home.sapo.pt. 
 
43 Decree-Law 517-A, full text cited in APCM. 
 
44 Why would the Council of the Revolution (CR) decree the transfer of its own firms to a putatively 
civilian agency in the first place? Military officers controlled the defense portfolio in the cabinets of 
governments after 1976. Moreover, the CR explains its decision in the text of Decree-Law 517, writing that 
MoND control of the holding would impose needed order and eliminate duplication of effort and other 
redundancies by unifying and coordinating the disparate activities of different firms in the sector. Ibid. 
 
45 Renato Fernando Marques Pinto, “As Indústrias Militares e As Armas de Fogo Portáteis no Exército 
Português,” Revista Militar, May 28, 2010. 
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Now, in 1985, the newly-elected Silva saw the enforcement of the remaining 
provisions of the revolutionary council’s INDEP decree law as critical to advancing his 
own defense industry reform agenda. Silva’s goal was maximum privatization, but 
actually turning military enterprises over to private hands would be difficult in the 
existing state of affairs. As a result of the failed implementation of CR’s reorganization, 
the military in effect retained executive powers to operate FMBP, FNMAL, and the rest 
of the defense firms. Tasks such as deciding if, when, and how the enterprises would be 
reformed would be reserved for military officers, making it likely that key actors in a 
reform decision-making process would resist Silva’s desired changes. Following through 
with the subordination of FMBP and FNMAL to INDEP’s patrimony, on the other hand, 
would make reforming those specific companies easier, which it would do by 
redistributing powers in and over those companies from the military to the civilian 
defense minister. The change would permit the minister to control the two firms—
through INDEP—and decide on when and how they would be reformed. 
Opposition to enforcing the rest of the INDEP law was certain, but the 
institutional environment in which the order to relinquish control would be issued had 
begun to change. In 1981, Democratic and Social Centre (CDS) Defense Minister Diogo 
Freitas do Amaral of the Democratic Alliance (AD)—a center-right conservative political 
alliance consisting of the CDS, Social Democratic Party (PSD), and People's Monarchist 
Party (PPM)—decided that he would not tolerate the military’s tutelary power and the 
weakness of his portfolio. Taking matters into his own hands, Freitas do Amaral 
elaborated a national defense law and revision of the 1976 Constitution which abolished 
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the revolutionary council and subordinated the military to the president through the 
defense minister.46 To succeed, Freitas do Amaral would have to mobilize the required 
two thirds vote in the Assembly of the Republic to amend the constitution. 
The introduction of these institutional and organizational changes put Freitas do 
Amaral and the civilians on a collision course with the armed forces. The constitution 
gave the military great political power through the role bestowed upon the military-
controlled revolutionary council. The body, in effect, made the military a separate and 
almost co-equal branch of government through which the military controlled the passage 
of laws affecting the armed forces, established budgetary and procurement policies, and 
wielded the power to veto international agreements involving national defense. The 
council was also an advisory body to the president and functioned as a constitutional 
court designed to ensure that the laws passed by the civilian parliament were to the 
military’s liking and did not undermine the achievements of the revolution. It even served 
as a high-level decision-making body for the armed forces themselves, who needed such 
an institution in order to heal their internal schisms.47 The 1982 law, on the other hand, 
intended to make the military subordinate to civilian political authority, functioning 
through the minister of defense, in defense policy matters. That would deprive the 
military of valued influence and prerogatives. Opposition was therefore certain. 
                                                        
46 These were among numerous other changes intended to strengthen the civilian defense minister and 
weaken the military chiefs. 
 
47 Constituent Assembly of Portugal, Constitution of the Republic of Portugal, April 2, 1976, Articles 148–
9. 
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As expected, the military immediately challenged the proposed amendments. The 
popularly-elected president, General Ramalho Eanes—who combined the role of head of 
state with that of Chief of the General Staff and was first elected in 1976 and re-elected in 
1981—enlisted the presidential spokesman to warn against approving the changes on the 
grounds that the armed forces would be politicized by allowing the minister of defense to 
choose the chief of staff and the heads of the three services. Also objecting was CR itself, 
two of whose members said that they would return to the streets “and do another 25 of 
April” if the government did not repent and seek forgiveness for its sins.48 Meanwhile, 
the military officers included in the cabinet of governments after 1976 specialized in 
cloakroom pressures. 
And the military was not the only objector. The Socialist Party (PS) and 
Communist Party (PCP) also questioned the proposal to empower the civilian defense 
minister at the military’s expense, with the Communists even launching two attempted 
“general strikes”—the only two general strike attempts since April 25, 1974—in 
opposition to the proposed changes.49 The military had armed itself with these leftist 
allies going back to 1975, at the height of the revolution. When the Socialists won 
elections for a constituent assembly with 60 percent of the seats that year, the 
predominately leftist Movimento das Forcas Armadas (Movement of the Armed 
Forces—MFA) joined with leftist groups and began pressuring and cajoling the assembly 
                                                        
48 This was a reference to the day in 1974 when the Armed Forces Movement (MFA), composed of some 
200 junior- and mid-level officers, overthrew the 50-year-old civilian-led authoritarian regime. 
 
49 Diogo Freitas do Amaral, “Forças armadas em regime democrático,” Nação e Defesa, 94, 2 (2000), 175–
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to carve out privileges for the military and leftist actors in the new constitutional 
setting.50 A coalition began to form between the military and leftist parties as they 
increasingly lobbied the assembly. This alliance proceeded to thoroughly impose its will 
upon the assembly, such that the constitution finally approved (in 1976, after the military 
had to intervene amid clashes between Socialists and Communists) sought to facilitate a 
transition to a kind of military socialism. Besides vesting the military with a tutelary role, 
the document made it nearly impossible to fire workers and severely restricted private 
enterprise, including in the military-dominated defense sector. Many of the articles 
bestowing these advantages on the military and left were advanced by PCP 
representatives, but they were also advocated by Socialist representatives.51 
During and after the transition, the military exploited its coalition with the leftist 
parties to great effect. The parties would defend the military’s interests and prerogatives 
from centrist and rightwing parties’ efforts to turn Portugal into a typical pluralistic 
Western democracy in which the military was clearly subordinate to civilian authority 
through the command of the defense minister. In return, the military would use its 
institutional and political power to favor leftist parties and governments while 
simultaneously creating and defending the socialist order. Thus, in 1975, when MFA 
assumed a formal role in government, it established a single trade union confederation as 
well as nationalized the leading banks, insurance companies (representing 99% of 
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insurance companies’ capital), and petroleum refineries; the transportation sector and 
steel industry, and, eventually, Portugal’s leading privately-owned industrial monopoly, 
Companhia União Fabril. Large agricultural holdings were also expropriated and 
redistributed.52 Moreover, CR did not treat governments in an impartial way, but rather 
favored leftist governments and thwarted rightist ones, as when it acted in its capacity as 
a constitutional court to find unconstitutional several laws that had been passed by 
rightist AD governments. In return, “the Communist Party, extreme left, and Council of 
the Revolution all spoke in the opposite direction” when rightist parties began voicing 
their desire to subordinate the military to civilian control in all areas of political and 
economic life. The Socialist Party, for example, formulated a “balance sheet” whereby 
the Council of the Revolution would be maintained, albeit with better-defined functions. 
“The democratic civil society could be increasingly affirmed in all areas, except for 
military policy.”53 
Now, in 1982, leftist parties were finding it difficult to take a position on the 
proposed institutional changes that diverged with that of the military. The Communists 
supported the military and the Council of the Revolution in the hope that the party would 
continue to enjoy military support even if it lost ground with the electorate, which was 
becoming more of a reality as voters increasingly shifted rightwards.54 The Socialists had 
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begun gradually moving to the center of the political spectrum, abandoning the fierce 
advocacy of socialism that characterized the party in the mid-1970s in favor of a more 
politically-palatable middling centrism, and its staunch support for the military was 
diminishing as it increasingly sought to patronage and please its constituents. 
Nevertheless, being in the opposition, it at first withheld its support for Freitas do Amaral 
and the rival AD government. 
But Freitas do Amaral was unfazed by this everyday opposition. In fact, he saw in 
the Socialist Party the potential consent needed to obtain the required two thirds vote in 
the Assembly of the Republic to amend the constitution, and sought to engineer the 
defection of that party from the military coalition by forging an agreement between it and 
the AD majority. When presented with the opportunity, the Socialist Party reflected on its 
past and admitted that the institution of the revolutionary council was a concession to the 
armed forces for allowing the constituent assembly to be seated and make laws. Not only 
that, but in the heat of the moment in those heady days it was uncertain whether a 
transition to democracy would occur, and the Socialists were seeking to be as 
revolutionary as possible. Now, in 1982, democracy was in place, and electoral 
calculations were driving the party to suppress authoritarian impulses in search of votes 
and the full power of elected office, so the Socialists accepted and linked arms with the 
AD.55 The military was alarmed by the flight of the Socialists from its coalition ranks and 
responded by trying to restore the original boundaries, but it could not alter the electoral 
and political incentives facing the Socialists when its own sources of power were tutelary. 
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Consequently, military pleas fell on deaf ears, and the emerging civilian institutional 
reform coalition built on an alliance of center-left and center-right parties was fortified. 
Freitas do Amaral’s coalition-building altered the original balance of political 
power between civilians and the military. The defense minister now had more power to 
exert his influence in the parliament than before 1982 when the Socialists had not yet 
been persuaded to defect from the military coalition and enlist in the civilian ranks. The 
military, on the other hand, had less power to exert its influence in parliament than during 
the period between 1976–1982 when its coalition of leftist parties held up well through 
consecutive rounds of military-party exchanges. All of this made it more likely that the 
civilians would prevail in a parliamentary battle to determine the fate of the proposed 
institutional changes. The political climate was ripe for constitutional reform. 
The moment of truth came not long after the AD-Socialist alliance began debating 
the institutional changes in 1982. The two legislative factions used their combined votes 
to approve the National Defense Law and revision of the 1976 Constitution. Yet 
uniformed President of the Republic General Ramalho Eanes promptly vetoed the 
legislation. Undeterred and defiant, the parliament made zero changes to the proposed 
constitutional law and immediately initiated a second reading of it. That concluded with 
another parliamentary vote, to override the presidential veto. Again the AD-Socialist 
coalition leveraged its collective strength to approve the law, thereby delivering the fatal 
blow to the military’s partisan and institutional allies and ending the military’s control of 
politics.56 
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These developments began to alter the original balance of institutional power 
between civilians and the military. Since the new defense law subordinated the military to 
the president through the defense minister, the civilians no longer had to try to persuade 
the military to cede control voluntarily. Instead, the defense minister could simply force 
the Army to comply with the INDEP law and hand over FMBP and FNMAL. The Army 
would have to obey or risk running afoul of the law and incurring much greater costs. All 
of this made it more likely that the civilians would prevail in an administrative battle over 
ultimate control of FMBP and FNMAL. And so, the military quietly acquiesced and, in 
compliance with Decree-Law 485/85, passed the two firms to INDEP and MoND.57 The 
transfer to civilian hands, though a small victory, nevertheless firmly settled the floating 
question of the possession and dependency of the once-rogue military enterprises. 
 
Defense Sector Liberalization Initiative 
 Despite the achievement that was the 1982 law, centrists and conservatives 
continued to criticize the 1976 Constitution as too ideological and economically 
restrictive. In 1988, Prime Minister Silva proposed a bill to amend the Law on 
Delimitation of Sectors to facilitate the opening of the defense sector to private 
enterprise.58 The military was so entrenched in the economic organs of the state—which 
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was “without transparency and far removed from the dynamics of the market”59—that 
creating a state holding to absorb its firms was unlikely to dilute military influence. The 
paucity of civilians with the requisite experience and tacit knowledge would result in 
civilian leadership failures and the dispersal of authority to the military. Private 
enterprise, on the other hand, could be used as a mechanism for fully absorbing formerly 
military firms. Silva therefore began pushing for the parliament to adopt the bill before 
the end of 1988.60 “We are a generation of change, and we are not prepared to sacrifice 
the nation’s major aims to vested interests or to outmoded forces opposed to 
modernization,” he said in July.61 
Naturally, the military opposed the idea. Though the bill did not directly affect 
military enterprises, it threatened them because only military enterprises benefitted from 
the status quo’s tight restriction on the entry of private initiative into the defense sector, 
and the military knew it. Making comments of the garden variety for military leaders, 
INDEP Chairman General Casimiro Proenca put it plainly: 
 
“Who’s going to furnish the bullets for those forces? Foreign companies? And if 
they should refuse to do so for transitory political reasons, then our police force 
couldn’t even guarantee law and order. Now if this argument holds true for the 
public safety forces, then it is much more valid as regards the military forces. I 
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repeat and insist that the issue is not one of selling or buying more cheaply. The 
question is whether or not we can dispense with certain domestic defense 
companies that are the bulwark of our Armed Forces without getting into a political 
position such as we were in during the African War, when no one would sell us 
the items we needed unless they could do so pretty much undetected.”62  
 
And it was not the first time the uniformed had so grieved. Between 1976–1982, the AD 
governments proposed to amend the law on the delimitation of the public and private 
sector three separate times, essentially aiming to initiate wider economic liberalization by 
opening up the banking sector. All were vetoed by President General Ramalho Eanes on 
the basis of the objection of the Council of the Revolution.63 
Nevertheless, Silva had reason to be optimistic because the political environment 
had begun to change since the days when the military could veto reform. In elections in 
1987, the PSD won just over 50 percent of the vote, which gave it an absolute majority in 
the parliament and the first single-party majority since the restoration of democracy in 
1974. Far behind were the Socialists, with only 60 seats, and the Communists, with 31. 
Supported by a majority in parliament, Silva’s government aimed at obtaining the 
requisite support to reduce the number of sectors closed to private enterprise as well as 
permit the denationalization of the state-owned banks and other public enterprises 
nationalized in 1975. And his position was strengthened when, after Portugal became a 
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member of the European Community in 1986, an infusion of funds from the 
organization’s first extensive aid packages began to improve Portugal’s infrastructure and 
boost the incomes of Portuguese wage earners almost immediately.64 And so, by 1988, 
with help from the PS, Silva had set up the coalitional frameworks for mobilizing the 
required two-thirds vote in the assembly to amend the constitution to open up the 
petroleum refining, basic petrochemicals, steelmaking, and gas and electricity sectors. 
Now, with his defense sector liberalization initiative in the holster, Silva anticipated that 
the requisite support to approve it would be forthcoming as well. 
The prime minister was all the more surprised, then, when the Socialists and even 
many powerful members of his own party opposed the bill to liberalize the defense sector 
while simultaneously ensuring their support for opening up the other branches of the 
economy. The Socialists and some PSD parliamentarians demurred when presented with 
the opportunity to open up the military defense sector to private enterprise—why? 
Because the presence of relatively stronger interests vested in military enterprises and 
other traditional state firms made it harder to change course in those firms. In 1988, 
Portuguese state enterprises could be divided into two groups—the traditional sector, 
which included enterprises in state hands before 1975, including the military firms; and 
the new sector, including firms in heavy industry, banking, insurance, and other 
industries nationalized by the military in 1975. These different enterprises had not 
developed organized interests vested in the state-centered model to the same degree. 
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On the one hand, those interests were more extensive and more entrenched in the 
traditional state-owned enterprises, and particularly in military firms. These firms had 
been under state control for many more decades, and few had ever known a steward other 
than the state. During those long years, interest groups developed and refined 
mechanisms for using the public enterprises to redistribute income from society to 
themselves. A key example was the organized labor movement, which was stronger and 
more militant in traditional state firms, and particularly in the defense sector. The “elite” 
public enterprise unions in the defense sector had long aspired to guarantee employment 
and above-market wages to the more than 15,000 reform-skeptical workers employed by 
military enterprises in 1982, and had grown stronger as a result of historical events that 
locked in their privileges, including Portugal’s waging of three separate counter-
insurgency wars in Africa between 1961–1974, when the military grew to 200,000 men 
and absorbed one-half of the national budget. The workers also became more militant in 
defense companies, such as INDEP, where workers kidnapped the management during a 
period of great internal agitation.65 The opposition of these traditional vested interests 
was clearly demonstrated in a general strike in early 1988.66 
The Socialists had always found it difficult to adopt a position that diverged with 
that of the public-sector unions because their workers belonged to the Socialists’ core 
clientele and were likely to lose some of their privileges in case of privatization. Not only 
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that, but with each successive step in the military’s direction over many decades, it 
became harder and harder to reverse course because of the growing strength of labor and 
clout of the enterprises. And there were other groups who had developed interests or 
opportunities in the military industry over time, including oversight ministries (Finance, 
others) long intent upon expanding their authority as well as the usual parties and 
politicians who had used the enterprises to expand patronage opportunities. Now, in 
1988, both the Socialists and the PSD faced electoral and political incentives to oppose 
the liberalization of the defense sector in order to avoid the great risk associated with 
confronting the relatively stronger vested sectoral interests in that branch of the economy. 
On the other hand, the interests vested in the enterprise’s relationship to the state 
were far less extensive and entrenched in businesses nationalized by the military in 1975. 
These firms had developed largely in private hands. They had only been under state 
control for a little more than a decade. Indeed, all interested parties could remember the 
previous state of affairs, before seizure by the military at a time of great upheaval in a 
pre-European Portugal. Organized labor was also less organized and less militant in many 
enterprises nationalized in 1975, which was evident in the fact that their managers were 
better able than their counterparts in traditionally state-owned both to resist strong wage 
demands and to avoid creating problems of flagrant overstaffing for reasons of political 
expediency. More generally, whereas a fear that liberalization would “de-Portugalize” the 
economy created great pressure to preserve the status quo in defense and some other 
sectors, a sense that the military acted impulsively and illegitimately in 1975 created 
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equally great pressure to do just the opposite and release the specific sectors and 
enterprises nationalized by the military back out into the wild.67 
Prime Minister Silva insisted that “we shall have to foster economic groups in 
Portugal” and sought to ensure all parties that government support for the development of 
such groups would be forthcoming.68 Yet he could not assuage the anxieties of his 
numerous detractors, and the continuity school persisted and even gained some new 
enrollees. And as the military, Socialists, and some members of Silva’s own PSD 
increasingly diverged from the government with regard to liberalizing the defense sector, 
a dominant anti-reform coalition began to form between them, altering the original 
balance of political power between Silva and the military. Despite losing the coalitional 
battle waged over the 1982 law, the military was now regaining the power to exert its 
influence on this issue, while Silva was losing the power to exert his influence in this area 
correspondingly. The dynamic made it more likely that the military would prevail in a 
parliamentary battle to shape the fate of the amendment to liberalize the defense sector. 
Ultimately, the defense industry legislation was not approved; sufficient support 
for the measure between the PS and PSD never became available. Yet those same parties 
voted with Silva to permit the liberalization and/or privatization of sectors and businesses 
nationalized in 1975, including banking, insurance, petrochemicals, steelmaking, and gas 
and electricity production and distribution.69 Stronger vested interests in traditional state 
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strongholds such as firms in defense and other sectors in state hands before 1975 
prevented amendments affecting those sectors from moving forward as uniformly as in 
the cases of sectors and businesses nationalized in 1975. Silva knew that this was the 
main obstacle, too. Thus, it drew his harsh rebuke when it became clear that the requisite 
support for his defense sector bill was not available: “It is an opposition which appears to 
be statist and corporativist. It has no overall view of the country. It is full of delusions. It 
is a May 1968 opposition,” he told a reporter in 1989 when asked about the opponents of 
some of his liberalization policies.70 
 
OGMA Corporatization Program 
 Thwarted legislatively by the military’s defenders in the parliament, Silva sought 
to mobilize the requisite executive authority to turn larger firms into commercial 
enterprises integrated in the defense ministry, starting with OGMA. Any strategy to 
reform an enterprise bureaucratically required the blessing of Socialist President Mário 
Soares, who exercised the executive power. Beyond that, partial privatization was 
inviable because the courts could strike down such reforms on the grounds that they 
violated the Law on the Delimitation of Sectors. And even with Soares’s blessing, the 
defense ministry could not control a process of privatization anyway because the firms 
depended on the general staff of the military branch associated with their production. 
Using the defense ministry to withdraw firms from military control and turn them into 
corporations subordinated to MoND in its capacity as owner and manager would not 
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require military cooperation. OGMA, for its part, was the largest military firm, profitable, 
and active in the global market, so reforming it first would become a confidence builder 
for the bureaucracy. As a result of these various considerations, in 1991, government 
officials announced a tentative plan to transform OGMA into a corporation. 
Then director of OGMA General Rui do Carmo Espadinha reacted coolly to 
reports that the corporatization matter was being studied by the defense ministry and yet 
simultaneously insisted that change was welcome “provided that the national interests, 
and particularly the Portuguese Air Force’s interests, are safeguarded.”71 But Silva had 
been preparing to face the opposition by reorganizing and strengthening the institutional 
environment via the Organic Law of the Ministry of National Defense approved by the 
Council of Ministers on February 11, 1988 and an October, 27, 1989 MoND decree 
establishing the new organization of the defense ministry (Decree 32/89).72 Chapter IV of 
Decree 32/89 created a structure charged with defining and implementing policy for the 
defense industry, the Directorate-General for Armaments (DGA). Headed by a Director 
General—the National Director of Armaments—and assisted by the Deputy Director 
General, DGA was empowered to draw up the policies to be adopted in the field of 
defense industries, designate the firms that qualified to produce defense equipment, and 
implement defense industry-related functions delegated to it by superior authorities.73 
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Freeing the civilian defense minister’s staff from its dependence upon the military 
was considered a matter of necessity. Consequently, the new institution developed 
rapidly when the requisite resources to establish a monopoly of authority and expertise in 
defense industry policy were increasingly bestowed upon it during the period between 
1989–1992. Silva’s government became the first to serve out the entire four-year 
legislative term, and, in 1991, Silva led his party to a second victory and absolute 
majority. Stable government and relative continuity in defense ministry and DGA 
leadership contributed to the steady development of institutional capacity. As early as 
October 27, 1989, the government could report that the study, preparation, and start-up of 
the defense-industrial bureaucratic structure was nearly complete and that “some of the 
nuclei are already in operation, which will give shape to the future agencies and services 
of the Ministry.” On the same day, the government issued a new decree formalizing the 
organization, attributions, competences, and staff of the organizations and services.74 
The military was dissatisfied with the new institutional arrangements, just as it 
had been with Freitas do Amaral’s 1982 law.75 Yet it was powerless to stop civilians on 
their own turf. The military lacked any real influence over or pull with Silva, and Silva 
had his own clear and well-defined incentive to pursue reforms that complemented his 
wider modernization program but had nevertheless been “postponed for too long… 
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through lack of strength to oppose vested interests.”76 Consequently, the new institutional 
arrangements survived, while the military, finding itself further separated from key 
decision sites by new and deeper layers of authority, suffered another important setback. 
This pattern of institution-building fully altered the original balance of 
institutional power between civilians and the military. Prior to the changes, when the 
defense minister’s staff was dependent upon the military, the military used its power to 
pick and choose which parts of the government’s defense industry policy goals to pursue 
and which parts to ignore. For example, in March 1989, the government said it would 
restructure INDEP by privatizing its shares in the civilian explosives sector, laying off 
personnel, and transferring and concentrating assets. Yet it had to create a military-led 
body and put it in control—the so-called Installation Committee for the Restructuring of 
Defense Industries as chaired by Generals Mateus da Silva and Rosario Sanca—because 
the defense ministry lacked the capacity to execute the restructuring.77 Once in charge, 
General Silva dismissed the possibility of privatization outright, declaring that “the 
proposals presented [had] not been worthwhile to Portugal.”78 
 But now, in 1991, the tables had turned. Reform-minded civilians in government 
had more power to exert their influence administratively than before the changes when 
they were still dependent upon the military to generate policy. At the same time, the 
military had less power to exert its influence within key governmental agencies than 
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before when it retained a monopoly on effective control, organization, and expertise. This 
new balance of power made it more likely that civilian agents would prevail in a 
bureaucratic struggle to shape the crafting and implementation of the policy for OGMA. 
And so, when the defense ministry was commanded to produce the OGMA reform, it 
obeyed. In August 1993, the Council of Ministers adopted a MoND plan to transform 
OGMA into a corporation, dependent on MoND, to absorb the Air Force’s shares in that 
firm and then dependency of the General Staff of the Air Force, and the defense ministry 
bureaucracy proceeded to implement the changes in turn. 
 The transfer of OGMA constituted an important civilian victory for the sheer size 
and importance of the enterprise, but the wider defense industry reform was far from 
complete. Though Silva and civilians in government had been able to begin to advance 
the first part of a defense industry reform agenda despite military opposition, the military 
had been able to prevent more radical changes legislatively despite Silva’s best effort to 
mobilize the parliamentary consent needed to prevail. As a result, more than half of the 
firms in military hands at the start of the post-1982 period remained there, including MM, 
LMPQF, OGFE, OGME, FNC, and Arsenal do Alfeite. That fortified the military’s 
vested interest in much of the sector while incompletely incorporating the civilian interest 
and viewpoint. Not only that, but the occupation of the sector by opposing forces resulted 
in a loss of complementarities between enterprises. Consider the example of the OGME-
INDEP “silent war” of the mid-1990s, in which the military OGME tried to take a market 
away from the civilian INDEP. 
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When the civilian defense minister defined the development of optoelectronic 
production capability as vital to the ongoing restructuring of INDEP, the Army General 
Staff ordered OGME management to contact suppliers in the sector and acquire the 
equipment and know-how to start producing and repairing optoelectronic systems ahead 
of INDEP. Meanwhile, OGME Director Lieutenant Colonel Esteves repeatedly refused to 
make himself available to explain the objectives of his unit, instead instructing 
subordinates to say he was not in the office. Civilian officials cried foul at the 
“inexplicable maneuver by the Army, since, by logic, they should be one of our principle 
clients,” but the Army held fast, saying that it had an immediate need and INDEP was not 
yet working in the sector. One civilian official conceded that the problem was inevitable 
because the capabilities of INDEP and OGME had not been reconciled, and that the 
situation was made worse by the lack of communication between Army and civilian: 
“The situation only exists because there is no dialogue—no one knows what the Army 
needs or if INDEP can meet those needs—and because in Portugal, everyone wants to 
have his own chapel.”79 
Besides its contingency and the resultant reduction of complementarities between 
firms implied by its use, the civilians’ institution-centered approach to the politics of 
defense industry reform carried another disadvantage. Namely, the institutions for reform 
the civilians built could only be used if a reform-minded president and prime minister 
were in power, which was not always the case. The governments of Socialist Prime 
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Minister António Guterres (1995–2002) did not challenge the status quo in OGFE, 
OGME, LMPQF, FNC, and Arsenal do Alfeite. Instead, the first one created a new 
defense ministry holding company to absorb INDEP and OGMA and set up new defense 
firms—EMPORDEF. Ruling coalitions proceeded to use their control of EMPORDEF to 
make numerous patronage appointments, packing boards of directors with cronies and 
followers. Examining data from 1995–2003, Barros found that in each EMPORDEF 
company on average only one and a half members of the traditional composition of five 
directors was not an ex-serving general or board member whose placement was based on 
political affiliations and connections.80 All of this cronyism took a toll. Between 1995–
2000, the same firms registered no growth in total factor productivity, and improvements 
in technical efficiency were offset by deterioration in technological change and 
maintenance of scale efficiency.81 The governments of Social Democratic Prime 
Ministers José Manuel Barroso (2002–4) and Pedro Santana Lopes (2004–5) also left the 
defense sector alone. 
 
Arsenal do Alfeite Corporatization Program 
The drive to gain control of new patronage resources showed signs of shaping 
elite behavior and strategy again in early 2007 when the government of Socialist Prime 
Minister José Sócrates (2005–11) began vetting options for reforming shipyard Arsenal 
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do Alfeite. The gradual nature of the reform process created more opportunities for 
interest groups to seek advantages along the way than would have been the case if Silva 
had succeeded in his parliamentary quest to radically reorganize the sector. But curiously, 
the military-left alliance became pregnant with its own unintended consequences for the 
military. Namely, it afforded the leftist parties some influence over the military at the 
same time that it afforded the military some influence over the parties. It did not hurt that 
former Prime Minister Cavaco Silva (PSD) was elected President of Portugal in the 2006 
election either. Now, in 2007, the Socialists planned to use their pull to try to bring 
Arsenal do Alfeite under their gaze, with the expectation of political gain. Indeed, they 
had already enlisted Defense Minister Nuno Severiano Teixeira and DGA to form a 
committee and study the “entrepreneurialisation of Arsenal do Alfeite.”82  
The Navy was frightened by the clear governmental interest in confiscating a firm 
boasting a proud “80 years at the service of the sea economy.” Also taking exception 
were the firm’s 1,200 workers and their leaders in the Alfeite workers’ commission. 
Fernando Rosas and other union leaders criticized the government for not including 
workers in the working group assembled to discuss the future of the Navy yards. But the 
employed became yet more agitated after Defense Minister Teixeira ignored the demands 
of the union for information on the restructuring of the yard. So, in April 2007, 600 
workers gathered at the door of the defense ministry, demanding to be received by 
Defense Minister Teixeira and told what the government had planned for the shipyard. 
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Rogério Gomes, a unionist, said that the workers were worried about redundancies and 
that the shipyard’s fate would be like that of OGMA, where “in addition to workers, 
those who stayed are in much more precarious conditions than they were before,”—a 
clear reference to the perilous fate of the armed forces in a new civilian order.83 
 Yet the civilians in government were in a much stronger position to advance than 
the military and labor were to defend. The defense ministry had more than the necessary 
means at its disposal to craft its policy of choice without depending upon the military, so 
long as it avoided partial privatization or some other strategy that would require military 
cooperation. In the years since its creation and empowerment in the late 1980s, the now-
named Directorate General of Armament and Defense Industry had developed a much 
larger, more skilled, and more permanent core civilian staff. As the center of gravity and 
expertise tilted in the civilian direction in the 1990s and 2000s, the military lost ground. 
Now, in 2007, the military did not occupy the requisite positions within key domains of 
the state apparatus to shape policy, and labor was even more removed from the locus of 
power, as demonstrated by the defense ministry’s autonomy from the workers’ bodies. 
Consequently, with the balance of authority in civilian hands, it was again more likely 
that those civilian authorities would prevail in the unfolding struggle. 
 The civilians’ institutional strength exhibited itself in the ensuing 18 months of 
planning and executive action. Union bosses argued to captive government ears that the 
shipyard’s military management tried to address its needs by hiring more workers, only to 
be thwarted by the civilian powers that be. Labor was relatively powerless to influence 
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the process, which was unfolding several layers deep within a defense ministry the 
boundaries of which were less permeable and less likely to be breached by outside actors. 
Indeed, labor’s reaction to the development of the policy was itself shaped by its near 
total exclusion from the process. And so, by November 2008, the DGA had developed a 
plan to reform Arsenal do Alfeite that yielded no ground at all to the military or to labor. 
The idea was to replicate the OGMA reform by creating a joint-stock firm of the same 
name with exclusively public capital, integrated in civilian-run holding EMPORDEF, to 
absorb the military’s shares in the shipyard. The layoff of 200–400 workers as part of 
restructuring was anticipated.84 
Naturally, the workers were outraged. Union leaders accused the government of 
wanting to privatize the shipyard, then mobilized the ranks by again concentrating at the 
door of the defense ministry on December 12, 2007.85 But neither the government nor 
defense ministry civilians flinched, and the Council of Ministers proceeded to adopt and 
ordain the reform policy with a decree stamping the executive body’s approval.86 From 
there, all that was left was the execution of the administrative changes, which was all the 
more likely with longtime politically unattached reformist Cavaco Silva in possession of 
executive power. Once again, neither military nor labor could intercede, and the erstwhile 
Navy stronghold was extracted and successfully passed to civilian handlers. 
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Defense Industry Privatization Plan 
The military got another opportunity to demonstrate its coalition-making capacity 
beginning in 2009 when the Socialist minority government of Prime Minister José 
Sócrates unveiled a program featuring a new plan to privatize the defense industry. Gone 
were the days of plenty. Instead, the political class was preoccupied with staving off a 
growing crisis that threatened all of their skins as Portugal came face to face with a 
deteriorating economic and financial condition complete with a skyrocketing deficit and 
growing external debt. Many already wondered why enterprises like OGFE, OGME, and 
LMPQF remained in the public sector and authorized to produce defense material, much 
less in military hands.87 Consequently, all eyes turned to these military firms and the 
state’s holdings in EMPORDEF when the government vowed to sell off state industries 
in a bid to collect the balance of payments deficit and correct the public sector accounts 
deficit. Sensing an opening and eager to generate needed savings, Sócrates put the 
privatization of the industry once and for all on the government agenda. 
The military was neither amused nor swayed by the implications of the near 
financial crisis in which Portugal found itself. Some military leaders insisted instead that 
privatization “does not mean 100 percent private” and that Portugal should eschew the 
proposed course, not least because “when privatization is complete, the state has created 
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mechanisms that continue to secure their strategic interests and impose their will on 
companies, like what happens in the USA.”88 The parties in parliament, meanwhile, had 
their own objections. Carlos Barros argues that parties were, in general, interested in 
maintaining public defense enterprises as a way to provide protected and privileged 
senior positions to their allies and supporters. State control was as an important actual 
and potential patronage resource because the defense sector was more amenable to 
distribution as patronage than other sectors as a result of its acute limits to information 
and transparency. Consequently, parliament agreed with the military, and the proposed 
constitutional amendment to open up and privatize the defense sector did not survive.89 
 
Conclusion 
The evidence presented in this chapter refutes the notion that the impact of power 
relations diminishes at higher levels of external obligations. Political life may not have 
been identically organized in each of the five cases, but key relations of power 
nevertheless played a critical role in each of them. By altering power relations between 
civilian and military, coalition and institution formation created a mix of constraints on 
and capacities available to both sides. Civilians could not freely pass radical legislative 
reform initiatives or confiscate individual enterprises bureaucratically, just as the military 
could not block reform at will. Instead, actors could only prevail by outperforming their 
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rival in competitive coalition or institution-building struggles, thus affording themselves 
the power to exert their influence (and suppress that of their rival) within parliament, key 
governmental agencies, or both. 
In Turkey, the military’s coalition did not encompass as many actors as it 
typically did in Chile, and Turkey’s institutions were also more developed than those of 
its Chilean counterpart. Yet the similarities between the cases loomed larger than the 
distinctions. The Turkish military coalition, like the Chilean variant, consisted of 
mutually-interested political and legislative players with sufficient power to prevent 
democratic actors from moving forward with a legislative reform agenda. It is notable, 
moreover, that like Turkey, in Chile between 2016–2018, the military’s coalition rested 
on a military-executive alliance. And the institutions in both Turkey and Chile were 
either agencies with a sizeable military component or insufficient authority relative to 
existing military institutions to shape the structure of the defense industry. These political 
arrangements posed numerous obstacles for civilian actors trying to advance their defense 
industry reform agenda on either legislative or administrative fronts. 
The Portuguese case demonstrates that even the highest levels of external 
obligations may not motivate politicians to support defense industry reform. In Portugal, 
as in Argentina (1983–1989), leaders created and developed civilian defense industry 
agencies that became vital sources of institutional strength when those leaders went 
beyond the parliament and pursued the first part of their reform agenda bureaucratically. 
The military discovered how hard it was to stop a chief executive armed with a civilian 
agency situated in the chain of command, staffed by civilians, and vested with a 
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monopoly of authority, information, and expertise in defense industry policy and 
development. Planning, stability in personnel (particularly in Portugal), and decisive 
presidential leadership translated into a surplus of competence, continuity, and resolution. 
This drove the bureaucracy to use the authority and tools vested in it, while military 
actors trying to defend their enterprises administratively were powerless to stop it. 
Nevertheless, when those same civilians sought to advance the rest of their reform 
agenda legislatively, the military found party allies willing to collaborate with it against 
the intruders. Both Portuguese parties and Argentine parties between 1983–1989 decided 
that the benefit of radically civilianizing the defense sector was outweighed by the cost of 
tampering with firms that served as patronage resources and were strongholds of able 
constituencies. Even in Portugal, where leaders were given extensive duties regarding 
establishing democratic oversight of the military when the country joined the European 
Union in 1986, the benefit of bypassing external scrutiny and enforcement was 
insufficient to drive parties to support reform. The Portuguese military was a beneficiary, 
argues Carlos Barros, of “an undeclared equilibrium between right-wing parties 
interested in maintaining public [defense] enterprises as a way to provide senior positions 
to their cronies, and left-wing parties keen to maintain public ownership because of 
historic, anachronistic ideological principles.”90 This is why it is important to treat actors 
as causal agents in their own right and not as mere conduits for external forces. 
If one is counting wins and losses, civilians in the five cases under study did not 
gain any clear advantage over the military in the fight for the defense industry. Only in 
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Argentina (1989–1997) did democratic leaders turn the entirety of defense firms into their 
fetters. It is therefore tempting to think of this comparative analysis as painting a less than 
satisfying picture of democratic ownership and management of the defense industry. 
Have civilians not failed to advance the goal of civilian control, abdicating their 
responsibility, if they cannot seize control of the defense industry lock, stock, and barrel? 
Readers would be remiss to conclude as much. The record is indeed mixed when viewed 
from a substantive perspective, but it looks very different through a procedural lens. 
From this angle, we see not just ritual military obedience to democratic norms and 
institutions, but also democratic institutions working effectively to channel and represent 
the interests of the military as but one actor among numerous actors in the new 
democratic setting. Viewed in this way, military victories in the fight for the defense 
industry occurred not in spite of the consolidation of competitive rule, but because of it. 
That ought to encourage us all. 
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Conclusion 
 
External obligations and forces cannot automatically translate preferences into 
policy; their proponents must construct dominant political arrangements first. Evidence 
from the Chilean, Argentine, Turkish, and Portuguese cases show that the defense 
industry policy victories and defeats of civilians and the military were less a product of 
duties to an external entity or state regarding democratic governance of the military and 
defense sector and more that of relations of power between those actors that would-be 
reformers must navigate in order to advance their proposals through the key authoritative 
institutions of the democratic polity. Where the military’s allies control the legislature, 
executive, or defense portfolio, the military can repel legislative initiatives, while the 
civilian can more easily fight off military opposition to reform where their friends control 
these theatres. On the other hand, the military can repel administration programs where it 
either preserved the bureaucratic institutions already under its control or penetrated 
newly-created ones, while the civilian can more effectively suppress military opposition 
to their programs where the civilian executive strengthened the institutions under their 
control. 
Building coalitional or institutional power is only half the battle. Actors must 
create political arrangements able to dominate both legislature and bureaucracy if they 
wish to make the totality of decisions that affect their overall defense industry agenda. 
This was on vivid display in Argentina (1989–1997), Chile, and Turkey. In Argentina 
(1989–1989), President Carlos Menem successfully created decisive coalitional and 
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institutional advantages for himself. Menem encouraged a division within the military’s 
labor ally while using bargains, tradeoffs, and transfers to stitch together a coalition 
consisting of the Peronist Party and small rightist and provincial parties. All the while, he 
transferred the economy ministry structure and team to the defense ministry and charged 
it with reforming the defense sector. And so, it was not just that Menem could leverage 
the strength to approve his sweeping defense industry privatization bills; when Menem 
delegated the crafting of the reform policies for individual military firms to the civilian 
institutions, the military was powerless to stop the bureaucracy’s ensuing advances, and 
the industry was turned over to civilians. 
But the military proved itself every bit as politically capable as the civilians. 
When Chilean presidents sought to use legislative and executive power to reform the 
military’s defense industry, the military responded by cultivating an alliance with the 
party-backed defense industry labor unions, whose party allies had the power to prevent 
the supermajorities required to change key constitutional defense industry laws. At the 
same time, the military successfully lobbied to limit the powers of the civilian defense 
industry agency created in 2010. Thus, civilians had no recourse when Congress and the 
administrative state repeatedly defended the military and its industry. And in Turkey, the 
military responded to the same kinds of pressures not just by eliciting the cooperation of 
the prime minister but by continually penetrating newly-created governmental defense 
industry agencies. The Turkish military could therefore defend its industry root and 
branch against reform efforts even as it lost ground in similar policy areas, including 
procurement and budgetary transparency. 
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If actors fail to create political arrangements capable of dominating both 
bureaucracy and legislature, they risk surrendering control of decisions that affect their 
overall defense industry agenda. We witnessed as much in Argentina (1983–1989) and 
Portugal. In Argentina (1983–1989), President Raúl Alfonsín shifted the bureaucratic 
institutions for reform when he empowered the defense ministry and demoted the military 
commanders, created a new civilian secretariat in charge of the defense industry and 
vested it with appointment power, and subordinated the firms to the agency. The military 
then suffered those institutions’ replacement of military firm presidents and boards with 
civilian heirs. Yet the military gained an edge in Congress by aligning itself with the anti-
reform unions, which had sway with the Peronist Party running the Senate and sympathy 
from the Radical Party in the Chamber of Deputies. The tables then turned, as civilian 
suffered the military coalition’s defeat of repeated legislative initiatives to divest the 
military of the very same firms. In Portugal, civilians found ways of cultivating 
institutional capacity to reform individual enterprises. But the military overcame the 
odds—made unfavorable by growing external pressure for reform after Portugal’s 
accession to the EU in 1986—to align itself with key parties in parliament, which 
proceeded to prevent democratic leaders from advancing the more sweeping legislative 
changes needed to complete the defense industry overhaul. 
At the same time, however, the presence of multiple battlegrounds benefitted the 
loser of the first competitive struggle more because that actor was always assured an 
opportunity to even the score and stop its rival from amassing yet more power in the 
second. But partial reform, a result of the mixed power relations that developed in cases 
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where the first-round loser successfully rehabilitated itself in the second round, carried 
unintended consequences because it easily led to a loss of institutional complementarities 
between new civilian and old military firms (or even between new civilian managers and 
old military owners inside the same firms). The collisions triggered redundancies and 
duplication of effort, communication failures between civilians and military (Portugal 
and Argentina, 1983–1989), and even hostile behavior by the military such as military 
firms poaching markets sought after by civilian firms (Portugal). All of this makes (and 
made) partial reforms more vulnerable to reversal because the resultant discontinuities 
can cause net losses.1 The unflattering signals sent by early reform may make it harder to 
move to full reform in the future. Finally, partial reform may create a new class of 
stakeholders who benefit from the partially reformed status quo and face an incentive to 
use their newfound power to resist the completion of the transition.2 
But even if partial reform can be perilous to the civilian’s overall defense industry 
reform agenda and helpful to a military seeking to claw back lost ground or safely 
prevent the loss of more, there is no doubt that the military’s new, non-coercive ways of 
widening its legislative support and building its administrative decision-making capacity 
are a welcome and perhaps unexpected change. Readers will recall how, in 1994, Phillipe 
Schmitter juxtaposed the military’s politics with those of newly-enfranchised and 
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represented civilian constituencies.3 The military was portrayed as a pre-democratic actor 
whose interests are laid to waste by emerging societal interest groups issuing more 
competitive claims to scarce resources. Ironically, however, this study suggests that the 
military itself is increasingly one of the newly-enfranchised and represented groups that 
Schmitter observed repopulating the political ecosystem in the early days of restored 
civilian rule in Third Wave democracies. 
The military’s insertion of itself into the democratic order took an array of forms 
in the four countries and five cases under study. Nowhere did the military lobby parties or 
politicians directly, even in countries where such interactions were par for the course 
during authoritarian rule. Instead, the military used timing, positioning, and signals to 
position itself while relying on civilian or non-active duty allies—usually trade unions, 
suppliers, other actors directly dependent on military firms, or retired military 
personnel—to broadcast the benefits of the military order and rouse and leverage the 
opposition of actors whose economic interests dovetailed with the military’s. Sometimes 
the military kept other actors at arms’ length, articulating a clear and well-defined 
preference within appropriate channels and pinning its hopes on others taking positions 
which converged with its own. Other times it kept parties at a distance but galvanized 
non-governmental, societal actors—including defense industry labor unions and private 
military partners—who themselves opposed reform but, critically, enjoyed links to 
parties. But regardless of how the military chose to act, the fact remained that it did so 
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non-coercively, fairly, and without breaching the limits of civilian control. It behaved, in 
a word, democratically. 
This is not a simple matter of military compliance with democratic norms and 
procedures, however critical is that rudimentary obedience.4 Rather, it is one of the 
military’s active participation in democratic life. Far from an authoritarian, reactionary 
force, the military in our world is a thinking actor who recognizes that times have 
changed. The military may have resisted democratization, but the installation of a 
democratic regime reconfigured the political environment and incentives facing all of its 
inhabitants, military included. Now only those who prevail under the formal democratic 
rules of the game gain the right to legitimately make decisions that affect everyone, while 
the losers have to accept the victors’ decisions, however much disdain it has for them. It 
does not have to participate in its ouster, but the military cannot take its capital and walk 
away, and certainly cannot take it and leave the country. The rational decision becomes 
not just to accept democracy, but to learn to prevail within its confines. 
This is no small decision on the military’s part. Once again, let us pause to 
emphasize the evolution, and do so by examining the Chilean case. In Chile, generals and 
admirals developed a rigid and uncompromising view of military economic institutions as 
unassailable, permanent military artifacts that were above politics, history, relationships 
to the international community, and just about everything else. The military demanded 
continuity in order to prevent the apparent politicization of the military establishment, as 
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when the ruling president and commander in chief of the Army, General Augusto 
Pinochet, torpedoed the defense-sector reforms planned by the Chicago Boys as part of 
their Carmona Project on national security grounds in 1986.5 Yet, in later decades, that 
same military shifted gears and pinned its hopes on the good graces of the defense 
industry labor unions and their leftist party allies. Why would the military trade in 
coercion for cooperation at the cost of control? Democracy changed coercion’s relative 
costs and benefits, making it inviable as an alternative, while elevating cooperation as the 
most effective method for translating interests into policy. Even for the military, 
democracy became the only game in town. 
 
The Benefits of Democratic Military Politics 
Still, the benefits of the military’s democratic turn may not be obvious. Do a 
legislative coalition and bureaucratic institutions at its disposal not empower the military 
to protect and perhaps even enlarge its economic arrangements? It is true that under this 
model there exist clear paths to not only the establishment of civilian control but also the 
continuation of military control of the defense industry and any number of other 
economic or political institutions. And military coalitions and institutions could very well 
choose to accelerate the military’s acquisition of market share, as they did in Turkey. But 
the same could be said of any other model of political life or civil-military relations 
because a model makes no guarantee about the substantive outcomes produced by actors 
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themselves. And as far as models of behavior or relations go, democratic military politics 
is advantageous for both military and civilian. Let us consider three of its benefits before 
focusing on its wider implications for civilian control and economic development. 
First, democratic military politics helps ensure military compliance with 
democratic norms and procedures, even when valued influence and prerogatives are 
under threat. In a pre-democratic era, the military may—before turning to threats or 
intimidation—attempt to invoke or exercise veto power over decisions that it finds to be 
an affront to its institutional interests or integrity. Civilians may not so much as broach 
the issue of objectionable reform for fear of eliciting the military’s wrath. Yet the game 
begins to change as competitive rule solidifies. Confined to the same democratic 
institutions as their civilian rivals, and having accepted those trappings, the military 
cannot walk away or reject the outcome should civilians succeed in advancing reforms. It 
may return for another round should such an opportunity present itself, but it cannot veto 
the decision already democratically made. Rather, it must accept the outcome.6 
Second, democratic military politics may deepen the military’s acceptance of 
democracy and the democratic regime itself. Under this model, the military chooses 
others to represent it and compete legislatively on its behalf. Those representatives and 
partisan and institutional allies ensure, in turn, that the interests of the military are 
considered. Even if the military is weaker than the civilians and likely to lose the policy 
battle, the military’s preferences are still debated on the legislative floor and in the 
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corridors of executive power. The military still gains a seat at the table through political 
stewards, and may be in a better position to influence the outcome regardless of its 
weakness than if it attempted to shape policy coercively via extraconstitutional channels. 
Because it can persuade the military that it is being treated fairly, this representation may 
make the military more likely to promote democracy and accept the other policies created 
by democratic governments, including those that affect other military interests.7 
Third, democratic military politics helps to reduce limits to information and 
transparency during the creation of military policy. In a pre-democratic era, military and 
defense industry policy are often decided on their own terms, behind closed doors, 
between the military and particular executive branch leaders. Input from other societal 
groups is less likely to enter the picture, and little conscious effort is made to insert 
military policy in the government’s wider program. But the solidification of democratic 
rule drives representatives to do just the opposite—that is, to aggregate the differing 
demands of the military and civilian groups into a more coherent and politically logical 
program. Now, the military is just one more social group, whose interests may be 
efficiently and expediently linked with other issues, as in the examples of the inclusion of 
military industry reforms in consecutive legislative corporate governance reform 
initiatives in Chile. The cumulative effect of this enfranchisement of military policy is the 
full incorporation of the military itself into the democratic ecosystem. The military is 
enfranchised. 
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Democratic Politics and Civilian Control 
The importance of the military’s politics for civilian control should be more 
obvious. If the military has accepted the formal democratic rules of the game and entered 
its field of play, then it may more readily accept its subordination to civilian authorities. 
Readers may question if democratic politics is possible in the first place if the military 
has not accepted as much. Yet as we have seen, such politics is an acceptance of the rule 
of formal democratic institutions, not necessarily an embrace of the many informal as 
well as formal dimensions of its subordinate status within the context of its relationship to 
the civilian executive. And the importance of democratic politics in this regard is that it 
provides the military with an opportunity to accept its subordination without forfeiting 
the opportunity to potentially veto policies that affect its interests and influence. In other 
words, democratic politics provides the military with a way to challenge the limits of 
civilian power without challenging civilian control. 
To illustrate the point, let us take the case of Chile, which is one of our more 
extreme examples as far as military strength is concerned. In Chile, like every other case 
but Argentina (1989–1997), the military could fight off efforts to reform certain 
arrangements—including those the effects of which directly undermined civilian 
control—while simultaneously accepting its subordinate status. At no time did it flout the 
conventions of civilian authority, as it did not lobby parties directly but aligned itself with 
unions whose party allies had the requisite strength to veto reform initiatives. All told, 
while the military behaved democratically, parties and interest groups did too, by 
aggregating, channeling, and representing the interests of social and political actors and 
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subjecting them to a rigorous collective debate. Thus, reform failed because of the effects 
of the solidification of competitive rule, not in spite of them. 
This does, however, raise the thorny question of whether civilian control can exist 
when institutions that may threaten it continue, even if the military itself behaves 
democratically. This is an important question but one to which there would seem to be no 
easy answer. Nevertheless, the military’s acceptance of democratic institutions and active 
insertion of itself into them are clear victories considering that the military was formerly 
prone to extraconstitutional outbursts. Moreover, we may be holding the military to an 
unfair standard as well as splitting hairs in raising such an objection. Other actors have 
interests that can undermine democracy too, and some such interests were developed in 
collaboration with the military during the authoritarian period, as in the examples of the 
assisted sector in Argentina, business in Chile and Turkey, and labor unions in every 
case. And so, while scrutinizing continued military power and wealth is critical, so too is 
remembering our starting point and appreciating the military’s evolution into but one 
more actor in the democratic society. 
 
Economic Development and Democratic Politics 
Because democratic politics is marked by institutions that effectively restrain 
powerful elites and arbitrary expressions of power, it is bound to create new opportunities 
to stimulate development. Economies develop when they form financial, human, and 
social capital goods that can be utilized to produce goods and services more efficiently 
and effectively than otherwise. Economic actors seek to use the resources at their disposal 
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to turn less into more, faster. When a whole group of economic actors can use its capital 
goods to turn resources into valued goods and services faster and more efficiently, the 
economy grows; the improvement in labor productivity and resultant surplus of goods 
and services makes it easier to achieve and sustain a certain standard of living. And yet 
the formation of capital is far from given. It requires time and, above all, continual 
savings and investment to develop and build larger and larger magnitudes of financial, 
human, and social wealth. 
The civilian-led reform of the military’s defense industries arrived at through 
coalition and institution building can contribute to this process of economic and human 
development by jumpstarting new processes of civilian capital formation. As they are 
shifted from military to civilian owners and managers, defense firms’ previous tax, tariff, 
market, political, resource rent, and other advantages tend to dissipate, as do the firms’ 
power to veto private projects through direct action, indirect promotion, and veto 
guidance and to favor some civilian concerns by investing in them and squeeze out others 
by competing with them. This retreat of the military and its protections creates space for 
potentially more dynamic, innovative, and efficient civilian economic actors to enter and 
multiply. As the institutional environment evolves into one that is decidedly more 
competitive and inclusive, civilian institutions begin to thrive. The civilian economy and 
its institutions emerge more readily and grow more quickly than they did before the rise 
of the freer and fairer climate, their capital goods growing larger and more effective, 
producing more optimal outcomes and growing the fortunes of the entire society. 
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Consider the Argentine (1989–1997) experience. The actors who made history 
there crafted the most radical defense industry reform the world had ever seen. And the 
sweeping transition created a universe of new possibilities equally large in scope. As we 
saw, privatized military firms—particularly in steel and petrochemicals, the latter of 
which was one sector in which Argentina had a comparative advantage—provided better 
and better goods and services, logging improvements in production efficiency, financial 
profitability, and services delivered. 8 Not only that, but Argentina entered a period of 
economic prosperity after the enormous transfer of wealth and control. For a country 
where the notion of development was once so linked with the military that the treasury’s 
budgetary transfers to cover the military industry’s seismic losses were euphemistically 
grouped under the budgetary item, “Development of the Economy,” the case shows that 
defense industry reform itself may be one method for developing the economy. 
Of course, democracy itself is not the end of history, and it is actually in retreat 
the world over as I write this in August 2019.9 What we can conclude for now at least in 
Argentina, Chile, Turkey, and Portugal—and perhaps throughout the still-democratic 
post-authoritarian world—is that soldiers have not only accepted but entered democratic 
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institutions. Moreover, power relations between civilian and military can be changed, but 
it takes time, savings, investment, and politics. Thus, at any given moment, the prevailing 
balances of coalitional and institutional strength enable one actor and constrain the other. 
Those power relations determine the political currencies at the actors’ disposal. They 
shape how political resources are mobilized and exercised and the timing of each player’s 
moves. They define the logic of acceptance and resistance specific to each actor. The 
military never in fact forswore politics,10 but state and market may be better off now that 
it has taken the democratic playing field. 
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